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Abstract 
This account explores the sociological and political legitimacy of minority group rights within 
modern nation-states, particularly with regard to language and education. While sociological in 
focus, it draws in addition upon political theory, sociolinguistics, education, history and law in 
order to explore fully the issues which pertain to such rights, their mobilisation, and the potential 
consequences for the present and future organisation of nation-states. 
In so doing, debates on ethnicity, its social construction, and its validity as a form of social 
identification and political mobilisation are highlighted. Parallel discussions on nationalism and 
national identity are also explored. In both instances, the position adopted is that ethnic and 
national identities are to some extent constructed phenomena but that they are also material forms 
of life which, for many, continue to constitute significant forms of individual and collective 
identity. Liberal-communitarian debates in political theory are also explored with regard to the 
exclusion of cultural membership from the theory and practice of liberal-democracies, leading to 
the cultural and linguistic disenfranchisement of minorities within modern nation-states. The links 
between language and identity, and the role of mass education in reinforcing a common language 
and culture, are given particular attention here, both with regard to the historical construction of 
modern nation-states and their contemporary political consequences for minority groups. 
Various case examples are discussed throughout, including Ireland, France, the USA, and Quebec. 
However, the case of Wales is explored at length, particularly with regard to its historic and 
contemporary nationalisms, its ongoing debates around language and national identity, and its 
recent development of a nascent Welsh/English bilingual state framework. As part of this 
extended case study, new empirical research is conducted on language attitudes to Welsh, and to 
bilingualism. The data highlight that while the development of state bilingual policy in Wales has 
considerable support at a general level, specific aspects of such policy, and the minority rights 
which attach to them, remain more contested. This is particularly so when bilingual policy 
developments are seen to impinge on the notion of individual rights. Nonetheless, Wales can be 
said to provide an instructive model of how nation-states may be reorganised, or reimagined, to 
accommodate a greater recognition of minority language and education rights. This process 
involves imbuing political democracy, as currently constructed, with a greater recognition and 
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We are the lost people. 
Tracing us by our language 
you will not arrive where we are 
which is nowhere. The wind 
blows through our castles; the chair 
of poetry is without a tenant. 
We are exiles within 
our own country; we eat our bread 
at a pre-empted table. `Show us', 
we supplicate, `the way home', 
and they laughing hiss at us: 
`But you are home. Come in 
and endure it. ' Will nobody 
explain what it is like 
to be born lost? We have our signposts 
but they are in another tongue. 
If we follow our conscience 
it leads us nowhere but to gaol. 
The ground moves under our feet; 
our one attitude is vertigo. 
`And a little child' the Book tells us 
`shall lead them. ' But this one 
has a linguistic club 
in his hand with which, old as we are, 
lie trounces and bludgeons us senseless. 
(R. S. Thomas, 1995: 14) 
X 
INTRODUCTION 
To be truly modem we are told, one must belong to a nation, better still to a nation-state. 
(C. Williams, 1994: 1) 
We live today, as we have now for some centuries, in the era of the nation-state. The nation-state 
remains the bedrock of the political world order, exercising internal political and legal jurisdiction 
over its citizens, and claiming external rights to sovereignty and self-government in the present 
inter-state system. But the nation-state is also under increasing pressure -- both from above and 
below. From above, the inexorable rise of globalisation, along with the burgeoning influence of 
multi-national companies and supra-national political organisations, have required modern nation- 
states to re-evaluate the limits of their own political and economic sovereignty. From below, 
minority groups are increasingly exerting the right either to form their own nation-states -- as seen 
in various secessionist and irredentist movements around the world -- or for greater representation 
within existing nation-state structures. It is this last development, and its implications for the 
social, cultural and political organisation of nation-states, which are the principal focus of this 
account. 
There are obvious advantages to the nation-state which help to explain its ongoing ascendancy. 
It liberates individuals from the tyranny of narrow communities, guarantees their personal 
autonomy, equality, and common citizenship, and provides the basis for a collectively shared way 
of life (Parekh, 1995a). Or at least it does so in theory. As such, it is often viewed as the apogee 
of modernity and progress - representing in clear political terms the triumph of universalism over 
particularism. 
But the nation-state also excludes as much as it includes -- most notably, via its central 
requirement that all its citizens adopt a common language and culture for use in the civic realm. 
The imposition of a uniform national language and culture, and the ideology underlying it, may 
be described as the `philosophical matrix of the nation-state' (see Chapters 2& 3). Ilowever, 
minorities are increasingly beginning to question and contest the principles and effects of this 
matrix, the latter as a result of the long historical proscription of minority languages and cultures 
that has usually attended it. In the process, the public discourse on national identity, its 
parameters, and its constituent elements, are opened up for debate. In short, the nation-state is 
being asked, even forced, to reimagine itself along more plural and inclusive lines. 
As I will argue, nation-states must attend to these debates, and the questions and consequences 
that ensue from them, if they are to continue as the major basis of social and political organisation 
in the next century. They must do so for two reasons. If minority demands for greater 
representation and inclusion within the nation-state are not met they may lead, in turn, to 
secessionist pressures and the potential fragmentation of the nation-state. Given the likely 
consequences of such fragmentation, and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries which 
normally ensues, we should avoid this wherever we can. The spectres of the former Yugoslavia 
and Rwanda are sufficient reasons alone for doing so. However, there is also a positive dimension 
to this. If nation-states are reimagined in more plural and inclusive ways, there is greater potential 
for the recognition of not only political democracy but etlinocultural and ethnolinbniistic 
democracy as well. Thus, far from undermining democratic principles -- a common assumption 
among liberal commentators, as we will see -- the accommodation of minority rights may well 
extend them. 
Before proceeding further, a few caveats are in order. It should be stated from the outset that I 
am committed both to the extension of minority rights and, concomitantly, to a greater 
recognition of cultural and linguistic plurality within modern nation-states. On this basis, some 
critics might suggest that my argument is a `moralistic' one rather than a form of `disinterested' 
academic enquiry (see, for example, Edwards, 1985: 144). I do not accept this critique nor the 
distinction on which it is based. All positions that are taken on ethnicity and nationalism -- 
academic or otherwise -- involve a moral dimension, reflecting the particular values and ideologies 
of their exponents. Ideology is not the sole preserve of nationalists or minority `ethnic 
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spokespersons', although it is often painted as such. Seen in this light, the equation of academic 
disinterestedness with scepticism towards, and/or criticism of ethnicity and nationalism may be 
seen for what it is -- an ideological move in the politics of ethnicity, nothing more. Indeed, as I 
will argue, such a move often acts to reinforce the hegemony of dominant ethnic groups within 
nation-states. 
Second, and more broadly, this position is consonant with debates in critical theory on the 
situatediwess of any academic inquiry. As I have argued elsewhere (May, 1994,1998a), all 
research is value-laden and, as such, a researcher must begin from a theoretical position of some 
description, whether this is articulated or not in the ensuing study. Accordingly, it is better to 
state one's position at the start than to cloak it in the guise of apparent neutrality. Not only that, 
critical social research, of which the following forms a part, is not content with the interpretive 
concern of `describing' a social setting `as it really is', since this assumes an objective, `common 
sense' reality where none exists. Rather, this `reality' should be viewed as a social and cultural 
constructions, linked to wider power relations, which privileges some, and disadvantages other 
participants. The discourses of ethnicity, nationalism and minority rights are prime sites where 
such power relations are articulated and outworked. 
On a more technical note, since much of what follows is also concerned with the particular roles 
and functions of minority languages within modem nation-states, and the questions of their status, 
use and value, I have deliberately chosen not to follow the usual publishing procedure of italicising 
non-English words and phrases. This is not to imply their Subsumption within English. Rather, 
it aims to act as a visual metaphor for a central tenet of my account -- that the normalisation of 
minority languages within the public domain is a legitimate and defensible sociological and 
political activity. 
Overview 
I begin in Chapter 1 by highlighting the pejorative perception of ethnicity -- and, by extension, 
minority ethnic groups -- apparent in much academic and political discourse. This is primarily a 
result, I suggest, of the unfavourable juxtaposition of ethnicity with the nation-state -- the one 
associated with primitivism and particularism, the other associated with modernity and 
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universalism. From this, I proceed to explore in detail the various academic debates on ethnicity 
and, in particular, the broad polarisation between `primordial' and `situational' perspectives which 
marks the field. The former ascribes to ethnicity an enduring, intrinsic character that is associated 
with, and determined by particular objective cultural characteristics -- the `cultural stuff' of 
ethnicity such as language, ancestry and history. The latter rejects this position as essentialist and 
argues instead for the social and political constructedness of ethnicity, its fluidity and malleability, 
and its instrumental mobilisation to particular political ends. 
It is clear from these debates that a situational account of ethnicity has, and is seen to have far 
greater veracity than primordialism -- a conclusion with which I broadly concur. However, my 
own position is that the primordial/situational dichotomy is in the end unhelpful and unnecessary 
and that one can, and should, combine elements of the two. Thus, ethnicity needs to be viewed 
as both constructed and contingent, and as a social, political and cultural form of life -- a 
Durkheimian social fact, in effect. Adopting this position allows for a more adequate exploration 
of the constitutive elements of ethnicity, the varied forms of its political expression and 
mobilisation, and their complex interconnections. To this end, I employ Bourdieu's (1977,1990a, 
1990b, 1991) notion of `habitus' and Anthony Smith's (1981,1986,1991,1995) concept of 
`ethnie' as a useful means by which to theorise this position. 
I take much the same stance in Chapter 2 which examines parallel debates on nationalism and the 
construction (and constructedness) of nation-states. Here, I am inclined to broadly agree with 
modernist accounts of nationalism which point to the formation of nation-states as a specific 
product of eighteenth and nineteenth century nationalisms and the related processes of 
industrialisation and modernisation. Conversely, the claims of many nationalists -- that nations 
have always existed in one form or another, and that (like ethnicity) they are determined by certain 
cultural characteristics, are clearly untenable. However, I suggest again that a middle position 
may be a more helpful way forward here since the principal disadvantage of a modernist 
perspective is its failure to account adequately for the ongoing influence of ethnicity and 
nationalism in the modem world. After all, if modernism has now largely been achieved, and the 
nation-state is its apogee, so too should ethnic and national movements have atrophied. And yet 
this is clearly not the case. 
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This central weakness of modernist accounts here is attributable to the valorisation of the 'legal- 
political' dimensions of the nation-state over the `cultural-historical' -- that is, the perception of 
the nation-state as principally a political rather than an cthnocultural community (when in fact it 
is both). This in turn arises from the modernist concern to disavow airy link between ethnicity and 
nationalism. However, such a position conflates the nation and the state. In so doing, it fails to 
explore adequately the differential power relations that underlie the representation of the language 
and culture of the dominant ethnie as that of the civic culture of the nation-state. The result is 
the marginalisation of a range of sociological minorities within modern nation-states whose 
languages and cultures are consigned to the private sphere. 
The claims of minorities are explored further in Chapter 3 in relation to political theory, 
particularly with regard to the various arguments surrounding the merits of individual and group- 
differentiated rights. This debate has largely been polarised around, on the one hand, the tenets 
of orthodox liberalism and, on the other hand, the claims of communitarianism. Much of the 
debate, as perhaps one might expect, favours the former over the latter. Individual rights, which 
are associated with citizenship and the apparent neutrality of the civic realm, are valorised for their 
universalism, their protection of fundamental liberal freedoms, and their strict impartiality. Group- 
differentiated rights are viewed far more sceptically, often hostily by liberal commentators. They 
are most often associated with particularism and the potential illiberality that may result -- some 
would argue, ahs'ap results -- when one apportions rights differently between groups. 
My own position, following Iris Young (1993) and Will Kymlicka (1995a), is that group- 
differentiated rights are defensible as long as they retain within them the protection of individual 
liberties. Of course, combining the two is not always easy. Nonetheless, I argue that such an 
alternative is necessary because the present articulation of individual rights within political 
liberalism implicitly, and at times explicitly, supports the hegemony of the dominant ethnie within 
nation-states. In developing an argument for group-differentiated rights, I also distinguish here 
between the rights that might be attributable to national, ethnic, and other social/cultural 
minorities. While I argue that all such groups should have greater representation within the civic 
realm of the nation-state, only national minorities can claim the right to forma! representation, 
given their status as historical ethnies. By way of example, I discuss the current positioning of 
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indigenous minorities (who may be equated with national minorities) within nation-states, and in 
relation to international law. 
Chapters 4 and 5 examine the various debates outlined thus far with particular reference to 
language. Chapter 4 explores the relationship between particular languages and the ethnic and 
national identities with which they are (or have been) associated. In line with my previous 
discussions on ethnicity and nationalism, I argue here that language is not a necessary marker of 
such identities, as can be clearly seen in the growing prevalence of `minority language shift' 
(Fishman, 1991). The loss of Irish and its replacement by English in Ireland, provides an example 
here which I discuss at some length. However, I also critique the view that language is peripheral 
to identity and the related implication that minority language shift is an inevitable, voluntary and 
beneficial process for minority groups. Rather than being about `modernisation', as it is often 
constructed, this process is more often about differential power relations than anything else. 
Bourdicu's (1982,1991) notions of `cultural capital', `linguistic capital', `symbolic violence' and 
`misrecognition' provide an explanatory framework for this discussion -- particularly with regard 
to the differential apportionment of status and value between dominant and minority languages. 
The ascendancy of the former is principally achieved, I suggest, by their legitimation and 
institutionalisation within nation-states. I illustrate this via a discussion of the development of 
French as the national language of France, and in relation to English as the current lingua franca, 
or world language. 
Chapter 5 explores the links between education and minority language policy. Since education 
plays a key role within modern nation-states it can be used effectively to promote a minority 
language. That said, it is also acknowledged that education cannot by itself effect language 
change, or reverse language shift. Various approaches to minority language policy are examined 
here, ranging from the complete disavowal of minority languages to their formal inclusion within 
all significant institutional and language domains of the nation-state. The specific debates 
surrounding minority language education, and the controversies which ensue from them, are 
highlighted by an extended discussion of the English Only movement in the USA and by a briefer 
examination of Quebec's French language laws. 
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Chapters 6-8 examine the case of Wales, and in particular the development of Welsh bilingual 
policy, as an example of the key issues outlined in preceding chapters. Chapter 6 explores the 
contested debates surrounding Welsh national identity both within the wider British state and 
within Wales itself. The prominence of cultural nationalism and the complex dialectic between 
the Welsh language and Welsh identity are highlighted here. Chapter 7 discusses recent 
developments in Wales which have led to the nascent development of a bilingual state, and the 
close interrelationship between language and education policies that underpins it. Chapter 8 
provides an empirical analysis of attitudes to such developments via a language attitude survey 
of 494 teacher trainees in Wales. Drawing on the tenets of language attitude research, the analysis 
combines both quantitative and qualitative dimensions in order to explore attitudes to minority 
language policy in Wales, and the views associated with them. The data highlight a tension 
between, on the one hand, strong support for such policies at a general level and, on the other, 
ongoing controversy and contest with regard to the implications of more specific aspects of such 
policy. The latter, I suggest, is to a large extent attributable to the tensions that continue to 
surround debates about individual and group-differentiated rights with regard to minority 
languages and cultures. 
The concluding chapter reiterates my position that minority language rights are both sociologically 
and politically defensible and argues that the nation-state be rcimagined to accommodate greater 
cultural and linguistic diversity. While continuing to uphold the importance of citizenship and 
individual rights, it is my contention that a greater accommodation of minority languages and 
cultures within the nation-state provides a more just representation of the (at times differing) 
interests of all its citizens. More pragmatically, such accommodation may become a political 
necessity, given the growing discontent with existing nation-state structures evident among 
minorities today. In short, nation-states may well be living increasingly on borrowed time. This 




This chapter will explore the various debates surrounding ethnicity, particularly as these have 
come to be expressed within the primordial/situational distinction. However, before doing so, I 
want to chart briefly the long-held pejorative perception of ethnicity in much academic and 
popular commentary. This predominantly negative view of ethnicity in both discourses, I suggest, 
arises from its unfavourable juxtaposition with the nation-state. For example, it is almost de 
rigeur now in academic discourse to view ethnicity as socially and politically constructed; an 
essentially anti-modem and regressive phenomenon that is mobilised instrumentally by particular 
groups to achieve certain (self-interested) political ends. Concomitantly, the `cultural stuff' of 
ethnicity -- that is, the particular ancestry, culture, language and/or religion of the group(s) in 
question -- is regarded as largely fictive. As we will see, many academic commentators view 
ethnicity as simply a convenient construction of an ethnic group's supposed distinctiveness that 
is employed retrospectively to engender `ethnic solidarity' as a basis for social and political action. 
Popular commentary reflects a similarly sceptical bias towards ethnicity, albeit of a somewhat 
different kind. Fuelled by lurid media reports of the immolation attending yet another `ethnic 
conflict', the wider public locate in ethnicity the principal cause of many of today's social and 
political problems. Places like Rwanda, Burundi, Sri Lanka, Northern Ireland, and the former 
Yugoslavia -- to name just a few contemporary examples -- suggest starkly the destructive and 
unproductive nature of ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation. Indeed, since the end of the Cold War, 
these `ethnic conflicts', as they have come to be known, have been ascribed as the most common 
source of political violence in the world (Gurr, 1993). Such developments are closely related, in 
turn, to the proliferation of a variety of `ethnonational movements' -- movements based on ethnic 
affiliation which aim to establish a national state of their own and which may, but do not always, 
resort to violence to achieve their ends. The Tamil Tigers in Sri Lanka, the separatist ETA 
movement (Euskadi to Alkartasuna) in the Basque Country, the Parti Qudbdcois in the Canadian 
province of Quebec, Plaid Cymru (the Welsh Nationalist party) in Wales, and Republicans in 
Northern Ireland can all be cited as examples here. In addition, there are minority groups who, 
while not necessarily wanting to establish a state of their own, want greater recognition and 
representation within existing nation-states and agitate, sometimes violently, to this end. Most 
notable here, perhaps, are indigenous people groups such as the Nliiori of New Zealand, the Koori 
(Aboriginal peoples) of Australia, Sami (Lapps), Inuit (Eskimos) and Native Americans. 
Suffice it to say, that while these various developments present us with qualitatively different 
examples of ethnic minority affiliation and mobilisation, ' they are all widely held to be negative 
phenomena. This is so eve"i wIietz such groups may be seen to have legitimate and supportable 
claims, as I will proceed to argue. In the following section, I want to outline how this negative 
perception of ethnicity has come to hold such sway, focusing in particular on the historical 
development of academic discourse in this area. 
The denunciation of ethnicity 
This widespread dismissal of the legitimacy and value of ethnicity as a form of social and political 
identification has been juxtaposed historically against the valorisation of national identity and the 
modern nation-state from which it springs. Nation-states are something to which we can 
legitimately give our allegiance it seems, but ethnic groups are not. Nation-states are embracing 
and cohesive whereas ethnic groups are exclusive and divisive. Nation-states represent modernity 
while ethnic groups simply represent a harping, misinformed and misguided nostalgia. Or so the 
story goes. Moreover, it is a story long told and with an impressive academic pedigree. In the 
nineteenth century, for example, the British liberal John Stuart Mill argued in Represelrtative 
Govermne»t: `Free institutions are next to impossible in a country made up of different 
nationalities. Among a people without fellow-feeling, especially if they read and speak different 
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languages, the united public opinion, necessary to the working of representative government, 
cannot exist' (1972: 361). Mill proceeds to elaborate on why he deems alternative ethnic 
affiliations to be so counter-productive to the political organisation of the nation-state. In so 
doing, he invokes a clear cultural hierarchy between different groups, arguing that smaller 
nationalities -- the equivalent of `ethnic minorities' in modern political parlance -- should be 
assimilated into the nation-state via its `national' culture; that is, the culture of the dominant 
(national) group: 
Experience proves it is possible for one nationality to merge and be absorbed in another: 
and when it was originally an inferior and more backward portion of the human race the 
absorption is greatly to its advantage. Nobody can suppose that it is not beneficial to a 
Breton, or a Basque of French Navarre, to be brought into the current of the ideas and 
feelings of a highly civilised and cultivated people -- to be a member of the French 
nationality, admitted on equal terms to all the privileges of French citizenship ... than to 
sulk on his own rocks, the half-savage relic of p ast times, revolving in his own mental 
orbit, without participation or iirterest in the general movemeist of the world. The same 
remark applies to the Welshman or the Scottish Highlander as members of the British 
nation [sic]. ' (1972: 395; my emphases) 
Likewise, the French nationalist and historian, Michelet -- a near contemporary of Mill -- was to 
conclude of the French Revolution that: `this sacrifice of the diverse interior nationalities to the 
great nationality which comprises them undoubtedly strengthened the latter.... It was at the 
moment when France suppressed within herself the divergent French countries that she 
proclaimed her high and original revelations' (1946: 286; my emphasis). ' In this view then, an 
homogenous national identity -- reflected in the culture of the dominant national group and 
established by the processes of political nationalism -- should supersede and subsume alternative 
ethnic and/or national identities. As we shall see in Chapter 3, many modern liberals continue to 
hold to this position. However, the merits of the dominant group's culture tend to be emphasised 
less overtly in contemporary commentary (although the cultural hierarchy underpinning such 
assumptions remains). Rather, the argument is couched on the basis of defending two ostensibly 
key liberal democratic principles - universal political citizenship, and the recognition of individual 
(as opposed to collective) rights. These two principles are seen as sufficient in themselves to 
repudiate the claims of other ethnic groups for greater social recognition in the public or civic 
realm of the nation-state (the private realm is seen as less problematic), and for associated political 
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recognition/representation (sec, for example, Glazer & Moynihan, 1975; Porter, 1975; Gcllncr, 
1983; Schlesinger, 1992; Hughes, 1993). But more on this later. ' 
As for Marxist commentary on the legitimacy of ethnicity as a basis for social and political 
mobilisation, Marx and Engels were themselves to adopt a remarkably similar position to their 
contemporary liberal commentators. In discussing the position of ethnic minorities, Marx and 
Engels drew on Hegel's distinction between nation and state -- equating the `nation' directly with 
the modern nation-state and `nationality' with ethnic groups, or ethno-cultural communities, 
which lacked a state of their own (Nimni, 1995). On this basis, Engels could observe: 
There is no country in Europe which does not have in some corner or other one or several 
fragments of peoples, the remnants of a former population that was suppressed and held 
in bondage by the nation [nation-state] which later became the main vehicle for historical 
development. These relics of nations [ethnic groups], mercilessly trampled down by the 
passage of history, as Hegel expressed it, this ethnic trash always become fanatical 
standard bearers of counter-revolution and remain so until their complete extirpation or 
loss of their national character, just as their whole existence in general is itself a protest 
against a great historical revolution. Such in Scotland are the Gaels.... Such in France are 
the Bretons.... Such in Spain are the Basques... (Marx & Engels, 1976a: 234-235; my 
emphasis) 
The position of Marx and Engels vis-ä-vis ethnic minorities arises from their somewhat 
contradictory views on nationalism. On the one hand, Marx and Engels argued, as one might 
expect, that the working classes were the motor of history. In The Connnuidst Manifesto, Marx 
observes: `The working men have no country ... 
National differences and antagonisms between 
peoples are daily more and more vanishing' (Marx & Engels, 1976b: 65). On the other hand, 
Marx and Engels also endorsed the nationalist causes of `historic' nations where these were seen 
to facilitate and expedite the proletarian revolution. Thus Marx observes, again in The 
Communist Ma»ifesto, that the struggle of the proletariat with the bourgeoisie is `at first a 
national struggle' and that `the proletariat of each country must, of course, first of all settle 
matters with its own bourgeoisie' (I 976b: 60). In neither instance, however, were the claims of 
`non-historic' nations or `historyless peoples' (Geschichtslosen Völker) recognised -- that is, 
ethnic and/or national groups which lacked the `historical vitality' to consolidate a national state 
of their own. As Nimni concludes in his lucid discussion of this question, `Marx and Engels were, 
to put it mildly, impatient with and intolerant of ethnic minorities' (1995: 68; see also Guibemau, 
1996: 13-21). In this regard, they were, like their liberal contemporaries, Mill and hlichelet, very 
much a product of their times. Indeed, Flobsbawm (1990) argues that it is `sheer anachronism' 
to criticise them for holding such views since they were shared by nearly all nineteenth century 
political theorists on both the right and the left. 
And yet, having said this, ilobsbawm's views are not too dissimilar to his nineteenth century 
counterparts. Ilobsbawm, for example, contrasts a positive unifying nineteenth century 
nationalism - modelled on the French Revolution and located in the political formation of nation- 
states -- with a negative and divisive twentieth century variant, largely centred on ethno-cultural 
and linguistic differences (ethnonationalisms, in effect). This is clearly comparable with the 
distinction drawn by Marx and Engels between `historic' and `non-historic' nations, and the 
transitory and regressive nature attributed to the latter. Other Marxist commentators have been 
less sceptical about the legitimacy of ethnicity and ethnic mobilisation. Nonetheless, their analyses 
of ethnicity are predicated principally on the pre-eminent influence of capitalism and on the 
subsequent subsumption of ethnic and national relations within class relations (see, for example, 
Rechter, 1975; Wallerstein, 1979,1983,1991; Nairn, 1981; Hroch, 1985; Balibar, 1991). ' 
The rehabilitation of ethnicity? 
More recently, postmodemists have developed what might be seen as a counter-argument to this 
broadly articulated modernist position on ethnicity. Postmodernists argue that the rise of 
globalisation6 -- the next stage of the modernisation process -- has significantly undermined 
previous forms of identification and political mobilisation. In this view, modern nation-states are 
finding it more difficult to impose a uniform national identity in the increasingly global economy 
and culture of today's world. Consequently, a new decentred and `hybridized' politics of 
identities is emerging (Harvey, 1989; Jamieson, 1991; Hall 1992a, 1992b; Robertson, 1992; 
Bhabha, 1994; Featherstone, 1991,1995). In the place of the previous certainties of nationhood 
and national identity, local, ethnic and gender identities have now become the principal sites of 
postmodern politics. As Stuart Hall observes, the result is the simultaneous rise of new `global' 
and new `local' identities and the consequent proliferation of supra- and sub-national identities: 
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Increasingly, the political landscapes of the modern world are fractured ... 
by competing 
and dislocating identifications.... National identities remain strong, especially with respect 
to such things as legal and citizenship rights, but local, regional, and community identities 
have become more significant. Above the level of the national culture, `global' 
identifications begin to displace, and sometimes override, national ones. (I 992a: 280,302) 
Post-modern analyses thus provide a space for the re-emergence of ethnicity as a valid social and 
political form of identification and mobilisation. I iowever, ethnicity in this context faces some 
stiff competition. The fragmented, dispersed and dccentred individual of the postmodern world 
is supposedly able to choose from a bewildering range of identity styles and forms of political 
mobilisation, and ethnicity, it seems, is just one of them. As I will argue in this chapter, this 
position significantly understates the key role that ethnicity often assumes in the processes of 
identity formation and social and political mobilisation. Relatedly, postmodernists may also have 
underestimated the salience and resilience of `national cultures' in which liberal and Marxist 
commentators have historically placed such store. Michael Billig cogently argues, for example, 
that national allegiances cannot simply be exchanged like `last year's clothes'. As he proceeds to 
observe: 
There is a sense Was if' in some versions of the postmodern thesis. It is as if the nation- 
state has already withered away; as if people's national commitments have been flattened 
to the level of consumer choice; as if millions of children in the world's most powerful 
nation [the USA] do not daily salute one, and only one, style of flag; as if, at this moment 
around the globe, vast armies are not practising their battle manoeuvres beneath national 
colours. (1995: 139; see also Miller, 1995; Smith, 1995a) 
And so we come to a point where -- despite both consistent negative attribution, and confident 
predictions of its imminent demise, for over two centuries now -- ethnicity continues to persist 
and prosper in the modern world. Many contemporary liberals are confounded and dismayed by 
the resilience of ethnic ties, and the increasing advocacy of ethnic minority rights, within 
contemporary nation-states. Marxist commentators are similarly bemused by the emergent and 
ongoing claims of ethnonational movements in post-industrialist societies; a feature which the 
achievements of modernisation (and class-based politics) should have rendered obsolete. 
Likewise, postmodernists, while they rightly highlight the contingent and multiple aspects of 
identity formation, cannot explain adequately why ethnicity (and nationality) should so often 
`trump' the competition. The salience of ethnicity may well vary from context to context and, as 
13 
we shall see, its inter-relationship with nationalism and national identity, and with other forms of 
social relations and social identity, may be complex, overlapping and at times contradictory. 
Nonetheless, ethnicity cannot be as easily discounted as we have been led to believe. Moreover, 
the rejection of ethnicity as a valid form of social and political action is in itself problematic. As 
I will proceed to argue in this account, if ethnicity has survived and prospered -- despite, it seems, 
insuperable odds -- this suggests that it has at least some basis in social reality. Ethnicity cannot 
simply be a convenient and largely fictive construction, although such elements arc clearly 
apparent within it. The `cultural stuff' of ethnicity -- ancestry, language, and culture -- does 
matter to a significant amount of people. Likewise, ethnicity has meaning not only at the level 
of social and political mobilisation but also as a principal form of individual and collective social 
identity. In short, and whether we like it or not, ethnicity continues to have a special claim on the 
individual and collective allegiances of many people in the world today and we need to understand 
why this should still be so. 
Ethnicity and modernity 
So what exactly is ethnicity and what are the key sociological questions which surround it? Before 
examining these questions in detail, I want to flag a central theme which should already be 
apparent from my discussion thus far and which pervades much of what will follow -- that is, 
ethnicity's complex and ambiguous relationship to modernity. There is a dualistic tension in much 
of the academic debate about ethnicity which posits `ethnic groups', ironically, as at once both 
a modernist creation -- defined socially and politically by their partial incorporation into the 
modern nation-state -- and as essentially cacti-modern. The former is signalled by the usual 
collocation of `ethnic' and `minority'. Indeed, most of the discourse concerning ethnicity still 
tends to concern itself primarily with subnational units, or minorities of some kind or another 
(Chapman et al. 1989). The latter is suggested by the unflattering comparison of ethnic (minority) 
groups as atavistic and regressive in contrast to the modernity of the nation-state; a position that 
is particularly evident in nineteenth century academic commentary, as we have seen, but is not 
exclusive to it. Thus, while these ethnic minority groups may argue that their apparently distinct 
ethnicity pre-dates their (incomplete) incorporation within the modern nation-state, ethnicity is 
generally viewed here as a construction of modernity -- a by-product, in effect, of the political, 
14 
cultural and ideational processes of nation-state formation -- rather than an antecedent to it. Yet, 
at the same time, ethnic claims for social and political recognition arc rejected on the basis that 
they fail to reach or reflect appropriate standards of modernityl As I will argue in Chapter 2, both 
these assertions are problematic and have much to do with the primacy ascribed to political 
nationalism(s), and to its institutional embodiment in the modern `nation-state', over the last two 
centuries. At this stage, however, it is enough to point out that this central dualism can be traced 
through much of the academic (as well as social and political) commentary on ethnicity. 
Terminology 
Not only that, it is also evident in the very terminology used, and the various attempts over the 
years to define both `ethnicity' and `ethnic group'. The first use of the term `ethnicity' was 
attributed by Glazer & Moynihan (1975) to the American sociologist David Riesman in 1953, 
although other commentators suggest an earlier genesis in the 1940s (Sollors, 1989; Fishman, 
1989a, 1997). Despite its apparent recency, however, ethnicity actually derives from the Greek 
word `ethnos', meaning people or tribe. The equivalent term for ethnos in English -- `ethnic' -- 
was used from the mid-fourteenth century to the mid-nineteenth century to describe someone as 
heathen or pagan (Williams, 1976). ' This etymological association was subsequently to fit well 
with the pejorative construction of ethnic groups in relation to the nation-state. The related 
collocation of `ethnic' and `minority' is also reflective of this positioning since it assumes that 
majority groups are somehow not `ethnic'; that they simply represent modernity, or the modern 
(civilised) way of life. However, as I will proceed to argue in this account all groups -- both 
minority and majority ones -- incorporate an ethnic dimension and the failure of the latter to 
recognise or acknowledge this has more to do with differential power relations between groups 
than with anything else. 
Subsequent discussions of the term ethnicity in the social sciences continue to reflect these 
ambiguities and tensions. Isajiw (1980), for example, found in a review of 65 studies of ethnicity, 
that 52 gave »o explicit definition of the concept. If a particular view of ethnicity was assumed 
in these studies, it tended by de facto to accord with the `cultural stuff of ethnicity -- ancestry 
language, and culture. This position is reflected in its broadest terms by Glazer & Moynihan's 
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much cited assertion that ethnicity is 'the character or quality of an ethnic group' (1975: 1). More 
recently, however, a view of ethnicity as subjective and situational has come to the fore; a 
position which has much to do with Barth's (1969) elaboration of ethnic boundaries and which 
is characterised by Eriksen's counter description of ethnicity as 'essentially an aspect of 
relationship, not a property of a group' (1993: 12). 
These seemingly contradictory aspects of ethnicity arc encapsulated within Max Weber's 
definition of the associated term `ethnic group'. Weber argues that ethnic groups arc `those 
human groups that entertain a subjective belief in their common descent because of similarities 
of physical type or of customs or of both, or because of memories of colonisation and migration' 
(1961: 389). This definition highlights how ancestral, cultural, and at times racialised traits are 
commonly associated with particular ethnic groups, both by members of the groups themselves 
and by others. ' However, along with these traits, Weber also specifically emphasises the 
subjective nature of ethnic group membership. For Weber, objective characteristics such as 
language and particular cultural practices do not in themselves constitute an ethnic group, they 
simply facilitate that group's formation. Rather, he stresses that it is the political community 
which engenders such sentiments of likeness, although ethnic bonds, once created, contribute in 
an ongoing way to the solidarity of the group (Guibernau, 1996). 
Polarities and their like 
Weber's formulation effectively highlights the countervailing dimensions of ethnicity, although 
he does not necessarily resolve them fully. However, this at least remains a better formulation 
than much subsequent academic commentary on ethnicity which, as with many debates in the 
social sciences, has tended towards a dichotomous approach. Accordingly, such analysis has 
largely been framed within and by the following kinds of polarities. Is ethnicity a pre-modern or 
a modem phenomenon? Is it an intrinsic attribute of human identity or a social construction that 
is mobilised to achieve certain political ends? Can it be defined by particular objective cultural 
attributes or is it subjectively maintained by shifting relational boundaries which allow groups to 
distinguish themselves one from another? Does it only apply to minority groups or does it 
encompass majority groups as well? Is ethnicity primarily material or symbolic, political or 
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cultural, voluntary or involuntary, individual or collcctive? Thcsc dichotomics ovcrlap in many 
instances and may be summarised as follows: 
Ethnicity as: 
0 primordial or situational 
" intrinsic or instrumental 
" content or boundaries 
" objective or subjective 
" category or group 
" involuntary or voluntary 
" individual or collective 
" material or symbolic 
" minority or majority 
In the remainder of this chapter, I aim to critically evaluate these debates on ethnicity and the 
various oppositions to which they give rise. In so doing, I will frame my analysis within the 
bifurcated approach that has been largely characteristic of these discussions until now -- working, 
in particular, within the broad distinction commonly drawn between primordial and situational 
accounts of ethnicity. However, this should not be seen as endorsement of this practice. I adopt 
it here simply as a useful heuristic device in order to compare and contrast the various positions 
adopted in these debates. My own argument is that such an approach is unhelpful. Adopting an 
oppositional stance, though a favourite pastime of social scientists, inevitably results in a partial 
view of the phenomena analysed. Self evident as it may seem, the only sensible way forward is 
to endorse a middle ground -- combining, where appropriate, salient elements of traditionally 
bifurcated positions. As such, after presenting an overview of the relevant debates, I will 
conclude the chapter by arguing that Bourdieu's concept of `habitus' and Anthony Smith's notion 
of `ethnie', in combination, provide us with the means of developing a more integrative -- and, 
in the end, more adequate -- account of ethnicity. Such an account will also help to explain not 
only the continuing influence of ethnicity in the modern world but also its complex 
interconnections with nationalism and national identity, the subject of the next chapter. However, 
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in saying this, it should also be borne in mind that distinguishing ethnicity from nationalism and 
national identity is inevitably a somewhat arbitrary exercise, given their numerous 
interconnections. Accordingly, both this and the next chapter will demonstrate some degree of 
overlap in their thematic concerns. 
Ethnicity as primordial 
One of the key reasons profrered for the enduring nature of ethnicity in the modern world is that 
it constitutes a primary aspect of human nature and human relations. This stance, which is broadly 
termed 'primordialism', is actually represented by a range of positions (Smith, 1995a). The 
extreme version, elaborated in the `organic' nationalism of the eighteenth century 'German 
Romantics', Herder, Humboldt and Fichte, posits ethnic -- and, by extension, national -- identity 
as natural and immutable. Human beings are viewed, by nature, as belonging to fixed ethnic 
communities which are, in turn, defined by the constitutive elements of 'language, blood and soil' 
(see also Chapter 2). A second stream of primordialism is represented by the socio-biology of van 
den Berghe (1979) who argues that ethnic groups are `natural' because they are extensions of 
biological kin groups, selected on the grounds of genetic evolution. The third, and most plausible 
stream, is associated most prominently with Geertz (1963,1973), Isaacs (1975), and Shils (1957, 
1980). Geertz for example, in a much cited passage, develops Shils (1957) argument that the 
political actions of ethnic groups are often attributable, in the first instance, to primordial 
attachments. These primordial ties are regarded as a fundamental basis for collective action 
because they are rooted in our earliest socialisation, in kinship, and in the wider ties and 
solidarities built on and around kinship. As Geertz outlines: 
By a primordial attachment is meant one that stems from the `givens' of existence, or 
more precisely ... the assumed givens of social existence: immediate contiguity and live 
connection mainly, but beyond them the givenness that stems from being born into a 
particular ... community, speaking a particular language ... and 
following particular social 
practices. These congruities of blood, speech, custom and so on, are seen to have an 
ineffable, and at times overpowering, coerciveness in and of themselves. One is bound to 
one's kinsman, one's neighbour ... as the result not merely of personal affection, tactical 
necessity, common interest or incurred moral obligation, but at least in great part by virtue 
of some unaccountable absolute import attributed to the very tie itself. (1973: 259; my 
emphasis) 
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On this basis, Gccrtz's provides us with an explanation of why primordial attachments often 
trump what he describes as `civil sentiments' -- those sentiments and allegiances which arise from 
civic participation in the modern nation-state. This has been construed in much subsequent 
academic commentary as an endorsement of a primordial view of ethnicity, although it is not 
entirely clear whether this was actually Geertz's intention (see Fenton, 1998). 9 I iowever, if we 
accept that Geertz's argument is representative of this position, we may note that he is not 
arguing that ethnic ties or affiliations are primordial in any real sense -- hence, his deliberate 
qualification regarding `the assumed givens of social existence'. Rather, he is arguing that people 
perceive these ties as primordial and thus as pre-eminent over other atTiliativc tics. Such a 
position then does not necessarily entail that ethnic groups arc fixed and static, although ethnic 
groups are still equated in this conception with certain cultural characteristics -- the `congruities 
of blood, speech, custom and so on'. 
Notwithstanding the more flexible accounts of Gecrtz cat at, the primordialist position has been 
widely dismissed by modernist theorists of ethnicity and nationalism (see, for example, Eller & 
Coughlan, 1993). A number of key objections have been raised in this regard. First, modernist 
critics argue that while cultural attributes are often associated with ethnic distinctiveness, they do 
not constitute a s: Jficie,, t explanation for ethnicity. To attempt to equate the two, in fact, 
amounts to cultural determinism. Nor does an emphasis on cultural characteristics explain 
adequately why some cultural attributes -- language, for example -- may be salient markers of 
ethnic identity in some instances but not in others. In effect, cultural differences do not always 
correspond to ethnic ones. As Robert Thornton argues, an understanding of culture must thus 
involve more than `simply a knowledge of differences, but rather an understanding of hotiv and 
why differences in language, thought ... and 
behaviours have come about' (1988: 25; my 
emphases). Second, and relatedly, cultural forms thus require an historical examination; as indeed 
do all aspects of ethnic group formation (Mare, 1993). This is not something which a 
primordialist account can adequately provide. By situating the search for ethnicity within `the 
assumed givens of social existence', the primordialist position conveniently explains both 
everything and nothing. It lacks, in effect, explanatory power and predictive value and is, at best, 
an ex post facto argument (Rothschild, 1981; Stack, 1986). As John Stack elaborates, the 
primordial approach `fails to explain why ethnicity disappears [as an organising social category] 
19 
during one historical period and rcintcnsifics in another' (1986: 2). Third, and most tcllingly 
perhaps, primordial accounts also underplay the multiplicity of social groups to which individuals 
may belong and the role of individual choice in selecting between and within them. 
Situational ethnicity 
This emphasis on individual choice is reflected in the alternative endorsement of a situational view 
of ethnicity, a view outlined in Barth's influential (1969) Ethnic Croups acrd 13oanclaries (see also 
Moorman, 1965,1974). Barth's central insight is that ethnicity is »vl an immutable bundle of 
cultural traits which can be enumerated in order to determine differences between ethnic groups 
(Jenkins, 1994). Indeed, the `cultural stuff' of the group is not even a key consideration for 
Barth. Rather, ethnic groups are situationally defined in relationship to their social interactions 
with other groups, and the boundaries established and maintained between them as a result of 
these interactions. As Barth asserts: 
ethnic categories provide an organisational vessel that may be given varying amounts and 
forms of content in different socio-cultural systems.... The critical focus of investigation 
from this point of view becomes the ethnic boundary that defines the group, not the 
cultural stuff that it encloses. (1969: 14-15) 
For Barth, ethnicity is about social relationships rather than specific cultural properties. Cultural 
attributes are not significant in themselves since any one of a range of cultural properties could 
be used to fill the `organisational vessel' of a particular ethnicity. This may well explain the 
diversity of cultural diacritics employed by ethnic groups in the world today to distinguish 
themselves from others. Instead, it is theirl)erceired usefulness in maintaining ethnic boundaries 
which is central. Cultural attributes only become significant as markers of ethnic identity when 
a group deems them to be nrecessary% or socially effective, for such purposes. Thus, particular 
cultural attributes may vary in salience, may be constructed or reconstructed, and may even be 
discarded by an ethnic group, depending on the particular socio-historical circumstances of their 
interactions with other groups, and the need to maintain effectively the boundaries between them. 
It is these ethnic boundaries which determine in the end who is and who is not a member of a 
particular ethnic group, as well as designating which ethnic categories are available for individual 
identification at any given time and place (Nagel, 1994). 
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Barth's emphasis on the relational, processual and negotiated aspects of ethnicity (Erikson, 1993) 
also presupposes that the formation of ethnic identity is largely shaped by the group itself. This 
will be in response to those on the other side of the ethnic boundary, and to changing 
circumstances, certainly. Likewise, the success of ethnic ascription will depend to a large extent 
on the reciprocity of other parties in recognising and accepting the distinctions involved. 
Nonetheless, ethnicity is seen by Barth as a product of hum-group processes of negotiation rather 
than the direct result of outside forces. In short, an ethnic group is ultimately defined by its own 
members. As Barth clearly states, it `makes no difference how dissimilar members may be in their 
overt behaviour -- if they say they arc A, in contrast to another category B ... they 
declare their 
allegiance to the shared culture of AT (1969: 15). 
Ethnicity as subjective 
In adopting this position, Barth's account can be said to be a subjectivist one. It emphasises the 
role of individual agents, rather than social structure, as the primary force in the construction of 
ethnic identities. As such, it has been criticised for underplaying (or even ignoring) the social and 
cultural constraints facing actors in their ethnic choices (Worsley, 1984; Wallman, 1986; J. 
O'Brien, 1986; Fardon, 1987). As these critics argue, ethnogenesis, or the creation of new 
ethnicities, does not just happen. Identities are not -- indeed, cannot -- be freely chosen and to 
suggest otherwise is to adopt an ahistorical approach which reduces life to the level of' a market, 
or cafeteria' (Worsley, 1984: 246). 
While this criticism is a valid one, the answer probably lies somewhere in between both positions. 
As Eriksen astutely observes, `ethnic identities are neither ascribed nor achieved: they are both. 
They are wedged between situational selection and imperatives imposed from without' (1993: 
57). Joane Nagel likewise suggests that ethnic identity: 
is the result of a dialectical process involving internal and external opinions and processes, 
as well as the individual's self-identification and outsiders' ethnic designations -- i. e., what 
ynu think your ethnicity is, versus what they think your ethnicity is.... Ethnic boundaries, 
and thus identities, are constructed by both the individual and the group as well as by 
outside agents and organisations. (1994: 154-155). 
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In other words, ethnic groups are both internally and externally defined; distinguishing 'us' from 
`them' is always a two-way process. Where the balance might lie between internal and external 
definitions of ethnicity, however, remains an open question. As Jenkins (1994) observes, in any 
given instance it is a question of degree. The continuum which is possible here is perhaps best 
illustrated by the commonly drawn distinction between ethnic categories and ethnic communities. 
Anthony Smith (1991) argues that the former are identified by others as constituting separate 
cultural and historical groupings. However, they may have little self-awareness at the time that 
they form such separate collectivities. Ethnic categories, in short, are named, characterised and 
delineated principally by others (Jenkins, 1996). Ethnic communities, in contrast, define 
themselves, their name(s), their nature(s) and their boundaries, and arc thus more akin to Barth's 
notion of an ethnic group. As Paul Brass describes it, an ethnic community `has adopted one or 
more of its marks of cultural distinctness and [has] used them as symbols both to create internal 
cohesion and to differentiate itself from other ethnic groups' (1985: 17). Such communities are 
thus characterised by a sense of ethnic solidarity which, in turn, is usually mobilised via an 
insistence on certain social and political rights. These rights are said to derive from the specific 
`group character' (Glazer & Moynihan, 1975) and often involve an association with a particular 
territory or homeland. 1° I will return to the notion of ethnic community in my discussions below 
on Anthony Smith's (1986,1991,1995a) use of the comparable French term `ethnic'. 
Ethnicity and `race' 
Discussion of the balance between internal and external ascription also allows us to explore the 
crucial distinction between ethnicity and `race'. Michael Banton, for example, argues that this 
distinction can be made on the basis that `membership in an ethnic group is usually voluntary; 
membership in a racial group is not' (1983: 10). In other words, ethnicity is internally defined, 
`race' is externally ascribed. There are serious weaknesses with Banton's argument here -- not 
least, the implicit assumption that racial groups are somehow real" -- to which I will return. 
However, the distinction he draws is useful in highlighting the processes of ascription which have 
led to the stigmatising of certain groups on supposedly racial grounds and, from that, the 
establishment of social -- and, in some cases, political -- hierarchies between various groups. 
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This racialisation process has occurred in two principal ways. One has been via the imputation 
of biologically determined characteristics as a means of distinguishing between various groups. 
This process has been most prominently associated with the scientific racism of the nineteenth 
century (sec Gould, 1981), although it continues to be represented in current academic discourse 
(sec Kohn, 1995) and is still widely held at a popular `common-scnsc' level (Omi & Winant, 1986; 
Miles, 1989,1993; Small, 1994). 
A second, comparable process of ascribing essentialised cultural differences to groups has also 
become increasingly widespread. This has led to the rise of 'new racisms' which describe group 
differences principally in cultural and/or historical terms -- ethnic terms, in effect -- without 
specifically mentioning `race' or overtly racial criteria (Barker, 1981; Wetherell & Potter, 1992; 
van Dijlc, 1993; Small, 1994). New racisms, in this sense, can be described as a form of ethnicism 
which, as Avtar Brah describes it: 
defines the experience of racialised groups primarily in `culturalist' terms: that is, it posits 
`ethnic difference' as the primary modality around which social life is constituted and 
experienced.... This means that a group identified as culturally different is assumed to be 
internally homogenous.... ethnicist discourses seek to impose stereotypic notions of 
common cultural need upon heterogenous groups with diverse social aspirations and 
interests. (1992: 129) 
Before proceeding further, however, a number of additional caveats need to be raised in relation 
to Banton's initial distinction between `race' and ethnicity. First, the distinction considerably 
understates the reciprocal nature of group identification and categorisation discussed in the 
preceding sections. As Jenkins (1994) argues, the definition of `them' in terms of `race' is likely 
to be an important aspect of our definition of `us' (which will, in turn, incorporate a `racial' 
dimension). Second, while many examples of ethnic categorisation do involve the imputation of 
essentialised notions of racial and/or cultural difference -- and, from that, the positing of a 
hierarchy of group difference -- many also do not. In this sense, racism in its various forms can 
be viewed as a particular subset -- or, more accurately perhaps, specific subsets -- of ethnic 
categorisation. However, they are not reducible one to the other. Ethnic categories may be 
essentialised in the same way as 'race' categories have been historically but they geed not be. Nor 
are ethnic relations necessarily hierarchical, exploitative and conflictual in the same way that `race 
relations' invariably are (Rex, 1973; Jenkins 1994). Indeed, it has often been the case that the 
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global impact of racism has overridden previously non-hierarchised ethnic categories (Balibar, 
1991; Fenton, 1998). As such, it is simply wrong to conflate `race' with ethnicity as some 
commentators are in the habit of doing (see, for example, Wallman, 1978,1986; Anthias, 1992; 
Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). Third, groups as well as being identified negatively by others, 
may actually seek to identify themselves in positive 'racial' terms; a feature which is notable in 
many forms of black nationalism and also within some indigenous peoples' movements. Finally, 
`racial' and ethnic ascription both remain, in the end, comparable processes of social and cultural 
construction. As the development of `new racisms' indicates, and as Richard Jenkins argues, `it 
is emphatically not the case that the difference between ethnicity and "race" is a simple difference 
between the physical and the cultural, although it may be a difference between purported physical 
and cultural characteristics' (1994: 208; my emphasis; see also Goldberg, 1993; Ch. 4). Paul 
Gilroy, in his discussion of `race' and racism, similarly asserts: 
Races are not ... simple expressions of either 
biological or cultural sameness. They arc 
imagined - socially and politically constructed.... Dealing with these issues in their 
specificity and in their articulation with other [social] relations and practices constitutes 
a profound and urgent theoretical challenge. It requires a theory of racisms that does not 
depend on an essentialist theory of races themselves. (1990: 264) 
Much the same could be said for the broader concept of ethnicity. Acknowledging that ethnicity 
is a social and cultural construction allows us to explore its articulation with other social forces 
and the various, or multiple, manifestations which may result (including various racisms). In so 
doing, the way in which ethnicity is deliberately employed -- or mobilised -- in specific contexts 
becomes central, as do the particular ends pursued in the process of mobilisation. The 
mobilisation of ethnicity here can be summarised as `the process by which a group organises along 
ethnic lines in pursuit of collective political ends' (Stack, 1986: 5). In order to examine this 
process more closely, we need to turn to discussions on the instrumental utility of ethnicity. 
Instrumental ethnicity 
Accepting a situational view of ethnicity invites an obvious corollary: if ethnicity is primarily an 
aspect of social relationships, then it can best be analysed through the various uses to which 
individuals and/or groups put it. Ethnicity can thus be regarded principally as a social and political 
resource and ethnic groups as specific interest groups, comparable to other groups that might 
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mobilise on the basis of social class, or trade unionism, for example. This appears to be the 
consensus of most current commentators on ethnicity (sec, for example, Cohen, 1974; Glazer & 
Moynihan, 1975; Worslcy, 1984; Rex & Mason, 1986; Nash, 1989; Rooscns, 1989; Marc, 1993; 
Nagel, 1994). It is summarised, in its most trenchant form, by Peter Worslcy: 'Cultural traits arc 
not absolutes or simply intellectual categories, but are invoked to provide identities which 
legitimise claims to rights. They arc strategics or weapons in competitions over scarce social 
goods' (1984: 249). 
Such a view also presupposes the f luidity or malleability of ethnicity. In effect, the origin, 
content and form of ethnicity are all open to negotiation, reflecting the creative choices of 
individuals and groups as they define themselves and others in ethnic ways (Nagel, 1994). Such 
choices involve a wide range of possibilities. At one level, ethnic choices may be limited to what 
Gans (1979) has termed `symbolic ethnicity'. This is common among many immigrant minority 
groups and, as Gans suggests, is `characterised by a nostalgic allegiance to the culture of the 
immigrant generation, or that of the old country; a love for and pride in a tradition that can be felt 
without having to be incorporated in everyday behaviour' (1979: 9). In this regard, many 
hyphenated white identities in the United States (Italian-Americans, Jewish-Americans etc. ) 
continue to exhibit a `symbolic ethnicity' even when previously demarcated ethnic boundaries 
%%ithin the white population (such as language, religion and endogamy) have atrophied over time 
(see Kivosto, 1989; Fishman, 1989; Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990; Yinger, 1994). At the other end 
of the spectrum, ethnicity may be constituted as a (or the) principal form of social identity and 
political organisation -- a context which is literally saturated by ethnicity (Fenton, 1998). As 
Fenton argues, ethnicity becomes here a more or less dominant element of the framing of political 
power, its legitimation and exercise. This can be seen historically in Nazi Germany and Apartheid 
South Africa, and currently in such places as Rwanda, Burundi, and the former Yugoslavia. 12 
When viewed in this light, ethnic histories and ascriptions can be adopted and adapted by 
individuals and/or groups according to the particular social and political aims being pursued at the 
time. Eugeen Roosens (1989) provides one of the most pointed examples of this process at group 
level in his depiction of the Huron Indians of Quebec. Roosens argues that the Huron developed 
- or rather reconstituted - their history as a Native American tribe in order to claim access to the 
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political rights and rewards associated with 'indigenousness'. This `invention of tradition' 
(Ilobsbawm & Ranger, 1983) involved the establishment of a pan-Indian identity where before 
there was none. It also saw the development of a reified 'ethnic counterculture' (Roosens, 1989) 
in which the uniformly positive characteristics of Huron 'culture' were juxtaposed against the 
largely negative depictions of the colonial cultures which supplanted it. Of course, such 
reconstructions are not limited to indigenous peoples and, indeed, are a common characteristic 
of national as well as ethnic histories; a point which I will elaborate upon in the following chapter 
on nationalism and national identity. However, Rooscns' principal argument -- that the 
construction of ethnicity may comprise a largely fictive element in some instances -- is a hard one 
to ignore (see also Sollors, 1989). 
A comparable degree of scepticism is directed at individuals who decide to adopt or change a 
particular ethnic affiliation. As Roosens again observes, `many people change their ethnic identity 
only if they can profit from doing so' (1989: 13; see also Steinberg, 1981: 256). In his ensuing 
discussion of ethnic minority group members in the USA, Roosens also elaborates on the 
particular utility of choosing to mobilise on the basis of an ethnic identity rather than, for example, 
on the basis of social class: 
It becomes more interesting to appear socially as a member of an ethnic group than as a 
specimen of a lower socio-economic category. In a world where a re-evaluation of 
`oppressed' cultures is in vogue in many circles, this is a way of self-valorisation that 
cannot be achieved by considering oneself, for example, a member of the working class 
or the lower middle class. (1989: 13-14) 
Similarly sceptical views have been expressed about the changing processes of ethnic ascription 
evident among the indigenous Wori of New Zealand (Hanson, 1989; Mulgan, 1989). Suffice it 
to say at this point, that any notion of individual choice with regard to ethnicity is usually viewed 
pejoratively, particularly by majority group members in any given society. This rejection of an 
apparent `designer ethnicity' among minority groups occurs despite the fact that majority group 
members may exhibit considerable latitude in their own ethnic choices and social identifications 
(Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990). Conversely, the latter may mobilise a composite `white' identity to 
similar instrumental ends (Lieberson, 1985; Roediger, 1991; McLaren, 1995; Pearson, 1990; 
Young, 1993); a point I will explore in more detail in Chapter 3. 
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Multiple identities 
Mobilising particular identities will also depend, to a large extent, on the audience(s) being 
addressed. This may produce a pattern of `ethnic layering' for different ethnic groups (Nagel, 
1994). For example, Cornell (1988) discusses the various levels of ethnic identity available to 
Native Americans, including sub-tribal, tribal, regional and pan-Indian identities. A similar pattern 
is found for Maori in New Zealand -- ranging from whAnau (extended family), through hapü (sub- 
tribe) and iwi (tribe), to a pan-Maori identity (R. Walker, 1990). A variety of situational levels 
of ethnic identification can also be found among African Americans (Waters, 1990), Hispanic 
Americans (Padilla, 1985), white Americans (Kivosto, 1989; Alba, 1990; Waters, 1990), British 
Asians (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Modood, 1992,1997), and African-Caribbeans in Britain 
(Goulbourne, 1991a; Gilroy, 1987,1993). 
Of course, the variety of ethnic identifications available to these -- and, by implication, all other -- 
ethnic groups should not surprise us. A situational view of ethnicity requires it. As Nagel 
observes, a'chosen ethnic identity is determined by the individual's perception of its meaning to 
different audiences, its salience in different social contexts, and its utility in different settings' 
(1994: 155). Relatedly, these various identities may overlap with, or cut-across other social 
identities. For example, one may be a woman, a Muslim, a Bangladeshi, an Asian, working class, 
a Londoner, English, and British, all at the same time. However, which of these identities 
predominate in any given circumstance, and how they interact with each other, will depend on the 
context, the audience, and the ongoing balance between internal definition and external ascription 
of social identities, discussed above. This complex dialectic also suggests that there will be 
significant i, rtra-ethnic differences evident within any given ethnic group. The varying confluence 
of ethnicity, class, religion and gender, for example, will result in a full repertory of social 
identifications and trajectories among individual members of a particular ethnic group. 
Ethnicity, class and gender 
The potential mobilisation of a range of social identities brings us to the interconnections between 
ethnicity, social class and gender. However, it is important to note at the outset that these 
27 
interconnections are not only outworked at the level of social Identityy, they are also articulated 
within the wider social relations of which they form a part. Moreover, the various 
interrelationships which result are necessarily complex, overlapping, shifting, and at times 
contradictory. Thus, in relation to ethnicity and social class, ethnic mobilisation may at times 
subsume internal class distinctions, and class mobilisation may override ethnic distinctions. 
I lowevcr, it is also possible for different ethnic groups to collaborate in relation to common class 
interests while retaining a strong sense of their respective ethnic identities (Brass, 1985). The 
varied combinations possible here (and they are by no means limited to the above) are also 
contingent on whether particular ethnic communities include a full range of class distinctions or 
whether they are located principally within a single class category. This is particularly important 
in explaining the often differing economic and social trajectories of majority and minority ethnic 
groups, since majority groups tend to be located in the former context and minority groups in the 
latter. Accordingly, the socio-economic conditions within which particular ethnicities are formed 
and mobilised are crucial to their analysis (Enloe, 1973; Worsley, 1984; liagendoorn, 1993). 
One example of this ethnic/class nexus can be seen in Roosens' discussion above on ethnic 
minorities in the USA. Here, he argues that ethnicity is employed at the exj)ense of social class 
as a central organising principle of collective action. Nonetheless, his comments also indicate, 
perhaps unwittingly, the importance of a predominantly working-class location (and related socio- 
economic disadvantage) for these particular ethnic minority groups. Ethnicity may have been 
chosen as the principal means of mobilisation in this instance but class and socio-economic 
circumstances remain significant to the actual processes of mobilisation undertaken, and the need 
for such groups to mobilise along these lines in the first place. A parallel can also be clearly 
drawn here with Ml on in New Zealand whose mobilisation on the basis of ethnicity is closely 
(although not solely) linked to the degree of historical marginalisation and socio-economic 
disadvantage which they have experienced in that society (Pearson, 1990; Sharp, 1990; May, 
1997). 
However, ethnic and class mobilisation may also work in opposition to each other and/or to 
different ends. In Wales, for example, the industrialised south of Vales has been characterised 
by a largely class-based mobilisation, closely allied to British (as opposed to Welsh) working-class 
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and socialist interests. This stands in sharp contrast to a pattern of ethnic mobilisation also 
apparent in Wales -- particularly, in rural mid and North Vales -- with its origins in nineteenth 
century religious Nonconformity and political liberalism. The latter movement is based principally 
on the preservation of Welsh language and culture and is generally opposed to their encroachment 
by the British state. I will explore these different (and competing) forms of mobilisation -- and 
their antecedents -- more fully in Chapter 6. Sutlice it to say at this point, that while class and 
ethnic groups, and their forms of mobilisation, often intersect, they do not always do so. As van 
den Bcrghc has observed: 
Ethnicity and class are interrelated but analytically distinct phenomena. The fact that 
different social classes most commonly show sub-cultural differences and, conversely, that 
ethnic groups living under a common government are more often than not ordered in a 
hierarchy of power, wealth and status does not make class reducible to ethnicity, or 
ethnicity to class. (1975: 73) 
This observation remains apposite when gender is added to the equation. In relation to the 
division of labour for example, some forms of labour participation which may be described as 
generally shaped by ethnicity and class may also be specifically gendered. Examples here might 
include: the international exploitation of Filipina maids and Thai prostitutes; the disproportionate 
location of African-Caribbean female nurses in the UK in the low-status areas of mental health and 
geriatrics, as well as on night shift; and the predominance of Latinas in the US in low-level service 
industries such as cleaning (see, for example, Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992; Stasiulus & Yuval- 
Davies, 1995). The interconnections between ethnicity, class and gender should be readily 
apparent here although I am not suggesting that curnu/atiº-c disadvantage (in the labour market 
or elsewhere) is necessarily the result; there are just as many cross-cutting and counter-examples. 
In this light, it also needs to be constantly borne in mind that ethnic, class and gender groups are 
themselves not solidary groups but have their own broad-based internal divisions. Paul Brass is 
thus surely right when he argues in relation to ethnicity and class (and one can add gender here 
also): 
that the processes of ethnic -- and class -- identity formation and of intergroup relations 
always have a dual dimension, of interaction/competition with external groups and of an 
internal struggle for control of the group.... It [thus] becomes critical to have analytical 
categories that can be used to analyse both the internal conflicts and the external relations 





Limits to the social construction of ethnicity 
I will proceed to outline such analytical categories in my discussion of habitus and ethnic below. 
however, before doing so, it is important to ask where this modernist conception of ethnicity 
leaves us? Can we be satisfied that ethnicity is a modern construction, only incidentally related 
to culture? Is it completely fluid and malleable -- able to be mobilised at will, in virtually any 
forum, by individuals and groups in their pursuit of social and political gain? Not entirely. For all 
its persuasiveness, there is an obvious degree of overstatement in the situational view of ethnicity. 
If taken to its extreme, for example, all ethnic choices become possible; a position represented by 
the methodological individualism of rational choice theory (see Banton, 1977,1980,1987; 
Ilechter, 1986,1987). " As I have already discussed, such a position fails to address adequately 
the external constraints facing actors in their ethnic choices. Ethnicity may well be a social 
construction but it is clear that not everything will function equally well in the social legitimation 
of ethnic identities. " As Eriksen argues, 
If the agents themselves hold that a certain description of their culture is obviously false, 
it cannot provide them with a powerful ethnic identity. If a group's version of its cultural 
history is seriously contested by other groups ... 
it may also be problematic to maintain 
the identity postulated by that account of history. So we cannot conclude that anything 
goes and that everything about ethnicity is deception and make-believe.... rather, [ethnic] 
identities are ambiguous, and ... this ambiguity 
is connected with a negotiable history and 
a negotiable cultural content. (1993: 73; my emphases) 
Negotiation is a key element here to the ongoing construction of ethnicity, but there are also limits 
to it. Individual and collective choices are circumscribed by the ethnic categories available at any 
given time and place. These categories are, in turn, socially and politically defined and have 
varying degrees of advantage or stigma attached to them (Nagel, 1994). Moreover, the range of 
choices available to particular individuals and groups varies widely. A white American may have 
a wide range of ethnic options from which to choose on the basis of their ancestry. An African 
American, in contrast, is confronted with essentially one ethnic choice -- black; irrespective of any 
preferred ethnic alternatives they might wish to employ. As Nagel observes: 
the extent to which ethnicity can be freely constructed by individuals or groups is quite 
narrow when compulsory ethnic categories are imposed by others. Such limits on ethnic 
identification can be official or unofficial. In either case, externally enforced ethnic 
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boundarics can be powcrful dctcrminants of both the contcnt and mcaning of particular 
cthnicitics. (1994: 156) 
The above example also suggests that the different ethnic choices available to majority and 
minority group members arc a product of wwqual power relations in the wider society. In 
particular, it is the differing location(s) of particular ethnic groups within the nation-state which 
shapes and constrains the ethnic options available to them; a theme I will pursue more fully in the 
following chapters. Suffice it to say at this point, that when ethnicity is viewed solely as an 
instrumental resource these differences in power are not adequately addressed. Similarly, the 
power differentials within a particular ethnic group, and the broad-based divisions which may 
result, are also ignored (Brass, 1985; O. O'Brien, 1993). 
Limits to the instrumental use of ethnicity 
Relatedly, there are limits to the central instrumentalist notion that ethnic groups are simply one 
of many interest groups seeking resources in and from the nation-state. Such a view is 
problematic because it fails to answer the question of tit'hy ethnicity is so often chosen as a means 
of mobilisation over other possibilities. In attempting to answer this question we can leave aside 
the somewhat limited suggestion that ethnicity is more effective in attaining social and political 
goals. In some cases it may well be (see, for example, Roosens' comments above). In other 
instances, it clearly is not. After all, ethnic groups have been known to reproduce their ethnicity 
et-en when it reduces their chances of attaining prosperity and political power (Eriksen, 1993). 
Why is this? The reasons lie principally in the 'ineffable' cultural and symbolic attributes of 
ethnicity largely dismissed in instrumental accounts. Ethnic groups differ from other interest 
groups in their particular concern with cultural attributes and symbols, kinship, and historical 
memory. These features are predicated principally on `belonging' rather than `accomplishment' 
(Kyrnlicka, 1995a; Margalit & Raz, 1995) and provide the basis not only for political action but 
also, crucially, for identity and meaning (11telucci, 1989; Guibernau, 1996). They may well be 
socially constructed (or reconstructed) but their enduring influence cannot be explained on the 
basis of functionality alone. Ignoring the cultural matters that are important to ethnic groups is 
thus an analytical error since these are central to their distinction from other interest groups. Paul 
Brass argues to this end: 
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Ethnic groups, by definition ... are concerned not only with material 
interests but with 
symbolic interests. Moreover, no matter how old or new, 'genuine' or 'artificial', rich or 
superficial, the culture of a particular ethnic group may be, its culture and the definition 
of its boundaries are crucial matters that do not arise in the same way for other interest 
groups. (1985: 31) 
Finding common ground - ethnicity as habitus 
The dichotomous approach adopted in much of the primordialistrnstrumentalist debate on 
ethnicity -- like so many dichotomies posited in the social sciences -- seems to have led us to a 
theoretical impasse. Indeed, as Richard Jenkins has observed, 
the debate about whether or not ethnicity is `situational' or `primordial' seems futile; it 
confuses the ubiquity of a social phenomenon such as ethnicity with `naturalness', 
implying fixity, determinism and some kind of pre-social power of causation. (1994: 220; 
see also Nash, 1989: 124) 
Given this, I want to suggest that primordial and situational views do not form mutually exclusive 
conceptualisations of ethnicity but that each formulation represents a partial representation of the 
underlying social and cultural movements which they seek to describe (Fenton & May, 1998). 
Following Jenkins, ethnicity can thus be viewed as both a cultural creation and a primary or first- 
order dimension of human experience: `on the one hand, ubiquitous and, on the other, possessing 
a particular immediacy and compelling urgency in many social situations' (Jenkins, 1996: 72). As 
Jenkins argues, despite its limitations, the `primordialist' position outlined by Geertz, Isaacs and 
Shils rightly highlights that ethnicity is something in which we actively participate, an integral 
aspect of ourselves, rooted in our earliest socialisation (see also Stack, 1986; Fenton, 1998). John 
Rex muses along similar lines that this may well explain `why it is that, despite the very strong 
pressure in complex societies for groups to be formed on the basis of congruence of interest, 
many individuals do in fact stubbornly continue to unite with those whom they have ties of ethnic 
sameness, even though such alliances might run contrary to patterns of group formation 
determined by shared interests' (1991: 11). 
However, to take ethnicity seriously as a primary social sentiment in this way does not necessarily 
entail its reification as a set of fixed cultural properties. " We do not need to abandon the social 
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constructionist consensus on ethnicity. Nor do we need to naturalise ethnicity as a socio- 
biological phenomenon as, for example, do van den Berghc (1979) and Kcllas (1991). Ethnicity 
can still be viewed as socially constructed and fluid, withinn certain limits (sec above). Likewise, 
its mobilisation by individuals and groups in the social and political domain, and within specific 
temporal and historical contexts, can be fully acknowledged and explored. In this sense, ethnicity 
can be viewed as both situational and pervasive (Smith, 1995a; Billig, 1995). 
A way in which this apparent dualism can be effectively incorporated and expressed is through 
Bourdieu's concept of habitus. Bourdieu's analysis of habitus is principally concerned with social 
class (see Bourdieu, 1984,1990a, 1990b; Bourdieu & Passeron, 1990; Bourdieu & Wacquant, 
1992). However, since Bourdieu describes habitus as `a system of dispositions common to all 
products of the same conditionings' (1990b: 59), the application of habitus to ethnicity and ethnic 
identity formation is equally applicable (see Bentley, 1987; Smaje, 1997; May, 1994,1998b). For 
Bourdieu, habitus comprises all the social and cultural experiences that shape us as a person; his 
use of the term `dispositions' is an attempt to capture fully this meaning. Specifically, there are 
four key aspects of habitus highlighted in Bourdieu's work which are useful to our discussion 
here: embodiment; agency; the interplay between past and present, and, the inter-relationship 
between collective and individual trajectories (see Reay, 1995a, 1995b). I will look at each of 
these elements in turn. 
First, habitus is not simply about ideology, attitude or perception, it is a material form of life 
which is `embodied and turned into second nature' (1990a: 63). It is, in effect, an orientation to 
social action (Bourdieu, 1990b). Thus, via the concept of habitus, Bourdieu explores how 
members of a social group come to acquire, as a result of their socialisation, a set of embodied 
dispositions -- or ways of viewing, and living in the world. This set of dispositions -- what 
Bourdieu would call `bodily hexis' -- operates most often at the level of the unconscious and the 
mundane and might comprise in the case of ethnicity such things as attitudes to language, dress, 
diet and customary practices (Smaje, 1997). The key point for Bourdieu is that habitus is both 
shaped by, aid also shapes, the objective social and cultural conditions which surround it. As 
Roy Nash observes, the habitus is `a system of durable dispositions inculcated by objective 
structural conditions, but since it is embodied the habitus gains a history and generates its [own] 
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practices [over] time even when the objective conditions which give rise to it have disappeared' 
(1990: 433-434). Ethnic attitudes and practices (including language use) may thus be lived out 
implicitly as a result of historical and customary practice. As such, they may provide the 
parameters of social action for many. However, in the course of those very actions they may also 
begin to take on a life of their own (see below). 
Second, Bourdicu's notion of habitus is concerned to explore the inter-relationship between 
agency and structure. While many have dismissed Bourdicu's position as structurally determinist 
(for a critique of this position, see Harker & May, 1993, May, 1994), his specific aim is actually 
to overcome the agency/structure dichotomy in sociological thought -- `to escape from 
structuralist objectivism without relapsing into subjectivism' (1990a: 61). Thus, Bourdicu argues 
that habitus does not deter, nii, e individual behaviour. A range of choices, or strategic practices, 
is presented to individuals within the internalised framework of the habitus. Moreover, these 
practices, based on the intuitions of the practical sense, orient rather than strictly determine 
action. Choice is thus at the heart of habitus. However, not all choices are possible. As Bourdieu 
observes, `habitus, like every "art of inventing" ... makes 
it possible to produce an infinite number 
of practices that are relatively unpredictable (like the corresponding situations) but [which are] 
also limited in their diversity' (1990b: 55). These limits are set by the historically and socially 
situated conditions of the habitus' production; what Bourdieu terms both `a conditioned and 
conditional freedom' (1990b: 55). As he proceeds to elaborate, 
being the product of a particular class of objective regularities, the habitus tends to 
generate all the `reasonable' and `commonsense' behaviours (and only those) which are 
possible within the limits of these regularities, and which are likely to be positively 
sanctioned because they are objectively adjusted to the logic characteristic of the field, 
whose objective future they anticipate. At the same time ... 
it tends to exclude all 
`extravagances' (`not for the likes of us'), that is, all the behaviours that would be 
negatively sanctioned because they are incompatible with the objective conditions. (I 990b: 
55-56) 
In short, improbable practices, or practices viewed as antithetical to the mores of a particular 
group, are rejected as unthinkable. Concomitantly, only a particular range of possible practices 
is considered, although this range of possibilities may evolve and change over time in relation to 
changing circumstances. Thus, Bourdieu posits that individuals and groups operate strategically 
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within the cotutraints of a particular habitus, but also that they react to changing external 
conditions; cconomic, tcchnological and political (Marker, 1984,1990; May, 1994). 
This recursive position allows IIourdieu to argue that the habitus is both a product of our early 
socialisation, yet is also continually modified by individuals' experience of the outside world (Di 
Maggio, 1979). Within this complex interplay of past and present experience -- the third key 
dimension highlighted here -- habitus can be said to reflect the social and cultural position in 
which it was constructed, while also allowing for its transformation in current circumstances. 
However, the possibilities of action in most instances will tend to reproduce rather than transform 
the limits of possibility delineated by the social group. This is because habitus, as a product of 
history, ensures the active presence of past experiences which tend also to normalise particular 
cultural practices and their constancy over time (Harker & May, 1993). Nonetheless, this 
tendency towards reproduction of group mores and practices does not detract from the pate»tial 
for transformation and change. 
The fourth element of habitus - the inter-relationship between individual action and group mores 
- also reflects this tension. In many instances, individual practices will conform to those of the 
group since, as Bourdieu argues, `the practices of the members of the same group ... are always 
more and better harmonised than the agents know or wish' (1990b: 59). Yet Bourdieu also 
recognises the potential for divergence between individual and collective trajectories. In effect, 
habitus within, as well as between, social groups differs to the extent that the details of 
individuals' social trajectories diverge from one another (Reay, 1995a): 
The singular habitus of the members of the same [group] are united in a relation of 
homology, that is, of diversity within homogeneity reflecting the diversity within 
homogeneity characteristic of their social conditions of production. Each individual 
system of dispositions is a structural variant of the others, expressing the singularity of its 
position within the [group] and its trajectory (1990b: 60) 
There is, in all of this, a certain sense of vagueness and indeterminacy in Bourdieu's rendition of 
habitus and debates about its efficacy in bridging the structuretagency divide remain ongoing (see 
Harker et al., 1990; Robbins, 1991; Jenkins, 1992; Calhoun et al., 1993; Harker & May, 1993; 
May, 1994). However, if the concept is employed as social method rather than as social theory -- 
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that is, as a way of thinking and a manner of asking questions, which is actually IIourdieu's 
preference (see I Iarker el aL, 1990) -- it can be usefully applied to a discussion of ethnicity. As 
Gilbert summarises it, Bourdicu's approach `suggests an explanation of the regularities of social 
practice [in this case, ethnicity] as structured by the relations between, on the one hand, an 
objective set of historically produced material conditions, and on the other, historically produced 
definitions of those conditions and predispositions to act in certain ways in any historical 
conjuncture' (1987: 40-41). In other words, ethnicity as socially constructed und as a material 
form of life is addressed by the concept of habitus. In so doing, the 'primordialist' mistake of 
assuming a realist definition of ethnicity is avoided without diminishing the sig»ificance of 
ethnicity and the processes of ethnic identification (see also Smaje, 1997). As ßourdieu observes 
of social class, for example -- and one can clearly add ethnicity here also: 
My work consists in saying that people are located in a social space, that they aren't just 
anywhere, in other words, interchangeable, as those people claim who deny the existence 
of `social classes' [or ethnic groups], and that according to the position they occupy in this 
highly complex space, you can understand the logic of their practices and determine, inner 
alia, how they will classify themselves and others and, should the case arise, think of 
themselves as members of a `class' [or ethnic group]. (1990a: 50) 
Similarly, the dichotomy between the `ineffable' nature and the `calculated' use of ethnicity is also 
rendered negotiable by employing the concept of habitus. As Gilbert again observes: 
The notion of habitus, while recognising conscious intention, need not inflate it in 
explaining action, nor relegate the dynamic of social action to an ineffable consciousness. 
Further, the theory offers an explanation of human understanding and action which goes 
beyond individualism, but does not resort to abstract social forces, functionalist 
mechanisms or reified institutions as agents of social practice. Finally it allows us to sec 
how ideologies through their symbols and representations are part of the objective 
presentation of the contexts of practice, the means for defining a situation, and the 
medium in which past and present practices are installed in the interpretive and generative 
operations of the habitus. (1987: 41) 
Finally, habitus is also extremely pertinent to a discussion of ethnicity because it is employed by 
Bourdieu principally in order to explore inequalities in power between dominant and subordinate 
groups. As Bourdieu argues, the individual and collective habitus of the former is invariably 
constituted as cultural capita! -- that is, recognised as socially valuable -- whereas the habitus of 
the latter is not. This has obvious parallels with the negative, and commonly expressed views of 
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ethnic minority cultures and practices (including the speaking of a minority language) as 
regressive and 'prc-modcrn'. These views are expressed both by majority group members and 
by minority group members themselves; the latter usually as the end result of a process of negative 
i,, i. 'nsi/isatioii. While I have already briefly addressed the historical antecedents of this pattern 
of negative ascription in the early part of the chapter, I will explore its social and political 
implications more fully in Chapters 3-5. At this point, it is sufficient to observe that the habitus 
of ethnic minority individuals and groups tend to be specifically marginalised and devalued, both 
as a legitimate means of identity, and for their apparent lack of 'relevance' to the modern world. 
Ethnics 
If habitus provides us with a useful methodological framework for exploring ethnicity, Anthony 
Smith's notion of ethnic provides a consonant explanation of how the actual particulariliev of 
ethnicity and ethnic identity are enacted by individuals and groups. Smith's central argument -- 
as in this account -- is that the divide between primordialist and instrumentalist conceptions of 
ethnicity leads us into a theoretical cul-de-sac. As he observes in hie Ethnic Origins of Nations: 
By fixing attention mainly on the great dimensions and `fault lines' of religion, customs, 
language and institutions, we run the risk of treating ethnicity as something primordial and 
fixed. By concentrating solely on the attitudes and sentiments and political movements 
of specific ethnie or ethnic fragments, we risk being so caught up in the day-to-day ebb 
and flow of ethnic phenomena that we see them as wholly dependent `tools' or `boundary 
markers' of other social and economic forces. (1986: 211) 
In order to avoid this dichotomy, Smith argues that any realistic account of ethnicity and 
ethnogenesis must `reconstitute the notion of collective cultural identity itself in historical, 
subjective and symbolic terms' (1991: 25). As Smith elaborates, a conception of ethnic identity 
along these lines: 
refers not to a uniformity of elements over generations but to a sense of continuity on the 
part of successive generations of a given cultural unit of population, to shared memories 
of earlier events and periods in the history of the unit and to notions entertained by each 
generation about the collective destiny of that unit and its culture. (1991: 25; my 
emphasis) 
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The parallels with habitus are obvious here. Particular sets of social networks are formed on the 
basis of believed or actual (ethnic) connectedness and are sustained, crucially, by a collective 
sense of continuity. Thus, ethnic groups in Smith's conception change more slowly than is often 
assumed by modernist commentators and may express deeply held group values and meanings 
(Hutchinson, 1994). However, this sense of continuity does not preclude cultural change and 
adaptation, and the unit itself may rise or fall, subject to the vicissitudes of history. In this sense, 
Smith argues, such collectivities are doubly 'historical' since 'not only arc historical memories 
essential to their continuance but each ... is the product of specific historical forces and is 
therefore subject to historical change and dissolution' (1991: 20). 
For Smith, the concept of ethnie, or ethnic community, best expresses the historical and symbolic 
processes highlighted here. Specifically, ethnics are said by Smith to comprise the following 
characteristics: 
"a collective proper name 
"a myth of common ancestry 
" shared historical memories 
" one or more differentiating elements of common culture 
" an association with a specific `homeland', and 
"a sense of solidarity 
As can be seen, most of these characteristics reflect a significant cultural and historical content 
and, except for aspects of a common culture, a strongly subjective component also. Given this, 
ethnies are not incompatible with a situational view of ethnicity. For example, in relation to the 
characteristic of common ancestry, Smith argues that it is `myths of common ancestry, not any 
fact of ancestry (which is usually difficult to ascertain), that are crucial. It is fictive descent and 
putative ancestry that matters for the sense of ethnic identification' (1991: 22). Likewise, 
attachments to a specific territory or homeland tend to be most significant to ethnic identity for 
their mythical and subjective qualities; the `sense of place' that they evoke. Even in relation to 
the more objective aspects of a common culture -- language, religion and kinship, for example -- 
it is the diacritical significance attached to these elements which makes them salient to ethnic 
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idcntity, not the actual elements themselves (cf. Barth, 1969). Finally, while Smith argues that 
these attributes are clearly characteristic of ethnic groups, they are also in a state of constant flux. 
Thcy may vary in their salience; singly and in relation to each other, within and between historical 
periods, and among individual group members and thus the group itself: 
As the subjective significance of each of these attributes waxes and wanes for the 
members of a community, so does the cohesion and self-awareness of that community's 
membership. As these several attributes come together and become more intense and 
salient, so does the sense of ethnic identity and, with it, of ethnic community. Conversely, 
as each of these attributes is attenuated and declines, so does the overall sense of ethnicity, 
and hence the ethnic itself would dissolve or be absorbed. (1991: 23) 
Smith's notion of ethnie allows us then to see ethnic identification as a dynamic quality of group 
relations. Fiore importantly perhaps, it provides us with an operational concept that encapsulates 
`the central paradox of ethnicity: the coexistence of flux and durability, of an ever-changing 
individual and cultural expression within distinct social and cultural parameters' (Smith, 1991: 
38). 16 As we shall see, the concept of ethnie also allows us to explore effectively the close inter- 
relationship between ethnic and national identities. As such, it seems appropriate at this point to 
turn to the comparable discussions surrounding the latter before considering further the specific 
links between the two. 
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Notes -- Chapter 1 
1. I will outline in the following chapter the important distinctions which may be drawn between 
different minority groups -- including national, indigenous, and ethnic minorities -- along with 
their often widely differing social and political objectives. For now though, I will follow the 
popular convention of subsuming such groups within the generic phrase 'ethnic minorities'. 
However, its adoption here is only for convenience and should 1wt be construed as an 
endorsement of its general use in this way. 
2. Britain is not a nation, it is a multi-national state comprising four nations - England, Wales, 
Scotland and Northern Ireland. I will explore these distinctions in more detail in Chapter 2. 
3. Another prominent nineteenth century commentator, Alex de Tocqucville (1956), provides an 
equivalent argument in relation to the democratic development of the USA. 
4. There are important exceptions to this position within liberal ideology, as Will Kymlicka (1989, 
1995a, 1995b) highlights. I will return to this point, and its implications, in Chapter 3 when I 
discuss the question of the legitimacy of minority rights within the modern nation-state. 
5. Marxist commentators vary widely here in the degree to which they regard capitalism as 
determining the construction of ethnic relations. Strongly class determinist theories of ethnicity 
seek to reduce ethnic categories to the exigencies of more encompassing (class-based) 
experiences. Weaker versions attempt a more open-ended examination of the interconnections 
between ethnic and class mobilisation(s). However, in both cases, Marxist perspectives on 
ethnicity have considerable difficulty in accounting for the specificity of ethnic form and meaning 
in the circumstances of their mobilisation (Smaje, 1997; see below). 
6. Globalisation `refers to those processes, operating on a global scale, which cut across national 
boundaries, integrating and connecting communities and organisations in new space-time 
combinations, making the world in reality and in experience more interconnected' (Hall, 1992a: 
299). 
7. As Fishman (1997) observes, this largely negative semantic association derives from the 
Biblical Hebrew distinction between goy and `am, the former denoting an ungodly people and the 
latter a godly people. In the third century Greek translation of the Hebrew Bible (the Septuagint) 
the Greek word `ethnos' was used for `goy', hence its subsequent association with heathenism. 
8. WVeber's inclusion of racial characteristics as a part of ethnicity points to the close relationship 
between `race', racism and ethnicity. I will explore further these interconnections -- and, more 
crucially perhaps, the distinctions between them -- later in the chapter. 
9. It seems to me that Geertz is talking principally about primordialism here rather than ethnicity 
per se and that the two are not necessarily reducible to each other. 
10. Handelman (1977) proposes a more detailed continuum between ethnic categories and ethnic 
communities. Based on the principle of differing degrees of ethnic incorporation, he suggests two 
intermediary levels -- the ethnic network and the ethnic association. An ethnic network `suggests 
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that people will regularly interact with one another in terms of an ethnic membership set' (1977: 
269). An ethnic association involves the addition of some form of political organisation, enabling 
the collective interests of the ethnic group to be represented in the formal political sphere, usually 
in the form of a pressure group. 
11. This process of equating group differences on 'racial' grounds is now considered to be 
scientifically invalid (see, for example, Gould, 1981; Miles, 1989,1993); hence, the use of 
quotation marks around the term 'race'. 
12. The recent immolation in the former Yugoslavia also demonstrates the varying salience of 
ethnicity over time with regard to social and political organisation. For example, from the time 
of the Second World War to the beginning of the major ethnic conflicts of the late 1980s, ethnicity 
had not been mobilised as a principal form of social and political delineation in the relations 
between Serbian, Muslim and Croatian groups in the area (see, for example, Glenny, 1993; 
Bowman, 1994; Silber & Little, 1995). 
13. Methodological individualism assumes that groups are `constituted from individual behaviour 
and arc subject to continual change as individuals respond to changes in their circumstances' 
(Banton, 1987: 140). In this view, social relations become a form of market relations with 
individuals making rational choices about their ethnic alignment(s) solely on the basis of the social 
and material gain it will be bring them. As Banton observes of this process, an individual will join 
in ethnic group mobilisation `only when he expects the benefits of his participation to exceed the 
costs' (1987: 136; see also Hechter cat aL, 1982). On this basis, it is argued that the ethnic options 
of individual actors can be predicted. However, serious limitations can be attributed to this 
analysis. The central premise that rationality equals self-interest is too narrow; one may also act 
rationally in someone else's -- or a collective group's -- interest. Likewise, not all ethnic choices 
may be rational or freely chosen (see below). Given this, rational choice theory presents us with 
a socially and economically reductive account of ethnicity (for a useful critique, see Figueroa, 
1991). 
14. Even avowed social constructionists, such as Eugeen Roosens, concede this point. As 
Roosens observes, 'Ethnic groups and their cultures are not merely a completely arbitrary 
construct: there is always a minimum of incontestable and noninterpretable facts necessary to win 
something from the opponent.... The reality [of ethnicity] is very elastic but not totally arbitrary' 
(1989: 156; see also below). 
15. Stack (1986) argues, for example, that the primordialist position of Geertz, Shils and Isaacs 
has never denied the significant role of socioeconomic and political factors as intervening variables 
in the crystallisation of ethnicity. Nor, as I suggested earlier, has it conceptualised ethnicity as 
immutable and static (see, for example, Geertz, 1973: 258). 
16. Interestingly, this position is close to Barth's later (1989) formulation of `streams of tradition' 
or `universes of discourse' in which individual actors differentially participate but which possess 
a degree of stability over time (see also Jenkins, 1995). 
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Chapter 2 
NATIONALISM AND ETHNICITY 
Many of the academic arguments surrounding ethnicity have also been rehearsed at length in 
relation to national identity and nationalism. Given this, it is perhaps surprising that these 
discussions have until recently been conducted largely in isolation from one another. As Erikson 
(1993) observes, the remarkable congruence between theories of nationalism and national identity, 
and anthropological theories of ethnicity, seems to have gone unrecognised, or at least 
unremarked, by many theorists of nationalism (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Iiobsbawm, 1990; 
Anderson, 1991). This may well be attributable to the well-known solidity of academic 
boundaries. However, it may also be due to the prevailing modernist view among theorists of 
nationalism that ethnicity and nationalism are separate phenomena. Hobsbawm argues, for 
example, that nationalism and ethnicity are `different, and indeed non-comparable, concepts' 
(1992: 4). Consequently, any connection between the two is seen as more or less coincidental. 
By this, modernist commentators on nationalism have attempted to debunk the central claim of 
many nationalist movements in the modem world; that the right to nationhood is based principally 
on pre-existing ties of ethnicity. In its most extreme form, this latter position equates nations 
directly with ethno-cultural communities which are, in turn, defined by fixed cultural 
characteristics -- particularly, but not exclusively, a common language. While this view is now 
largely limited to nationalist proponents themselves, it also had some early currency in the 
academic writings of the late eighteenth century `German Romantics', Herder, Humboldt and 
Fichte. However, like the debates on ethnicity in the previous chapter, the common orthodoxy 
nowadays is to reject this primordial position as essentialist and to argue for a more subjective, 
situational, and socially constructed account of nationalism and nationhood. 
I will explore these debates more fully in due course. Ilowever, before doing so, I want to 
foreshadow my own position. As in the previous chapter, my argument will be that the 
polarisation of primordial and modernist accounts has been unhelpful -- resulting in limited and 
partial accounts of the phenomena of nationalism and nationhood which they seek to explain. 
Thus, after outlining the key tenets of the primordial/modcrnist debates, I will once again 
advocate an alternative position -- one that combines salient elements of both extremes and, in so 
doing, returns ethnicity to the study of nationalism. This alternative can broadly be described as 
`ethnicist' and it has been most prominently associated with the long-standing work of Anthony 
Smith on nationalism and, in particular, his elaboration of the central concept of ethnic (see 
Chapter 1). An ethnicist perspective avoids the trap of essentialism associated with primordial 
accounts while still being able to explain the crucial interrelationship of ethnicity with nationalism 
and national identity, something modernist accounts have seen fit to ignore. As such, it provides 
an appropriate basis for the ensuing arguments in Chapters 3-5 in support of minority rights -- 
both generally, and in particular relation to language and education. It is my view here that the 
historical denigration of ethnic minority language(s) and culture(s) within the nation-state, and 
their concomitant exclusion from the public or civic realm, are fundamentally misguided. 
Moreover, for those groups which can claim to be national minorities (ethnics) in their own 
historic territory, such an approach can actually be said to be iUegilimate (see also Guibernau, 
1996). 
The processes of denigration and exclusion to which minority groups have been subject stem from 
the long-standing pejorative views of ethnicity in both political and social science commentary, 
discussed in Chapter 1. As I will argue in this and the next chapter, these views can be traced 
historically to an over-emphasis on political nationalism and its institutional embodiment in the 
modern nation-state, and to the concomitant valorisation of civic over ethnic ties; the latter usually 
being invoked in support of liberal democracy. Such a position suits well the interests of majority 
(or dominant) ethnic groups in nation-states since it ends up representing their ethnic affiliations, 
particularly their language and cultural traditions, as those of the nation-state. In effect, the ethnic 
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interests of the majority group arc legitimated and naturalised as ciric ones which, in turn, arc 
equated directly with modernity. Concomitantly, the legitimate claims of minorities for similar 
recognition and inclusion in the public or civic realm arc ignored, discounted and/or suppressed 
on the basis that they arc merely `ethnic'. At best, minority group members may be able to 
continue to maintain their ethnic habitus in private; although the pressure to assimilate to the civic 
language and culture may remain intense. At worst, minority language(s) and culture(s) may be 
actively suppressed -- as, for example, was the case for the Catalan and Basque national minorities 
in Franco's Spain. 
Terminology 
Before proceeding further, however, it behoves us once again to clarify our terms. Indeed, if it 
is not already clearly apparent, one of the principal difficulties in discussions of both ethnicity and 
nationalism has been the indeterminacy and confusion that have surrounded the meaning and use 
of key terms. As such, it is crucial at the start to define, and distinguish between, the following 
four central concepts: the 'nation', 'nationalism', the `state' and the 'nation-state'. In due course, 
I will also examine the distinctions that can be drawn between `political nationalism', `cultural 
nationalism', the `multinational state' and the `polyethnic state', and will specify in detail how a 
variety of ethnic and national minority groups are positioned in relation to all of the above. 
Follo%%ing Guibernau (1996), a `nation' refers to a group of people who are conscious of forming 
a distinct community and who may be said to share: 
" an historic territory, or homeland 
" common historical memories 
"a common culture 
"a common (political) destiny and, relatedly, 
0a desire for at least some degree of social and/or political self determination 
Thus, the `nation' includes five key dimensions -- psychological (consciousness of forming a 
group), territorial, historical, cultural and political -- and may be regarded, for the purposes of the 
following discussion, as equivalent to the concept of ethnie outlined in the previous chapter. 
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Following Drcuilly (1993) and Smith (1994), the ideology of nationalism can be broadly 
summarised as follows: 
" the world is divided into nations, each with its own identity and destiny; 
" the nation is the sole source of political power, and the interests and values of the nation 
take priority over all other interests and values. Loyalty to the nation is pre-eminent; 
" everyone must belong to a nation, if everyone is to be truly free; 
0 to realise themselves, nations must be as politically independent as possible. Political 
autonomy, or at least some degree of seif-determination, arc central tenets of nationalism; 
0 to maintain peace and justice in the world, nations must be both sufficiently free and 
sufficiently secure to pursue their own (national) interests (see Breuilly, 1993: 2; Smith, 
1994: 379). 
Admittedly, it needs to be stressed here that the history of nationalism(s) is replete with numerous 
and wide variations. Accordingly, some commentators have despaired of finding, or even 
attempting a universal definition of nationalism. Hall, for example, makes the blunt assertion that 
`no single, universal theory of nationalism is possible. As the historical record is diverse, so too 
must be our concepts' (1993: 1). Other commentators, while not endorsing this degree of 
relativism argue that explanations of nationalism must at least take due account of the temporal 
and societal context (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; C. Williams, 1994, Jenkins, 1995; Smith 
1995a). However, these caveats notwithstanding, there is sufficient consistency among nationalist 
proponents to present the above as the `core doctrine' of nationalism, particularly as it has been 
mobilised historically and politically in the establishment of `nation-states'. 
Which brings us to the `state' and the `nation-state'. The `state', first of all, has been defined in 
western social science theory as an entity a) with political sovereignty over a clearly designated 
territorial area, b) with monopoly control of legitimate force and c) consisting of citizens with 
terminal loyalty to it (Giddens, 1984; Oommen, 1994). The `nation-state' -- the raison d'etre of 
so many historical and current nationalisms -- is the confluence of the nation and the state. As 
Gellner asserts in his seminal Nations and Nationalism, `nationalism is primarily a political 
principle, which holds that the political and the national unit should be congruent' (1983: 1; my 
emphasis). In other words, the core tenet of what might be termed `political nationalism' is the 
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belief that 'the national state, identified with a national culture and committed to its protection, 
is the natural political unit' (Gcllncr, 1993: 409). It follows directly from this principle, of course, 
that all nations should aspire to be represented in and by a state of their own. Moreover, as 
Gellner's latter comment implies, once this coincidence of nation and state has occurred, the 
principal aim of the institutional nation-state is, recursively, to create (or recreate) and maintain 
a particular conception of nationhood and/or national identity. Thus, the Italian nationalist 
Massimo d'Azeglio could declare: 'We have made Italy, now we have to make Italians' (cited in 
Ilobsbawm, 1990: 44). In so doing, the nation-state conflates the cultural/historical and the 
political/Iegal dimensions of nationhood in order to create an homogenous national culture with 
which its members can identify and to which they will be committed. As we shall see, this is 
achieved principally through the establishment and promotion of a common language and civic 
culture, and via the agencies of the state -- most notably, education. 
The nation-state is thus a specifically modern phenomenon; the product, in effect, of the 
nationalism of the last two centuries. However, such is the pervasiveness of the nation-state in 
the modern world, and so unquestioned are the political principles upon which it is predicated, 
that it has come to be largely naturalised and taken for granted. So much so, in fact, that the 
`nation-state' is often seen as synonymous with both `society' and `modernity'. Of the equation 
of the nation-state with society, Zygmunt Bauman observes of western social science generally, 
and of sociology in particular: 
Sociology, as it came of age in the bosom of Western civilisation and as we know of it 
today, is endemically national-based. It does not recognise a totality broader than a 
politically organised [nation-state]: the term `society' ... 
is, for all practical purposes, a 
name for an entity identical in size and composition with the nation-state. (1973: 42-43; 
(see also Halle, 1962; Bauman, 1973; Tilly, 1984) 
Of the correspondence of modernity and the nation-state, Hobsbawm asserts that `the basic 
characteristic of the modem nation and everything associated with it is its modernity' (1990: 14). 
These two tenets combine when nation-states -- or, more specifically, those `nations' whose 
culture is currently represented within and by a `state' -- are compared with those nations, or 
ethnies, which currently are not. As David McCrone observes in this regard, of the early 
development of British sociology: 
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British sociology simply accepted that `society' was coterminous with the British state, 
unitary and highly centralised, driven by social change in the political and cultural 
heartland of southern Britain [i. e., England]. If there was a particular sociology of the 
`periphery' -- in Walcs, Ireland and Scotland -- it had to do with analysing a 'traditional', 
pre-capitalist way of life. It was judged to be the task of the sociologist of these parts 
merely to chart its decline and ultimate incorporation into `modern' society, or so it 
seemed. (1992: 5) 
And so, by implication, we return once again to the pejorative distinction between `ethnicity' and 
the modern `nation-state', first discussed in Chapter 1. However, we can also now specifically 
include within the former category the sublimation of `national minorities', or nations not 
currently represented by a (corresponding) state. In order to explore further the origins, nature, 
and validity of this particular construction, I want now to turn to a closer examination of 
nationalism and the various debates and controversies which have surrounded it. 
Romantic nationalism 
For many nationalists, nations are perennial; they have always existed in one form or another. In 
this view, modern nations can trace their antecedents to the Middle Ages and, in some cases, to 
`nationes' in antiquity. Relatedly, in a position which closely parallels the primordial conceptions 
of ethnicity, the enduring influence of nations, and nationhood, is explained by an ideology of pre- 
existing kinship or ethnic ties. From this, the nation is objectified via a range of `national' 
characteristics -- including language, history, and a variety of specific cultural practices. Both 
primordial ties and the weight of history are thus regularly invoked by nationalists in their 
assertions of (and for) nationhood. Indeed, it is this `deep-seated sense of kinship which infuses 
the nation' (Connor, 1993) that nationalist leaders have so effectively employed in mobilising 
individual members of nations on behalf of nationalist causes. 
This view of nations as objective, pre-given, and fixed social entities has been principally 
expounded by nationalists themselves, although it was also to gain some early currency in 
academic commentary on nationalism. Schleiermacher, for example, viewed the nation as `a 
natural division of the human race, endowed by God with its own character' (cited in Kedourie, 





Fichte -- the 'German Romantics' as they have come to be known -- who have been most closely 
associated with this position in the social sciences. Thus, Johann Gottfried I lerder (1744.1803) 
argued, along very much the same lines, for the divine inspiration of the nation as a natural form 
of human organisation: 'a nation is as natural as a plant, as a family, only with more branches' 
(1969: 324). From this, Herder and Humboldt, and subsequently richte, were to advocate an 
'organic' or 'linguistic ' nationalism where culture -- and particularly, language -- were viewed 
as central to the essence or character (Volksgeist) of the nation. In this perspective, language 
came to be the most important distinguishing characteristic of nationhood » indeed, its very soul. ' 
As Kcdourie observes, language was seen as 'an outward sign of a group's particular identity and 
a significant means of ensuring its continuation' (1960: 71). Or, put another way, the continuing 
existence of a nation was inconceivable without its own language. Without a language, l lerder 
argued, a Volk is an absurdity (Unding), a contradiction in terms (see Barnard, 1965: 57). 
Romantic nationalism's culturalist emphases on 'language, blood and soil' as constitutive elements 
of the Volk were established in direct opposition to the political nationalism of the French 
Revolution and its associated notions of equality and popular sovereignty. Indeed, the anti-French 
feeling of Herder, Humboldt and Fichte, and their general ethnocentrism, are prominent features 
of their writings. Fichte (1762-1814) is the most extreme in this regard. In his Addresses to the 
Genua : Nation [ 1807], he argued that of all the `Teutonic' peoples only the Germans retained 
their original language: `the German speaks a language which has been alive ever since it first 
issued from the force of nature, whereas the other Teutonic races speak a language which has 
movement on the surface but is dead at the root' (1968: 58-59). On the basis of this 
anthropomorphic view of language, Fichte asserted that if German was superior to all other 
languages, then on Herder's principle of the centrality of language to nationhood, the German 
nation was also, by definition, superior to all others. Consequently, Fichte has been attributed 
with extrapolating Herder's (and Humboldt's) ideas about language distinctiveness into the wider 
socio-cultural and political arena (Kedourie, 1960). 2 Kedourie succinctly summarises the logic 
of this process of extrapolation as follows: `a group speaking the same language is known as a 
nation, and a nation ought to constitute a state' (1960: 68). 
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I will have much more to say about the interrelationship between language, ethnicity and 
nationalism in Chapter 4 and will outline there why language can be regarded as a significant 
marker of ethnic and national identity. Suffice it to say at this point, that the arguments of 
romantic nationalism do little to give this view any kind of credibility, and rightly so. The view 
of nations as both natural and linguistically determined -- or, as Richard I landler's describes it, 
as `bounded cultural objects' (1988: 27) -- is both essentialist and determinist. As such, it holds 
little if any currency today, except perhaps among some nationalists. Certainly, it is widely 
dismissed by most commentators on nationalism, many of whom have instead opted for a 
modernist perspective. In this latter view, two principles are seen to be central to any sensible 
discussion of nations and nationalism: 
1) attempts to adduce a clearly definable set of `national' criteria (such as language, for 
example) simply cannot account for all contexts and variants. Consequently, more 
subjective criteria are necessary to describe effectively the formation of nations and 
national identities. 
2) modem nations can be distinguished quite clearly from their historical antecedents; the link 
between the two is not necessarily continuous. 
I will deal with each of these key tenets in turn. 
The will to nationhood 
As we have seen in our discussions on ethnicity, objectivist definitions exclude as much as they 
include; there are always variants and exceptions which do not fit easily into an established schema 
of objective criteria. Kohn, for example, argues that nationalities `come into existence only when 
certain objective bonds delimit a social group' (1961: 3). However, he also quickly concedes that 
these `bonds' are not sufficient in themselves to provide an adequate definition of the nation. This 
`subjectivist' view was first articulated in the nineteenth century -- generally, in direct response 
and opposition to the tenets of cultural and linguistic nationalism outlined above. One of the most 
notable early proponents of this more subjectivist account of nationhood was Ernest Renan (1823- 
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1892). In his seminal lecture, `Qu'cst cc qu'unc nation? ', delivered at the Sorbonne on March 
11 1882, he argued that various objective criteria "" language, religion, material interest, 
geography and `race" - were all insufficient delimiters of the nation. In relation to language, for 
example, and in direct contravention to Fichte, he states: `Language may invite us to unite but it 
does not compel us to do so' (1990: 16). This leads him to conclude that the nation is, in essence, 
`a soul, a spiritual principle' (1990: 19) that is not directly linked to any particular objective 
marker(s). Rather, two aspects constitute this principle for Renan, one of which lies in the past, 
one in the present: 
One is the possession in common of a rich legacy of memories; the other is present-day 
consent, the desire to live together, the will to perpetuate the value of the heritage that 
one has received in an undivided form. A nation is therefore a large-scale solidarity.... It 
presupposes a past; it is summarized, however, in the present by a tangible fact, namely 
consent, the clearly expressed desire to continue a common life. A nation's existence is, 
if you will pardon the metaphor, a daily plebiscite... (1990: 19) 
The will to nationhood both unifies historical memory -- that history 'received in an undivided 
form' -- and secures present-day consent. The former requires some serious forgetting, or 
sublimating, of countervailing and contradictory histories. As Renan famously observes, 
`forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical error, is a crucial factor in the creation of 
a nation' (1990: 11). The latter implies a continual renegotiation of the boundaries of consent -- 
the desire to live together: 'the wish of nations is, all in all, the sole legitimate criterion, the one 
to which one must always return' (1990: 20). Both dimensions suggest our active participation 
in the construction of nationhood; that is, the construction of a particular `discourse on society 
that performs the problem of totalizing the people and unifying the national will' (Bhabha, 1994: 
160-161). 
tax Weber, in his essay on the structures of power, reaches some remarkably similar conclusions. 
Near the outset of his brief analysis of the nation, he states: 
If the concept of `nation' can in any way be defined unambiguously, it certainly cannot be 
stated in terms of empirical qualities common to those who count as members of the 
nation. In the sense of those using the term at a given time, the concept undoubtedly 
means, above all, that one may exact from certain groups of men a specific sentiment of 
solidarity in the face of other groups. 711us, the concept belongs in the sphere of values. 
Yet, there is no agreement on how these groups should be delimited or about what 
concerted action should result from such solidarity. (1961: 172; my emphasis) 
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Weber's analysis, like Renan's, suggests the constructed nature of nationhood; its place 'in the 
sphere of values'. As a result, Weber goes on to explore, and discount, a number of commonly 
invoked prerequisites of nationhood. With regard to a common language, for example, he 
suggests that 'national solidarity among men speaking the same language may be just as well 
rejected as accepted' (1961: 173). Likewise, he dismisses the notion of 'ethnic solidarity' as a 
su cicnt condition of nationhood, although he does concede that 'the idea of the "nation" is apt 
to include the notions of common descent and of an essential, though frequently indefinite, 
homogeneity' (1961: 173; my emphasis); a point to which i will return. 
The conclusions drawn by Renan and Weber clearly emphasise the subjective over the objective 
in the development of nationhood; a cental characteristic of modernist accounts. The will to 
nationhood, in Renan's evocative terms, is both a conscious choice and a particular construction 
of history and therefore cannot be equated directly with pre-existing ethnic, cultural and/or 
linguistic communities. This position seems to be given credence by the many instances where 
the use of objective `national' criteria is shown to be clearly inadequate as a predictor of 
nationhood and nationalism. With regard to ethnic affiliation, for example, Connor (1991) notes 
that modem Greeks are not descended from their alleged ancestors, the ancient I-Iellenes, but from 
Slavs who first migrated to mainland Greece in the sixth century AD. Language and religion are 
also problematic as national indicators. Language may or may not be a key focus of national 
identity, as seen in the nationalist movements of %Vales and Scotland respectively. Even where 
it is, as in Wales, it may not be so across the population as a whole (see Chapter 6). Likewise, 
religion differs in significance from one national context to another. For example, the 
Catholic/Protestant religious divide is a principal factor in nationalist struggles in Northern Ireland 
but not in Scotland. ' More complicated still, objective characteristics such as religion and 
language may vary in salience both internally within a national group and across different 
historical periods. When the Belgium state was established in 1830, for instance, religious 
differences were far more important than linguistic ones. However, more recently, there has been 
far greater emphasis in Belgium on the linguistic differentiation between French and Flemish 
speakers (Vos, 1993). A similar trend is observable in Quebec where nationalist claims since the 
Quiet Revolution have focused increasingly on the French language at the expense of an earlier 
focus on Catholicism (Handler, 1988; Penrose, 1995; see Chapter 5). 
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In short, no single distinguishing feature fits all national contexts. As Anthony Smith observes, 
'a national identity is fundamentally multi-dimensional; it can never be reduced to a single 
clement' (1991: 14). The strident claims of linguistic nationalism can thus be safely dismissed 
since language, it seems, is only one of many characteristics which may (or may not) be salient 
at any given time and place. Where national symbols do achieve significance in particular national 
contexts, and/or in particular historical periods, it is principally because of their role in 
differentiating 'us' from 'them'. As Armstrong (1982) observes, objectified national 
characteristics act in this way as symbolic 'border guards'. These border guards arc closely linked 
to specific cultural codes and function to identify people as members or non-members of the 
specific national collectivity. This is not too dissimilar a position to a situational account of 
ethnicity (cf. Barth, 1969). 
The modern nation 
The second, and related, tenet of the modernist position on nationalism is the argument that 
modern nations are just that - modern - and thus fundamentally distinct from previous forms of 
collective organisation. In short, modernists proclaim that nations -- by which they actually 
invariably mean nation-states (see below) - are the product of the age of nationalism (see, for 
example, Kedourie, 1960; Kohn, 1961; Deutsch, 1966; Seton-Watson, 1977; Nairn, 1981; 
Geilner, 1964,1983; Hobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; Giddens, 1984; Hobsbawm, 1990; Anderson, 
1991; Breuilly, 1993). Moreover, it is argued that this age of nationalism arose out of the specific 
historical and social developments of modernisation and its concomitants -- industrialisation, 
political democracy, and universal literacy - in eighteenth and nineteenth century Europe. Prior 
to this, the feudal, dynastic and largely agrarian societies of the day had little notion of national 
sentiment - those feelings of collective `national' belonging - that characterises the modern 
nation. ' In this view, to equate the modern nation with its ancient predecessors is to commit the 
sin of `retrospective nationalism'. As Smith summarises it: `according to the modernist 
perspective, nations and nationalism are not logically contingent; they are sociologically necessary 
only in the modern world' (1994: 377). 
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The important distinctions between pre-modern and modern nations highlighted by modernists 
can be summarised as follows. First, modern nations tend to be equated directly with their 
political representation in the nation-state. In other words, modern nations arc seen as 'mass' 
nations, based on the notion of universal enfranchisement, and with the specific goal of 
administrative and political representation in the form of the nation-state (Smith, 1995a). In this, 
they arc a product of post-enlightenment political rationalism and the ideology of nationalism, 
both of which emerged only in the eighteenth century. ' 
Second, and relatedly, the term 'nation' in its modern sense embodies two interrelated meanings -- 
the'nation' as the people living wcithür a nation-state and the 'nation' as the nation-state (Billig, 
1995). Accordingly, the modern nation is viewed as both an 'historical culture-community' and 
a 'legal-political' one (Smith, 1995a), «ith the latter invariably taking precedence over the former. 
These two dimensions, and their coalescence in the institutionalised nation-state, arc again 
products of the ideology of political nationalism. Thus, on the one hand, nationalism legitimates 
the construction of a particular sense of national identity for those historical culture-communities 
which are said to inhabit their own nation-state. This involves the exercise of interiml political 
and legal jurisdiction over its citizens and the construction (or attempted construction) of an 
homogenous national culture in which political and ethnic boundaries are seen to coincide 
(Gellner, 1983). On the other hand, political nationalism also includes the general principle that 
nations should, if at all possible, possess their own state. For already established nation-states this 
latter principle involves the exercise of external rights to sovereignty and self-government in the 
present inter-state system, along «ith the defence of these rights -- by war if necessary. For those 
historical culture-communities which do not currently possess their own state, this principle is 
expressed via the many secessionist and irredentist nationalist movements in the world today. 
Third, the link between the modem nation, and its institutional embodiment in the nation-state, 
is further predicated on the rise of a bureaucratic state organisation, a capitalist economy, and a 
`high' literate and scientific culture; the latter based, usually, on a single and distinctive vernacular 
language. All of these are characteristic of modernisation (see below). In contrast, previous 
cultural communities tended to be localised, largely illiterate, and culturally and linguistically 
heterogeneous (Birch, 1989; Hutchinson, 1994; C. Williams, 1994). 
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In the modernist view then, nations (as represented in and by the nation-state) are the product of 
very specific social, economic and political circumstances. Their emergence as the primary social 
community in the modem era is directly related to the advent of modernisation and the 
concomitant rise of the state and the ideology of nationalism. ' As such, any attempt to present 
the nation as a natural and/or ancient form of human organisation must involve what we saw 
described in our discussion of ethnicity in Chapter 1 as `the invention of tradition' (I lobsbawm 
& Ranger, 1983; see also l lobsbawm, 1990). Like situational accounts of ethnicity, modernists 
commentators on nationalism view nations as, at best, socially constructed and, at worst, simply 
invented. In either case, the central relationship between a pre-existing ethnicity and nationhood 
is specifically disavowed. 
The modernists 
What is broadly termed the modernist position on nationalism, however, is by no means 
undifferentiated. In particular, modernists differ over the historical timing of nationalism, and the 
nation-states to which it gave rise, and over the key influences which have surrounded the 
development of nationalism. In relation to the former, a range of starting points for nationalism 
is offered. Kohn (1961) and Greenfeld (1992) suggest the seventeenth century British rebellion 
against the monarchy, Anderson (1991) the American Revolution, Best (1988) and Alter (1989) 
the French Revolution, and Kedourie (1960) and Breuilly (1993) the German response of Herder 
et at to the political implications of the French revolution. All are agreed, however, about the 
historical recency of nationalism' and its rapid and widespread development. As Best (1982) 
succinctly observes, by the beginning of the nineteenth century the world was full of it. In relation 
to the latter, a range of key influences is attributed by modernist writers to the rise of nationalism. 
Gellner (1983) has argued, for example, that the emergence of nationalism is predicated on the 
impact of industrialisation, Anderson (1991) on the role of print capitalism, and Giddens (1984) 
and Breuilly (1993) on the development of the modem state. 
It is not my intention here to explore in any depth the full range of modernist theories; there are 
numerous books already devoted to such a task (for some recent examples, see Breuilly, 1993; 
Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 1991; 1995a). However, it is my intention to examine in some detail 
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two exemplars of this position -- Ernest Gellncr (1983, see also 1964) and Benedict Anderson 
(1991). These two theorists illustrate the modernist position writ large and their work on 
nationalism has been particularly prominent and influential. As we shall sec, both theorists also 
place a prominent emphasis on the interconnections between nationalism, language and education, 
a concern which is central to this account and which will be explored more fully in the following 
chapters. 
Gellner's theory of industrialisation 
Gdlner argues, in Nations and Natio»alisni (1983), that the rise of nationalism cannot simply be 
explained ideologically -- that is, as the result of a contest of ideas -- but must be rooted in the 
material changes brought about in Europe at the end of the eighteenth century by 
industrialisation. In this, his analysis is essentially functionalist, although it bears similarities to 
some Marxist perspectives on nationalism. 10 For Gellner, nationalism developed within the 
context of the transition from traditional agrarian societies to modern industrial societies. In the 
former, literacy performed a specialised function and, along with occupational mobility, was 
limited to a small elite. Mass public education was unheard of. Political control was also largely 
decentralised and populations spoke a variety of languages and dialects. Localism in both speech 
form and cultural identification was the norm and, consequently, there was little, if any, emphasis 
on achieving a uniform state culture. As Gellner observes, `what is virtually inconceivable within 
such a system is a serious and sustained drive for linguistic and cultural homogeneity.... Both the 
will and the means [and, one might add, the heed] for such an aspiration are conspicuously 
lacking' (1987: 15). " 
In contrast, the modern industrialised society - with its literate, mobile, and occupationally 
specialised division of labour -- required cultural continuity and, where possible, cultural 
homogeneity in order to function effectively. In this context, individuals needed to be 
`substitutable' -- that is, they had to be able to cope with and move between the increasingly 
complex and differentiated roles created by the division of labour. What makes the individual 
`substitutable' in this way is a significant degree of cultural and linguistic homogeneity and this 
was achieved via the implementation of state sponsored `national' education systems. For 
Gellner, mass education -- established, maintained and monitored by the state -- provided the 
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literacy and'tcchnological compctcnce' ncccssary for producing 'full' or'cfcctivc' citizens in 
modern industrial socictics. 
The principle of 'one state, one culture' thus saw the state, via its education system, increasingly 
identified with a specific language and culture. As Gcllncr asserts: 'whereas in the past the 
connection [between state and culture] was thin, fortuitous, varied, loose and often minimal.... 
now it [became] unavoidable. That is what nationalism is all about... ' (1983: 38). The result was 
the emergence of the nation-state in which cultural and political boundaries were seen to 
conveniently converge. In Gcllner's view, the rise of nationalism is thus inextricably linked to the 
prior development of a strong state culture from which an homogenous nation could be shaped. 
As he observes: 
It is not the case that the `age of nationalism' is a mere summation of the awakening and 
political self-assertion of this, that, or the other nation. Rather when general social 
conditions make for standardized, homogenous, centrally sustained high cultures, 
pervading ethnic populations and not just elite minorities, a situation arises in which is'ell- 
dt uteri educationally sanctioned and unified cultures constitute very nearly the only kind 
of unity with which men willingly and often ardently identify. The cultures now seem to 
be the natural repositories of political legitimacy. Only their does it come to appear that 
any defiance of their boundaries by political units constitutes a scandal. (1983: 55; my 
emphasis in the first instance) 
Gellner's analysis situates nationalism in the social, economic and political changes of the time 
while also linking nationalism specifically to the development of a literate, national `high' culture. 
Nationalism has flourished, he suggests, because `well-defined, educationally sanctioned and 
unified cultures' offer a path to modernity, a basis of political legitimacy, and a means of shared 
cultural identity. 
'1 nderson's `imagined communities' 
Benedict Anderson's likening of the modern nation to an `imagined political community' evokes 
a similar conception. In his influential analysis, Anderson argues that all national communities are 
`imagined because the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow- 
members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their 
communion' (1991: 6). This is not to say that a sense of national consciousness or identity is 
imagimuy. It is merely to suggest that the idea of a collective `national' community, like all large- 
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scale collectivities, has to be specificallh and consciously cultivated since it involves concciving 
of something that is beyond one's immediate day-to-day experience. As he outlines, `my point 
of departure is that nationality, or, as one might prefer to put it in view of that word's multiple 
signification, nation-ness, as well as nationalism, arc cultural artefacts of a particular kind' (1991: 
4). 
Anderson argues that the development of the modern nation `conceived as a solid community 
moving steadily down (or up) history' (1991: 26) arose from the congruence of industrial 
capitalism and print technology in fifteenth and sixteenth century Europe. The convergence of 
capitalism and print technology at this time saw the rapid spread in print of previously localised 
vernacular languages. These developments gave a new fixity to language and created unified 
fields of exchange and communication below Latin (the dominant administrative language of the 
day) and above the spoken vernaculars. As a result, vernacular languages came to assume many 
of the administrative functions previously enjoyed only by Latin and rose to be `languages-of- 
power'. As speakers of languages with widely different dialects became capable of 
comprehending one another, via print, they also came to recognise themselves as belonging to one 
particular language (and cultural) group among many. With the advent of modernisation and the 
increasing centralisation of state control, this was to lead, in turn, to an emerging sense of national 
consciousness. By this process, a shared sense of a particular nation's history -- along with its 
associated language(s) and cultural symbols -- began to be cultivated. 
Anderson argues that this emerging national consciousness `could arise historically only when 
substantial groups of people were in a position to think of themselves as living lives parallel to 
those of other substantial groups of people -- if never meeting, yet certainly proceeding along the 
same trajectory' (1991: 188). In this way, a new kind of indirect relationship was formed in which 
the biographies of individuals, and the nation as a whole, could be joined in a common historical 
narrative (Calhoun, 1993a). We may all have our own personal histories but the claim to 
nationhood provides us with a collective sense of history: 
by linking us to past and future generations; 
by situating us in the global context as a member of one nation among many, and; 
by providing formal equivalence for us as one member among many of a specific nation. 
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Other modernist commentators (sec, for example, I Iobsbawm & Ranger, 1983; 1 iobsbawm, 1990; 
Balibar, 1991) would suggest at this point that the construction of such collective histories is 
fictive. In the British context, for example, this is said to be reflected in the invented traditions 
of Scottish tartans and highland culture (Trcvor-Ropcr, 1983), in the nineteenth century druidic 
inventions of the %Vclsh cistcddfodau (sec Chapter 6), and even in the supposed centrality of the 
monarchy to conceptions of British identity (Cannadinc, 1983; Colley, 1992). This 'inventionist' 
position, most trenchantly outlined by Ilobsba smn (1990), has dear parallels with Roosens' (1989) 
account of the construction of I luron ethnicity outlined in Chapter 1.1 lowcvcr, Anderson is less 
concerned here with outlining a moral position on nationalism. " lie argues simply that all 
modern nations are imagined in this way. It is not so much the falsity/genuineness of nations 
which is thus in question but the style in which they are imagined. " 
Like Gellner then, Anderson's principal thesis is that the rise of nationalism has effected the 
construction of the modem nation as we know it in its nation-state form -- an anonymous, socially 
differentiated and large scale collectivity with its basis in the categorical relationships of equivalent 
individuals. The sense of commonality that results has seen `the "imagined community" ... spread 
out to every conceivable contemporary society' (1991: 157). Nonetheless, the nation and 
nationality are, for all that, still cultural artefacts. Nationalism has produced nations (as nation- 
states) and national identity, not the other way around. 
Limits of the modernist account 
However, as with situational accounts of ethnicity, modernist conceptions of nationalism and 
national identity may be overstated. Modernists have been rightly sceptical of perennial and 
primordial accounts which attempt to `naturalise' nationhood via a pre-existing ethnicity and/or 
language and have also highlighted the apparent disjunctures between modern nation-states and 
earlier collectivities. However, on this basis, modernists cannot account for the ongoing 
persistence of nationalism in the modern world -- particularly in situations where political 
modernisation has already been achieved. After all, the logic of the modernist argument is that 
as nationalism supersedes ethnicity, so should internationalism replace nationalism as the next 
stage of the modernisation process. Instead, neither has really occurred. The rise today of an 
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increasing intcrnationalisation appears in cvi: uncriois uriih nationalism rather than as a 
replacement for it (Robertson, 1992; see Chapter 1). Likewise, ethnicity continues to feature 
prominently in relationship to nationalism, as the increasing proliferation of `cthnonationalisms' 
in the modem world highlights. 
Part of this inability to predict the ongoing salience of ethnicity and nationalism, and their 
interconnections, can be explained by Anthony Smith's observation that, in rejecting primordial 
accounts entirely, modernist commentators on nationalism have confused individual and collective 
levels of ethnicity. As I argued in Chapter 1, we may, as individuals, demonstrate a considerable 
degree of latitude in our attachment to and choice of particular social and political identities. As 
such, ethnic choices and identifications may vary in their salience -- both in themselves, and in 
relation to other social identities -- at any given time and place. Ilowever, this view needs to be 
balanced by the recognition that `at the collective as opposed to the individual level, ethnicity 
remains a powerful, explosive and durable force' (Smith, 1995a: 34). 
Some modernists have countered here with an economic 'core-periphery' explanation -- that 
ethnonationalism persists because modernisation proceeded unequally, leading to the uneven 
economic development of certain historical culture-groups within particular nation-states and, 
thus, to the growth of ethnonationalist movements (see, for example, Deutsch, 1966; Wallerstein, 
1979). An obvious example here is the `internal colonialist' thesis advanced by Rechter (1975; 
see also Nairn, 1981). Hechter argued that uneven economic development in Britain led to a 
stratified 'cultural division of labour' in the `Celtic fringe' of Wales, Ireland and Scotland which, 
in turn, could account for their respective nationalisms: 
To the extent that social stratification in the periphery is based on observable cultural 
differences, there exists the probability that the disadvantaged group will, in time, 
reactively assert its own culture as equal or superior to that of the relatively advantaged 
core. This may help it conceive of itself as a separate `nation' and seek independence. 
(1975: 10) 
However, the model of internal colonialism has since been widely contested. McCrone (1992), 
for example, points out that while the Scottish highlands, or Gaeltachd, may have been seen as 
a suitably appropriate example of the model, the `culturally anglicised' and `overdeveloped' 
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lowlands of Scotland certainly were not. Likewise, in relation to Wales, internal colonialism 
considerably understates the centrality of south Wales to the rapid development and expansion 
of British industrialisation (G. A. Williams, 1982,1985). In Williams' view, the industrialised 
south of Wales was no mere satellite of an imperial economic core based in London, as I icchtcr 
would have it. Rather, the imperial core came to Wales. This can be demonstrated by the huge 
influx of migrants to the area in the late nineteenth century, and by the consequent reconstruction 
of local Welsh issues and concerns as British ones (C. Williams 1994; sec Chapter 6). 
If we look more widely, the relatively prosperous Catalan, Basque and Quebecois nationalist 
movements also illustrate the limits of the core-periphery approach. " While adverse economic 
factors may play a significant part in some ethnonationalist movements (as we saw in Chapter 1), 
they are not a sufficient explanation for the ongoing prominence of such movements in the 
modern world. Moreover, economic considerations aside, a modernist conception still cannot 
answer the question of u-1W ethnicity -- as opposed to religion, regionalism or class, for example 
is so often chosen as the principal focus of nationalist mobilisation. 
Ethnicist approaches to nationalism 
For a more adequate explanation, we need to consider an approach which returns ethnicity and 
ethnic identity to the study of nationalism (see, for example, Armstrong, 1982; Fishman, 1989b; 
Smith, 1983,1986,1991,1995a; Hutchinson, 1994; Jenkins, 1995). As Richard Jenkins argues: 
If the concept [of nationalism] is to retain its analytical value, the varieties of what we 
persist in calling `nationalism' must also have something in common. Although not the 
only common thread - political membership conceived as citizenship might be another 
ethnicity, personal and collective identity which draws upon a repertoire of perceived 
cultural differences, is the most ubiquitous and plausible... (1995: 369) 
Ethnicist approaches accept many of the tenets of modernism -- particularly the, at times, 
constructed nature of national identity. However, they also address three of the key weaknesses 
of the modernist thesis: its historicity, its conflation of the `nation' and the `nation-state', and its 
separation of political and ethnic nationalism(s). I will deal with each of these key issues in turn. 
60 
Historical continuity 
First, while cthnicist commentators acknowledge the distinctive characteristics of the modern 
nation, they also argue that the processes of nation formation need to be examined within and 
through a longer and more cyclical account of history. In this view, nationalism comes to be 
situated uiithin a wider theory of ethnic formation, an approach which emphasises commwmlities 
as well as di fjercirccs between the pr -modern and modern eras. As Anthony Smith argues, the 
rise of nationalism and the nation-state /zac been shaped by pre-modern ethnic identities (ethnics), 
whatever modernists might say, and thus can be situated «ithin a larger cycle of ethnic resurgence 
and decline in history. " His position specifically links 'the consequences of modernity with an 
understanding of the continuing role played by cultural tics and ethnic identities which originated 
in pre-modern epochs' (1995a: 47). Richard Jenkins reiterates this view in his observation that 
`nationalism is an aspect of the growth of... complex political units, based, to some degree, on 
notions of ethnic and cultural commonality (however, much, 1xace Anderson, imagined)' (1995: 
370). 
Following this argument, the formation of modern nations is seen to involve the appropriation of 
some of the key attributes of pre-existing ethnies. In the process, many extant memories, myths 
and symbols are assimilated, while additional ones are invented where necessary. Crucially, this 
view also allows us to extend the principle of nation formation beyond established nation-states 
to include those nations which are currently not represented by a corresponding state (see below), 
something not countenanced in modernist accounts. Thus, for example, the modern Breton 
nationalist movement draws heavily on the persistence of Breton traditions, myths, memories and 
symbols which have survived, in various forms, throughout the period of French domination since 
1532. Likewise, Catalan nationalism - first instigated in 1880, revived in the 1930s, and again 
in the 1980s - draws on Catalonia's long maritime history and the attraction and prestige of the 
Catalan language and culture (see Smith 1995a: 57-58). Accordingly, the difference between 
modem nations and ethnies becomes a question of degree rather than kind. As Jenkins observes, 
`the boundary between "ethnicism" and "nationalism" ... 
becomes indeterminate, lying somewhere 
along a continuum of change within historically evolving traditions or universes of discourses' 
(1995: 372). 
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In adopting a more evolutionary position, however, ctlhnicist commentators do not make the 
mistake of assuming a causal relationship between prior ethnics and the subsequent formation of 
modern nations. As Ilutchinson observes, to do so without empirical examination is to make 
uncritical assumptions about continuities between pre-modern ethnic and modern national 
identities and to fall into the post hoc ergo proptcr hoc fallacy' (1994: 26: sec also Fishman, 
1989b: 111). Nonetheless, they hold that the distinction between modern nations and pre-modern 
ethnic communities has been too starkly drawn by modernists. Thus, a modernist account such 
as Gellner's can be criticised for its teleological overtones in emphasising a single and 
revolutionary transition from pre-industrial to industrial society as an explanation for nationalism. 
Geilner's difficulties here are that in many contexts (e. g., Eastern Europe) nationalism predates 
industrialisation. Moreover, a causal link between industrialisation and mass education may be 
overstated since Britain, the first industrialised country, did not develop a state education system 
until 1870. 
In ethnicist accounts then, nationalism is viewed not only as a means to achieve modernity but 
also, crucially, as a means of (re)creating a sense of distinctive collective identity and autonomy 
(Hutchinson, 1994). The nation is not just seen as a political community represented by the 
nation-state. It is also viewed as an ellmocultural community which may or may not be so 
represented and yet which is still shaped by shared myths of origins, and a sense of common 
history and ways of life. Moreover, it is principally this latter dimension which endows its 
members %tiith identity and purpose (Armstrong, 1982; Fishman, 1989b; Hutchinson, 1994; Smith, 
1986,1991,1995a). In this sense, nationalism and national identity can be understood in relation 
to the notion of habitus, and to the related limits concerning the constructedness of ethnic 
identities discussed in Chapter 1. Bhikhu Parekh argues, for example, that national identity is a 
process of self-creation that does not occur in a historical vacuum. Rather, 
A [national] community inherits a specific way of life ... which sets 
limits to how and how 
much it can change itself. The change is lasting and deep if it is grafted on the 
community's suitably reinterpreted deepest tendencies and does not go against the grain. 
A community's political [and cultural] identity then is neither unalterable and fixed, nor 
a voluntarist project to be executed as it pleases, but a matter of slow self-recreation 
within the limits set by it past. (1995b: 264; my emphases)" 
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Such a position shifts the focus away from the increasingly and debates surrounding the historical 
and political legitimacy of nationalism. As Joshua Fishman has argued, in an essay first published 
in 1972, 'we must not ask if [nationalism] is "good", if it is "justified", if it is based on "valid 
arguments". Rather, we must ask "why does it occur, and when, and how can its obvious power 
be most productively channelled"? ' (1989b: 104). These questions are crucial to unravelling the 
ongoing salience and alliance of ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. By attending to 
the popular base and cultural framework of nationalism -- an area which modernists have chosen 
to ignore -- cthnicist accounts provide us with a plausible explanation to these questions. Aller 
all, it is not chronological or factual history that is the key to the nation but seintic. "nnt or fell history 
(Connor, 1993). As Craig Calhoun observes, 'ethnicity or cultural traditions are bases for 
nationalism when they effectively constitute historical memory, when they inculcate it as habitus 
... not when 
(or because) the historical origins they claim are accurate' (1993a: 222). 
Uncoupling the nation-state 
In so doing, an ethnicist approach also allows us to untangle the confluence of the historical- 
cultural and legal-political dimensions of nationhood as they have come to be represented in the 
institutionalised form of the nation-state. As I have already suggested, this has arisen from the 
central principle of political nationalism -- nation-state congruence -- which holds that the 
boundaries of political and national identity should coincide. The view here is that people who 
are citizens of a particular state should also, ideally, be members of the same national collectivity. 
Gellner's definition of nationalism as a `theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic 
boundaries should not cut across political ones' (1983: 1) clearly illustrates this standpoint. The 
end result of nationalism, in this view, is the establishment of the ethnically exclusive and 
culturally homogenous nation-state. 
This attempt to make both state and national culture coextensive entities has resulted in the 
nation-state system as we know it today and continues to form the basis of many of the current 
nationalist claims for self determination. And yet, interestingly, the earliest uses of the term 
'rationalism did not actually conflate the nation and the state in this way (Connor, 1978). 
However, by the nineteenth century nationalist doctrine had come to hold that nation and state 
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were coterminous; that every nation deserved a state. Not only this. an important corollary had 
also by then emerged - that each state should represent one nation. As Gcllncr describes it, 
nationalism holds that the nation and state 'were destined for each other; that either without the 
other is incomplete, and constitutes a tragedy' (1983: 6). Max Weber appears to reiterate this in 
his observation that '... a nation is a community which normally tends to produce a state of its 
own' (1961: 176). This crucial intcrlinking of the idea of nation, and its political representation 
in the state is perhaps not too surprising. As Immanuel Wallerstcin observes: 
\V'hy should the establishment of any particular sovereign state within the interstate system 
create a corresponding `nation', a `people'? This is not really difficult to understand. The 
evidence is all around us. States in this system have problems of cohesion. Once 
recognised as sovereign, the states frequently find themselves subsequently threatened by 
both internal disintegration and external aggression. To the extent that `national' 
sentiment develops, these threats are lessened. The governments in power have an 
interest in promoting this sentiment, as do all sorts of subgroups within the state.... States 
furthermore have an interest in administrative uniformity that increases the efficacy of their 
policies. Nationalism is the expression, the promoter and the consequence of such state- 
level uniformities. (1991: 81-82) 
«'allerstein argues, along with other modernist commentators, that nationalism arose out of the 
emergence of the modern state system: `in almost every case statehood precede[s] nationhood' 
(1991: 81). Political expression in the form of the nation-state thus legitimates and 
histitutio, zalises nationhood. However, a sense of national sentiment is also at the same time 
promoted by the agencies of the state -- particularly education and the media - and this acts 
recursively to maintain the nation-state's internal cohesion. This, in turn, provides a basis on 
which to counter possible outside threats to its autonomy. The state's role is thus crucial in 
accomplishing the three recurrent goals of nationalism which I outlined at the beginning of this 
chapter -- national identity, national unity and national autonomy (see Smith, 1994). The 
imbuement of citizenship with `national' sentiment also helps to explain for modernists why 
'national' identities - or, rather, `civic' ones - commonly `trump' other personal or group 
identities (Calhoun, 1993 a). 
The principal difficulty with the formulation of nation-state congruence, however, is its iirnbility 
to accommodate and'or recognise the legitimate claims of nations without states, or national 
minorities. This limitation has two related dimensions; one theoretical and one practical. 
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Theoretically, the conflation of the nation and the state assumes that the two concepts arc 
reducible to each other when they clearly arc not. Nations are ollen but not always represented 
in and by a [nation-]state. Or, to put it another way, citi: cnship does not always equate directly 
%%ith riatiolxrlityy. " Practically, and following from this, the `nation-state' is actually a misnomer 
since its construction as ethnically exclusive and culturally homogenous is directly contradicted 
by demographic and political realities. 
In relation to the former, it is worth noting that Wcbcr's earlier comment on the link between 
nation and state contains an important qualification: 'a nation ... normally tenor to produce a 
state of its own' (1961: 176; my emphasis). The qualification suggests a distinction between 
nation and state and Weber reiterates this distinction even more clearly elsewhere in his 
observation that a "`nation" is ... not 
identical with the "people of the state", that is, with the 
membership of a given polity' (1961: 172). In short, nation and state are not one and the same 
thing. As such, the `nation' should be seen as a separate ideological and political construct from 
that of the `nation-state' (Anthias & Yuval-Davis, 1992). 
In relation to the latter, the happy coincidence of national and state loyalties, while the central aim 
of political nationalism, seldom actually occurs. Smith (1983) notes, for example, that even in 
Europe - where, arguably, the ideal of the nation-state is strongest -- there were, at the time of 
his writing, 73 nations and only 24 states. Likewise, several nations can co-exist within the 
boundaries of a particular state -- Britain and India are obvious examples here. The Welsh 
nationalist Dafydd Elis Thomas is at pains to point out this distinction between nation and state 
in the British context: 
Britain is a state rather than a nation. The British state, imposed upon the English, 
Scottish, Welsh and part of the Irish peoples and then imposed world wide, is an 
inherently imperial and colonial concept at home and abroad. The British state cannot and 
should not be an object of affection, save for those who want to live in a form of 
authoritarian dependency. (cited in Gilroy, 1990: 263) 
A comparison of the terms `nationalism' and `patriotism' may help to illustrate this distinction 
further. As Walker Connor argues, `Nationalism, in correct usage, refers to an emotional 
attachment to one's people - one's ethnocultural group. It is therefore proper to speak of an 
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English, Scottish, or Welsh nationalism, but not of 'British' nationalism, the latter being a 
manifestation of PATRIOTISM' (1993: 374; emphasis in original). On this argument, nationalism 
and patriotism will only coincide in 'true' nation-states; that is, in states where the population is 
ethnically homogenous. I lowcvcr, Connor proceeds to point out that this is extremely rare since 
most states, by this definition, arc not actually nation-states at all. For example, in 40 percent of 
all states there are at least five or more statistically and/or politically significant ethnic groups, 
while in nearly one-third of all states (31 per cent) the largest national group is not even the 
majority (Connor, 1993; see also Niclsson, 1985). These groups comprise both national and 
indigenous minorities -- such as Irish, Scots and Welsh in Britain, Ilawai'ians and Native 
Americans in the USA, Queb&cois and Aboriginal peoples in Canada, Sami in Finland, Norway 
and Sweden, and Wori in New Zealand -- and a wide variety of immigrant groups. The result 
is that most states are inulhi-iratio, ra! (comprising a number of national minorities) and/or 
polyedulic (comprising a range of immigrant groups). Indeed, most countries in the world have 
been historically, and remain today, a combination of the two (Kymlicka, 1995a). " As Anthias 
Yuval-Davis conclude: 
Today there is virtually nowhere in the world in which ... a pure nation-state exists, 
if it 
ever did, and therefore there are always settled residents (and usually citizens as well) who 
are not members of the dominant national collectivity in the society. The fact that there 
still exists this automatic assumption about the overlap between the boundaries of the state 
citizens and `the nation', is one expression of the naturalizing effect of the hegemony of 
one collectivity and its access to ideological apparatuses of both state and civil society. 
This constructs minorities into assumed deviants from the `normal', and excludes them 
from important power resources. (1992: 21-22) 
If, as these commentators suggest, the ethnically exclusive and culturally homogenous `nation- 
state' is a misnomer, how has it come to so dominate conceptions of nationalism and nationhood? 
This, in turn, leads us to another question. Even if we acknowledge the primacy of multinational 
and polyethnic states -- and it is hard not to - why does the dominant ethnic group in these states 
so often continue to perceive the state as the political expression of their particular ethnic group 
(and, usually, theirs' alone)? I will explore these questions more fully in the final section of this 
chapter. Before doing so, however, I want to turn to the final limitation of modernist conceptions 
of nationalism -- which is closely related to much of the preceding discussion -- that is, the 
dominance of statist (or political) nationalisms over what might be termed `cultural nationalisms'. 
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Statist and cultural nationalisms 
An inevitable corollary of the modernist rejection of ethnicity as a central variable in nation 
formation is, as' we have seen, an over-emphasis on the political and civic elements of nationalism 
at the expense of its cultural dimensions. In effect, this has involved the legitimation of the 
'Staatsnation' over the 'Kulturnation'. The latter, accordingly, has often been relegated to an 
'ethnic' rather than a 'national' concern, a move illustrated by the commonly invoked distinction 
between ethnicity and nationalism in the academic literature. Anthias & Yuval"Davis provide us 
with a representative example of this distinction: 
there is no inherent difference (although sometimes there is a difference in scale) between 
ethnic and national collectivities. What is specific to the nationalist project and discourse 
is the claim for a separate political representation for the collectivity. This often -- but not 
always -- takes the form of a claim for a separate state (1992: 25). 
No« er, in reality, the distinction drawn here between ethnicity and nationalism is not nearly so 
straightforward. As Craig Calhoun observes, in a somewhat more nuanced analysis: 
The relationship between nationalism and ethnicity is complex.... Nationalism, in 
particular, remains the pre-eminent rhetoric for attempts to demarcate political 
communities, claim rights of self-determination and legitimate rule by reference to 'the 
people' of the country. Ethnic solidarities and identities are claimed most often when 
groups do not seek `national' autonomy but rather a recognition internal to or cross- 
cutting national or state boundaries. The possibility of a closer link to nationalism is 
seldom altogether absent from such ethnic claims, however, and the two sorts of 
categorical identities are often invoked in similar ways. (1993a: 235) 
Even this analysis though does not go far enough, since it continues to assume, unproblematically, 
nationalism's principal preoccupation with political and civic legitimation -- externally via its 
autonomy in the inter-state system, and internally via the establishment of national citizenship. 
In this regard, the aspiration of nations for statehood may be overdrawn. While attaining 
statehood is offen the central aim of nationalist movements it may not always be and nationalist 
movements may be content to pursue more limited political aims in relation to self-determination. 
Nationalist sentiments need not therefore be limited to the questions of state formation or 
secession; indeed, statehood need not even be the central issue at stake. The long-held emphasis 
on statist definitions of nationalism has tended, as a result, to preclude the recognition of a much 
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eider range of cultural nationalisms (Fishman, 1989b; I lutchinson, 1987,1994). These cultural 
nationalisms are a recurring force in the modern world and, ironically perhaps, seem currently to 
affect most those western nations whose state power and boundaries have long been settled. Such 
nationalisms are concerned principally %%ith what constitutes national fclcntllyy, and with the moral 
regeneration of the national cvm: uurni, ); or 'way of life', rather than with state secession as such. 
Via this communitarian emphasis, cultural nationalisms attempt to reconstruct tradition (be it 
historical, cultural or linguistic) in order to meet more adequately the demands of modernity 
(llutchinson, 1994). 
That said, cultural nationalisms %, *ill always incorporate some political aims and, as such, may 
develop into political nationalisms with their attendant claims to independent statehood -- as seen, 
for example, in Quebec in recent times. In effect, as Calhoun's comment above suggests, both 
political and cultural emphases are likely to be present at any given time in nationalist movements, 
even if different weightings are ascribed to them. Moreover, these weightings may also vary in 
salience over time. Nonetheless, cultural and political nationalism can be seen as distinct variants, 
with differing emphases and concerns. Cultural nationalisms are principally concerned not so 
much with tradition per se but with the modernisation of national communities from within, 
thereby enabling socio-political development on more indigenous lines. " They also differ from 
political nationalisms in the nature and extent of their political organisation -- comprising largely 
small-scale 'grass roots' movements which have as their principal foci specific historical, linguistic 
and educational concerns (Hutchinson, 1994). 20 
NVales provides us with a clear example of cultural nationalism here. As Richard Jenkins (1991, 
1995) argues, Wales has had a long history of political and economic incorporation into the 
British state. Wales is institutionally far less autonomous and distinct than Scotland, for example; 
the latter still having its own church, law and education system. The degree of Welsh political 
incorporation into the British state is clearly illustrated by the administrative term `England and 
Wales' which is employed to describe a wide range of shared institutions and programmes (as in, 
for example, the `National Curriculum of England and Wales'). Given this, Welsh nationalism has 
sought its legitimacy historically largely in `cultural continuity' and collective memory (C. 
Williams, 1994). This can be seen particularly in the promotion of Welsh culture, and its 
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associated traditions, and in the importance placed on the Welsh language. As Jenkins argues: 
'In Wales, the defence and promotion of Welsh culture -- symbolised most sharply by the Welsh 
language - is the dominant item on the nationalist agenda, with some form of devolved self- 
government coming a poor second' (1991: 32). While this does not preclude the quest for 
statehood among some Welsh nationalists -- particularly in light of a slightly more positive 
attitude to Welsh devolution in recent tines (see Chapter 6) -- the history of Welsh nationalism 
demonstrates that there arc means other than state recognition by which national distinctiveness 
can be attained and maintained. 
Moreover, the move to greater regional autonomy in Britain, and elsewhere, does not necessarily 
fuel the fires of political nationalism at the expense of former culturalist emphases. In continental 
Europe, for example, the European Union's increasing emphasis on regional autonomy has 
strengthened rather than weakened the tenets of some cultural nationalist movements. Thus, in 
relation to Catalan nationalism, Jordi Capo, Professor of Political Science at Barcelona University, 
can observe: `The Catalans prefer the pragmatic route to obtain maximum regional powers. The 
most important thing was to guarantee our language. The notion of sovereignty, on the other 
hand, has lost its importance and will have steadily less importance as the European Union gets 
stronger' (Me Guardia, 8 May, 1996: 16). 
The modernist mistake then has been to assume that cultural and political nationalisms are entirely 
separate phenomena - the former related only to `ethnic' groups, the latter only to `national' ones 
-- rather than distinct variants of the same phenomenon. This dominance of statist or political 
forms of nationalism, and the consigning of cultural nationalism to the realms of `mere ethnicity' 
can be traced back to the principle of nation-state congruence, discussed in the preceding section. 
Nationalism is only nationalism (and therefore justifiable), it seems, when it is tied to the 
modernising state (Calhoun, 1993a). This is to miss an essential element of the power of 
nationalism, its chameleon-like quality (Smith, 1995a). However, as Smith proceeds to observe: 
It is also crucially to misunderstand the relationship between culture and politics in 
nationalism. Nationalism cannot be reduced to the uniform principle that the cultural unit 
must be made congruent with the political unit. Not only does this omit a number of other 
vital nationalist tenets, it fails to grasp the fact that the development of any nationalism 
depends on bringing the cultural and moral regeneration of the community into a close 
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rclationship. if not hannony, %sith the political mobilisation and sc1P dctcrmination of its 
members. (1995a: 13) 
In short, the principal consequence of this approach has been to legitimate the 'legal-political' 
dimensions of nationhood over the 'cultural-historical'. For majority ethnic groups the result has 
been relatively unproblematic since the latter dimension (their ethnic habitus, in effect) is seen to 
cotrc po, xl directly %Nith the former. In so doing, their 'ethnic' tics arc normalised and legitimated 
as'civic' ones. For minority groups, however, their ethnic habitus is seen to be distinct from and 
oppositional to the legal-political interests of the nation-state. Accordingly, any claims that arc 
made for some degree of ethnic autonomy vis-3-vis the nation-state, and/or greater civic 
representation within it, are rejected as inherently parochial and destabilising. 
Dominant cthnies 
The fundamentally different treatment of majority and minority ethnic groups within the nation- 
state is indicative of what Michael Billig (1995) describes as the `projection' of nationalism onto 
`others' and the 'naturalisation' of one's own. Billig describes the latter process as banal 
nationalism and he equates this, as I have, with contemporary `civic' loyalties to nation-states. 
The naturalisation of such ties means that banal nationalism - that is, the nationalism of the 
dominant ethnic - `not only ceases to be nationalism ... 
it ceases to be a problem for investigation' 
(1995: 17). By this, the ihegemonic construction of the nation-state is overlooked, or at the very 
least, is viewed as unproblematic. And yet, as Billig again observes: 
The battle for nationhood is [specifically] a battle for hegemony, by which a part claims 
to speak for the whole nation and to represent the national essence.... The triumph of a 
particular nationalism is seldom achieved %vithout the defeat of alternative nationalisms 
and other ways of imagining peoplehood. (1995: 27,28) 
Walker Connor (1973,1993) uses the term `Staatsvolk' to illustrate the process by which the 
dominant ethnic group comes to determine the `national essence' of the nation-state. Staatsvolk 
describes a people who are culturally and politically pre-eminent in a state, even though other 
groups are present in significant numbers. Connor suggests that, by their pre-eminence, the 
dominant group's culture and language come to be represented as the core or national culture and 
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language. Minority groups, and their languages and cultures, consequently tend to be excluded 
from 'national' recognition. At the same time, minority groups are also variously encouraged 
and/or coerced by the dominant ethnic to assimilate to 'national' (i. c, dominant ethnic) norms. 
These countervailing pressures place minority groups in a double bind. If they resist, their 
attempts at maintaining a distinct identity are often labelled as a parochial and anti-national form 
of communalism. This is despite the fact that the dominant cthnic's advocacy of a 'universalistic' 
national consensus is simply a majoritarian version of the same process (Dcnch, 1986). if they 
acquiesce, minority groups may still face exclusion from the full benefits or a. 'national' identity 
determined and delimited by the dominant ethnic (sec below). 
The ethnic hegemony which results sees a situation in which members of the Staatsvolk control 
knowledge/pow er, and thus the creation of socio-cultural reality, through both their socio- 
economic dominance and their control over the major institutions of the state (Bullivant, 1981). 
This process of ethnic hegemony can be clearly demonstrated, in the British context, by the 
dominance of England, and particularly its south-east region, over the affairs of the British state 
(see, for example, Rechter, 1975; Nairn, 1981; Evans, 1989a). Many English people, for 
example, have a tendency to use the term England to describe the entire British state and English 
to describe all the people therein. This, of course, simply reminds the Welsh, Scots, and other 
non-English peoples living in Britain that they live in a multinational state dominated by the 
English (Connor, 1993; Crick, 1989,1995; Miles, 1996; see Chapter 6). 
Most modernist accounts of nationalism accept this process of ethnic hegemony uncritically, 
assuming it to be the necessary price of modernisation. 2' Gellner, for example, has argued that 
it was the requirements of a modem industrialised society that led to the perceived need for an 
homogenous national culture in the first place, particularly in the form of a common language and 
culture. This was reflected in the 'one state, one culture' principle discussed above. As he states: 
the culture needs the state and the state probably needs the homogenous cultural branding 
of its flock, in a situation in which it cannot rely on largely eroded sub-groups either to 
police its citizens, or to inspire them with that minimum of moral zeal and social 
identification without which social life becomes very difficult... (1983: 140; my emphasis) 
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The need for a 'minimum of moral zeal and social identification' is the basis on which an 
homogenous national culture is advanced. Accordingly, any alternative form of ethnic and 
cultural identification is seen as opphositio? ral to this overarching conception of national culture 
and, thus, undermining of social cohesion. Furthermore, since the nation-state represents in the 
modernist %iew the end point of the transition from tradition to modernity, alternative ethnic and 
cultural identifications are also, by dcfnition, seen as regressive and pre-modern. As such, the 
nation-state appears as a new form of group life at cxklr with that of separate ethnic groups; these 
being, no doubt, the 'largely eroded sub-groups' to which Gcliner refers (Rex, 1991). This 
position is not too dissimilar to the nineteenth century views of Mill, Michclct and Engels on 
minority groups, outlined in Chapter 1. For Gellner, the best such groups can hope for is to be 
represented in the modern nation-state 'in a token and cellophane-packaged form' (1983: 121). 
The construction of sociological minorities 
To recapitulate, it has been my argument that modernist accounts of nationalism fail adequately 
to explain the ongoing link between ethnicity and nationalism in the modern world. This 
inadequacy is demonstrated in both the historical and cultural realms. In relation to the former, 
explaining the rise of nationalism via the transition to modernity in the eighteenth and nineteenth 
centuries leads to a teleological account of history which over-emphasises the role of modernism 
and underplays, or ignores, the influence of pre-existing ethnics. In relation to the latter, nation- 
state congruence leaves little or no room for minority ethnics to have their historical, cultural and 
linguistic concerns recognised by, and expressed «ithin, appropriate state hierarchies. As Richard 
Jenkins concludes, both these dimensions are interconnected: 
Historically, the [modernist] argument tends towards tautology: nationalism is what 
supersedes ethnicity which is what precedes nationalism. Culturally, we are left with no 
authentic place within modem-nation states for ethnicity, other than an axiomatic 
homogeneity on the one hand, or an immigrant or peripheral presence on the other. (1995: 
372) 
The result has seen the juxtaposition in today's nation-states of (modern) `national' and (pre- 
modem) `ethnic' identities and, relatedly, of dominant ethnics and a wide range of sociological 
minorities. The distinction drawn here between dominant ethnies and sociological minorities 
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highlights two often overlooked features of national life. The first relates to its heterogcitelly -- 
a characteristic which, at the individual level, we may take for granted but at the level of the polity 
we tend to ignore. As I noted earlier, for example, Max Weber highlights this disjuncture in his 
observation that the idea of the nation includes 'an essential, though frequen1l)y lnalcf nice, 
homogeneity' (1961: 173, my emphasis). As he proceeds to observe: 
If one believes that it is at all expedient to distinguish national sentiment as something 
homogenous and specifically set apart.... one must be clearly aware of the fact that 
sentiments of solidarity, very heterogcnous in both their nature and origin, arc comprised 
within national sentiments. (1961: 179) 
The second, and related, aspect is that ifsonic 'sentiments of solidarity' take precedence over, 
and/or subsume others in the construction of the nation-state, they must do so on the basis of a 
differential apportionment of status and value. As Billig succinctly comments, `the aura of 
nationhood always operates %Nithin contexts of power' (1995: 4; see also Ball, 1992a). Given this, 
sociological minorities can be defined as groups which are a numerical minority in a given state 
and which are also politically non-dominant (Minority Rights Group, 1990). Indeed, in this 
context, while the term `minorities' tends to draw attention to numerical size, its more important 
reference is to groups with few rights and privileges (although see Chapter 5). This is not to 
suggest that majority/minority relationships arc fixed since, by definition, they arc relative and 
relational and may differ from one context to the next (Eriksen, 1993; Young, 1993). 
Nonetheless, sociological minorities are usually characterised by a history of social, economic and 
political marginalisation and/or exploitation by dominant ethnics within given `nation-states' 
(Rechter, 1975; Byram, 1986; Churchill, 1986; Dench, 1986; Thornberry, 1991; Tollefson, 
1991). 22 
In this final section, I want to outline briefly the key distinctions that can be drawn between 
various sociological minorities. In so doing, I will employ Eriksen's (1992,1993) useful attempts 
at a tpology along these lines. Given the inevitable limitations of typologies, I will also draw on 
a number of complementary categorisations where appropriate (see, for example, Churchill, 1986; 
Ogbu, 1986; Gibson & Ogbu, 1991; Kymlicka, 1995a). However, this attempt at a more nuanced 
categorisation notwithstanding, the follo%%ing distinctions should be seen primarily as useful 
heuristic devices rather than as definitive and/or exhaustive categories. It should also be borne 
73 
in mind that these minority cthnics are no more homogcnous than any other grouping and will, 
accordingly, reflect significant intragroup as wcll as lirtcrgroup diffcrcnccs, along with a 
considcrablc dcgrcc of ovcrlap (scc Chaptcr 1). 
Indigenous peoples 
Indigenous peoples rcfcr to aboriginal groups who arc politically non-dominant and who arc not, 
or are only partially, integrated into the nation-state. They include such groups as Maori, Simi, 
Koori, Native Ameri cans, Ilawai'ians and Inuit. These groups are associated historically with a 
non-industrial mode of production and a stateless political system (Minority Rights Group, 1990). 
The extreme disadvantages faced currently by many indigenous groups in modern nation-states 
arc the result ofcolonisation and subsequent marginalisation within their own historic territories. 
Such historic processes have usually seen the expropriation of land, and the destruction, or near 
destruction of their language(s) and traditional social, economic and political practices -- not to 
mention the very groups themselves. In Australia, for example, British colonisers in the previous 
century declared sovereignty on the basis that the land was terra nullius. In effect, the indigenous 
Koori were deemed to be so uncivilized as to be safely ignored. Indeed, as late as 1953, the 
Australian delegate to the United Nations Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination 
and the Protection of Minorities could state that `there were no minority problems in Australia.... 
There were, of course, the aborigines [sic], but they had no separate competing culture of their 
own' (cited in Kingsbury, 1989: 145). 
Accordingly, the predominant concerns of indigenous peoples are for separate political and 
cultural recognition withint the nation-state and, where possible, for political and economic redress 
for past injustices. In this regard, political pressure from indigenous peoples has led to a limited 
range of reparative legislation %vithin nation-states in recent times. Such legislation includes the 
1984 Treaty of Waitangi Act in New Zealand and the 1992 hiabo land judgement in Australia. 
Indigenous concerns have also been articulated at an international level by the World Council of 
Indigenous Peoples (\VCIP) and the United Nation's Working Group on Indigenous Populations 
(WGIP). The increasing influence of this broad movement has led, for example, to the recent 
development by the United Nations of a Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People 
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(1993), although the final status of this document in intcrnational law is by no nicans assurcd (scc 
Chaptcr 3). 
As Erikson (1992,1993) observes, however. the concept of 'indigenous peoples' is not an 
accurate analytical one since it excludes groups such as the Welsh, Catalans and Basques who 
could also claim to be 'indigenous' but who do not share all the attributes ascribed to these 
groups as they have come to be defined. In this regard, Stacy Churchill's (1986) distinction 
between 'indigenous' and 'established' minorities is a useful addendum here. Churchill argues 
that 'established' and 'indigenous' minorities arc both minority groups which have been long- 
established in their native countries. however, where indigenous peoples are characterised by a 
'traditional' culture which is often regarded as being at odds with that of the majority group, 
established minorities arc characterised by a lifestyle similar to the remainder of the national 
society, although sometimes falling behind in rate of evolution. As such, established minorities 
are more likely to be able to lay claim to a right to conserve their identity and to back it with 
political might. This distinction is not entirely unproblematic (see Chapter 3). However, it does 
point to the overlap of established minorities with the next group in Eriksen's typology, 'proto- 
nations'. 
Proto-nations 
Proto-nations are most commonly associated with the growing number of secessionist and 
irredentist nationalisms in the world today that have come to be termed `cthnonational 
movements'. As discussed previously, these comprise historical culture-communities which are 
territorially based and which do not currently possess their own nation-state. Such groups arc 
usually no more or less modem than other national groups and are fully differentiated along class 
and educational fines. Their numbers may be said currently to include Serbs, Kurds, Palestinians, 
Southern Tamils, Northern Irish Catholics, Basques, and the Quebecois. The most commonly 
associated aim of ethnonational movements is to (re)claim statehood and to be recognised 
subsequently in the world inter-state system. As such, their concerns are more closely reflective 
of political nationalisms (see above). However, there is also often a considerable degree of 
overlap within such movements between an overtly separatist political approach and one which 
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favours more culturalist (and non-secessionist) emphases. The distinctions between the Basque 
scparatist ETA organisation and modcratc Basque politicians. Sinn Fcin/litA and the mainlinc 
nationalist SDLP party in Northern Ireland, and the separatist Parti Quebecois and othcr 
Francophone nationalist organisations in Quebcc, are illustrative of these differences. 
Urban ethnic minorities 
Unlike the preceding groups which can be broadly classified as national minority ethnics -- that 
is, as previously self governing and with an historic claim to a particular territory -- urban ethnic 
minorities comprise immigrant groups which have settled in the country of destination. Usually 
such groups have come to be concentrated in urban areas, although this may not have been the 
case historically. Thus. Indian and Chinese minorities in Malaysia. Fiji and New Zealand were 
initially employed as predominantly agricultural migrant labour in the nineteenth century before 
subsequently settling in cities in this century. ' African-Caribbeans in Britain provide a more 
recent example of direct migration to urban areas in the 1950s as part of a post-war British 
employment policy to fill low-skill, low wage positions in the depleted labour market of the time. 
While these ethnic minority groups may retain elements of their culture, language and traditions -- 
sometimes over the course of a number of generations -- their general aim is to integrate into the 
host society and to be accepted as full members of it. As such, immigrant minority groups can 
be distinguished from national minority ethnics since their ethnic and cultural distinctiveness is 
manifested primarily in the private domain and is not inconsistent with their institutional 
integration into the nation-state (Kyrnlicka, 1995a). This is not to suggest that such groups do 
not face racism, discrimination and exclusion within the host nation-state, nor that they may resist 
assimilation to the norms of the dominant ethnic. Quite the reverse in fact, since the so-called 
`ethnic revival' that emerged in the 1960s has seen immigrant groups increasingly assert the right 
to express their ethnic particularities (see Chapter 3). However, such minorities do not usually 
seek separate and self governing status within the nation-state, as is typically demanded by 
national minorities. Rather, they argue for a more plural and inclusive conception of national 
identity and culture which recognises their contribution to, and influence on the historical and 
contemporary development of the host nation-state. In the process, the boundaries of nationhood 
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-- what it is that constitutcs the national community -- is opcncd up for dcbatc. Of ccntral 
concern in this debate arc the questions of who is (and who is not) to be included in the national 
collcctivity, and on what (and w"hosc) tcrms arc the critcria for inclusion to be bascd. 
That said, there arc a number of caveats which need to be addressed before proceeding further. 
First, these so called 'ethnic minorities' may become national minorities over time if they settle 
together and acquire self governing power in the interim (Kymlicka, 1995a). This is particularly 
evident in ex-colonial societies such as the USA, Canada, Australia, and New Zealand where 
white settler groups have subsequently come to constitute the dominant ethnics) in the modern 
nation-state. Ukc%ise, the one possible exception to the broad distinctions so far outlined is the 
example of African-Americans in the USA. African-Americans clearly fit neither the national nor 
immigrant category. They have no historic territorial claim to the Americas (unlike Native 
Americans) and their historical subjection through slavery clearly precludes voluntary 
immigration. 
In this regard, John Ogbu's (1987) distinction between `voluntary' (immigrant) and `involuntary' 
(caste-like) minorities proves a useful point of comparison (see also Gibson & Ogbu, 1991). 
Adopting a predominantly culturalist approach, Ogbu argues that all minority groups are subject 
to racism and discrimination to some degree, as well as facing cultural and language 
discontinuities in relation to their integration in the nation-state. However, for voluntary 
minorities these discontinuities are seen as primary culturaHmiguage differences; that is, they 
existed prior to their immigration to the host country and are thus viewed as barriers to be 
overcome. As such, voluntary minorities are more likely to accommodate to the `cultural model' 
of the majority group or dominant ethnic. In contrast, involuntary minorities -- including in 
Ogbu's view, African-Americans and indigenous people groups -- arc characterised by a history 
of exploitation and/or subjugation within a particular nation-state. Accordingly, involuntary 
minorities tend to develop a secondary cultural system in which cultural differences are viewed 
in light of that history, and in opposition to the majority group. 
Cultural and language differences thus come to serve a boundary maintenance function (sec 
Chapter 4). They are seen as symbols of identity to be maintained rather than barriers to be 
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overcome and may consequently develop into oppositional cultural (and political) nationalist 
movements. Such political nationalism has been represented among African-Americans principally 
through the call for a separate Black state. This was first supported in the 1930s, resurfaced again 
briefly in the 1960s in association with the 'Nation of Islam' movement, and has again gained 
prominence in the 1990s under the current leader of the Nation of Islam, Louis Farrakhan, Thcsc 
developments not%%ithstanding, however, much of the political cfIort among African-Americans -- 
including the principal concerns of the civil rights movement -- has centred on gaining full and 
equal rights and benefits for African-Americans err (IS cili: cnis. As such, the concerns of African- 
Americans approximate more closely immigrant minorities than national ones (Kymlicka, 1995a). 
Ethnics in plural societies 
Erikscn (1992,1993) makes one final distinction based on ethnic groups within so called `plural 
societies'. Plural societies are most prominently associated with the work of Furnivall (1948) on 
Burns and M. G. Smith (1965) on the British Nest Indies. They have come to refer to ex-colonial 
societies, primarily Asian and Caribbean, with self consciously culturally heterogenous 
populations. The groups which make up these societies are divided internally by class and rank 
but are also clearly identifiable through ethnic and cultural differences. They arc compelled to 
participate in uniform political and ethnic systems although one particular group will usually 
dominate. Ethnic relations are characterised consequently by inter-group competition. 
Secessionism is usually not an option since the groups involved have no external nation-state to 
which they realistically relate. 
Having said this, the utility of the term `plural society' has more recently been brought into 
question (see Jenkins, 1986). This is because, as I have already discussed, most contemporary 
states can be regarded as plural or polj In is in this way. In short, contemporary `nation-states' 
increasingly comprise a variety of ethnic groups which are in competition for the resources of the 
state -a process I outlined more fully in my discussion of situational ethnicity in Chapter 1. The 
USA is perhaps the clearest example of a polyethnic state in this regard. To complicate matters 
further, polyethnic states are often multi-national ones as well. In other words, indigenous and 
national minority groups are also present in many of the same states (the USA being no exception; 
78 
sec Chapter 3). 1lowcvcr, what has tended to happen up until now is that both these types of 
minority group have been treated in the mu ne way by the dominant ethnic. In other words, 
indigenous peoples and other national minorities have been denied their historical rights as ethnics 
and have been treated as merely one of a number of competing 'ethnic groups' laying claim to the 
nation-state's limited social, economic and political resources. 
As I have argued, this elision has been the inevitable result of the exclusion of ethnicity from the 
realms of nationalism which has, in turn, been predicated on the principle of nation-state 
congruence and the related separation of political and cultural nationalisms. It may also help to 
explain the continued spread of cthnonationalism(s) in the (post-)modcrn world. The voices of 
dissenting national minorities are increasingly questioning the pejorative distinction drawn 
between the (modem) 'national' identity of the dominant ethnic and their own supposedly (pre- 
modern) `ethnic' identities. Not only this, they are also increasingly dissatisfied with the 
concomitant rejection by the former of their claims for greater civic recognition and inclusion 
within the nation-state. As Homi Dhabha argues, we are confronted with the nation-state 'split 
within itself, articulating the heterogeneity of its population.... a liminal signifying space that is 
internally marked by the discourses of minorities, the heterogenous histories of contending 
peoples, antagonistic authorities and tense locations of cultural difference' (1994: 148). 
Of course, such minority disenchantment is by no means a new phenomenon, nor is the state- 
minority relationship from which it springs. However, what I have argued here is that these 
developments include a growing number of indigenous and established national minorities who 
are less concerned with independent statehood -- although it may inevitably spill over into this -- 
than with challenging and changing the hegemonic construction of `national' culture upon which 
nation-states have traditionally been based. As Colin Williams observes, `it is clear that as many 
societies become increasingly multi-ethnic in composition the question of national congruence will 
have to be re-defined and more appropriate answers given than those which are currently 
practised in many states' (1994: 12). What might be involved exactly in re-defining or 
reimagining the nation-state to this end is the focus of the next three chapters. 
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Notes -- Chapter 2 
1. The interrelationship between language and the soul or spirit of the nation is most clearly 
stated by Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767-1835): '[the nation's] language is its spirit and its spirit 
is its language' (Cowan, 1963: 277). Indeed, Humboldt is credited as a result with the 
development of the twin theories of linguistic determinism and linguistic relativism -- that 
language plays a significant role in determining culture, and that each language has a different way 
of'looking at the world' (Clyne, 1997; see Chapter 4). 
2. It is important here, however, to distinguish between the differing political objectives of I Ierder 
and Fichte. While Herder was not entirely immune to anti-French sentiment (see Edwards, 1985, 
1994), his general view of the direct links between language and 'national' communities led him 
to adopt a pluralist and egalitarian stance towards other ethno-culturalllanguage groups (see 
Fishman, 1989d: 570-571). This can be contrasted directly with Fichte's subsequent hicrarchising 
of these same communities; principally, via his application or l Ierder's views on language to the 
tenets of political nationalism. 
3. Interestingly, in his discussion, Renan clearly rejects any notion of 'pure' races (see 1990: 13- 
16). 
4. I am not suggesting here that religious sectarianism is absent in Scotland (sec, for example, 
Walker, 1990; McCrone, 1992), simply that, unlike Northern Ireland, it is not the principal factor 
in questions of Scottish nationalism and national identity. 
5. It is important to distinguish national sentiment -- understood here as those feelings of 
collective belonging to a nation -- from the ideology and movement of nationalism itself. As 
Smith (1994) argues, one can have nationalist movements and ideologies among a given 
population without any corresponding diffusion of national sentiment in that population. The 
reverse can also be found, although rarely. For example, Norway, Switzerland, Denmark and 
Holland have widely diffused national sentiment but also appear to have little need for an explicit 
nationalist movement. Jenkins (1995) adds a caveat here, however. In his discussion of 
nationalism in Denmark, he suggests that while Denmark has no apparent nationalist movement 
it is still characterised by a weak discourse of nationalism. The problem is not so much then 
whether nationalism is present or absent in a particular country but whether our definitions are 
sufficiently broad enough to incorporate the full range of nationalisms. 
6. One only has to look to the nation-states which comprise the United Nations to confirm this 
since most did not exist, either in name or as an administrative unit, more than two centuries ago. 
Indeed, as Immanuel Wallerstein argues, there are actually very few states which can trace a name 
and a continuous administrative entity in a particular geographical area to a period prior to 1450. 
Of some 200 contemporary states, perhaps only France, Russia, Portugal, Denmark, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Morocco, Japan, China, Iran and Ethiopia can claim such a lineage. However, even 
these claims are somewhat problematic since it can still be argued that these states only came into 
existence as modem sovereign states with the emergence of the present world system. A number 
of other modem states such as Egypt, India and Greece have perhaps had a longer lineage but 
theirs' has been discontinuous (see Wallerstein, 1991: 80-81). 
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7. This is an important qualification to Rcnan's and Webcr's emphasis on the 'will to nationhood' 
discussed above. As Geliner (1964,1983) argues, for example, the volitional aspect of 
nationhood is an important but insufficient identifier of the modern nation since other collectivities 
have also possessed this in various historical periods. In Gcllncr's view, the emergence of the 
modern nation is thus primarily associated with the structural changes brought about by 
modernisation (see below). 
8. There is, admittedly, some variation here. Some modernist commentators do acknowledge 
a connection between ethnicity and nationhood (see, for example, Gellner, 1983; Anderson, 
1991), while others, like 1lobsbawtim (1990), argue that the two phenomena arc entirely unrelated. 
These differences notwithstanding, modernists are all agreed that nationhood is the result of 
political modernisation - expressed in nationalism and the construction of the nation-state -- and 
not the result of pre-existing ethnicity. 
9. The historical recency of nationalism is highlighted by the term `nationalism' itself which, as 
Connor (1978) points out, only gained a permanent place in dictionaries in the nineteenth century. 
Likewwiise, it was probably Lord Acton (1907) who first coined the term 'nationality' (Edwards, 
1985). 
10. The main difference between Gellner's theory and most Marxist perspectives (sec, for 
example, Nairn, 1981; 11roch, 1985; Ilobsbawm, 1990) is that Gellncr sees nationalism as the 
concomitant of industrialisation (in any form) whereas Marxist analyses link nationalism more 
specifically to capitalism. 
11. Previous political forms required neither the demarcation of clear territorial boundaries nor 
the fostering of internal integration and homogenisation (Calhoun, 1993b). Feudal elites, for 
example, controlled wide territories but exercised little centralised control. Empires, larger in 
scale again, demanded political loyalty from their diverse people groups but made little, if any, 
demands for cultural homogenisation. In either case, the state systems and ruling castes of 
antiquity and feudalism presided oivr society. However, with the development of modernisation, 
and the concomitant centralisation of administrative control (see below), the whole people 
actually became incorporated for the first time as pxrrt of society (Gramsci, 1971; Nairn, 1981). 
12. Adopting a moral position on nationalism (which invariably means a negative one) has been 
a principal feature of most political and social science commentary, dating from Lord Acton's 
critical account in 1862. 
13. In this sense, Anderson adopts a position that is closer to earlier modernists such as Kedourie 
(1960), Deutsch (1966), Seton-\Vatson (1977), and Tilly (1975). These earlier commentators 
highlighted the fictive elements of nation-formation. However, they also assumed that nations, 
once formed, were real communities of culture and power, a Durkheimian 'social fact', in effect 
(Smith, 1995b). 
14. The Catalan national minority, for example, was politically and culturally oppressed under 
Franco's fascist regime until his death in 1975. However, the Catalan region itself has been 
historically one of the strongest economic regions in Spain. Thus, in 1980 Catalans comprised 
16% of the Spanish population but 20% of GDP, while per capita income was 30% above the 
Spanish average. Moreover, this long-standing economic and demographic power had, in the 
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nineteenth century, formed the basis of the cosmopolitan and high culture Catalan language 
movements Retwixcitca and Afod'rnlsta (Miller & Miller, 1996). 
15. Smith argues that there are two principal types of ethnic: l wcral, which develop round a 
centralised state and are confined to a social and political elite; and r. 'rlical, which are usually 
subordinated status groups that are sustained by cultural and religious institutions and values that 
act to unify the population (see, 1986; Ch. 4). In either case, however, the pre-existing profile 
serves to shape the contours of the modern nation-state. 
16. Parekh does not adopt an cthnicist position in the way described here. Nonetheless, his 
description of national identity lends itself well to a comparison with habitus. 
17. This is not to suggest that modernist commentators on nationalism have not attempted to 
make the distinction between the nation and state (for useful examples of such attempts, see 
Connor, 1978,1993; Gellncr, 1983). However, modernists remain largely constrained within the 
nation-state model of political nationalism (cf Fishman, 1989b; Oommcn, 1994; Smith, 1994). 
18. I will explore the distinctions between multinational and polycthnic states, and between 
national, indigenous, and immigrant minorities, more fully in the final section of this chapter. 
19. The central emphasis of cultural nationalism on `modernisation from within' counters the 
often invoked criticism that such movements are merely traditionalist and reactionary (see, for 
example, hohn, 1961; Gellner, 1964,1983; Schlesinger, 1992). 1 will explore these criticisms, 
and their inherent weaknesses, more fully in the following chapters. 
20. Anthony Smith has argued that the different historical and organisational trajectories of statist 
and cultural nationalisms relate to the distinction between lateral and vertical ethnics (see n. 15); 
a position that Hutchinson in his formulation of cultural nationalism, also implicitly accepts. 
However, I am inclined to agree with Jenkins' (1995) conclusion that this perpetuates the `ethnic' 
and `civic' divide within nationalism and that, rather, all nationalisms should be regarded as in 
some sense `ethnic'. If there is a more appropriate distinction to be drawn then, perhaps it is 
between those nationalisms which claim territory on the basis of putative ethnic commonality and 
those which attempt to construct ethnic commonality within an already occupied territory (see, 
Jenkins, 1995: 387). The latter, in my view, are more offen associated with cultural forms of 
nationalism. 
21. Interestingly, some recent `primordial' accounts of nationalism adopt a similar position (see, 
for example, Shils, 1995). 
22. Although see my previous provisos in relation to the spread of ethnonationalisms. 
23. Fijian Indians are an exception here, since they are still principally agriculturally based. 
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Chapter 3 
LIBEML THEORY AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
It has been my argument thus far that the construction of national and ethnic minorities, and their 
pejorative and marginalised status, are the result of what Stacy Churchill (1996) has termed the 
philasophi«rl matrix of the motion-stale. A philosophical matrix denotes `a combination of ideas, 
not easy to separate or define, that embodies the expectations of society as to how it should 
function' (MacLachlan, 1988: x-xi). The philosophical matrix of the nation-state, rooted in the 
political nationalism of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, has been predicated on the 
confluence of nation and state and on the establishment (often retrospectively) of a common civic 
or `national' language and culture. 
Interestingly, this linking of nation, state and language into an indissoluble whole was first 
advocated by Fichte. Fichte, as we have seen, incorporated Herder's views on language and 
culture %kithin a statist account of nationalism (Hutchinson, 1994). This led to the development 
of the linear `one language, one nation, one state' principle of romantic nationalism; a principle 
which has subsequently been % idely discredited as essentialist and which has also been associated 
(pejoratively) with many contemporary cthnonationalisms. In contrast, political nationalism 
argued that it was the state which preceded and precipitated the rise of the nation, not the other 
way around. The key principle which followed from this can be summarised as `one state, one 
nation, one language' and it has since come to represent the common orthodoxy in discussions 
of nationalism, not to mention the development of modern nation-states themselves. Indeed, as 
Carly as 1862, Lord Acton argucd uncquivocally on this basis for the supcriority of political 
nationalism over romantic nationalism: 
The State may in course of time produce a nationality ... 
but that a nationality should 
constitute a State is contrary to the nature of modern civilisation.... [Such a position is] 
in defiance of the modifying action of external causes, of trucliiioir and (! f existing rights. 
It overrules the rights and wishes of the inhabitants, absorbing their divergent interests in 
a fictitious unity, sacrifices their several inclinations and duties to the higher claim of 
nationality and crushes all natural rights and established liberties for the purpose of 
vindicating itself. (1907: 288; my emphasis) 
And yet political nationalism, and the modern nation-state to which it gives rise, can be accused 
of these very same proclivities. The nation-state, as it has come to be constructed, creates 
sociological minorities by establishing a civic language and culture that is largely limited to, and 
representative of the dominant ethnic or Staatsvolk. Minorities arc, in turn, denied legitimate 
rights to their existing language and cultural traditions where these differ from those of the 
dominant ethnic. Political nationalism may thus have prided itself on the reversal of the romantic 
nationalists' nation-state-language connection but it has left the linearity of the principle 
untouched. As such, what results is still ethnic and linguistic hegemony, albeit from a different 
direction. Moreover, the hegemonic construction of the nation-state is far less readily apparent 
than more `overt' ethnonationalisms. Cloaked as it is in the apparently neutral representation of 
a modern `national' language and culture, the legitimation and valorisation of the dominant 
ethnic's habitus often escapes notice or critical comment. As Billig observes, this `banal 
nationalism' is simply `overlooked, forgotten, even theoretically denied' (1995: 17) which perhaps 
helps to explain why dominant groups so seldom come to define themselves as `ethnic'. 
A further explanation of the uncritical acceptance of this elision of civic and ethnic ties rests with 
the key liberal democratic principles of universal political citizenship, and the related primacy of 
individual over collective rights. These principles have been regularly invoked over the last two 
centuries by liberal commentators in their dismissal of ethnicity as a valid form of collective social 
and political organisation and identity (see Chapter 1). Concomitantly, they have also been 
consistently employed in support of the present political organisation of the nation-state. In this 
chapter, I will examine the cogency of this orthodox liberal defence of the nation-state, and the 
key tenets on which it is based, and will argue that these accounts are framed within, and thus 
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constrained by, the notion of nation-state congruence arising from political nationalism. if this 
assumption is dropped, the recognition or a more plural conception of the nation-state -- based, 
at least to some degree, on group-ditTercntiatcd rights - becomes a possibility. In this regard, it 
is my %icw that national minorities (including indigenous and established minorities) have rights 
to greater inclusion within the civic realm of the nation-state -- that is, `civil society' in Gramsci's 
(1971) sense' -than many currently enjoy. Moreover, these rights of inclusion arc (listinct fron 
those of other ethnic minorities (see Chapter 2). Accordingly, I will concentrate in much of what 
follows on the particular rights of national minorities. i iowever, I will return to the question of 
other ethnic minority groups, and the wider implications of my own position with regard to them, 
in Chapters 5 and 9. 
The pluralist dilemma 
A central concern in current debates surrounding the organisation and legitimacy of modern 
nation-states has to do with what Brian Bullivant (1981) has termed `the pluralist dilemma'. The 
pluralist dilemma, for Bullivant, is `the problem of reconciling the diverse political claims of 
constituent groups and individuals in a pluralist society with the claims of the nation-state as a 
whole' (1981: x; my emphasis); what he elsewhere describes as the competing aims of `civism' 
and `pluralism'. Other commentators have suggested similar distinctions: `roots' and `options' 
(Rokkan & Urwin, 1983); `state' and `community' (Smith, 1981); and, drawing on Saussure, 
`parochialism' and `intercourse' (Edwards, 1994). All these distinctions emphasise, like 
Bullivant's, the apparent polarities involved in the task of national integration; the difficulties of 
reconciling social cohesion on the one hand %vith, on the other, a recognition and incorporation 
of ethnic, linguistic and cultural diversity within the nation-state. In an earlier analysis, 
Schermerhom has described these countervailing social and cultural forces as centripetal and 
centrifugal tendencies. As he observes: 
Centripetal tendencies refer both to cultural trends such as acceptance of common values, 
styles of life, etc, as well as structural features like increased participation in a common 
set of groups, associations, and institutions.... Conversely, centrifugal tendencies among 
subordinate groups are those that foster separation from the dominant group or from 
societal bonds in one way or another. Culturally this most frequently means retention and 
presentation of the group's distinctive tradition in spheres like language, religion, 
recreation etc. (1970: 81) 
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Ilow then can the tensions arising from the pluralist dilemma best be resolved in the social and 
political arena? Two contrasting approaches have been adopted in response to this central 
question which Gordon (1978,1981) has described as 'liberal pluralism' and 'corporate 
pluralism'. Liberal pluralism is characterised by the absence, even prohibition, of any ethnic, 
religious, or national minority group possessing separate standing before the law or government. 
Its central tenets can be traced back to Rousseau's conception of the modern polity as comprising 
three inseparable features: freedom (non-domination), the absence of differentiated roles, and a 
very tight common purpose. On this view, the margin for recognising difference within the 
modern nation-state is very small (Taylor, 1992). Corporate pluralism, in contrast, involves the 
recognition of minority groups as legally constituted entities, on the basis of which, and depending 
on their size and influence, economic, social and political awards are allocated. Glazer (1975) and 
Walzer (1992a, 1992b) draw similar distinctions between an approach based on 'non 
discrimination' -- which involves, in Glazer's memorable phrase, the 'salutary neglect' of the state 
towards ethnic minorities -- and a 'corporatist' (Walzer) or 'group rights' (Glazer) model. 
It is clear, however, that for most liberal commentators the merits of liberal pluralism significantly 
outweigh those of a group rights approach. 2 In effect, the answer to the pluralist dilemma has 
been consistently to favour civism over pluralism. As such, the `claims of the nation-state as a 
whole' -- emphasising the apparently inextricable interconnections between social cohesion and 
national homogeneity -- have invariably won the day over more pluralist conceptions of the 
nation-state where ethnic, linguistic and cultural differences betis'cen different groups arc 
accorded some degree of formal recognition. This should perhaps not surprise us, since the 
former is situated squarely within the `philosophical matrix of the nation-state' to which I referred 
earlier. Relatedly, liberal pluralism also accords closely with the long-standing pejorative 
distinction between citizenship and etlusicily -- a distinction first illustrated in Chapter 1 by the 
likes of the nineteenth century liberals, Mill and Nlichelet, and the socialists, Marx and Engels. ' 
The result has been the construction in contemporary orthodox liberal accounts of a range of 
interrelated, and at times overlapping, polarities which are outlined below. In each, the former 
feature is associated (positively) with liberal pluralism while the latter is associated (negatively) 
with a corporatist approach: 
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" universal or particularist 
" individual or collective 
" autonomy or identity 
" private or public 
" informal or formal 
" fluid or bounded 
" dialogic or ghettoised 
" changing or static 
" modernity or tradition 
" commonality or difference 
" cohesion or fragmentation 
In orthodox liberal accounts, individual and universal `citizenship' rights are invariably 
constructed in opposition to collective and particularist `ethnic' rights. As such, formal 
differentiation within the nation-state on the grounds of (ethnic) group association is rejected as 
inimical to the individualistic and meritocratie tenets of liberal democracy. Where countenanced 
at all, alternative ethnic affiliations should be restricted solely to the private domain since the 
formal recognition of collective (ethnic) identity is viewed as undermining personal and political 
autonomy, and fostering social and political fragmentation. As Will Kymlicka observes, `the near- 
universal response by liberals has been one of active hostility to minority rights.... schemes which 
single out minority cultures for special measures ... appear 
irremediably unjust, a disguise for 
creating or maintaining ... ethnic privilege' 
(1989: 4). Any deviation from the strict principles of 
universal political citizenship and individual rights is seen as the first step down the road to 
apartheid. Or so it seems. 
If this wasn't enough, many liberal critics have also argued that an approach which acknowledges 
and accommodates group-related differences is, by definition, inherently flawed since it must 
significantly understate the fluid and dialogic nature of inter- and intra-group relations 
(Goulbourne, 1991a, 1991b; Edwards, 1985,1994; Waldron 1993,1995; see also Chapter 1). 
The resulting liberal consensus is well illustrated by Brian Bullivant: 
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Certain common institutions csscntial for the well-being and smooth functioning of the 
nation-state as a tirhole must be maintained: common language, common political system, 
common economic market system and so on. Cultural pluralism can operate at the level 
of the private, rather than public, concerns such as use of ethnic [sic] language in the 
home.... But, the idea that maintaining these aspects of ethnic life and encouraging the 
maintenance of ethnic groups almost in the sense of ethnic enclaves will assist their ability 
to cope with the political realities of the nation-state is manifestly absurd. (1981: 232) 
Defending liberal democracy 
This `de-ethnicised' view of liberal democracy, and the various polarities which characterise it, 
are clearly evident in the work of three contemporary liberal commentators -- John Porter, Arthur 
Schlesinger Jr, and Harry Goulboume. In what follows, I want to explore briefly their respective 
arguments. Before doing so, however, I should point out that Porter and Schlesinger tend 
towards the conservative end of the liberal continuum while Goulbournc's position is considerably 
further to the left. This raises an important point. The orthodox defence of liberal democracy, 
in the form of liberal pluralism, is advocated by commentators on both the left and right of the 
political spectrum -- albeit, for somewhat different reasons, as we shall see. Nonetheless, the wide 
support that liberal pluralism garners reinforces the degree to which the political tenets of nation- 
state congruence underlying it have come to be taken as given. ' 
The vertical mosaic 
The late John Porter (1965,1972,1975) Wrote extensively on pluralism in Canada, particularly 
in relation to the 'ethnic revival' of the 1960s and 1970s. In this regard, he was a strong advocate 
of liberal pluralism and a sharp critic of the corporatist model. As he observes, 'the organisation 
of society on the basis of rights or claims that derive from group membership is sharply opposed 
to the concept of a society based on citizenship, which has been such an important aspect in the 
development of modern societies' (1975: 297). From this, Porter argued that the maintenance 
of collective ethnicity in modern societies was regressive and historically naive. Moreover, it 
resulted in a form of ethnic stratification or 'vertical mosaic' which, in combination with social 
class, reduced the social and economic mobility of individuals. ' The stark choice facing 
Canadians, he asserted, was `between ethnic stratification that results from ethnic diversity and 
the greater possibilities for equality that result from a reduction of ethnicity as a salient feature of 
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modern society' (1972: 205; sec also 1975: 288-304). Like many other liberals, Porter directly 
equated 'modern society' here with the homogenous civic culture of the nation-state, On this 
basis, he advocated the assimilation of ethnic minorities into Canadian national life and rejected 
any form of multiculturalism which would perpetuate ethnic and/or cultural distinctiveness. This 
was clearly in the best interests of ethnic minority groups, he believed, since in modern socicty: 
the emphasis was on individual achievement and in the context of a new nation with 
uinivcrsalistic standards of judgement it meant forgetting ancestry and attempting to 
establish a society of equality where ethnic origin did not matter. (1975: 293; my 
emphases) 
In advocating this position, Porter does allow for some recognition of ethnic minority languages. 
As he concedes, 'identification with and the use of their own language, particularly in school, may 
be important in providing opportunity for very low status groups' (1975: 302). However, he 
quickly proceeds to argue that `such use of language is quite different from the goal of having 
ethnic communities become a permanent compensation for low status, or as psychic shelters in 
the urban-industrial world' (1975: 303). For Porter, it was only citi: cn ship which could provide 
minority ethnic group members with the individual social mobility and achievement necessary to 
make their way in the modern world. This, in turn, implied `a commitment to the values of 
modernism and a movement away from the [minority] ethnic community with each succeeding 
generation' (1975: 302). The reason for this was obvious enough. Minority cultures were 
`tradition bound' and 'less and less relevant for the post-industrial society' (1975: 303). As Porter 
concludes, ethnicity in the modem world is simply an anachronism: 'Many of the historic cultures 
are irrelevant to our futures. Opportunity will go to those individuals who are future oriented in 
an increasingly universalistic culture. Those oriented to the past are likely to lose out' (1975: 
304). 
The cult of ethnicity 
More recently, these themes have been echoed in the often vituperative debates surrounding 
multiculturalism, bilingualism and `Afrocentricity' in the United States, particularly in relation to 
education (see, for example, Bloom, 1987; Hirsch, 1987; D'Souza, 1991; Ravitch 1992; 
Schlesinger, 1991,1992; Hughes, 1993). Albert Schlesinger's The Disuniting of America (1992) 
provides us with a representative example of the conservative critique of corporate pluralism here. 
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As his title suggcsts, Schlcsingcr, a notcd libcral historian, has argucd to much public acclaim 
against the 'disuniting' of America by the 'cult of ethnicity': 
A cult of ethnicity has ariscn both among non-Anglo whites and among non-white 
minorities to denounce the idea of the melting pot, to challenge the concept of 'one 
people', and to protect, promote, and pcrpctuatc separate [ethnic] communities.... The 
new ethnic gospel rejects the unifying vision of individuals from all nations melted into a 
new race [sic]. Its underlying philosophy is that America is not a nation of individuals at 
all but a nation of groups, that ethnicity is the defining experience for most Americans, 
that ethnic tics are permanent and indelible..... The ethnic interpretation, moreover, 
reverses the historic theory of America as one people -- the theory that has thus far 
managed to keep American society whole. (1992: 15-16) 
For Schlesinger, this 'ethnic checrieading' is prescntilionist rather than trw :. sformatititiw and results 
in a view of America which, instead of being `composed of individuals making their own 
unhampered choices', is increasingly `composed of groups more or less ineradicable in their ethnic 
character'. The result is a 'multiethnic dogma [which] abandons historic purposes, replacing 
assimilation by fragmentation, integration by separatism' (1992: 16-17). In the face of this 
assault, Schlesinger gloomily wonders: `The national ideal had once been c pluribus unum [out 
of many, one]. Are we now to belittle anum and glorify pturibus? Will the centre hold? Or will 
the melting pot give way to the Tower of Babel? ' (1991: 14; see also 1992: 18). 
In this regard, Schlesinger directs particular opprobrium at the emergence among African- 
Americans of an `Afrocentric' view of American (and world) history, along with its formal 
promotion in schools under the rubric of multiculturalism. For Schlesinger, these developments 
are simply nationalist myth making, along the lines of Ilobsba% m's 'invention of tradition', and 
lead inevitably to cultural reification and essentialism. The rise of Afrocentricity may be 
understandable, he argues - given the consistent exclusion of black voices in previous historical 
accounts - but it is still bad history, albeit of a manifestly different kind from that which preceded 
it. Moreover, the whole notion of using history as therapy, whose principal function is to raise 
minority self-esteem, is misguided. rimer all, as Schlesinger points out, `the absence of historical 
role models seems [not] to have handicapped two other groups in American society -- Jewish 
Americans and Asian Americans' (1992: 89). 
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In saying this. Schlesinger does acknowledge the cliccts of racism -- both historically and 
currently -- on the African"Amcrican community. As he observes, 'black Americans, after 
generations of psychological and cultural evisceration, have every right to seek affirmative action 
for their past.... For blacks the American dream has been pretty much a nightmare and, far more 
than white ethnics, they arc driven by a desperate need to vindicate their own identity' (1992: 60). 
I Iowti cr, in his view, Afrocentricity is not the answer to the problem since it simply replaces one 
form of ethnic and/or cultural exclusiveness (and exclusion) with another. Indeed, Schlesinger 
argues that the end game of this 'filiopictistic commemoration' (1992: 99) -- or, more prosaically, 
the worship of ancestors - will actually confirm rather than ameliorate self-pity and sclf- 
ghettoisation among African-Americans. Rather, he asserts: 
would it not be more appropriate for [ethnic minority] students to be ... encouraged to 
understand the American culture in which they are growing up and to prepare for an 
active role in shaping that culture?.... As for self-esteem, is this really the product of ethnic 
role models and fantasies of a glorious past? Or does it not result from a belief in oneself 
that springs from achievement, from personal rather than [ethnic] pride? (1992: 90,92). 
Finally, Schlesinger extends his trenchant and apocalyptic critique to include an attack on 
bilingualism and the bilingual movement in the USA, along with its strong links to Hispanic 
communities. ' Unlike Porter, who was at least prepared to countenance a limited role for 
minority languages, Schlesinger rejects the official recognition of minority languages out of hand 
-- a position presaged by his previous allusion to the Tower of Babel: 
The separatist movement is by no means confined to the black community. Another 
salient expression is the bilingualism movement.... In recent years the combination of the 
ethnicity cult with a flood of immigration from Spanish-speaking countries has given 
bilingualism new emphasis. The presumed purpose is transitional.... Alas, bilingualism has 
not worked out as planned: rather the contrary.... indications are that bilingual education 
retards rather than expedites the movement of Hispanic children into the F&rglish-speaking 
world and that it promotes segregation more than it does integration. Bilingualism shuts 
doors. It nourishes self-ghettoisation, and ghettoisation nourishes racial antagonism.... 
using some language other than English dooms people to second class citizenship in 
American society (1992: 107-108; my emphases)' 
In attributing bilingualism %%ith the same fractious and regressive characteristics as Afrocentricity, 
Schlesinger invokes, once again, the rhetoric of national cohesion. `A common language is a 
neccssary bond of national cohesion in so heterogeneous a nation as America.... institutionalised 
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bilingualism remains another source of the fragmentation of America, another threat to the dream 
of "one people" (1992: 109.110; my emphases; see also Hirsch, 1987). 1iis parting coninicnts 
echo this conclusion when he returns directly to the question of the pluralist dilemma: 'The 
question America confronts as a pluralistic society is how to vindicate cherished cultures and 
traditions without breaking the bonds of cohesion -- common ideals, common political 
institutions, common language, common fate-- that hold the republic together? ' (1992: 138). Ills 
answer, by now, should come as no surprise: 'the bonds of social cohesion in our society arc 
sufficiently fragile, or so it seems to me, that it makes no sense to strain them by encouraging and 
exalting cultural and linguistic apartheid. The American identity will never be fixed and final; it 
%%ill always be in the making' (1992: 138). Quod crat dcmonstrandum, or so it seems. 
The communal option 
The final example of liberal pluralism that I want to discuss is Barry Goulbourne's (1991a) 
account of the position of non-white ethnic minorities in post-imperial Britain. As I suggested 
earlier, Goulbourne's arguments are somewhat different in both tenor and substance to the 
previous two commentators, largely due to his long involvement with, and commitment to 
antiracism in the British context. In particular, he clearly acknowledges that majoritarian 
conceptions of a common (national) culture and identity may be just as exclusive and exclusionary 
as those of ethnic minority groups -- more so, perhaps, since they tend to be implemented and 
maintained by the machinery of the state. ' This ethnic nationalism `which in a very real sense 
belongs to the majority although it formally claims the loyalty of all' (1991a: 14) stimulates, in 
turn, an `ethnic' response within minority communities. In this regard, Goulbourne's account is 
far more aware of the cultural hegemony with which the `common culture' argument of 
conservative apologists like Porter and Schlesinger is imbued. Nonetheless, his conclusions can 
still be situated broadly within an orthodox liberal defence of the nation-state. 
The reasons for this lie principally with his dismay - in line with other liberal commentators -- 
about the gro%ving `assertion of difference' between various ethnic groups in Britain. As he 
observes of these developments: 
Whilst in the past similarities between groups of people fonncd the basis of unity or 
collective existence, the growing demand, or emphasis, today, is for communities to be 
bound together by the factors which establish differcnncc from others.... This new 
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nationalism dcmands ethnic siiigi arityy and ... of cn cxhibits unncccssary 
intolcrancc and 
insistcncc on securing particularist rights, [cvcn though] its righteousness and demands 
are generally couched in terms of strengthening democracy. (1991 a: 12) 
For Goulbourne, such emphases lead to what he describes as 'the communal option' by which he 
means 'the generalised encouragement, and the increasing desire, of many individuals to be a part 
of an identifiable group, and for each group not only to exist entirely, within its oicit confines but 
also to ensure that individuals conform to the supposed norms of the group. This is rapidly 
becoming the British experience' (1991a: 13). Indeed, in his view, the pursuit of the communal 
option is clearly evident in both 'cultural conservative' and 'new pluralist' or multicultural 
conceptions of Britain. The former seeks to establish a narrow sense of Britishness which 
excludes non-white minorities from full participation in the national community (see, for example, 
I Ioncyford, 1988). 9 The latter %vishes to present as a desirable social good the image of Britain 
as characterised by a diverse range of ethnic, cultural and linguistic groups (sec, for example, The 
Swann Report; DES, 1985). While clearly more sympathetic to the politics of the new pluralism, 
Goulbourne remains sharply critical of both positions, arguing for the abandonment of the harping 
nostalgia and exclusivism of cultural conservatism and the optimism and naivete of 
multiculturalism: 
Where the one %vishes to maintain a pre-imperial, almost nativist, conception of the British 
community, the other would arrest the present imperfect, still emerging, moment and 
make that the ideal, preferred, social condition. The cultural conservative's position 
suggests that Britain's non-white population have made no contribution to the community 
in'vhich they, in any event, ought not to belong. Multiculturalism holds out the prospect 
that the cultural differences between groups in Britain should not be respected only by 
social institutions; these differences should be publicly supported and maintained. Its 
pessimism lies in its underlying assumption that present differences between groups of 
people in Britain is a desirable long-term good for the nation [sic]. (1991a: 31) 
Goulbourne's solution is to argue for a reconceived multicultural ism which rejects `defensive 
minority communalism' (1991a: 14) and is reconstituted within the tenets of liberal pluralism. 
This would involve firstly separating the claims of social justice for ethnic minority groups from 
those of cultural preservation. Thus, instead of the current emphasis in much multiculturalism on 
cultural recognition, the social and political implications of equality and justice would come to 
dominate (see also Bullivant, 1981). Second, greater emphasis should be placed on commonality 
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since the assumption that 'the social aggregate of ... separate ethnic groups amounts to the whole 
and this whole is, or will, constitute the full expression of British society' (1991 a: 236-37) is 
fundamentally misplaced. In his view, it is simply naive to think that different groups can live 
together peacefully without having anything in common; a position which echoes Furnivall's 
(1948) and M. Smith's (1965) discussions of ethnics in plural societies (sec Chapter 2). Finally, 
Goulbourne returns to the merits of individualism as an answer to the pluralist dilemma: 'What 
is obviously required is a it-ill, a disfx Bition, on the part of most if not all groups to participate 
not as groups but as individuals -- in the construction of a common national community' (1991 a: 
241). For this to occur, however, he does concede that much depends on the largesse of the 
dominant ethnic: 'Whilst the challenge for [this] social synergism ... 
is likely to come from non- 
white minorities, it will largely be the willingness within the majority population to abandon its 
own communal response to [such minorities] which will determine success or failure' (1991 a: 
242). 
Critiquing liberal democracy 
Such is the current orthodoxy among liberals to the question of the pluralist dilemma. When in 
doubt, the historical and political imperatives of nation-state congruence should prevail, as should 
(for conservative commentators at least) the related prerogative of the dominant ethnic to 
determine civic culture. But how satisfactory is this broadly articulated position and what viable 
alternatives are there, if any? We can begin to unravel these questions by first highlighting some 
of the key inconsistences that are evident in each of the preceding accounts. 
Porter's strong advocacy of assimilation, for example, was based on his long-held and principled 
commitment to egalitarianism. Unlike other conservative commentators, his arguments did not 
stem principally from a sense of nativism, racism, or exclusion towards ethnic minorities. Rather, 
his advocacy of assimilation was promoted specifically on behalf of, and for the benefit of ethnic 
minority groups. In this sense, Porter represents the `old' liberal position of the likes of Mill and 
Michelet. `Ethnic' practices were seen as antediluvian and, it was assumed, would thus atrophy 
and eventually die in the face of modern (and modernist) civic culture. Consequently, the sooner 
ethnic groups were disabused of such 'traditional 'practices the sooner they could contribute in 
94 
and to the forward march of progress and civilisation. This march of progress was also, by 
implication, most clearly evident in the dominant ethnic. I Iowcvcr, its actual representation was 
couched almost exclusively in terms of the more 'objective' notions of'individual achievement' 
and 'universalistic standards of judgement', with the state assuming the role of neutral arbiter, 
from this, all individuals were to be treated as 'equal' members of the civic polity -- irrespective 
of their personal, social, religious and ethnic backgrounds -- in order to 'establish a society of 
equality where ethnic origin did not matter' (1975: 293). 
Porter's position is consistent here with an orthodox view of liberalism which addresses the 
person only as a political being with rights and duties attached to their status as riti: en. r. Such 
a position does not countenance private identity, including a person's communal membership, as 
something warranting similar recognition. These latter dimensions arc excluded from the public 
realm because their inevitable diversity would lead to the complicated business of the state 
mediating between different conceptions of'the good life' (Dworkin, 1978; pawls, 1985). On 
this basis, personal autonomy, -- based on the political rights attributable to citizenship -- always 
takes precedence over personal (and collective) identity and the widely differing ways of life 
which constitute the latter. In effect, personal and political participation in liberal democracies, 
as it has come to be constructed, ends up denying group difference and posits all persons as 
interchangeable from a moral and political point ofview (Young, 1993). 
However, this strict separation of citizenship and identity in the modern polity is problematic on 
two key counts. First, it understates, and at times disavows, the significance of wider communal 
affiliations, including ethnicity, to the construction of individual identity. As Michael Sandet 
(1982) observes, in a communitarian critique of liberalism, there is no such thing as the 
`unencumbered self -- we are all, to some extent, situated within wider communities which shape 
and influence who we are. t° Like%%ise, Charles Taylor argues that identity `is who we are, "where 
we're coming from". As such, it is the background against which our tastes and desires and 
opinions and aspirations make sense' (1992: 33-34). These arguments have clear parallels with 
my discussion of habitus in Chapter 1. They also highlight the obvious point that certain goods 
such as language, culture and sovereignty, cannot be experienced alone; they are, by definition, 
communally slimed goods. A failure to account for these communal goods, however, has led to 
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a view of rights within liberal democracy which is inherently individualistic and which cannot 
appreciate the pursuit of such goods other than derivatively (Van Dyke, 1977; Taylor, 1992; 
Coulombe, 1995). In short, individualistic conceptions of the good life may preclude shared 
community values that are central to one's identity. " This approach can be regarded as even 
more problematic when one considers, for example, that indigenous and other non-western groups 
tend to place greater emphasis on shared communal values as cnndr In thcrosc'ln s than does the 
more individualistically oriented west (Corson, 1993, May, 1994). 
Second, and relatedly, there is no such thing as the neutral state. As I have argued in the 
preceding chapters, ethnicity is not absent from the civic realm. Rather, the civic realm represents 
the particular (although not necessarily exclusive) communal interests and values of the dominant 
ethnic as tf these values were held by all. In Taylor's succinct analysis, the `supposedly neutral 
set of dit%rence-blind principles [that constitute the liberal] politics of equal dignity is in fact a 
reflection of one hegemonic culture.... [it is] a particularism masquerading as the universal' (1992: 
43-44). In a similar vein, Iris Young argues that if particular groups `have greater economic, 
political or social power, their group related experiences, points of view, or cultural assumptions 
will tend to become the norm, biasing the standards or procedures of achievement and inclusion 
that govern social, political and economic institutions' (1993: 133). 
This hegemonic process is clearly illustrated in Porter's direct equation of citizenship with 
modernity and the associated valorisation of homogeneity as simply the proper application of 
Reason (Goldberg, 1994). It is even more starkly apparent in Schlesinger's advocacy of a 
common American culture. In Schlesinger's account, the possibilities of heterogeneity arc at least 
acknowledged by him, albeit somewhat grudgingly. However, his overall argument is unequivocal 
about homogeneity as the historically prevalent condition of social life and, as such, an ideal to 
be pursued and recaptured at all cost. This conclusion is encapsulated in his bald assertion of 
American history as `the dream of one people' (1992: 110); a far from unproblematic assertion, 
as it turns out, since it can be accused of the very same features of `bad history' and `history as 
therapy' which Schlesinger had levelled at Afrocentricity. As Robert I lughes, another liberal 
commentator, candidly concedes, America `has always been a heterogenous country and its 
cohesion, whatever cohesion it has, can only be based on mutual respect. There never was a core 
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America in which everyone looked the same, spoke the sane language, worshipped the same gods 
and believed the same things' (1993: 12; see also Chapter 5). The idea of an homogenous 
common culture is thus simply another variant of nationalist myth making since, as we saw in 
Chapter 2, all nationalist histories arc therapeutic to some extent and contain inevitable elisions 
and absences. The key question then becomes not so much the teaching of bad or therapeutic 
history but w hose history one wants to teach. And this returns us once again to the central issue 
of hcgcmonic power relations. As Peter MicLarcn asserts of Schlesinger and other conservative 
critics in the USA: 
conservative attacks on multiculturalism as separatist and ethnocentric carry with them 
the erroneous assumption by Mite Anglo constituencies that North American society 
fundamentally constitutes social relations of uninterrupted accord. The liberal view is seen 
to underscore the idea that North American society is largely a forum ofconsensus with 
different minority viewpoints accrctivcly added on. We are faced here with the politics 
of pluralism which largely ignores the workings of power and privilege. (1995: 126-127) 
McLaren's analysis allows us to question the very notion of a commonly shared (American) 
culture and the supposedly unified and consensual history underpinning it. Common to whom, 
one might ask, and on whose terms? Who determines its central values and/or sets its 
parameters? Who is subsequently included and/or excluded from full participation in its 'benefits' 
and, crucially, at urlaat cost? After all, those whose cultural and linguistic habitus are not reflected 
in the public realm are more likely to pay a far higher price for their subsequent participation in 
that realm. In contrast, those whose habitus is consonant vvith the civic culture and language -- 
and, as such, are regarded as cultural and linguistic capital - have no such difficulties. 
I will return to these questions more fully in the following chapter. Suffice it to say at this point, 
that Schlesinger does not address them. Like other conservative commentators, he assumes an 
homogenous common culture as an historical and political given and, following from this, that the 
choice in the pluralist dilemma is one of either/or. Ethnic minorities must either give up their 
cultural and linguistic identities or prejudice both the social cohesion of the nation-state and the 
possibilities of their own individual social and economic success. As McLaren observes, this 
approach wants to assimilate ethnic minorities `to an unjust social order by arguing that every 
member of every ethnic group can reap the benefits of neocolonialist ideologies and corresponding 
social and economic practices. But a prerequisite of "joining the club" is to become denuded, [de- 
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cthniciscdl and culturally stripped' (1995: 122). Indeed, even those minority members who plod 
the conservative line -- and who arc, accordingly, much trumpctcd as a result -- generally do so 
from a position of personal ethnic and/or cultural dislocation (sec D'Souza, 1991; Rodriguez, 
1983,1993). The result leaves little or no room for iregoIlarfoii; little or no opportunity for 
changing 'the rules of the game'. And why is this? Because `our' common bonds are too fragile, 
too easily dismembered or dismantled by the demands of particularism. One wonders what should 
be so fragile about western civilisation and, conversely, what is so radical about multiculturalism 
that this should be the case (I lughes, 1993). But this, conservatives like Schlesinger insist, is what 
is centrally at stake. 
This brings us to two related inconsistencies in conservative account of liberal pluralism, of which 
Schlesinger's polemic is an exemplar. On the one hand. Schlesinger derisively describes group- 
based affiliations as mere 'ethnic checricading' and argues that these are essentially preservationist 
rather than transformative. And yet, on the other hand, he ends up, as we have seen, invoking a 
majoritarian version of the same process -- a prior, and preeminent civic or `national' identity to 
which all should subscribe. While deploring the nationalistic jargon of Afrocentricity, Schlesinger 
thus ask us to make the same kind of nationalistic choice -- to choose an homogenous trational 
identity over an ethnic one. It must be one or the other -- a prior nationalism that trumps all other 
identities (Calhoun, 1993 a). Such a position not only considerably understates the possibilities 
of holding dual or multiple identities, except oppositionally, it also allows no room for a dynamic 
and multifarious conception of nationhood. The end result is not too dissimilar to the 
preservationist and group-based conceptions that conservatives like Schlesinger have purportedly 
set themselves against. As Sonia Nieto (1995) observes, the charge of ethnic clheerleading by 
conservatives may stem more from the fear that their ethnic cheerleading is being challenged than 
from any notion of wanting to retain a common national identity `for the good of all'. In this 
light, the racism underlying much of the conservative critique of cultural and linguistic pluralism 
also becomes more readily apparent, despite protestations to the contrary (see Chapter 5). For 
example, it is hard to imagine Schlesinger defending his view of bilingualism as self ghcttoisation 
in relation to speaking French or some other `prestigious' language variety (Dicker, 1996); 
indeed, one might well expect the reverse to be the case. Rather, in directing his critique of 
bilingualism towards Hispanic communities in the USA, it is clear that the central issues for 
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Schlcsingcr havc morc to do %%ith 'racc', immigration and class than with bilingualism per se (sce 
also Wildavsky, 1992). 
Moreover, the inevitable connections that are drawn by Schlesinger and other conservatives (sec, 
for example. Iloncyford, 1988; D'Souza, 1991; Ravitch, 1992) between ethnic difTcrcntiation, 
conflict, and fragmentation remain open to question. While conflict and fragmentation have 
undoubtedly occurred from ethnic dificrentiation, dray neet] not always do so. Likewise, the 
national integration envisaged by conservatives has not always resulted in -- indeed has seldom 
actually achieved -- inclusion, consensus and cohesion for all ethnic groups within multinational 
and/or polycthnic states. (Nor, one might venture, would some necessarily want it to). Rather, 
as Young asserts, `when oppressed or disadvantaged social groups arc different from the 
dominant groups, then an allegedly group-neutral assimilationist strategy of inclusion only tends 
to perpetuate inequality' (1993: 133). 
These criticisms, however, cannot be levelled at Goulbourne's analysis. Unlike Schlesinger, he 
is aware of the hegemonic processes involved in the construction of civic culture -- in this case, 
in relation to Britain -- and the nativism, racism and exclusion which oilcn attend it. 
Consequently, Goulbourne's analysis is far more even handed "- criticising the retreat into 
communal laagers of a majoritarian communalism on the one hand and a defensive minority 
communalism on the other. Both militate, in his view, against the formation of a new plurally 
defined British national community. That said, Goulbourne's argument is still principally 
concerned with a favourite theme of liberal commentators -- the idea that a communitarian 
approach to rights in a liberal democracy necessarily essentialises and reifies ethnic groups. For 
Goulboume, this process arises from an unhealthy emphasis on ethnic differences at the expense 
of what may be shared in common. Moreover, the communal politics which are its source 
promote the misplaced notion that ethnic groups should exist 'almost entirely within [their] own 
confines' and, relatedly, that individuals should be required to `conform to the supposed norms 
of the group' (1991a: 13). Goulboume's response to these developments is rightly sceptical. An 
over-emphasis on inter-ethnic differentiation, he argues, clearly understates the traffic between 
cultures, the fluidity of individual ethnic identification(s), and the possibilities therein of significant 
infra-ethnic differences, all of which may operate in combination with a variety of other social, 
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cultural and political allcgianccs (scc Chaptcr 1). Rclatcdly, the limiting of individual frccdom in 
the face of supposcdly fixed group norms can be regarded as patently illibcral. As he observes 
elsewhere, ascriptivc group membership denies the separate existence of individuals, thus 
undermining `much that has taken centuries of struggle to dcfinc and secure' (1991b: 225). 
These are valid and serious criticisms which Goulbourne raises, and ones that arc shared widely 
by other liberal theorists. In ctiect, communitarians arc charged %vith operating a model of group 
membership which is at odds with the complexities of identity in the modern world (I3urtonwood, 
1996). As Edward Said argues, in a similar vein, 'no one today is purely one thing. Labels like 
Indian, or woman, or Muslim, or American arc no more than starting points' (1994: 407). 
LikmNise, Jeremy Waldron objects to the idea that our choices and self-identity arc defined by our 
ethnicity and asserts, instead, the need for a 'cosmopolitan alternative'. As he dismissively 
observes, 'though we may drape ourselves in the distinctive costumes of our ethnic heritage and 
immure ourselves in an environment designed to minimise our sense of relation with the outside 
world, no honest account of our being will be complete without an account of our dependence 
on larger social and political structures that goes far beyond the particular community with which 
we pretend to identify' (1995: 104). On this view, people can pick and choose 'cultural 
fragments' from various ethnocultural sources, without feeling an allegiance to any one in 
particular. Thus, Waldron argues, an Irish American who cats Chinese food, reads Grimm's Fairy 
Tales to their child, and listens to Italian opera actually lives in a 'a kaleidoscope of cultures'. 
While Waldron concedes that we need cultural meanings of some kind, he argues that we do not 
need specific cultural frameworks: `we need to understand our choices in the contexts in which 
they make sense, but we do not need any single context to structure our choices. To put it 
crudely, we need culture, but we do not need cultural integrity' (1995: 108). 
However, there various criticisms also have their limitations. In Goulbourne's account, for 
example, there is still an implicit assumption throughout that the recognitiwr of ethnic differences 
is regressive, leading ultimately to the destruction of any sense of national commonality. Yet, at 
the same time, much of his analysis of post-war Britain demonstrates how a `difference-blind' 
approach has specifically disadvantaged and marginalised non-white minorities. This has led, in 
some cases, to the denial of basic civil rights -- as seen, for example, in Britain's increasingly 
100 
repressive immigration laws (Goulbournc, 1991a: Ch. 5; Solomos, 1993), Given this, it is not 
enough for Goulboume to lamely conclude that the merits of individualism will somehow provide 
the answer to a new plurally defined Britain where 'difference is merely secondary' (1991 a: 242) 
and where justice and equality reign for all. One wonders how exactly? Goulbourne does not say, 
except to suggest vaguely, and somewhat hopefully, that it lies in the ability of ethnic minority 
groups to initiate such change and, more crucially, in the willingness of the majority to accept it. 
Ilowever, the recent history of Britain's approach to non-white ethnic minorities, so clearly 
outlined by Goulbourne, would seem to make this particular scenario highly unlikely. 12 
More broadly, orthodox liberal critiques of communitarianism may well be overstated. As I will 
proceed to argue, a corporatist model of rights %tiithin liberal democracies may often result in, but 
does not necessarily entail a reified and esscntialiscd view of groups themselves. Nor, indeed, are 
essentialism and reification limited to communitarian approaches. We have already seen, for 
example, that such processes may just as easily result from the hcgemonic construction of civic 
culture, as represented in and by the dominant ethnic. Moreover, in contrast to Waldron's 
position, a group-based approach may be able to accommodate a view of ethnic and cultural 
groups as dynamic and fluid while still retaining some sense of distinct cultural identity. In this 
regard, Margalit & Raz (1995) argue that people today may well participate in a wide range of 
dif Brent social and cultural activities but that this does not necessarily diminish their allegiance 
to an `encompassing group' with which they most closely identify (see also Miller, 1995). And 
finally, an approach which acknowledges the importance of cultural membership to the allocation 
of rights within a liberal democracy need not necessarily conflict with and/or supersede the rights 
of individuals as citizens. 
While far from easy then, the two broad approaches of liberal and corporate pluralism may be, if 
not reconcilable, at least not mutually exclusive. As Pierre Coulombe observes: `No one (I hope) 
wants to live in a society which only protects our personal autonomy. Nor does anyone (I'm 
sure) want to be treated as an heteronomous being. The challenge, therefore, is to rethink a 
political community that springs from our self-image as self-authored, yet situated, citizens' 
(1995: 21). One might add here, of course, that we need to do this while, at the same time, 
avoiding the traps of reductionism and essentialism that have beset so many previous attempts at 
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recognising some notion of group"rclatcd rights. This difficult balancing act can be found in the 
work of Iris Young (1989.1990,1993) and Will Kpnlicka (1989,1995a. 1995b). 
Rethinking liberal democracy 
Those theorists who have become increasingly disenchanted with the orthodox liberal position on 
minority rights, and the philosophical matrix of the nation-state which underpins it, have begun 
to ask a number of key questions in their quest for a viable alternative approach. Following 
Mallca (1989), these questions may be summarised as follows: 
0 How can the values of individualism and pluralism be pursued simultaneously? 
0 Does the existence of ethnic and cultural diversity necessarily result in reduced levels of 
social cohesion? 
0 Can any society that embraces a monistic view of culture be considered democratic? 
0 What form might consensual theories ofgovcmmcnt take in plural societies? 
0 How much decentralisation can political systems cope %Nith in responding to the legitimate 
aspirations of national and ethnic minority groups? 
0 Does the concept of valid community lie in the extent to which it creates and maintains 
its own cultural norms? 
0 What levels of tolerance for contradiction and ambiguity can and should exist in plural 
societies? 
Iris Young and Will Kymlicka provide us with the first significant attempts within liberal theory 
at addressing these questions (see also Taylor, 1992). It is not my intention here to examine each 
of these questions in specific detail. However, it will soon become apparent that their various 
themes resonate throughout the work of Young and Kymlicka discussed below. In what follows, 
I will discuss Young's attempt to formulate an approach to rights within liberal democracies that 
is based on a recognition of group-related disadvantage and oppression, along with her 
recognition and accommodation of the relational and fluid nature of group identities. Will 
Kymlicka's work is examined for its development of the importance of cultural membership within 
a liberal (as opposed to communitarian) theory of rights. His central distinction between national 
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and ctlinic minorities, and the prcmisc of historical rights which underpins it. «ill also be explored 
in relation to my own arguments along these lines. Finally, these arguments, and their 
implications. % kill be illustrated by the current position of indigenous peoples within national and 
international law. 
Differentiated citizenship 
iris Young is a prominent critic of the conservatism and uniformity inherent in the notion of equal 
citizenship in liberal democracies. i icr principal theoretical focus has to do with the impact of this 
unditTcr ntiated process on women as a disadvantaged social group. I however, her work also has 
much broader application to other social, cultural and, for the purposes of this discussion, ethnic 
groups. Young argues, in of ect, that the process of treating everyone as abstract individuals, 
undifferentiated by ethnicity, sex, or class, actually reinforces the norms of the dominant group(s) 
Mithin the nation-state at the expense of a wide variety of marginalised and/or oppressed groups. 
As she asserts: 
In a society where some groups are privileged while others are oppressed, insisting that 
as citizens persons should leave behind their particular affiliations and experiences to 
adopt a general point of view serves only to reinforce privilege; for the perspectives and 
interests of the privileged will tend to dominate this unified public, marginalising or 
silencing those of other groups. (1989: 257) 
Instead, she advocates a form of 'differentiated citizenship' where group representation rights are 
accorded to marginalised and oppressed groups within a single polity on the basis of their systemic 
disadvantage: `the solution lies at least in part in providing institutionalised means for the explicit 
recognition and representation of oppressed groups' (1989: 258; see also 1990: 183-191). 11er 
suggested list of those groups in the USA for which such recognition might be appropriate is 
extremely broad. It includes: `women, blacks, Native Americans, Chicanos, Puerto Ricans and 
other Spanish-speaking Americans, Asian Americans, gay men, lesbians, working class people, 
poor people, old people and mentally and physically disabled people' (1989: 261). The inclusion 
of such diverse groupings is not without its problems, as I will discuss below in relation to 
Kymlicka's more focused position. However, Young's argument for a more heterogenous 
conception of the nation-state is an important one. Various social, cultural and ethnic groups 
have the right in her %iew to a differentiated place in the civic realm. This right, in turn, is based 
103 
on the mutual rccognition and valuing of thcir spccificity and worth in the public domain (Young, 
1993). The notion of social justicc is ccntral here to Young's argumcnt: 
The primary moral ground for this hctcrogcnous public is to promote social justice in its 
policies. Besides guaranteeing civil and political rights, and guaranteeing that the basic 
needs of individuals will be met so that they can freely pursue their own goals, a visio, s 
of social Justice pros-ides for some grotq) rckuccl rights and policies. 'These group 
institutions will adhere to a principle that social policy should attend to rather than be 
blind to group dificrcnce in awarding benefits or burdens, in order to remedy group based 
inequality or [to] meet group specific needs. (1993: 135-136; my emphasis) 
IIoww-ever, in advocating this notion of a differentiated and heterogenous public, Young does not 
make the mistake of reifying groups. In fact, she specifically rejects the two common alternatives 
in addressing the pluralist dilemma - assimilation and separatism -- for doing exactly this. 
Assimilation, she suggests, rightly champions individual freedom, equality and self-development. 
however, it wrongly assumes that rut), assertion of group identity and difference is, by definition, 
essentialist. Separatism may help establish cultural autonomy and political solidarity for oppressed 
groups and does challenge the hegemonic construction ofthe nation-state. However, it tends also 
to understate the historical interrclatio s between different groups -- particularly, in modern mass, 
urban societies -- and to simplify and freeze its own group identity in ways that fail to 
aclmoWedge intra-group differences. Consequently, both of these options end up reinforcing the 
notion of difference as `Otherness'. In this view, each group has its own nature and shares no 
attributes with those defined as Other. In effect, difference as Otherness `conceives social groups 
as mutually exclusive, categorically opposed' (1993: 126). " Young argues that this particular 
logic of identity essentialises and substantialises group natures, generates dichotomy at the 
expense of unity (even when it is couched in teeins of the latter), and runs counter to the relational 
and fluid nature of inter- and intra-group relations. In a position which echoes Eriksen's 
observation that ethnicity is `essentially an aspect of relationship, not a property of a group' 
(1993: 12; see Chapter 1), Young observes: 
Defining groups as Other actually denies or represses the heterogeneity of social 
difference, understood as variation and contextually experienced relations. It denies the 
difference among those who understand themselves as belonging to the same group; it 
reduces the members of the group to a set of common attributes.... The practical realities 
of social life, especially but not only in modern, mass, economically interdependent 
societies, defy the attempt to conceive and enforce group difference as exclusive 
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opposition, there arc always ambiguous persons who do not fit the categories.... partial 
identities [that cut) across more encompassing group identities. (1993: 127-128) 
In contrast, Young argues that her conception of a differentiated approach to public policy is 
better able to recognise heterogeneity and the interspersion of groups. Such an approach does 
not posit a social group as having an essential nature composed of a set of attributes defining only 
that group, nor does it repress the interdependence of groups in order to construct a substantial 
conception of group identity. Rather, 
a social group exists and is defined as a specific group only in social and interactive 
relation to others. Social group identities emerge from the encounter and interaction 
among people who experience some difFcrences in their way of life and forms of 
association, even if they regard themselves as belonging to the same society.... Group 
identity is not a set of objective facts, but the product of experienced meanings. (1993: 
130) 
This position is closely parallel to the conclusions drawn about situational ethnicity in Chapter 1. 
it is also akin to Charles Taylor's (1992) emphasis on the dialogical nature of identity formation 
in his comparable discussion on 'the politics of recognition'. The result is a conception of 
difference which allows for specificity, variation, and heterogeneity within the nation-state. The 
expression of group differences is encouraged but within common institutions and a shared 
commitment to a larger political order. Moreover, groups are understood 'as overlapping, as 
constituted in relation to one another and thus as shifting their attributes and needs in accordance 
with what relations are salient' (1993: 123-124). As Young concludes, 'different groups always 
potentially share some attributes, experiences, or goals.... The characteristics that make one group 
specific and the borders that distinguish it from other groups are always uiulccidable' (1993: 
130). Accordingly, a relational and contextualised conception of difference within the plurally 
conceived nation-state helps make more apparent 'the necessity and possibility of togetherness 
indifference' (1993: 124). 
Young's critique of liberal pluralism is principally concerned with equalising political influence 
for oppressed groups within the nation-state. In this regard, her remit can be seen as quite wide- 
ranging -- indeed, too wide-ranging, perhaps, since the conglomeration of oppressed groups is 
potentially unending. Her own description of the diverse range of groups who might be included 
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in her formulations bears this out. There is also a problem %%ith bringing such disparate groups 
together on the singular basis of disadvantage and/or oppression. One can argue, for example, 
that the rights of Native Americans as an indigenous people in North America, or of N15ori in 
New Zealand - both of whom she includes in her discussions of group-diflcrcntiatcd citizenship 
(sec 1990: 175-183; 1993: 143-147) -- arc quite distinct from those or a broad social group such 
as poor people. Focussing on disadvantage as the principal criterion for their inclusion thus 
obscures the p articular demands of these national minorities to greater self-determination within 
the nation-state. Native Americans and M iori can claim greater access to, and representation 
«ithin the state not simp1j, because they are marginalised groups (although they are marginalised), 
but because of their legitimate historical and territorial rights as ethnics. itelatedly, an emphasis 
on disadvantage implies only tcm»p oraryy representation until such time as the disadvantage has 
been redressed. This form of political affirmative action, in effect, is again clearly inadequate in 
addressing the long term demands of national minorities for greater acknowledgement and 
representation in the civic realm (Kymlicka, 1995a; see below). 
However, Young's failure to distinguish the rights of national minorities from other ethnic, 
cultural and social groups is not unusual in discussions of the pluralist dilemma. Indeed, this 
elision is also clearly apparent in the countervailing accounts of Porter, Schlesinger and 
Goulbourne. It is clear, for example, that each of these more orthodox liberal accounts is 
characterised by an almost exclusive preoccupation with et hic or immigrant minorities -- that 
is, urban ethnic minorities and ethnic groups in plural societies, as defined in Chapter 2. 
Accordingly, the arguments employed in defence of the nation-state gain much of their moral 
suasion from the implicit underlying belief that immigrant groups should have less claim to official 
recognition by the state than the national `majority'. Apart from a few desultory references to 
aboriginal peoples, Native Americans, and the Celtic national minorities by Porter, Schlesinger 
and Goulbourne, respectively, none addresses, or even acknowledges, the question of national 
minority rights. In so doing, they fail to differentiate the claims of national minorities from those 
of other ethnic minority groups. Indeed, even within the latter category. Schlesinger adopts an 
undifferentiated approach, as seen, for example, in his glib comparison between the social and 
educational trajectories of African-Americans, and Jc%vish and Asian ethnic communities in the 
USA. Such a comparison is dearly both inadequate and inappropriate since it takes little, if any, 
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account of class as a significant factor, or the voluntary/involuntary status of these groups (Ogbu 
1987; sec Chapter 2). 
Multicultural citizenship 
Will Kymlicka, in his various discussions on multicultural citizenship, is one of the few theorists 
on either side of the pluralist dilemma debates to draw a clear distinction between the rights of 
national minorities (including indigenous peoples) and other minority ethnic, cultural and social 
groups (sec also Walzer, 1982; Taylor, 1992). As he observes of these discussions, most 'focus 
on the case of immigrants, and the accommodation of their ethnic ... 
differences within the larger 
society. Less attention has been paid to the situation of indigenous peoples and other non- 
immigrant "national minorities" whose homeland has been incorporated into the boundaries of a 
larger state, through conquest, colonisation, or federation' (1995a: vii). On this basis, Kymlicka 
defines national minorities 'as distinct and potential), self-goteriiing societies incorporated into 
a larger state' and ethnic minority groups as 'immigrants who have left their national community 
to enter another society' (1995a: 19; my emphasis). The key distinction for Kymlicka is that 
national minorities, at the time of their incorporation, constituted an ongoing `societal culture' -- 
that is, 'a culture which provides its members with meaningful ways of life across the full range 
of human activities ... 
[and] encompassing both public and private spheres' (1995a: 76). Ethnic 
minorities, in contrast, may well wish to maintain aspects of their cultural and linguistic identities 
within the host nation-state but this is principally in order to contribute to, and modify the existing 
national culture rather than to recreate a separate societal culture of their own (see also Gurr, 
1993: 15). " In addition, both of these broad groupings can be distinguished from 'new social 
movements' such as gays, women, and the disabled who have been marginalised within their own 
national society or ethnic group. Kymlicka thus provides us with a more nuanced analysis which 
allows for the possibility of attributing differing rights to various minority groups within the 
nation-state. In this regard, his position is a significant advance on much of the literature 
concerned with multiculturalism which has largely failed historically to make these kinds of 
distinctions. This, in turn, has led to the valid charge of cultural relativism levelled against 
multiculturalism by its critics on both the right and the left, not to mention the attendant 
difficulties that such cultural relativism inevitably entails. " In what follows, I will concentrate 
principally on the specific concerns of indigenous and other national minority groups, although 
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I «iIl also bricfy address the specific rights attributable to cthnic minority groups and new social 
movvcmcnts. I will rcturn, howcvcr, to the widcr implications of the lattcr, and specific ways of 
addressing the problems of cultural rclativism, in Chaptcr 9. 
Meanwhile, as we saw in Chapter 2, the distinction between the respective positions of national 
and ethnic minorities in modern nation-states can be illustrated by the terms 'multinational' and 
'polycthnic'. As Kymlicka observes of this, most states are actually a combination of the both: 
'obviously, a single country may be both multinational (as a result of the colonising, conquest, or 
confederation of national minorities) and polycthnic (as a result of individual and familial 
immigration)' (1995a: 17). However, most countries arc also reluctant, more often than not, to 
acknowledge this combination in their public policy. Indeed, nation-states may well acknowledge 
neither, although this is rare, at least in liberal-democratic states. Marc usually, they may 
acknowledge one or the other. Thus, in the USA there is recognition of the country's 
poly-ethnicity - albeit, a grudging one among conservatives -- but an unwillingness to distinguish 
and accept the rights of national minorities such as Native Americans, I lawai'ians and Puerto 
Ricans. Likewise, Australia and New Zealand have historically argued that they arc settler 
colonies and hence have no national minorities; a position which ignores entirely the rights of the 
indigenous Koori and Maori who were the subject of European colonisation. In Belgium and 
Switzerland, however, the reverse applies. The rights of national minorities have long been 
recognised but an accommodation of immigrants and a more polyethnic society has been less 
forthcoming. A recognition of both dimensions then, and the respective rights attendant upon 
them, is the central challenge for developing a more plurally conceived approach to public policy 
in modem nation-states. 
Follo%%ing from this, Kymlicka argues that in addition to the civil rights available to all individuals, 
three forms of group-specific rights should be recognised in liberal democracies: 1) self- 
government rights; 2) polyethnic rights; and 3) special representation rights (see 1995a: 26-33). 
Self-government rights ackno%vledge that the nation-state is not the We preserve of the majority 
(national) group and that legitimate national minority ethnics have the right to equivalent inclusion 
and representation in the civic realm. Accordingly, national minorities should be provided with 
rights to their autonomy and self-determination %vithin the nation-state which, if necessary, could 
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be extended to incorporate the possibilities of secession. Ostensibly, this right of minority national 
groups to self-determination is not inconsistent with international law. The (1945) United 
Nations' Charter, for example, clearly states that 'all peoples have the right to sclf- 
dctermination'. However, the term 'peoples' is not defined by the UN and the injunction has 
tended to be interpreted only in relation to overseas colonies (the 'salt water thesis') rather than 
to national minorities, even though the latter may have been subjected to the same processes of 
colonisation. Self-determination has thus been limited hi practice to existing states and attempts 
at broadening the principle to include national minorities have until recently met with limited 
success (Thornberry, 1991a; see below). Where national minorities have been recognised within 
existing nation-states, federalism has been the most common process of political accommodation 
that has been adopted. An obvious example here is the degree of autonomy given to the 
predominantly French-speaking Quebec as part of a federal (and predominantly Anglophone) 
Canada (see Chapter 5). Self-government rights then, typically involve the devolution of political 
power to members of a national minority who arc usually, but not always, located in a particular 
historical territory. The key in providing for such rights is their permanent status. They arc not 
seen as a temporary measure or remedy which may one day be revoked. 
Polyethnic rights also challenge the hegemonic construction of the nation-state but for a different 
clientele and to different ends. Polyethnic rights arc intended to help ethnic (and/or religious) 
minority groups to continue to express their cultural, linguistic and religious heritage, principally 
in the private domain, without it hampering their success within the economic and political 
institutions of the dominant national society. One might add here that these rights are also 
available so that an undue burden of cultural and linguistic loss and/or change is not placed upon 
such groups (see Chapter 4). Like self-government rights, polyethnic rights are thus also seen as 
permanent, since they seek to protect rather than eliminate cultural and linguistic differences. 
However, their principal purpose is to promote integration into the larger society (and to 
contribute to and modify that society as a result) rather than to foster self-governing status among 
such groups. In this regard, integration comes to be seen as a reciprocal process rather than a 
simple accommodation of ethnic minority groups to the majoritarian national culture. It is a 
revision of integration rather than a rejection of it. Finally, special representation rights, along 
the lines outlined by Young above, are a response to some systemic disadvantage in the political 
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proccss which limits a particular group's vicw from bcing cffcctivcly rcprescntcd. Special 
representation rights aim to redress this disadvantage but do so principally on a tcmporary basis. 
Once the oppression and/or disadvantage has been eliminated the rights no longer apply. 
Taken together, these three kinds of rights can be regarded as distinct but not necessarily mutually 
exclusive. Indigenous peoples, for example, may demand special representation rights on the 
basis of their disadvantage, and self-governing rights on the basis of their status as a national 
minority ethnic. However, the key point is that these claims need not go together. Thus, the 
disabled may claim special representation rights but would not be able to claim either polycthnic 
or self-government rights. Likewise, an economically successful ethnic minority group may seek 
polyethnic rights but would have no claim to special representation or self-governing rights, and 
so on. Assuming the validity of such group-differentiated rights in the first place, however, does 
return us to the central questions surrounding the legitimacy of minority rights in liberal 
democracies and the difficulties involved in ascribing and/or determining particular group 
identities for the apportionment of such rights. Kymlicka's response to both these concerns is to 
defend minority rights on the basis of liberal theory rather than from a communitarian stance. In 
so doing, he manages to uphold the importance of individual citizenship rights while, at the same 
time, develop an understanding of the importance of cultural membership to such rights. 
Kymlicka brings a range of arguments to bear in support of his position. First, he rejects the 
assumption that group-differentiated rights are `collective' rights which, ipso facto, stand in 
opposition to `individual' rights. Group-differentiated rights are not necessarily 'collective' in the 
sense that they privilege the group over the individual -- they can in fact be accorded to individual 
members of a group, or to the group as a whole, or to a federal state/province within which the 
group forms a majority. For example, the group-differentiated right of Francophones in Canada 
to use French in federal courts is an iixlividual right that may be exercised at any time. The right 
of Francophones to have their children educated in French-medium schools, outside of Quebec, 
is an individual right also but one that is subject to the proviso `where numbers warrant' (see 
Chapter 5). In contrast, indigenous land and fishing rights are usually exercised by the collective 
tribal group -- as, for example, in the case of Native Americans in North America and Maori in 
New Zealand. Finally, the right of the Quebecois to preserve and promote their distinct culture 
110 
in the province of Qudbcc highlights how a minority group in a federal system may exercise 
group-differentiated rights in a territory where they form the majority, an example i will discuss 
in more depth in Chapter 5. In short, there is no simple relationship between group-difTcrentiated 
rights accorded on the basis of cultural membership and their subsequent application. Thus, the 
common criticisms of `collective rights' in the debates on the pluralist dilemma have little actual 
relevance to the question of group-differentiated rights. As Kymlicka concludes of the tatter, 
'most such rights arc not about the primacy of communities over individuals. Rather, they are 
based on the idea that justice between groups requires that the members of different groups be 
accorded different rights' (1995a: 47). 
Second, Kymlicka rejects the inevitable association of group-differentiated rights with illiberality. 
In this regard, he draws a key distinction between what he terms 'internal restrictions' and 
`external protections' (1995a: 35-44). Internal restrictions involve infra-group relations where 
the ethnic or national minority group seeks to restrict the individual liberty of its members on the 
basis of maintaining group solidarity. These rights arc often associated with theocratic and 
patriarchal communities and, when excessive, may be regarded as illiberal. External protections 
relate to inter-group relations where an ethnic or national minority group seeks to protect its 
distinct identity by limiting the impact of the decisions of the larger society. 1" This too has its 
dangers, although not in relation to individual oppression in this case but rather the possible 
unfairness that might result between groups. The ex-apartheid system in South Africa provides 
a clear example of the latter scenario. However, as Kymlicka argues, external protections need 
not result in injustice: `Granting special representation rights, land claims, or language rights to 
a minority need not, and often does not, put it in a position to dominate other groups. On the 
contrary ... such rights can 
be seen as putting the various groups on a more equal footing, by 
reducing the extent to which the smaller group is vulnerable to the larger' (1995a: 36-37). On 
this basis, liberals can endorse certain external protections where they promote fairness between 
groups while still contesting internal restrictions which unduly limit the individual rights of 
members to question, revise, or reject traditional authorities and practices. In relation to the 
various group-differentiated rights outlined above, Kymlicka concludes that `most demands for 
group-specific rights made by ethnic and national groups in Western democracies are for external 
protections' (1995a: 42). Even where internal restrictions are also present, these are usually seen 
as unavoidable by-products of cxtcrnal protections rather than as desirable cnds in themselves 
an issue I will explore more fully in relation to minority language rights in the following two 
chapters. 
Third, Kymlicka argues that a recognition of the importance of cultural membership to one's 
individual rights has historical precedent in both liberal theory and political practice. Indeed. the 
rigid separation of individual autonomy from individual and collective Identity has only really 
occurred in liberal theory and practice since the Second World War. Prior to this, liberal 
commentators did not assume that the state should treat cultural membership as a purely private 
matter. On the contrary, 'liberals either endorsed the legal recognition of minority cultures, or 
rejected minority rights not because they rejected the idea of an official culture, but precisely 
because they believed there should only be one official culture' (1995a: 53-54). The latter position 
is clearly illustrated by the arguments of Mill discussed in Chapter 1. The former view is 
exemplified in the work of Hobhouse and Dewey who argued, on the basis of the importance of 
cultural membership, that some accommodation should be made for the distinctive group-related 
rights of national minorities within the nation-state (K)mlicka, 1989). IIobhouse, for example, 
believed that if the claims of national minorities were satisfied by greater cultural equality, the 
distinctive problems of secession would not arise. In contrast, failure to address the legitimate 
rights of national minorities might actually hasten the break up of the nation-state rather than the 
reverse. On this view, individual citizenship rights teere insufficient to the continued maintenance 
of the nation-state: 
The smaller nationality does not merely want equal rights with others. It stands out for 
a certain life of its own.... [To] find the place for national rights within the unity of the 
state, to give scope to national differences without destroying the organisation of a life 
which has somehow to be lived in common, is therefore the problem which the modern 
state has to solve if it is to maintain itself. It has not only to generalise the common rights 
of citizenship as applied to individuals, but to make room for diversity and give some 
scope to common sentiments which in a measure conflict with each other. (1928: 146- 
147, my emphases) 
These concerns for the cultural protection of minorities were also reflected in political practices 
prior to the Second World War. In the nineteenth century, treaties were often employed for the 
protection of minority groups, initially on the basis of religion and later on the grounds of 
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nationality (Thornbcrry, 1991a). These practices culminated in the general organisation of the 
League of Nations, established in the wake ofthe first World Var. The League endorsed a range 
of treaties aimed at securing special political status for minority groups within Europe in what 
came to be known as the Minority Protection scheme. " This was to change significantly, 
however, with the advent of the Second World War and the associated excesses and abuses of the 
said scheme by the Nazi regime. " As a result, there was a post-war shift in emphasis to 
establishing generic human rights, irrespective of group membership, through the establishment 
and subsequent activities of the United Nations and other supra-national agencies such as the EU. 
In so doing, it was assumed that no additional rights need be attributed to the members of specific 
ethnic or national minorities. As Claude has observed of these developments: 
The leading assumption has been that members of national minorities do not need, are not 
entitled to, or cannot be granted rights of special character. The doctrine of human rights 
has been put forward as a substitute for the concept of minority rights, %vith the strong 
implication that minorities whose members enjoy individual equality of treatment cannot 
legitimately demand facilities for the maintenance of their ethnic particularism. (1955: 211) 
Consequently, all references to the rights of ethnic and national minorities were deleted from the 
(1948) United Nation's Universal Declaration of Human Rights. " Relatedly, a widespread 
comiction began to emerge among liberals that minority group rights were somehow incompatible 
with national and international peace and stability. However, as Kymlicka asserts, these 
assumptions are fundamentally misplaced. As we have seen, individual autonomy is inevitably 
dependent, at least to some extent, on one's cultural membership. Moreover, the failure of 
modem liberal theory and practice to acknowledge the specific rights of minorities has left them 
subject to the majoritarian decision-making processes of the state. The result has been to render 
minorities `vulnerable to significant injustice at the hands of the majority, and to exacerbate 
ethnocultural conflict' (1995a: 5), trends which the UN and other supra-national bodies have only 
recently begun to address (see below). 
Fourth, Kymlicka argues that Waldron's `cosmopolitan alternative', which disavows the 
importance of one's particular cultural membership, is significantly overstated. 20 On this basis, 
Waldron rejects the codification of minority rights as a misplaced and misguided anachronism 
since most people now move easily between cultures and thus do not need, it seems, to be 
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attached to just one. Concomitantly, there is no reason on this view why minority group members 
should not simply dispense with their cultural and linguistic backgrounds and adopt those of the 
dominant cthnie's. And yet, while people do clearly move between cultures -- immigrants are an 
obvious example here -- cultural loss and/or subsumption is not nearly as easy and as 
unproblematic a process as Waldron suggests. In contrast, Margalit & Rat (1995) have argued 
that the transfer from one culture to another is often extremely difficult, even for voluntary 
migrants, not only because it is `a very slow process indeed' but because of the importance of 
cultural membership to people's self-identity (see also Taylor, 1992; Tamir, 1993). This is even 
more so for national minorities who are often forced, in effect, to renounce the language and 
culture of their own 'societal' or 'encompassing' group for another's (see Chapter 4). As 
Margalit & Raz observe, this ignores the fact that: 
membership of such groups is of great importance to individual well-being, for it greatly 
affects one's opportunities, one's ability to engage in the relationships and pursuits 
marked by culture. Secondly ... the prosperity of the culture 
is important to the well-being 
of its members.... people's sense of their own identity is bound up with their sense of 
belonging to encompassing groups and ... their self-respect 
is affected by the esteem in 
which these groups are held. (1995: 86-87; sec also Taylor, 1992) 
In short, ethnic and national identities cannot simply be exchanged like last years clothes, as we 
saw Michael Billig observe in Chapter 1. Moreover, if members of the dominant ethnic typically 
value their own cultural membership, it is clearly unfair to prevent national minorities from 
continuing to value theirs'. As Kymlicka concludes, 'leaving one's culture, while possible, is best 
seen as renouncing something to which one is reasonably entitled' (1995a: 90). Relatedly, he 
argues: 
The freedom which liberals demand for individuals is not primarily the freedom to go 
beyond one's language and history, but rather the freedom to move within one's societal 
culture, to distance oneself from particular cultural roles, to choose which features of the 
culture are most worth developing, and which are without value. (1995a: 90-91) 
Kymlicka's (and Margalit & Raz's) position closely accords with my own view of ethnicity as 
habitus, outlined in Chapter 1.21 In addition, Kymlicka's last observation provides us with a 
rejoinder to a related criticism of Waldron's, that a defence of minority rights inevitably reinforces 
an homogenous conception of ethnic groups (see Waldron, 1995: 103-105). Waldron is 
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particularly critical here of notions of cultural 'purity' and 'authenticity' which, he argues, are 
regularly employed by indigenous peoples and other national minorities in support of their claims 
to self-government. These attempts at cultural delineation arc manifestly artificial in his view and 
can only result in cultural stasis and isolationism. As such, they should be regarded as anathema 
by liberals. however, as Kymlicka counters, the assertion of national minority rights does not 
necessarily preclude the possibilities of cultural adaptation, change and interchange: 
there is no inherent connection between the desire to maintain a distinct societal culture 
and the desire for cultural isolation. In many cases, the aim of self-government is to 
enable smaller nations to interact with larger nations on a more equitable basis. It should 
be up to each culture to decide when and how they adopt the achievements of the larger 
world. It is one thing to learn from the larger world; it is another to be swamped by it, 
and self-govcmment rights may be needed for smaller nations to control the direction and 
rate of change. (1995a: 103-104) 
Indeed, the desire of national minorities to survive as a culturally distinct society is most often not 
based on some simplistic desire for cultural 'purity'. Defenders of minority rights are rarely 
seeking to preserve their `authentic' culture if that means returning to cultural practices long past. 
If it was, it would soon meet widespread opposition from individual members. Rather, it is the 
right `to maintain one's membership in a distinct culture, and to continue developing that culture 
in the same (impure) way that the members of majority cultures are able to develop theirs' (I 995a: 
105). Cultural change, adaptation and interaction arc entirely consistent with such a position. As 
Kyymlicka argues elsewhere (1995b: 8-9), minority cultures wish to be both cosmopolitan and to 
embrace the cultural interchange that Waldron emphasises. flowever, this does not necessarily 
entail Waldron's own `cosmopolitan alternative' which denies that people have any deep bond to 
their own historical cultural and linguistic communities. In similar vein, Kymlicka asserts that 
minority rights `help to ensure that the members of minority cultures have access to a secure 
cultural structure from uchich to make choices for themselves, and thereby promote liberal 
equality' (1989: 192; my emphasis). On this view, national minorities continue to exercise their 
individual rights within their particular cultural (and linguistic) milieux and, of course, 
contextually, in relation to other cultural groups within a given nation-state (see Young, 1993). 
The crucial element, however, is that members of the national minority are themselves able to 
retain a significant degree of control over the process -- something which until now has largely 
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bccn the preserve of majority group members. The key issue thus becomes one of cultural 
autonnomyy rather than one of rctrcnchmcnt, isolationism, or stasis. 
Kymlicka's liberal defence of national minority rights is a cogent one. In rcconccptualising liberal 
theory - principally, by unshackling it from the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' within 
which it has come to be subsumed -- he provides a powerful theoretical framework and 
intellectual justification for such rights. In so doing, he also comes closest to balancing what 
Ilobhouse earlier highlighted as those 'common sentiments trhich In a nnrcasurc' conflict tit'ith each 
other' (1928: 146-147; my emphasis); namely, citizenship and (minority) ethnicity. This is not 
to say, however, that the measure of conflict between such sentiments is resolved by Kymlicka. 
Indeed, no account which deals with such issues could ever do so fully, nor indeed would it 
necessarily be helpful to do so, since the point in the end is that the various claims involved are 
competing ones (sec also Chapter 9). As llomi 13habha argues, 'the question of cultural 
ditTerence faces us with a disposition of knowledges or a distribution of practices that exist beside 
each other, abseits designating a form of social contradiction and antagonism that has to be 
negotiated rather than sublated' (1994: 162). On this basis, what is required is a negotiated 
settlement that acknowledges difference, and accommodates it where it can, rather than a 
compromise which subsumes it and/or attempts to resolve all its contradictory aspects. 
The inevitability of these ongoing tensions does mean though that Kymlicka has faced his own fair 
share of criticism. For example, communitarian critics such as Charles Taylor (1992) have argued 
that while Kymlicka's argument accounts for the cultural survival of existing groups who 
currently face pressure from majority cultural forces, it does not ensure their continued survival 
over generations which, for such groups, is the central issue at stake. For the latter to occur, 
collective goals would in some circumstances have to be preferred to individual one's, a position 
that Kymlicka is reluctant to take. Indeed, for Kymlicka, the principal importance of cultural 
membership is that `it allows for meaningful individual choices' (1989: 172). Thus, freedom of 
choice must be regarded as prior to the ties that bind us to community; in effect, community must 
remain commensurable with individual liberty (Coulombe, 1995). However, as Moore (1991) 
argues, there remains a certain contradiction in a position which claims that the value of autonomy 
is derived from its role in fostering community while also asserting that autonomy is the ultimate 
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value on which that community is to be assessed, Itclatedly, there is an ambiguity at times as to 
what actually constitutes a group for Kymlicka and, by extension, who might be eligible for the 
rights associated with such groups (I3urtonwood, 1996). Kymlicka is rightly sceptical here of any 
notion of a group identity that is pre-given or fixed but articulates this less clearly than, say, Iris 
Young. Accordingly, the problem of closure - the risk that institutionalised forms of group 
representation could block further development and change - is not completely obviated (Phillips, 
1995), even if, as we have seen, cultural fluidity and change is clearly countenanced by Kymlicka. 
Marrying a theory of rights to the complexities of political practice is a necessarily difficult and, 
at times, fraught process. Nonetheless, it remains my conviction that Kymlicka's arguments about 
rights, combined with Iris Young's more nuanced conception of the fluidity and interfusion of 
groups, provide us with a powerful explanatory model for a legitimate defence of national 
minority rights within liberal theory. 
The rights of indigenous peoples 
To illustrate the arguments concerning minority rights outlined thus far, I want to conclude this 
chapter %%ith a brief review of the debates surrounding the legal rights and standing of indigenous 
peoples. Indigenous peoples are currently at the forefront of developments regarding recognition 
of their group-differentiated rights in relation to both national and international law. However, 
these recent developments have only occurred after a long history of colonisation which has seen 
such groups faced with systematic disadvantage, marginalisation and/or alienation in their own 
historic territories (see Chapter 2). In the process, indigenous peoples have been viewed 
extremely pejoratively in relation to modernisation. Consequently, they have been subjected in 
many cases to forced assimilation, on the misplaced assumption that this was the only viable 
option for their social and cultural survival and/or advancement. Fiore often than not, indigenous 
peoples have also been treated solely as a disadvantaged ethnic minority group rather than as a 
national minority ethnic within the nation-state. Alternatively, indigenous peoples have been 
granted, in certain circumstances, some 'special privileges' and protection not afforded `regular' 
citizens. Traditional systems of social order, for example, including the right to very limited forms 
of governmental autonomy (e. g., tribal or band government on Native American reservations) 
have been preserved in some cases in order to allow, indigenous minorities to exercise a modicum 
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of control over their traditional territories and ways of He (Churchill, 1986; Kyntlicka, 1989). 22 
1 iow%cvcr, the extremely limited nature of these concessions has tcndcd simply to place indigenous 
peoples in a double bind. On the one hand, such concessions have done little, if anything, to 
redress the extreme marginalisation facing indigenous peoples in nation-states. On the other hand, 
the granting of even very limited local autonomy to indigenous peoples is usually viewed with a 
good deal of suspicion, and often with outright opposition, because it may infringe on the 
individual rights of majority group members. 
Given this, indigenous groups have become increasingly disaffected with their treatment by 
national majorities and have sought the right to greater sdJ- etertninatiou within nation-states, 
via both national and international law. In this respect, the definition of what constitutes an 
indigenous people becomes important. Howwever, as we saw in Chapter 2, such definitions are not 
entirely unproblematic and indigenous groups themsekties, like all broad groupings, exhibit a range 
of significant inter- and intra-group differences. These caveats notwithstanding, the International 
Labour Organisation's (ILO) Convention 169 (Article 1.1). formulated in 1989, may serve as a 
useful starting point: 
a) tribal peoples in independent countries whose social, cultural and economic conditions 
distinguish them from other sections of the national community, and whose status is 
regulated wholly or partially by their own customs or traditions or by special laws or 
regulations; 
b) peoples in independent countries who arc regarded as indigenous on account of their 
descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to 
which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonisation or the establishment 
of present state boundaries and who, irre pcctimr of their legal status, retain some of their 
own social, economic, cultural and political institutions. (my emphasis) 
Lest objectivist definitions be accorded too much weight, however, Article 1.2 adds the rider that 
`self-identification as indigenous or tribal shall be regarded as a fundamental criterion for 
determining the groups to which the pro%isions of this Convention apply' (cf. Chapter 1). Suffice 
it to say at this point, that self-identification, along with the qualification `irrespective of their legal 
status' highlighted above, are both central to any discussion of indigenousness since not all nation- 
states are willing to recognise indigenous groups in their territories. " 
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The ILO Convention 169 is also significant for another reason. It replaces an earlier convention 
(107), drawn up in 1957, which exhibited a much more paternalistic approach to indigenous 
peoples. These differences are reflected in both the wording and the general intent of the two 
conventions. With regard to wording, for example, Convention 107 (a) uses the phrase 'tribal 
populations' whereas 169 (a) employs 'tribal peoples'. This is significant, given the connotations 
of the term 'peoples' in international law (sec below). Convention 169 (a) also states that the 
social, cultural and economic conditions of tribal groups are clisringuishecl from other sections of 
the national community whereas 107 (a) employs the more pejorative phrase 'at a less advanced 
stage'. Ukc%%ise, where Convention 169 (b) states that indigenous peoples 'retain some of their 
own social, economic, cultural and political institutions', 107 (b) specifically equates these 
institutions with pre-modern practices and contrasts them with 'the [modern] institutions of the 
nation to which they belong'. These differences are not simply semantic ones. More broadly, 
Convention 107 clearly views indigenous culture as a temporary obstacle to modernisation. As 
such, it is as much concerned with the assimilation of indigenous peoples as their protection. In 
contrast, Convention 169 reflects a far more positive view of indigenous cultures and is 
specifically anti-assimilationist in intent (see Thornberry, 1991b: 18; dc Varennes, 1996a: 252- 
253). 
The distinctions between the two ILO Conventions illustrate the different status that has gradually 
come to be accorded to indigenous peoples in international law over the intervening 40 year 
period. Central to this change has been the argument of indigenous groups themselves that they 
are not ethnic minorities but peoples, with the associated rights of self-determination attributable 
to the latter under international law. This argument has been articulated by such organisations 
as the World Council of Indigenous Peoples (WCIP) and the Working Group on Indigenous 
Populations (WGIP), the latter being established in 1982 as part of the United Nation's Sub- 
Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities. The work of the 
WGIP has been particularly influential here and has contributed to a growing tendency to regard 
indigenous peoples `as a separate issue [from other minority groups] in international and 
constitutional law' (Thomberry, 1991b: 6). The culmination of these developments thus far has 
been the (1993) United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous People, a 
document which clearly outlines the key legal and political demands of indigenous peoples. 
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Article 8 of the Declaration states, for exanmple: 'Indigenous peoples have the collective and 
individual right to maintain and develop their distinct identities and characteristics, including the 
right to identify themselves as indigenous and to be recognised as such'. Article 3 is even more 
unequivocal: 'Indigenous peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they 
freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural 
development'. 
Such demands, if accepted, would involve a fundamental rcconccptualisation of national and 
international law and practice. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that, despite the more 
favourable view adopted towards indigenous peoples in recent times, there remains considerable 
reticence about the right of self determination being accorded to them. Much of this has to do 
with the specific meaning of self-determination in international law. The right of self- 
determination includes, crucially, the right to secession and this is why it has been limited in 
practice to existing states in the post Second World War era Thus, in the ILO Convention 169 -- 
which is clearly positive towards indigenous peoples -- there is also a clear caveat which states: 
`The use of the term "peoples" in this Convention shall not be construed as having any 
implications as regards the rights which may attach to the term under international law' (Article 
1.3). Like%vise, governmental responses to the Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous 
Peoples have been mixed. The New Zealand government, for example, while adopting a 
predominantly positive stance towards the Declaration, observes: 
There is no indication at present that governments will recognise a right of exter: al self- 
determination for indigenous peoples, that is, including the right to secede from a state. 
Any `right of self-determination' for indigenous people would therefore have to be 
understood differently from its traditional meaning in international law if it were to be 
acceptable to governments. [In this regard] international law may be moving towards 
recognition of an `aboriginal right to self-determination' or autonomy which does not 
include the right of secession. (Te Puni Kokiri, 1994: 9; my emphasis) 
And so it seems. As a result of the advocacy of indigenous groups, there is an increasing 
openness to an intermediate position which acknowledges the right to greater autonom), within 
the nation-state for indigenous peoples but which does not necessarily include the right to 
secession. This form of `internal self-determination' emphasises negotiated power sharing, both 
through constitutional reform and within existing institutions, and extends well beyond the 
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desultory mcasurcs of local autonomy already cstablishcd for some indigcnous groups. As 
Madame Dacs, the UN rapportcur for the WGIII obscrvcs of this: the existing state has the duty 
to accommodate the aspirations of indigenous peoples through constitutional reforms designed 
to share power democratically. It also means that indigenous peoples have the duty to try and 
reach an agreement, in good faith, on sharing power within the existing state and to exercise their 
right to self-determination by this means to the extent possible' (cited in Tc Puni Kokiri, 1994: 
11). 
Internal self-determination, as outlined here, bears a remarkable resemblance to the concept of 
cultural nationalism, discussed in Chapter 2, with its emphasis on the transformation of national 
communities from within the nation-state, rather than % ith secession per se. The link with cultural 
nationalism also highlights -- or, rather, reiterates -- that secession need not be the only avenue 
for expressing nationalist aims. Indigenous peoples arc not consumed with questions of secession 
since, generally, their limited socio-economic, demographic and political strength precludes such 
an option. Rather, indigenous peoples are advocating a right to separate representation, 
alongside national majorities, on the basis that they constitute a distinct ethnic in the nation- 
state. 24 These claims are clearly nationalist ones and contrast with the usual polyethnic concerns 
of (iimmigrant) ethnic minority groups for the abolition of barriers that lead to disadvantage and 
preclude greater integration into the nation-state (see Chapter 2). This is not to say, of course, 
that the latter are of no concern to indigenous peoples -- they clearly arc. however, polycthnic 
claims are not their principal preoccupation. Thus, state policies which address only these 
concerns, on the basis that indigenous peoples are simply one of many disadvantaged ethnic 
minority groups, do little to allay their specific demands. 
That such demands are beginning to be addressed though, however tentatively, signals a 
significant change in post Second World War liberal theory and practice. As dc Varennes 
comments of these developments: `Whilst their is certainly no unanimity, both international and 
national law appear to be heading towards increased recognition of the special position which 
indigenous peoples occupy within a [nation-state's] legal and political order ' (1996a: 274), 25 
National and international developments with regard to indigenous peoples have also been 
parallelled recently by moves towards greater recognition of national minorities more generally -- 
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most notably, in the draft Framework Convention for the Protection or National Minorities 
agreed by the European Union in Novcmbcr, 1994.2` In both these instances, the pivotal roles of 
language and education have been to the fore. The protection of language and culture is one of 
the central themes to be found in the Framework, while national and international instruments for 
the protection of indigenous peoples also place great emphasis on their linguistic and educational 
rights. The issues surrounding the linguistic and educational rights of national minorities within 
nation-states arc the focus of the next two chapters. 
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Notes -- Chapter 3 
I As Gramsci argues, in order to understand any nation-state as a whole, one must always 
distinguish between its 'State' or political and administrative structure, and its 'civil society'. The 
latter comprises, for example, its principal non-political organizations, its religious and other 
beliefs, and its specific 'customs' or way of life. In making these distinctions, there arc inevitably 
features which do not fit easily under either category. I iowevcr, as Nairn summarises its: 'that 
is relatively unimportant. What matters is that they arc distinguishable, and that the singular 
identity of a modern society depends upon the relationship between them' (1981: 131). 
2. This is certainly the position of Gordon, Walzer and Glazer in their respective analyses of the 
two approaches (sec also Bullivant, 1981; Gleason 1984; Rorty, 1991; Edwards, 1985,1994; 
Waldron, 1993,1995). 
3. It is worth observing that the consensus between liberal and Marxist commentators on the 
position of ethnic and national minorities within the nation-state has also been reflected in the 
subsequent construction of liberal-democratic and socialist states. As such, while I will 
concentrate in what follows on the political organisation of liberal democracies, it should be 
pointed out that socialist and other non-democratic states have also tended to adopt a very similar 
position sis-ä-vis national and ethnic minorities. In this latter regard, Churchill (1996: 268-269) 
provides a useful discussion of the former Soviet Union (see also Kymlicka, 1995a: 69-74). 
4. As I have already suggested, the clear parallels between liberal and Marxist accounts in the 
nineteenth century also reflect this broad consensus. 
5. In his seminal study hie Vertical Afosaic (1965), Porter argued that ethnicity was a principal 
factor in the formation and persistence of the social stratification system in Canada. In his view, 
this stratification process, or vertical mosaic, was initiated by the colonial contest between the 
British and French. When the French settlers lost this contest, they were accorded secondary 
status to their British counterparts. Subsequent immigrant groups were assigned an 'entrance 
status' which located them at various positions lower down the social hierarchy while Native 
American and Inuit occupied the lowest levels (see also Chapter 5). 
6. Hispanic communities in the USA are not a single category, as so often described in the 
literature. Rather they comprise a diverse range of groups, including Spanish-speaking national 
minorities (Puerto Ricans and Chicanos), various Spanish-speaking immigrants from Latin 
America, Cuban refugees, and illegal Mexican migrant workers (Ky nlicka, 1995a: 15-17; sec also 
Macias, 1979; Hernandez-Chavez, 1995). 
7. The arguments about bilingualism, the role of English, and the particular preoccupation with 
Hispanic communities will be revisited in greater depth in Chapter 5 where I examine the key 
tenets of the 'English Only' movement in the USA. 
8. In this regard, Goulbourne provides a cogent review and critique of official immigration policy 
in Britain which, since the 1960s, has been increasingly aimed at limiting and/or excluding non- 
% hite minorities. 
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9. As Goulbourne observes of this, `while the membership of [non-white] minorities is accorded 
formal recognition, this recognition is constructed in such a manner that their legitimate presence 
and participation in Britain arc nearly always questioned' (1991 a: 2). 
10. Communitarians believe that we discover our ends embedded in a social context, rather than 
choosing them ex nihilo. Their principal objection in this regard is thus to the idea of a self 
divorced from, or stripped of, the social features of identity (Coulombe, 1995). 
11. Criticism of this orthodox liberal position is not limited to communitarians, however. 
K)mlicka (1989) argues from a liberal perspective that the attempts of theorists like Rawls's and 
Dworkin's to separate citizenship from communal identity actually still retain an I»mp licit 
recognition of cultural membership as a primary good. The only reason they do not explicitly give 
it status as a grounds for differential rights claims, Kymlicka suggests, is because they accept 
uncritically the notion of the nation-state as politically and culturally cotenninous (sec Chapter 
2). If this assumption is dropped, cultural membership has to be explicitly recognised as a 
possible source of injustice and/or inequality -- a point which earlier theorists of liberalism, like 
Ilobhouse and Dewey, actually recognised. I discuss this latter point, and the significance of 
Kymlicka's wider contribution, more fully below. 
12. As an aside, this apparent contradiction is also linked to Goulbourne's analysis of 
multiculturalism -- or the `new pluralism' as he refers to it -- in which he highlights the Swann 
Report (DES, 1985) as an exemplar. Goulboume is rightly critical here of the Report's emphasis 
on cultural rather than social and political change (see also Troyna, 1993; May, 1994), a limiting 
feature characteristic of much of the literature on multiculturalism. I lowever, his own conclusions 
on liberal pluralism end up, somewhat ironically, very close to those of the Swann Report -- a 
point which seems to escape him. In this regard, it is apparent that the report, while adopting the 
catch phrase `diversity in unity', clearly favours the latter over the former. In so doing, it 
advocates an approach to cultural pluralism which 'enables all ethnic groups, both minority and 
majority, to participate fully in shaping society ... within a 
framework of commonly accepted 
tialues, practices and procedures, whilst also allowing, and where necessary assisting the ethnic 
minority communities in maintaining their distinct ethnic identities within this common 
framework' (1985: 5; my emphasis). In emphasising this `framework of commonly accepted 
values', however, the Swann Report fails crucially to address the key questions of ºrhich values 
are agreed, how they are chosen, and who benefits most from the choice. In the end then, 
Swann's conclusions are little different from Goulbourne's own ambivalent and somewhat 
contradictory position on the pluralist dilemma; it is `cultural diversity within social unity' which 
matters most, although why this should be so, and how we get there, remain far from clear. 
13. This process of social relations may occur between different groups that are relatively equal 
or unequal, although the latter is usually more common. Where the social relation of the groups 
is one of privilege and oppression, this attribution of Otherness is clearly asymmetrical: 
While the privileged group is defined as active human subject, inferiorised social groups 
are objectified, substantialised, reduced to a nature or essence. Whereas the privileged 
groups are neutral, exhibit free, spontaneous and weighty subjectivity, the dominated 
groups are marked with an essence, imprisoned in a given set of possibilities.... Using its 
own values, experience, and culture as [universal] standards, the dominant group 
measures the Others and finds them essentially lacking... (Young, 1993: 124-125) 
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14. Kymlicka's analysis here closely accords with my own discussion in Chapter 2 of the key 
distinctions between ethnic and national minorities and the related significance of cultural and 
political nationalisms. As I argued there, political nationalism is not the only determining feature 
of nationalist movements since such a view, while received wisdom for many, relegates national 
minorities which are not (yet) politically active to the status of mere'ethnic groups'. Kymlicka's 
emphasis on incorporation into the nation-state, rather than on political mobilisation per se, 
provides a useful complement to my own argument. It allows for quiescent national minorities 
and highly mobilised immigrant groups without confusing the political status of the two. 
15. For a more cxtcnsivc critique of multiculturalism in this regard, sec May (1994,1998c). 
16. External protections are thus intended to ensure that individual members arc able to maintain 
a distinctive way of life ff the), so choose and arc not prevented from doing so by the decisions 
of members outside of their community (see Kymlicka, 1995a: 204. n. 11). 
17. It must be said that the League of Nations did not initially encompass a formal concern for 
minority rights. Indeed, no provisions dealing %vith the protection of minorities, nor for that 
matter human rights generally, were incorporated within its original remit. however, these 
omissions created significant controversy and led the League of Nations to subsequently adopt 
and oversee the Minority Protection scheme. It should also be pointed out here that the latter was 
as much concerned with providing a mechanism for the protection of individual rights, especially 
the right to equality, as with the specific concerns of national minorities. As such, the League of 
Nations' approach is not inconsistent with the more recent adoption of universal human rights 
(see de Varennes, 1996a: 26-27; see also below ). 
18. Hitler used a supposed concern for minority rights against the political settlement agreed in 
Versailles in 1919, employing, in the process, pressure from vociferous German minorities 
allegedly denied self-determination. 
19. Article 2 of the Declaration states: 'Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set 
forth in this Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race [sic], colour, sex, religion, 
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status'. Consequently, 
minorities, as such, do not enjoy rights in the Declaration. Various attempts at including a 
recognition of minorities in the text were strongly opposed at the draft stages, the consensus being 
that `the best solution of the problems of minorities was to encourage respect for human rights' 
(see Thornberry, 1991b: 11-12). 
20. Waldron's view here is reminiscent of the advocates of situational ethnicity, discussed in 
Chapter 1, who emphasise the fluid and multiple nature of ethnic (and other group) identities and 
the varied instrumental ends to which these are put. As we shall see, criticisms of Waldron's 
position are also similar to those directed at the more extreme instrumentalist positions adopted 
by some advocates of situational ethnicity. 
21. Indeed, Margalit & Rai s (1995: 81-91) discussion of encompassing groups could easily be 
applied to the notion of ethnicity as habitus. At one point, for example, they observe: `familiarity 
with a culture determines the boundaries of the imaginable. Sharing a culture, being part of it, 
determines the limits of the feasible' (1995: 86). 
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22. Ofcoursc, protectionism in this form has also simply been used as a variant of assimilation. 
As Ilartwig argues, concerning 1%15ori in New Zealand and Koori in Australia: 'whatever the 
differences between "amalgamationist" and "protectionist" strategies, the ultimate aim of the state 
for long periods in both countries was the disappearance of Aboriginal and Mori societies as 
distinguishable entities' (1978: 170, cited in i larkcr & McConnochic, 1985). Joshua Fishman is 
also particularly critical of this kind of 'protectionism'. As he argues, 'even in such settings 
indigenous populations are robbed of control of the natural resources that could constitute the 
economic bases of a more self-regulatory collective life and, therefore, robbed also of a possible 
avenue of cultural viability as well' (1991: 62). 
23. Governments in Malaysia, India, Burma and Bangladesh have at times claimed that everyone 
is indigenous and that no-one is thus entitled to any special or differential treatment (dc Varcnncs, 
1996a). This unwillingness by national governments to recognise indigenous peoples is also 
extended to minorities more generally. Article 27 of the (19G6) International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights provides for the limited protection of minorities 'in those states in 
,. shich ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist'. However, this rather tentative formulation 
almost invites denial by states that any such minorities exist within their jurisdiction. France, for 
example, simply asserts that 'Article 27 is not applicable as far as the Republic is concerned' while 
many Latin American states have made similar claims (Thornberry, 1991 a, 1991 b). I will return 
to the broader intent of Article 27, and its overall effectiveness, in my discussion of language and 
education rights in Chapter S. 
24. Indeed, many states acknowledge as part of their internal law that indigenous peoples have 
either retained some degree of inherent sovereignty that has not been extinguished by conquest 
and/or colonisation, or have a continuing legal status that sets them apart (dc Varennes, 1996a, 
1996b). 
25. Examples of these developments at the national level include Brasil, where the adoption in 
1988 of a new constitution recognised for the first time the indigenous Indians' social 
organisation, customs, languages, beliefs and traditions, along with the right of native title to their 
lands (Brasil, ConsiiiuiVao, 1996, Chapter VIII, Art. 231; see Hornberger, 1997). The Mabo 
decision (Afabo i. Queensland (no. 2), 1992) in Australia has also recognised, again for the first 
time, traditional Aboriginal ownership of land after more than two centuries of European 
colonisation based on the contrary notion of terra nullius. «'hile in New Zealand, Te Tiriti o 
%Vaitangi (The Treaty of Waitangi) - originally signed in 1840 between the indigenous Ilion and 
the British Crown - has, after over a century of neglect, once again conic to be regarded as a 
pivotal constitutional document. Te Tiriti o Waitangi emphasises the partnership between Maori 
and P5keh5 (European New Zealanders) as distinct ethnics and upholds the former's rights as 
indigenous people (Orange, 1987; R Walker, 1990). 
26. Article 1 of the Convention states: 'The protection of national minorities and of the rights and 
freedoms of persons belonging to those minorities forms an integral part of the international 
protection of human rights, and as such falls within the scope of international cooperation'. 
However, like other such documents, the Framework Convention suffers from an inability to 
define the national minorities to which it refers. This allows nation-states, in implementing the 
convention, to determine for themselves who constitutes a national minority (see also n. 23). 
Thus, the Turkish delegation argued during the course of discussions on the Framework that 
Turkish guest workers in Germany constituted a national minority but that the Kurds did not. 
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Chapter 4 
LANGUAGE, IDENTITY ANI) MINORITY RIGHTS 
Much of the debate surrounding the pluralist dilemma has been concerned with -- some would 
say, consumed by - its implications for language and education within the nation-state. 
Conservative commentators like Schlesinger (1992), for example, are quick to denounce 
bilingualism in the USA and to point out the supposedly pernicious influence of multicultural and 
bilingual education on the fabric of American society. Likewise, advocates of cultural and 
linguistic pluralism often invest education with the capacity to transform public policy -- and, by 
implication, public attitudes -- to their more pluralist ends. The Swann Report (DES, 1985) in 
Britain, with its prominent advocacy of multicultural (but not bilingual) education, provides an 
exemplar here. 
This preoccupation with language and education should not surprise us, given their centrality to 
the formation and maintenance of modern nation-states (Geliner, 1983; Anderson, 1991; see 
Chapter 2). In effect, the battle for nationhood is often a battle for linguistic and cultural 
hegemony. Consequently, education -- and, crucially, the language(s) legitimated in and through 
education - play a key role in establishing and maintaining the subsequent cultural and linguistic 
shape of the nation-state. However, this is not a `once and for all' process, as much as some 
conservative commentators would want it to be. In contrast, established nation-states in the 
western world are having to revisit these questions in the light ofchanging demographic patterns 
and, more significantly for our ends, the 
increasing disenchantment of national minority groups 
with current cultural and linguistic hegemonies. In this chapter I want to explore the validity of 
these national minority claims in specific relation to language and identity, along with the various 
issues to which this gives rise. In Chapter 5I will examine more closely the role of education. 
I Iow vcr, in discussing language and education separately here, it needs to be bonne in mind that 
it is often extremely difficult to separate the two dimensions in ppructice when it conies to the 
pluralist dilemma. This point should already be self evident from what has been discussed thus 
far. It will also be clearly demonstrated over the course of the next two chapters since issues of 
language and education will inevitably impinge on one another. Thus, while attempting to 
maintain some analytical distance between the two in what follows, I will return to their specific 
interconnections at the conclusion of the following chapter. There I will examine at some length 
a case study where language, education and minority rights are inextricably intertwined -- the 
`English Only' movement in the United States. 
Language and identity 
In Chapter 1 we saw how language may be a salient marker of ethnic identity in one instance but 
not in another. While a specific language may well be identified as a significant cultural marker 
of a particular ethnic group, there is no fnevitabk correspondence between language and 
ethnicity. In eiTect, linguistic differences do not always correspond to ethnic ones -- membership 
of an ethnic group does not necessarily entail association with a particular language, either for 
indi,. idual members or for the group itself. Likewise, more than one ethnic group can share the 
same language while continuing without difficulty to maintain their own distinct ethnic (and 
national) identities. Indeed, even where language is regarded as a central feature of ethnic 
identity, it is the diacritical significance attached to language which is considered crucial not the 
actual language itself (cf. Barth, 1969; see below). Moreover, languages, along with other 
cultural attributes, vary in their salience to ethnicity both within and between historical periods. 
Languages may come and languages may go, or so it seems. These themes were reiterated in 
Chapter 2 when we examined the tenets of romantic or linguistic nationalism aka Herder, 
Humboldt and Fichte. There we concluded, along with most modernist commentators, that the 
view of nations as both natural and linguistically d'tcnnimicd Evas little more than sociological (and 
linguistic) nonsense. As Ernest Renan argued, language may well be a factor in national identity 
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but it ccrtainly not the only onc, nor is it cvcn csscntial: 'languagc may invitc us to unitc but it 
dots not compel us to do so' (1990: 16). 
Given this, one might be able to assume that language has little actual significance to, or bearing 
on questions of ethnic and national identity. I lowever, this would be to make a grave mistake, 
for a number of reasons. First, there is considerable evidence that while language may not be a 
delermini»g feature of ethnic and national identity, it remains nonetheless a süiiif dint one in 
many instances. To say that language is not an inevitable feature of identity is not the same as 
saying it is unimportant, yet many commentators in (rightly) assuming the former position have 
also (wrongly) assumed the latter. As I will argue below, language may not be intrinsically 
valuable in itself -- it is not primordial - but it does have strong and felt associations with ethnic 
and national identity. As such, language cannot be relegated, as some commentators would have 
it, to a mere secondary or surface characteristic of ethnicity (see, for example, Glazer, 1975,1983; 
Eastman, 1984; Edwards, 1984,1985; Rodriguez, 1983,1993). 
Second, and relatedly, the cultural significance of language to ethnic and national identity may 
help to explain, at least in part, its political prominence in many ethnic and ethnonationalist 
movements. In this regard, the interconnections between the cultural and political dimensions of 
language become central, no more so than in the official status accorded to particular languages 
within the nation-state. As Manning Nash observes: 
Language seems straightforwardly a piece of culture. But on reflection it is clear that 
language is often a political fact, at least as much as it is a cultural one. It has been said 
that `language is a dialect with an army and a navy'. And what official or recognised 
languages are in any given instance is often the result of politics and power interplays. 
(1989: 6) 
The official status of language(s) to which Nash refers is a key dimension in many of the debates 
on the pluralist dilemma and concerns majority group members as much as it does minorities. We 
have already seen the salience of language (and language rights) to the dominant ethnic from 
Schlesinger's comments in the preceding chapter, and we will encounter this preoccupation with 
language, from all sides, in the various examples which follow. However, Nash's comment also 
alludes to the fact that the official status ascribed to any one language is a somewhat arbitrary 
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process -" as much to do with political and social power relations an with nn)lhing else. This 
point has already been presaged by Gcllner's (1983) and Anderson's( 1991) accounts in Chapter 
2 of the development of national languages (often retrospectively) %vithin nation-states. And it 
brings me to the third reason for not underestimating the significance of language to ethnic and 
national identity. Language construction and/or reconstruction may well be a somewhat arbitrary 
process at times. Nonetheless, a certain linguistic arbitrariness does not, ipso facto, diminish the 
affective and/or political importance of the languages concerned for those who conic to speak 
them. Indeed, if this were the case, it would be hard, if not impossible, to explain why particular 
national languages have such socio-political currency and meaning for their adherents, a currency 
which extends far beyond the reach of its solely 'linguistic' functions. In short, the legitimacy, or 
othennise, of a language's provenance does not much matter. Ira particular language cones to 
serve important cultural and/or political functions in the formation and maintenance of a particular 
ethnic or national identity, it is important. With this in mind, I want now to turn to a more 
detailed examination of each of these three principles just outlined, along with the related role of 
English in the modern national and international arena. 
Identity in language 
Towards the end of his seminal account Imagined Communities, Benedict Anderson avers of 
language: 
What the eye is to the lover -- that particular, ordinary eye he or she is born with -- 
language -- whatever language history has made his or her mother tongue -- is to the 
patriot. Through that language, encountered at mother's knee and parted only at the 
grave, pasts are restored, fellowships arc imagined, and futures dreamed. (1991: 154) 
And yet Anderson is also the first to reject any suggestion of some kind of primordial status to 
language. It is ahvays a mistake, he argues, to treat languages in the way that certain nationalist 
ideologues treat them -- `as emblems of nation"ness, like flags, costumes, folk dances and the 
rest'. Much the more important aspect of language is `its capacity for generating imagined 
communities, building in effect particular solidarities' (1991: 133; emphases in original). The 
sociolinguist, Monica Heller, makes a similar point when she discusses the interrelationship 
between language and ethnic identity in a French immersion school in Toronto, Canada: 
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Language use is ... involved in the formation of cthnic idcntity in two ways. First, it 
constrains access to participation in activities and to formation of social relationships. 
Thus at a basic leer! lang algc' use is central to the formation of xrotih boundaries, 
Second, as children spend more and more time together they share experience, and 
language is a central means of making sense out of that shared experience. (1987: 199; 
my emphasis). 
Language, as a communally shared good, serves an important boundary-marking function 
(Tabourct"Keller, 1997). ' After all, being unable to speak a particular language places immediate 
restrictions on one's ability to communicate -- and, by extension, identify -- with those who speak 
that language and any ethnic and/or national identities with which it is associated. This process 
of demarcation may be more salient for minority groups since such groups are likely to be more 
conscious of the need for clear linguistic boundaries in relation to a surrounding dominant 
language and culture. The usefulness of linguistic demarcation may also thus help to explain why 
language often has a heightened sense of saliency in relation to identity when its role as only one 
of a number of cultural markers might suggest othcnvisc. 2 Moreover, to the extent that language 
boundaries are employed as a demarcating feature of identity, then a decreasing emphasis on, or 
a blurring of these boundaries would be regarded as a threat to a group's existence (Khleif, 1979). 
Relatedly, where language is regarded as central to identity -- or, as Smolicz (1979,1993,1995) 
terns it, where language is a `core cultural value' -- the shariirg of that language may engender 
particular solidarities. Certainly, ethnic and nationalist movements have seen the potential this 
connection offers -- often choosing language as a rallying point for the alternative histories, and 
associated cultural and political rights, that they wish to promote. In so doing, many such 
movements are simply reflecting long-held views of the language and identity link that are 
reflected in the language itself. The Welsh word 'iaith', for example, originally meant both 
language and community, the word for foreigner, `anghyfiaith', means 'not of the same language'; 
while the word for a compatriot, `cyflaith', means `of the same language'. Likewise, the Basque 
define their territory `Euskalherria' on the basis of where 'Euskera', the Basque language, is 
spoken. Frequently invoked nationalist slogans also reflect the primacy given to the language and 
identity link: 'Sluagh gun chanain, sluagh gun anam' is Gaelic for 'A people without its language 
is a people without its soul', while'llep brezhoneg, brcizh cbet' is Breton for `without Breton 
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thcrc is no Brittany', and there are countless other examples on which one could draw (scc, for 
examplc, Edwards, 1994: 129; Fishman, 1997: 331.333). 
From the above, it is clear that the link between language and identity encompasses both 
significant cultural and political dimensions. The former is demonstrated by the fact that one's 
individual and social identities, and their complex interconnections, are inevitably mediated in and 
through language. The latter is significant to the extent that languages come to be formally (and 
informally) associated with particular ethnic and national identities. These interconnections also 
help to explain why a `detached' scientific view of the link between language and identity may fail 
to capture the degree to which language is experienced as vital by those who speak it. 
Concomitantly, it may also significantly understate the role that language plays in social 
organisation and mobilisation (Fishman, 1997). In short, the 'shibboleth oflanguage', as Toynbcc 
(1953) coined it, still holds much sway. While the cultural and political dimensions of language 
and identity are inevitably closely intert%vined, I want to look briefly in what follows at each of 
these aspects in turn. 
Language and culture 
It does not take much to demonstrate that language is a communally shared good since language, 
almost by definition, requires dialogue. What is harder to determine is whether one's oirn 
language is a good. Is a particular language significantly related to one's cultural identity or 
, would any language suffice? This is a crucial question since, if the latter is proved, the case for 
specific language rights -- that is, rights relating to the protection and promotion of specific 
languages- is dealt a perhaps terminal blow. However, even if the former tenet is accepted, one 
must be able to account for the historical, social and political construction of the language and 
identity link and its clear tiariabilit}y, both at the inter- and intra-group level. This is not an easy 
task by any means but the work of the prominent sociolinguist Joshua Fishman provides us with 
a useful place to start. 
Fishman (1991) argues that language and ethnocultural identity are crucially linked in thrcc key 
ways: indexically, symbolically, and in a parthvhole fashion. First, a language associated with a 
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particular culture 'is, at any time during which that linkage is still intact, best able to name the 
artifacts and to formulate or express the interests, values and world"vicws of that culture' (1991: 
20). This is the indexical link between language and culture. Such a link does not assume that 
a traditionally associated language is a perfect isomorphic match with an attendant culture, nor 
that other languages might not be able to replace this traditional link in the longer term. I lowcvcr, 
in the shout term (that is, at any particular point in time), 'no language but the one that has been 
most historically and intimately associated with a given culture is as well able to express the 
particular artifacts and concerns of that culture' (1991: 21). In other words, the traditionally 
associated language reflects and conveys its culture more felicitously and succinctly than other 
languages, it-hilc that language-irr-culture link rrnrains generally intact. 
Fishman's position here reflects a weals version of what is known in linguistics as the Sapir-Whorf 
hypothesis. This theory -- named aller its proponents, Edward Sapir and Benjamin Whorf -- was 
popular in the early part of this century and can be traced back, in turn, to herder and Humboldt's 
views on language. Sapir's argument was that one's social and cultural experience is organised 
by language and thus each language represents a particular world view. His pupil Whorf extended 
this by arguing that thought is not independent of the language used because language carves up 
experience according to its particular grammatical structure, categories and types. Accordingly, 
the key implication of the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis is that people who speak different languages 
are likely to have somewhat different cultural outlooks on the basis that the particular structure 
of each language results in a culturally-specific structuring of reality. Indeed, a strong version of 
the hypothesis attests that languages are causal eis-A-eis culturally specific behaviours; a view 
which is broadly comparable to that held by herder et al. and which has been widely rejected as 
linguistically detemwnist. Howev7er, a weak version of the thesis, as here, highlights the influence 
of language in shaping our customary ways of thinking and can be regarded as both reasonable 
and unsurprising (Edwards, 1994). ' If identity is understood here in relation to habitus as `the 
background against which our tastes and desires and opinions and aspirations make sense' 
(Ta)lor, 1992: 33-34), then a traditionally associated language would seem to have a significant 
part to play. Indeed, linguistic habitus, in Bourdicu's (1991) terms, is a sub-set of the dispositions 
which comprise the habitus: it is that set of dispositions acquired in the course of learning to speak 
in particular social and cultural contexts. 
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Language and culture arc also linked symbolically; that is they conic to stand for, or symbolically 
represent, the particular ethnic and/or national collectivities that speak them. Accordingly, the 
fortunes of languages arc inexorably bound up with those of their speakers (Edwards, 1985, 
1994). Languages do not rise or fall simply on their own linguistic merits -- indeed, it has long 
been accepted that all languages arc potentially equivalent in linguistic terms. Rather, the social 
and political circumstances of those who speak a particular language will have a significant impact 
on the subsequent symbolic and communicative status attached to that language. This fact often 
escapes speakers of dominant national languages, and particularly English as the current world 
language, who take the 'natural' ascendency of these languages for granted. In contrast, the 
current international currency of a language like English has much to do with the socio-political 
dominance of those nation-states, notably the USA, for which English is the accepted language 
of public discourse (Tollefson, 1991; Phillipson, 1992; Pcnnycook, 1994, see below). Likewise, 
national languages reflect the greater socio-political status of their speakers in relation to minority 
languages and cultures within the nation-state. 
The final aspect -- the part/whole link -- reflects the partial identity between a particular language 
and culture. Since so much of any culture is verbally constituted (its songs and prayers, its laws 
and proverbs, its history, philosophy and teachings), there are parts of every culture that are 
expressed, implemented and realised via the language with which that culture is most closely 
associated. Fishman argues that it is within this part/whole relationship that: 
child socialisation patterns come to be associated %%ith a particular language, that cultural 
styles of interpersonal relations come to be associated with a particular language, that the 
ethical principles that undergird everyday life come to be associated with a particular 
language and that even material culture and aesthetic sensibilities come to be 
conventionally discussed and evaluated %ia figures of speech that are merely culturally (i. e. 
locally) rather than universally applicable. (1991: 24) 
Fishman's analysis highlights the cultural significance of language to identity. This does not 
imply, however, the reification of the latter or the assumption that such identity can be 'preserved' 
in some pure, unaltered state. Nor does it link particular languages inexorably with particular 
identities. Rather, a traditionally associated language is viewed as a significant resource to one's 
ethnic identity, both at the level of societal integration and social identification (see also Ruiz, 
1984). While such a resource may ultimately be discarded (see below), it remains important until 
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such a time as this occurs. As Fishman concludes, 'a preferred, historically associated mother 
tongue has a role in [the) process of individual and aggrcgativc self-definition and self-realisation, 
not merely as a myth (i. c. as a verity whose objective truth is less important than its subjective 
truth) but also as a genuine identifcational and motivational desideratum in the cthnocultural 
realm' (1991: 7). Given this, the concern to repudiate language as a significant feature of identity 
may be overstated. I lowcvcr, be that as it may, Fishman's argument still needs to account for the 
exceptions it implicitly acknowledges but does not necessarily explain. I low do we accommodate 
those individuals and groups for whom language is clearly not an important feature of their 
identity? How do we explain language shift which suggests that these associations, while 
important, arc by no means irreplaceable? And how do we counter the charge that the language 
and identity link is largely arbitrary -- a social and political construction along the well-rehearsed 
lines of the 'invention of tradition' argument? To answer these questions we need to explore 
further the interconnections between the cultural and political dimensions of language and identity. 
Language, culture and politics 
The language and identity link cannot be understood in isolation from other factors of identity, 
nor from the specific political conditions in which it is situated. The relation between language 
and identity is thus contingent on both subjective factors and particular political circumstances 
(Coulombe, 1995). On this basis, it can be argued that the language we speak is crucial to our 
identity to the degree to which ss'e define ourseMs by it. This will obviously vary widely, both 
among individuals and within and between groups. As such, it may well be that some individuals 
and groups will regard a particular language as a largely superficial marker of their identities and 
have no great sense of loss in abandoning it. Immigrant ethnic minorities, for example, often 
adopt the language of the host country in which they reside, albeit usually over the course of two 
or three generations, on the basis of enhancing their integration and social mobility within that 
country. On this view, Carol Eastman has proffered the explanation that language use is merely 
a surface feature of ethnic identity and thus adopting another language would only affect the 
language use aspect of our ethnic identity, not the identity itself. As she asserts, `there is no need 
to worry about preserving ethnic identity, so long as the only change being made is in what 
language we use' (1984: 275). Accordingly, immigrant ethnic groups may retain their original 
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language as an 'associated' language -- one which group members no longer use. or perhaps even 
know, but which continues to be a part of their hcritagc. Such an association is clcarly 
comparable with Gans' (1979) notion of symbolic ethnicity discussed in Chanter 1. 
These arguments can be extrapolated to the relationship between language and national identity 
as well. Gcllncr, for example, has argued that `changing one's language is not the heart-breaking 
or soul-destroying business which it is claimed to be in romantic nationalist literature' (1964: 
165). Ireland is regularly invoked as an example here because, over the course of the last two 
centuries, English has come to largely supplant Irish Gaelic as the ethnic (and national) language. 
Irish may still be spoken by a minority in the Gacltacht (the Irish-speaking heartland), ' and it still 
retains official status as the `first official language' of Ireland. however, the reality of Irish as a 
rapidly declining language has been clear for some considerable time now. For example, an 
extensive sociolinguistic research study conducted in the 1970s, entitled 'Committee on Irish 
Language Attitudes Research' (CLAR, 1975), found that less than three per cent of the overall 
population used Irish in any regular way. There was also little interest in the restoration of Irish, 
hostility to the compulsory aspects associated with learning Irish (see below), and significant 
pessimism about the continued maintenance of the Irish still in use at the time. Nonetheless, a 
symbolic valuing of Irish was still evident and, as such, was thought to continue to form part of 
Irish ethnic and national identity (Edwards, 1985). That said, a more cynical view is reflected in 
Ussher's tivell known observation: 'the Irish of course like their Irish, but they like it dead' (1949- 
107). 
Two complementary explanations can be oi%red for this clear process of language shift in Ireland. 
One is that while language is often a `core cultural value' for many ethnic and national groups, 
it is not so in relation to Irish identity. Thus, Smolica, who has promoted this notion of core 
cultural values, argues that the core values of the Irish ethnic group are 'unquestioningly centred 
on the Catholic religion' (1979: 63) rather than on the Irish language itself, a process that has 
been intensified by the fact that English was adopted as the language of Irish Catholicism from 
the late eighteenth century onwards. As Smolicz concludes of these developments: `Bereft of 
their ancestral tongue, it was in Catholicism that the Irish found the refuge and shield behind 
which they could retain their identity and awareness of their distinction from the conquering 
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British Protestants... ' (1979: 64). This might well explain why the various nationalist attempts 
this century to rcvivc Irish as the common language of communication "" principally, through 
education -- have proved to be largely unsuccessful (sec below). 
There is some merit in this explanation, although how the 'Irish ethnic group' is defined remains 
extremely problematic since intra-group differences are likely to be much more complex than such 
an analysis allows. In this regard, it is almost self evident that different sections of the community, 
not to mention individuals, will have different relationships to their language(s) for a variety of 
political, social and/or religious reasons, thus significantly weakening the core value explanation 
(Clyne, 1997). ' A more compelling explanation of language shift resides in the social and political 
processes which have seen the rise of English as the language of Ireland over the course of the 
last few centuries. These socio-political factors have linked English inextricably with 
modernisation, thus garnering the language %Nith increasing symbolic and communicative currency 
in Ireland. As such, the socio-political milieu of Ireland merits closer examination since it 
illustrates, writ large, the difficulties facing minority languages and cultures in the modem world. ' 
Language decline: the death of Irish? 
Irish enjoyed its `Golden Age' from the sixth to the ninth centuries where it was spoken as a 
common vernacular, alongside Latin, not only in Ireland' but also in the coastal areas of both 
southern and northern Britain. Indeed, Irish was so highly regarded at this time that by the eighth 
century it had supplanted Latin as the principal literary and religious medium, while the reach of 
the Irish-speaking community had extended over almost the whole area of present day Scotland. 
The dominance of Irish first began to be undermined though with the advent of the Norman 
invasions of the twelfth century. New towns were built by the Normans in Ireland, as elsewhere 
in Britain, and a largely English-speaking bourgeoisie introduced (b Aturchü, 1988). Even so, 
this process, which continued until the sixteenth century, was a slow and limited one. Irish 
continued to have a strong societal and regional base and remained the dominant language among 
all classes in the countryside. It also remained the primary language of communication in urban 
areas (although English was used for public affairs) in what appears to have been some form of 
Irish-English diglossia. ' From the sixteenth century, however, English began to make its 
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irrevocable advance. Henry VIII issued proclamations discouraging Irish and, more significantly, 
plantation schemes were initiated to replace Irish with English settlers. By 1800, English -" or, 
at least, an Irish variant of it - was spoken regularly by half the population; crucially the most 
powerful half Irish speakers were increasingly limited to the poor and underdeveloped Gacltacht 
while English speakers constituted the propertied rural and urban population. This language 
decline was compounded by the abandonment of Irish by the Catholic church, its formal exclusion 
from the English language National School system established in 1831, and the impact of rural 
depopulation (by both death and emigration) from the Famines of the 1840s. These trends, which 
can be regarded as largely external, were also hastened by the apparent willingness of Irish 
speakers themselves to abandon the language. As Edwards observes, `the mass of Irish people 
were more or less active contributors to the spread of English' (1984: 285). Despite various 
attempts to revive Irish from the mid-nineteenth century on -- exemplified most prominently in 
the activities of such nationalist inspired language bodies as the Gaelic League (Conradh na 
Gacilge), established in 1893 - the seemingly terminal decline of Irish continued into this century. 
By the time the Irish Free State was established in 1922 the pattern of language decline was 
largely confirmed. At most, only ten per cent of the population now used Irish as their daily 
language and this group was almost exclusively situated in the Gaeltacht (b Ciosain, 1988). 
Broader language trends were equally bleak. Census figures in 1926 indicated that only 18 per 
cent could actually speak Irish (compared with 25 per cent in 1861) and that very few of these 
were monoglot speakers (O Gadhra, 1988). Indeed, in 1901 census figures recorded only 21,000 
monoglot speakers -- less than one per cent of the population. Given the parlous state of the 
language, much effort was consequently made to reverse this decline, but with little success. 
Initially, education was viewed as the answer. Two main strategies were promoted here. In 
English-speaking areas, Irish would be compulsorily taught to all children by immersion methods. 
This, it was hoped, would produce an adult population with functional competence in Irish within 
a generation. The second strategy was to strengthen and extend the use of Irish in the Gacltacht 
(6 Ciosäin, 1988). These initiatives arose from the belief that if the nineteenth century education 
system had contributed to the demise of Irish via its advocacy of English, the reverse could also 
well apply. Indeed, such was the faith invested in schools that Timothy Corcoran, an educational 
advisor at the time, could assert: `the popular schools can give and can restore our native 
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language. They can do it cvcn without positivc aid from home' (1925: 387; citcd in Edwards, 
1985: 56). 
I lows vcr, such optimism was ill-founded, at least in the Irish case. While I will proceed to argue 
that education is a key component of any minority language policy, the example of Ireland 
demonstrates that the aim of restoring communicative competence in a language cannot be 
achieved on the backs of schools alone (sec also Fishman, 1991; Edwards, 1984,1985,1994; 
Williams, 1994). This over-emphasis on education in the Irish context was further compounded 
by a lack of suitable teachers of Irish and by the ambivalence of many teachers towards the 
language restoration project. Accordingly, by the 1960sl1970s the bulk of educational effort had 
been restricted to teaching Irish in the primary (elementary) sector. Even here though, teacher- 
training colleges were no longer instructing their students in Irish with the result that teachers of 
Irish were themselves not particularly competent. That said, the more recent development of 
Nalonrai -- locally initiated Irish-immersion-speaking pre-schools, initially outside of the regular 
school system -- is an example of a possible counter-trend, growing in number from one in 1968 
to 185 in 1988. The result has been the subsequent re-emergence of Irish-medium schools to 
cater for Naionral graduates although, once again, their development cannot in itself be expected 
to redress the language loss outlined above (Fishman, 1991; see Chapter 5). 
Allied initiatives in the public sector have also largely met %ith limited success in Ireland. Support 
for Irish at the state level continues, with most official documents printed bilingually, while the 
Bord na Gaeilge (Irish Language Board) was established in 1975 by the government to promote 
Irish in daily life. ' However, neither has had much impact on the actual language use of ordinary 
Irish people themselves. Moreover, as the CLAR (1975) sociolinguistic study found, and as more 
recent studies have confirmed (b Ciosiin, 1988; b Riagäin, 1988a), the compulsory dimensions 
associated with Irish -- particularly, the Irish language requirement for the Civil Service -- 
engendered actual hostility towards the language. This hostility to the compulsory language 
requirement remained prominent until its eventual abandonment in 1974, and despite a generally 
favourable attitude to Irish and to bilingualism at the level of ethnic and cultural association. 
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lFinally, even economic measures aimed at preserving some measure of Irish in the Gacltacht have 
backfired. For example, efforts to discourage the emigration of Irish speakers from the Gacltacht 
have included industrialisation projects aimed at improving employment prospects. 1 iowever, 
rather than safeguarding and reinforcing the Irish-speaking community, such projects have actually 
undermined them further by importing skilled and supervisory staff with no knowledge of Irish. 
Likmisc, those Irish speakers who have been drawn back have, in the interim, acquired non-Irish- 
speaking partners, thus increasing the number of non-Irish-speaking households in the area 
(O'Cinncide ct al., 1985). 
The result is that `Irish as a group seem not to have lost their national identity, but to have 
enshrined it in English' (Edwards, 1985: 62), a conclusion encapsulated in the title of I lindiey's 
(1990) The Death of the Irish Language. Even those with a more optimistic view of Irish, such 
as b Riagain, who argues that there has been `some measure of revival', also concedes that it is 
`of a scale that is continuously vulnerable to final submersion in the mainly English-speaking 
population' (1988b: 7). All of this would seem to indicate the futility -- not to mention, the 
naivccty and misguidedness - of attempting to maintain minority languages in the face of modern 
social and political realities. But before consigning Irish -- and, by extension, other minority 
languages -- to what might seem to be their inevitable fate, let us examine more closely the 
constituent elements of the Irish case. 
Language revival: flogging a dead horse? 
Ireland is an instructive example of a minority language policy which has met with limited success. 
As such, it is often invoked as a cause celebre by sceptics and opponents of minority language 
rights. John Edwards, for example, employs the Irish case to argue that the concerted revival of 
such languages should not be attempted when this operates `in the face of historical realities' 
(1985: 64). Language revival in these circumstances is inherently artificial and bound to fail. As 
he argues elsewhere: 
language shift reflects sociopolitical change and this, given the historical perspective, 
absolutely dwarfs efforts made on behalf of language alone. This is not to say ... that 
language cannot serve a vital rallying purpose in nationalistic political movements, but it 
only does so when it retains some realistic degree of communicative function. (1984: 288) 
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On this basis, it is a profound error to think of language dcclinc as anything other than a symptom 
of widespread social confrontation between unequal forces (Edwards, 1994). 1f this is the case, 
the next question must surely be 'should we attempt to reverse language decline at all'? Edwards 
and other like-minded commentators (sec, for example, Bcntahila & Davies, 1993) answer this 
question in the negative; endorsing, in effect, a form of linguistic social Darwinism. Such a 
conclusion may seem to many simple common-sense. However, it betrays a number of inherent 
contradictions that I want to explore further, not only in relation to the Irish case but also in 
relation to some of its wider implications. 
To begin with, there are specific aspects of the Irish case that militated against successful language 
revival. For example, by the time that serious language restoration attempts were promoted and 
implemented in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century, much of the language had already 
been lost to the majority of the population. Thus, while state support and a prominent role for 
education are important factors in language revival, as I will proceed to argue in the next chapter, 
they cannot be expected bye tlremselitis to reverse an already changed linguistic demography. 
Fishman (1991) makes exactly this point, in contradistinction to the Irish approach, when he 
asserts that inter-generational family transmission of any language is the key to its continued 
survival. While he argues that `the family (and even the immediate community) may 1: ot be 
enough [to reverse language shift], particularly where outside pressures are both great and hostile 
... without this stage safely under ... control the more advanced stages 
have nothing firm to build 
on' (1991: 94). In short, `nothing can substitute for the rebuilding of a society at the level of... 
everyday, informal life' (1991: 112). 10 This conclusion is reiterated in the Irish context by Ö 
Gadhra's observation that `the failure to recognise, for a very long time, the extremely low base 
from which we set out, has been one of the failures of the Irish revival effort' (1988: 254). 
A related feature of the Irish case which merits discussion is the political context in which 
language restoration came to be situated. The well known comment by the Irish nationalist, 
Eamon de Valera clearly illustrates this context: `If I had to make a choice between political 
freedom without the language [Irish], and the language Wthout political freedom.... I would 
choose the latter' (cited in Edwards, 1994: 129). Dc Valera's assertion highlights the prominent 
political prerogative underpinning the motivation to restore Irish -- namely, to employ the 
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language as a distinguishing characteristic of the newly emergent nation-state. however, this 
position was eventually to founder both politically and linguistically. In relation to the former, the 
attempt to promote the language as the unique heritage of all Irish people, including long 
established English settlers and a much larger segment of'native Irish' who had abandoned the 
Irish language in the nineteenth century, inevitably excluded more than it included (b Gadhra, 
1988). From the start, the changed linguistic demography -- coupled with long-standing forms 
of Irish identity not associated with the Irish language -- militated against the successful adoption 
of the language as a unifying feature of modern Irish nationalism. In relation to the latter, the 
nationalists' advocacy of Irish did little, if anything to reverse its linguistic decline. In fact, the 
language policy subsequently adopted by the nationalists may have further precipitated language 
loss by limiting itself largely to the promotion of the language's symbolic qualities. Dc Valcra 
illustrates this process well since he himself made little ctfort to give the language much more than 
symbolic import (Dwyer, 1980). This limited symbolic emphasis is thus likely to have been a 
contributing factor in the failure of the language to regain wider communicative currency. The 
state sector provides a clear example of this process here because while the formal promotion of 
Irish has long been a key aspect of language policy, actual language use has remained desultory 
and, despite the long-standing compulsory language components, largely nominal. " 
More broadly, the Irish example demonstrates just how long it may actually take for the 
traditionally associated language of a particular ethnic to decline and be replaced -- in this case, 
several centuries. This is not to suggest that language shift always occurs this slowly but it does 
demonstrate that the process of change is neither insignificant nor peripheral. Such a view is 
consistent with my previous discussions on the Am, process of change associated with habitus 
and encompassing cultures and, relatedly, on the significance of language to ethnic identity. 
Language shift does clearly occur - it would be foolish to suggest otherwise. I Iowever, it is more 
problematic and traumatic than is often assumed, particularly for those ethnics for whom a certain 
language represented, at least at one time, an important feature of their collective identity (Taylor, 
1992; Margalit & Raz, 1995). Fishman reiterates this view when he asserts that `language shift 
generally and basically involves cultural change as well indeed, initially, quite devastating and 
profound cultural change' (1991: 
16). 12 This is not to say, using Fishman's terminology, that 
`Xmen' cannot be Xmen if they do not speak the language `Xish'. Indeed, as we have already 
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seen, the detachability of language from ethnic identity is clearly demonstrated by those Xmcn 
who have already conic to speak'Yish' -- usually as a result of Yish being a language of greater 
power and opportunity, as in the Irish context. Nonetheless, we can assert on the basis of the link 
between language and identity, that it is a cliff rtrtt Lind of'Xishncss' that results. As Fishman 
concludes: 
The fact that the traditional symbolic relationship between Xish and Xishncss can 
ultimately be replaced by a new symbolic relationship between Yish and Xishncss mcrcly 
indicates that in the fullness of time such transformations arc possible and they have, 
indeed, occurred throughout human history. This does not mean that such symbolic 
redefinitions and self-redefinitions are either desirable or easily attained, or that Xishncss 
is the same under both sets of linguistic circumstances. (Fishman, 1991: 34) 
Fishman's argument raises another pertinent question, however. Adopting another language may 
result in a different kind of Xishness but if it is a more powerful and widely used language, if it 
results in a cultural shift towards greater modernity, surely this is a good thing? Again, this 
position is one adopted by most sceptics of minority language rights and it is one that bears 
remarkable similarities to the broadly pejorative views of ethnicity outlined in Chapter 1. On this 
view, minority languages are constructed as an impediment to modernisation and social progress. 
Not only this, proponents of minority languages arc dismissed as self-interested and 
unrepresentative elites who are intent on maintaining such languages solely for nostalgic and/or 
nationalistic reasons. This, critics suggest, is invariably at the expense of the wider social mobility 
of those who speak the minority language and, concomitantly, largely against not only the latter's 
interests but also their wishes as well. 
Schlesinger's views of bilingualism, discussed in the previous chapter, reflect well this dual attack 
on the t-. %in `perils' of linguistic self ghettoisation and the self interested elites who perpetuate it. 
Edwards (1985) is likewise dismissive of the apparent disparity between proponents of minority 
rights and their supposed constituents and uses the Irish case as an exemplar. " For the many who 
actually realise the 'benefits' of shifting to a more `modern' language, Edwards argues that 
economic rationality plays a significant part. In effect, this amounts to a linguistic variant of 
rational choice theory - loyalty to a particular 
language persists only as long as the economic and 
social circumstances are conducive to 
it (see also Dorian, 1981,1982). As Edwards proceeds to 
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observe, this contrasts with what he sees as the clearly regressive interests of minority language 
proponents: 
Note here how patronising and naive are attempts to preserve people as they are, on the 
grounds that they are really better off if only they knew it, that progress is not all it is 
made out to be.... Little wonder, then, that sensible populations themselves do not accept 
this line, and that the major proponents of the view are usually securely ensconced within 
that very segment of society they rail against.... looking backwards has been a favourite 
sport for disaffected intellectuals for a long time, but actually moving backwards has not 
been so popular. (1985: 95,97; my emphasis) 
Such views are also echoed in the developing world and are well represented by Kay's (1993) 
arguments on the `new African'. Drawing on Zambia as an example, 14 Kay argues for the 
displacement of African languages in favour of international languages such as English. African 
languages, with their reduced communicative power and symbolic purchase, reflect for Kay the 
old order while the likes of English now represent the best means of escaping both poverty and 
the strictures of ethnic identity in Africa. Consequently, language loss is seen as a necessary, 
perhaps inevitable aspect of modernisation and development, even if, in the process, it risks the 
`destruction' of cultures (see also Mazrui, 1975; Eastman, 1991). 
How can one respond to this critique? For a start, it can be argued that the question of minority 
leadership is largely a red herring -- merely a useful stick, in effect, with which to beat proponents 
of minority language rights. After all, the charges of self-interest and distinction from the `rank 
and file' can be invoked against any leadership (including those advocating a majority language). 
Likewise, it should be entirely unsurprising that a full range of opinion is expressed within 
minority groups about such central issues as language maintenance and shift. Internal differences 
are an inevitable characteristic of all groups. It is accordingly a reductio ad absurdum to imply 
that the presence of such differences negates the legitimacy of minority language claims. Indeed, 
critiques along these lines tend simply to obfuscate rather than clarify the competing goals, aims, 
values and opinions of the various protagonists involved in the minority language(s) debate 
(Fishman, 1991). Similarly, the charge of inherent preservationism -- apparent in Edwards' 
comments above -- does not necessarily follow, as I will argue below. Nonetheless, the view 
presented here of minority languages as a brake on individual social mobility and collective 
modernisation -- as a problem, in effect -- does seem convincing. It certainly has significant 
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purchase among many actual minority language speakers themselves, as commentators like 
Edwards are more than willing to point out. Relatedly, majority language advocates generally 
pose as (and consider themselves to be) both humanitarians and realists, with nothing but the best 
interests of minority language speakers at heart (Fishman, 1991). But this position, however 
benevolent it might seem, also harbours a number of significant problems of its own that are 
seldom acknowledged or addressed, and it is to these that I now want to turn. 
Re-evaluating language shift 
Language shift appears to be an increasing feature of the modern world. Certainly, there is a 
noticeably greater tendency for members of ethnolinguistic minorities to bring up their children 
in a language other than their native one, a process which often leads to the eventual displacement 
of the former language(s). This process of language displacement usually takes at least three 
generations. It involves: 1) initial language contact leading to minority status of the historically 
associated language; 2) bilingualism where the original language is retained but the new language 
is also acquired; 3) recessive use of the old language, limited largely to intra-ethnic 
communication; 4) increasingly unstable bilingualism, eventually leading to monolingualism in the 
new language (Brenzinger, 1997). 
Such trends have led to some dire predictions concerning the `endangered' status of these former 
languages. Hill (1978: 69) estimates, for example, that in the last 500 years at least half of the 
languages in the world have disappeared, and Krauss (1992: 7), in a much cited article, argues 
that as few as 600 of the currently estimated 6000 languages in the world will remain secure 
through the next century. Inevitably perhaps, there are disputes about the accuracy of such 
projections but the general trend is not in doubt (Grenoble & Whaley, 1996). To take just one 
example, when Australia was annexed to Britain in 1770 more than 250 languages were used by 
different Aboriginal communities in Australia. Some 200 years on only 90 of these languages 
remain in use, with 70 of these threatened with extinction in the near future. Only about ten per 
cent of Koori still speak indigenous languages, that is, 30,000 out of 300,000 (Brenzinger, 1997). 
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The reference to language `extinction' here is a pertinent one since parallels are often drawn 
between endangered languages and endangered species. James Crawford draws such comparisons 
directly when he argues that endangered languages `fall victim to predators, changing 
environments, or more successful competitors', are encroached on by `modern cultures abetted 
by new technologies', and are threatened by `destruction of lands and livelihoods; the spread of 
consumerism, individualism, and other Western values; pressures for assimilation into dominant 
cultures; and conscious policies of repression' (1994: 5; see also Hornberger, 1997). Lest the 
predatory allusion be taken too far, however, it should be stressed that most language shifts are 
not solely the result of coercion or `language murder' (Calvet, 1974). However, neither are they 
solely the result of a `voluntary' shift, or `language suicide' (Denison, 1977), as critics of minority 
language right are want to suggest. Both internal pull and external push factors are invariably 
involved -- although, as I will proceed to argue, it is usually the latter that direct the former. 
Likewise, it needs to be borne in mind that no two language contact situations are alike, nor do 
two language shifts resemble each other exactly (Brenzinger, 1997). Thus, while I will attempt 
to extrapolate general trends in what follows, it is regionally-specific, or even community-specific 
factors that dictate the ultimate patterns and effects of language shift in any given context 
(Grenoble & Whaley, 1996). 
One further caveat needs to be addressed before proceeding further. It is often thought that the 
number of actual speakers is the key variable in predicting the likelihood or otherwise of a 
particular language's survival. While numbers are clearly important -- the fewer speakers, the less 
likely that a language will be maintained over time -- this assumption is to some extent misplaced. 
It is not so much how many speak the language but who speaks it (and why) that is of most 
significance (Romaine, 1995). For example, in a recent report on the current situation of 48 
minority language groups in the European Union, Nelde et al. found that `the demographic size 
of a language group is no guarantee of the group's [linguistic] vitality, with the existence of some 
of Europe's largest language groups being severely threatened' (1996: Executive Summary). 
Two other variables were identified as far more influential in their analysis: 1) the low status of 
many minority groups and their often related social, cultural and economic marginalisation; and 
2) the degree to which minority languages were recognised by the state and supported within civil 
society -- what Nelde et al., along with others (see below), have termed the processes of 
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`legitimation' and `institutionalisation'. Both these variables highlight the importance of 
underlying power relations in situations of language shift, a key factor that is seldom 
acknowledged by its many apologists. 
Acknowledging power relations 
The significance of the often unequal power relations that exist between minority and majority 
language communities tends to be ignored, or at least downplayed, by proponents of language 
shift. In this regard, it is interesting to note that language death seldom occurs in communities 
of wealth and privilege, but rather to the dispossessed and disempowered (Crawford, 1994). 
Even where unequal sociopolitical conditions are ostensibly recognised as a central factor, as in 
Edwards' and Kay's accounts discussed above, these are legitimised in the name of `linguistic 
modernisation'. However, this type of argument exhibits a curious schizophrenia. Edwards 
(1985), for example, is quite willing to acknowledge that language loss has little to do with 
linguistic merit and almost everything to do with the (unequal) exercise of social and political 
power. Yet, at the same time, he is prepared to endorse the arrogation of a majority language on 
the basis of its greater `communicative currency'. In other words, the notions of `communicative 
currency' or `languages of wider communication' come to serve as linguistic proxies for the 
legitimation of the greater socio-political status of the majority language group. 
Moreover, attempts to provide a minority language with a greater communicative currency of its 
own are largely derided on the grounds that if another language already has such currency why 
bother? The best that can be hoped for, it is argued, is the retention of some of the minority 
language's symbolic or totemic qualities but its continued communicative currency is ruled out 
of court (see Edwards, 1984: 289-291; 1985: 17-18). This is a specious, not to mention 
historically ill-founded argument though, since all the current major languages in the world today 
have at some time undergone a comparable process of communicative expansion. One wonders, 
for example, what the current status of English would be in Britain, let alone globally, had it not 
undergone its own significant social and lexical expansion in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries. In the process, English was transformed within the British Isles from a language with 
a status lower than both Latin and French to effectively the `national' language, or at least the 
accepted language of wider communication! 
" Thus, while establishing a symbolic/communicative 
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distinction to language may well help to explain the detachability of language from ethnic identity, 
the implicit assumption that the latter should atrophy and die is inherently a political not a 
linguistic judgement. 
Relatedly, if the loss of a particular language is the result largely of political processes then 
apologists of such language shift demonstrate little credibility in their own decrial and/or dismissal 
of minority language promotion as `politically motivated'. If we accept the assumption that the 
socio-political dominates the linguistic when it comes to questions of language shift, then we must 
also accept that arguments both for and against any language shift are inherently political. On this 
basis, Edwards' arguments, and their like, simply represent a particular value judgement -- a 
judgment which equates minority language loss, and language shift to a majority language with 
progress and modernity. In effect, this position amounts to little more than linguistic social 
Darwinism -- only the languages with the greatest communicative currency should and/or will 
survive. 16 Concomitantly, any efforts undertaken to protect minority languages from such 
`inexorable' processes are viewed as antediluvian; as forlorn attempts to maintain some kind of 
cultural and linguistic stasis. Edwards' previous comments on the role of elites demonstrate this 
view clearly and he reiterates this position when he asserts: `language in its communicative sense 
is ... an element of 
identity very susceptible to change. We may lament the fact, we may wish it 
were not so -- but it is. To expect otherwise is tantamount to asking for change itself to cease' 
(1985: 97). Yet, as with the criticism of minority rights more generally (see Chapter 3), this 
argument is simply misplaced. There is no necessary correlation between the continued 
maintenance of one's minority language and cultural and linguistic stasis -- cultural and linguistic 
continuity and change are always and inevitably intertwined (Fishman, 1991). Likewise, cultural 
nationalism, which often incorporates a defence of minority language rights, is principally 
concerned with the reconstruction of tradition -- modifying it, where necessary -- in order to meet 
more adequately the demands of modernity (Hutchinson, 1994; see Chapter 2). The key question 
in both these contexts is thus not one of stasis but, rather, one of greater control and self- 
regulation of the process of cultural and linguistic change. As Fishman argues: 
A call for RLS [reversing language shift] must ... 
be seen and explained [principally] as 
a call for cultural reconstruction and for greater self-regulation.... RLS is an indication of 
the dissatisfaction with ethnocultural (and, often, also with ethnopolitical and ethno- 
economic) life as it currently is, and of a resolve to undertake planned ethnocultural 
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reconstruction. This change does not need to be backward looking in its thrust, regardless 
of the historical metaphors that it may utilise (because of their recognised symbolic and 
emotional significance). Indeed, most RLS-efforts are actually syncretistic and 
modernistic with respect to their cultural implications and goals. (1991: 17) 
This is not to say that all attempts to reverse language shift are shorn of their nostalgic elements. 
Nor does it preclude the unfortunate potential that still exists to reify language and culture. 
Nonetheless, the inevitable association of such movements with narrow provincialism is 
misjudged. As with the conclusions drawn in Chapter 3, maintaining one's minority language 
does not in any way preclude ongoing cultural and linguistic change, adaptation and interaction. 
Indeed, it can be argued that those who wish to maintain their historically associated language, 
usually alongside that of another more dominant language, actually exhibit a greater ability to 
manage multiple cultural and linguistic identities. Narrower identities do not necessarily need to 
be traded in for broader ones -- one can clearly remain both Welsh-speaking and British, or 
Catalan-speaking and Spanish -- and to insist on doing so exhibits its own particular form of 
ethnocentrism. 
But there is still a problem here. Arguments for the maintenance of minority languages are all 
very well but if increasing numbers of people are voluntarily choosing to opt instead for a majority 
language, as seems to be the case, then the cause already appears to be a lost one. " However, 
the degree to which voluntary shift actually occurs is extremely problematic. After all, if minority 
languages are consistently viewed as low status, socially and culturally restrictive, and an obstacle 
to social mobility, is it little wonder that such patterns of language shift exist? In effect, these 
widely-held views place minority language speakers in a seemingly intractable dilemma. This 
dilemma, as Fishman summarises it, is `either to reman loyal to their traditions and to remain 
socially disadvantaged (consigning their own children to such disadvantage as well), on the one 
hand; or, on the other hand, to abandon their distinctive practices and traditions, at least in large 
part, and, thereby, to improve their own and their children's lots in life via cultural suicide' (1991: 
60). However, one can reasonably question here the legitimacy of this juxtaposition and the 
apparently forced choice it entails. To what extent is language shift on these terns actually 
necessary? Moreover, what are the costs involved in this process and to what extent can they be 
149 
regarded as fair or warranted? And finally, what, if anything, can be done to change `the rules of 
the game' that constitute this dilemma in the first place? 
To explore these questions further, we need to examine the central issue of language status and 
the crucial role of the state in its apportionment. In particular, the role of the state has a 
significant part to play here with regard both to the official recognition of a language, and its 
acknowledged and accepted domains of use within civil society. 
A question of status 
It is surprising the extent to which the relationship between language and politics has been 
overlooked in much sociological and political analysis. After all, language is a contributing 
feature in many political conflicts in the world today including the Baltics, Belgium, Canada, 
Spain, Sri Lanka and Turkey, to name but a few (see Horowitz, 1985: 219-224). Yet, as 
Weinstein (1983) observes, while commentators have had much to say about `the language of 
politics', very few have had anything to say about `the politics of language' (see also Kymlicka, 
1995a, 1995b). 
What constitutes the politics of language then? Principally, it is a contest for linguistic control 
(and, by extension, social and cultural control) of the nation-state. In this regard, `national' 
languages are so called because they have been legitimated by the state and institutionalised 
within civil society, usually to the exclusion of other languages. Legitimation involves the formal 
recognition by the state of a particular language variety and this recognition is realised, usually, 
by the constitutional and/or legislative benediction of official status. " Accordingly, `la langue 
legitime a partie He avec l'Etat' (Bourdieu, 1982: 27) -- the legitimate (or standard) language 
becomes an arm of the state -- and other language varieties are consequently relegated to the 
lower status of `dialects'. This process of `language standardisation', as it is known in 
sociolinguistics, usually comprises four main aspects (see Leith & Graddol, 1996: 139): 
1. Selection: of an existing language variety, usually that of the most powerful social or 
ethnic group; 
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2. Codification: reduction of internal variability in the selected variety, and the establishment 
of norms of grammatical usage and vocabulary; 
3. Elaboration: ensuring the language can be used for a wide range of functions; 
4. Implementation: promoting the language variety via print (cf. Anderson's account in 
Chapter 2), discouraging the use of other language varieties within official domains, and 
encouraging users to develop a loyalty to and pride in it. 
Given this, it is important to stress that the often invoked distinction between languages and 
dialects is not principally a linguistic one. Indeed, to attempt a linguistic distinction of the two 
is fraught with difficulty. One cannot distinguish, for example, a language and dialect on the basis 
of mutual intelligibility. There are some languages -- such as Norwegian, Swedish and Danish -- 
which are mutually intelligible and there are some languages which encompass dialects that are 
mutually incomprehensible. Rather, the distinction between language and dialect is primarily a 
political consequence of the language legitimation processes undertaken by nation-states. As 
Haugen (1966) observes, a `dialect' is usually a language which did not succeed politically. Or, 
returning to an observation made at the beginning of this chapter, a language can be seen as a 
dialect with an army and navy! The boundaries between languages, and the classification of 
dialects, have invariably followed the politics of state-making rather than the other way around 
(Billig, 1995; see also Gramsci, 1971; Bakhtin, 1981; Harris, 1981). 19 
The legitimation of a language variety is thus an important first step in the political creation of a 
`national' language. 20 However, it is not, in itself, enough to ensure a central role for that 
language variety within the nation-state, since it is possible to legitimise a language without this 
having much influence on its actual use. We saw this clearly demonstrated in the case of Irish, 
for example. Crucially, what is needed, in addition, is the institutionalisation of the language 
variety within civil society. Indeed, this may be the more important aspect. By this, the language 
variety comes to be accepted, or `taken for granted' in a wide range of social, cultural and 
linguistic domains or contexts, both formal and informal. The degree to which a language variety 
comes to be institutionalised in this way will also have a significant bearing on the subsequent 
status attached to the language in question and, by extension, its speakers. In effect, an ethnic 
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group's cultural vitality, especially its linguistic vitality, is closely related to the degree of 
institutional support it enjoys (Bourhis, 1984; see also Giles et al., 1977). 21 
The result of this joint process of legitimation and institutionalisation is to privilege a particular 
language variety over others; imbuing it, in the process, with high status. Not only this, but the 
privileging of the language becomes normalised -- it is simply accepted or taken for granted. 
Consequently, speakers of the dominant language variety are immediately placed at an advantage 
in both accessing and benefiting from the civic culture of the nation-state. A dominant language 
group usually controls the crucial authority in the areas of administration, politics, education and 
the economy, and gives preference to those with a command of that language. Concomitantly, 
other language groups are limited in their language use to specific domains, usually solely private, 
and are thus left with the choice of renouncing their social ambitions, assimilating, or resisting in 
order to gain greater access to the public realm (Nelde, 1997). If language conflict results, this 
is attributable, at least to some degree, to the differential social status and preferential treatment 
of the dominant language by the state and within civil society, and the related stigmatisation of 
other varieties. Indeed, the dynamics of ethnic tension involving language, leading in some cases 
to political conflict, occur most often not when language compromises are made or language 
rights recognised, but where they have been historically avoided, suppressed or ignored (de 
Varennes, 1996a). The ongoing linguistic and political tensions in Canada and Belgium provide 
a case in point here. These two examples are often cited as clear evidence of the inherent 
instability of multilingual states. However, in contrast, much of the present political instability in 
these nation-states is attributable to the long-standing denial of specific language rights to French 
and Dutch speakers respectively, and the related socio-economic and socio-political disadvantages 
that these groups have experienced as a result (see Chapter 5). 
Such linguistic and political tensions are exacerbated by the continued assumption that the civic 
culture of the nation-state is somehow neutral and, concomitantly, that the adoption of a national 
language depoliticises that particular language variety. Yet, as I have argued, the ascription of 
a state-endowed or `national' language must be regarded as an inherently deliberate (and 
deliberative) political act; an act, moreover, that advantages some individuals and groups at the 
expense of others. ' In this regard, the public legitimation of a language, and its associated 
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institutionalisation in particular domains, become crucial to the ongoing maintenance of the 
dominant ethnie's cultural and linguistic hegemony within the nation-state. Relatedly, without 
these same processes being applied to minority languages, it is difficult to envisage a long-term 
future for minority language groups in the modem world of nation-states (Nelde et al., 1996). 
Given the spread of standardised education, the associated literacy demands of the labour force, 
and the inevitable and widespread interaction required in dealing with state agencies, any language 
which is not widely used in the public realm becomes so marginalised as to be inconsequential. 23 
Such languages may persist among a small elite, as we have seen demonstrated in the case of Irish, 
or in a ritualised form, but not as a living and developing language of a flourishing culture 
(Kymlicka, 1995a). 
Linguistic markets and symbolic violence 
To explore further the implications of language legitimation and institutionalisation for 
ethnolinguistic minorities, I want to turn again to the work of Pierre Bourdieu. Bourdieu has 
written widely, though disparately, on language, and his work in this regard includes the two 
seminal essays `Le fetichisme de la langue' (Bourdieu & Boltanski, 1975) and `The economy of 
linguistic exchanges' (1977). Where his thoughts on language (and linguistics) are perhaps most 
clearly articulated, however, are in Ce que parier vent dire (1982) and its English language 
adaptation Language and Symbolic Power (1991). 
24 His principal concern in these various 
accounts is to situate language in its proper socio-historical context. In this regard, he is 
particularly scathing of the preoccupation in modern linguistics with analysing language in 
isolation from the social conditions in which it is used. As he comments ironically of this process: 
`bracketing out the social ... allows 
language or any other symbolic object to be treated like an 
end in itself [this] contributed considerably to the success of structural linguistics, for it endowed 
the "pure" exercises that characterize a purely internal and formal analysis with the charm of a 
game devoid of consequences' (1991: 34). 
25 
For Bourdieu, the inherent formalism of so much modern linguistics rests on a central distinction 
between the internal form of the language and its outworking in speech. This distinction, in turn, 
arises from the conception of language as a `universal treasure', freely available to all -- a view 
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that was first articulated by Auguste Comte and subsequently adopted by the founding fathers of 
modem linguistics, Ferdinand de Saussure and Noam Chomsky. Saussure invokes the distinction 
via his celebrated comparison between `langue' and `parole' while Chomsky's notions of 
`competence' and `performance' reflect a similar conception. 2' Bourdieu describes the resulting 
orthodoxy, which posits a particular set of linguistic practices as a normative model of `correct' 
usage, as the `illusion of linguistic communism that haunts all linguistic theory' (1991: 43). By 
this, Bourdieu argues, the linguist is able to produce the illusion of a common or standard 
language while ignoring the socio-historical conditions which have established this particular set 
of linguistic practices as dominant and legitimate -- usually, as we have seen, as the result of 
nation-state formation. However, this dominant and legitimate language -- this victorious 
language, in effect -- is simply taken for granted by linguists (Thompson, 1991): 
To speak of the language, without further specification, as linguists do, is tacitly to accept 
the official definition of the official language of a political unit. This language is the one 
which, within the territorial limits of that unit, imposes itself on the whole population as 
the only legitimate language.... The official language is bound up with the state, both in 
its genesis and its social uses.... this state language becomes the theoretical norm against 
which all linguistic practices are objectively measured. (Bourdieu, 1991: 45) 
In addition to habitus, Bourdieu employs a number of key concepts that illuminate the processes 
which underpin language domination and legitimation. These include: `linguistic capital', 
`linguistic markets', `misrecognition' and `symbolic violence'. Linguistic capital, in Bourdieu's 
terms, describes the `value' given to one's linguistic habitus in particular linguistic markets. In 
a given linguistic market (such as the civic culture of the nation-state), some habitus are valued 
more highly than others. Accordingly, different speakers will have different amounts of linguistic 
capital depending on their ability to meet the requirements of the particular linguistic market 
concerned. Moreover, the distribution of linguistic capital is closely related to the distribution of 
other forms of capital (economic, cultural capital etc. ) which define the location of an individual 
within the social space (Thompson, 1991). Those whose habitus is consonant with the demands 
of the linguistic market are thereby able to secure an advantage, or `profit of distinction', since 
the linguistic capital required is far from equally distributed. Concomitantly, those whose habitus 
is assigned a lesser value by the market come to accept this diminution as legitimate, a process 
which Bourdieu has described as `symbolic violence'. Bourdieu argues here that symbolic 
violence occurs when a particular (linguistic) habitus, along with the hierarchical relations of 
154 
power in which it is embedded, is `misrecognised' (mdconnaissance) as legitimate and tacitly 
accepted -- even by those who do not have access to it -- as a `natural' rather than a socially and 
politically constructed phenomenon. To understand the nature of symbolic violence, Bourdieu 
argues, it is crucial to see that it presupposes a kind of active complicity, or implicit consent, on 
the part of those subjected to it; a process, in effect, which induces `the holders of dominated 
linguistic competencies to collaborate in the destruction of their [own] instruments of expression' 
(1991: 49). While by no means limited to such a comparison, Bourdieu's conceptual analysis is 
clearly helpful here in explicating the unequal relationship that exists between `national' and 
`minority' languages and the subsequent devaluation of the latter by both majority and minority 
speakers. As he observes: 
In order for one mode of expression among others (a particular language in the case of 
bilingualism, a particular use of language in the case of a society divided into classes) to 
impose itself as the only legitimate one, the linguistic market has to be riirified and the 
different dialects (of class, region or ethnic group) have to be measured practically against 
the legitimate language or usage. Integration into a single `linguistic community', which 
is the product of the political domination that is endlessly reproduced by institutions 
capable of imposing universal recognition of the dominant language, is the condition for 
the establishment of relations of linguistic domination. (1991: 46-47; my emphases) 
The single linguistic community, or the unified linguistic market, to which Bourdieu refers is most 
clearly represented in and by the homogenous civic culture of the modem nation-state. Indeed, 
the triumph of official languages and the suppression of their potential rivals are prominent 
characteristics of the construction of statehood and the achievement of national hegemony, as we 
have seen. Bourdieu illustrates the particular processes of language domination involved here by 
tracing the emergence of his own language of French as the `national' language of post- 
revolutionary France. 27 
Vive la France: the construction of la langue legitime 
There were five main languages spoken in medieval France. In addition to the langue d'oil (the 
antecedent to modern French) in the north, and the langue d'oc (Occitan) in the south -- both of 
which were subject to regional variations and a multitude of local dialects -- Basque, Breton and 
Flemish were also widely spoken. Latin was the administrative language and, as such, was 
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confined largely to the church, the university and the royal administration (Johnson, 1993). The 
rise of what was to become modern French began with the (1538) Ordonnance de Villers- 
Cotterets, issued by King Louis XII, which made the `maternal French tongue' (in the sense of 
langue d'oil, spoken in and around Paris) the language of the law. The initial intent of the decree 
was not to make French the `national' language but simply to ensure that the language of the 
King's court would be used in the quarters significant to his power (Weber, 1976). However, the 
decree's admonition (Article III) to transact and record all public acts in French, along with the 
establishment in 1635 of the Academic Francaise which was charged with preserving the `purity' 
of the French language, " were to foreshadow the eventual decline of other languages and dialects. 
The demise of these competing languages was not immediately apparent though, since they 
continued to be maintained ißt practice by local administrations until the advent of the French 
Revolution in 1789. It was during the Revolution in fact that the regional linguistic diversity of 
France was fully apprehended. A linguistic survey carried out by the abbe Gregoire in 1790 
revealed that only little more than a tenth of the population could speak French with any degree 
of fluency (Johnson, 1993). Even as late as 1863, official figures indicated that a quarter of the 
country's population, including half the children who would reach adulthood in the last quarter 
of the nineteenth century, still spoke no French (Weber, 1976). 
Nonetheless, the Revolution was to initiate significant and permanent social and linguistic change. 
If we recall the French historian, Michelet, and his comment in Chapter 1 advocating the `sacrifice 
of the diverse interior nationalities to the great nationality', we can begin to understand why. In 
short, the ideal of the Revolution lay in uniformity and the extinction of particularisms. To this 
end, a single national language, representing and reflecting the interests of the new revolutionary 
order, was regarded as an essential foundation for the new Republic and its advocacy of egalite. 
To this end, the Jacobins insisted: `The unity of the Republic demands the unity of speech.... 
Speech must be one, like the Republic' (cited in Weber, 1976: 72). As Bourdieu observes: `it was 
not only a question of communication but of gaining recognition for a new language of authority, 
with its new political vocabulary, its terms of address and reference, its metaphors, its euphemisms 
and the representation of the social world which it conveys... ' (1991: 48; my emphasis). 
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This vision of a brave new world, represented in and through French, took some time to effect 
in practice, as the above language figures for 1863 indicate. However, a combination of legal 
enforcement and an increasingly central role for education was to prove pivotal over the course 
of the nineteenth century in achieving this end. In the latter regard, the passing of the Lois Ferry 
in the 1880s ensured that French was taught in schools throughout France to the detriment of 
regional languages. Not only this, but the regional languages were viewed by the hussards noirs, 
the Republic's teachers, as worthless, barbarous, corrupt and devoid of interest (Bourdieu, 1982). 
A poignant illustration of this is provided by a prefect in the Department of Finistere in Brittany 
who, in 1845, formally exhorted teachers: `Above all remember, gentleman, that your sole 
function is to kill the Breton language' (cited in Quiniou-Tempereau, 1988: 31-32). Such 
attitudes reflect how Breton, and other regional languages -- now derisively termed `patois' -- 
were increasingly regarded as parochial vestiges of the ancien regime, the sooner forgotten the 
better. 29 In contrast, French was seen as the embodiment of civilisation and progress, and was 
promoted, not only in education, but in all official language domains, making its eventual 
ascendancy inevitable. 
The rise of French provides us then with a clear example of the centrality of power relations and 
associated language status in the construction of national languages. By implication, it also 
defuses the charge often levelled against many minority languages, and their related advocacy, 
concerning the arbitrary and/or artificial link between language and identity. After all, one cannot 
have it both ways. If there is a certain arbitrariness to the construction of national languages one 
might expect a similar pattern to be evident among minority languages also. Moreover, in neither 
instance do questions surrounding a language's provenance necessarily diminish the affective ties 
associated with that language. For all their constructedness, evolution and change, both national 
WId minority languages remain, for many of their speakers, important indicators of individual and 
collective identity. To accept this principle for one and not the other is clearly unjust. 
Instead, we need to change the terms of the debate. If, as I have argued, the legitimation and 
institutionalisation of a language are the key to its long term survival in the modern world, there 
is a strong moral (and political) argument for providing national minority languages with these 
very same attributes. In so doing, national minority ethnies would be accorded the necessary 
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cultural and linguistic capital to embark on their own process of linguistic modernisation; a 
modernisation initiated and shaped from within rather than from without as has largely been the 
case until now. Such a process does not preclude individuals from continuing to exercise their 
own language choices although, given the continuing balance in favour of dominant languages, 
and the questions this raises about so called `voluntary' language shift, the potential for conflict 
inevitably remains. Perhaps only when the new found status of minority languages becomes firmly 
established might the tendency for individuals to shift to a majority language begin to change. 
Meanwhile, the association of modernity with one `common' language and culture needs to be 
recognised as the nationalist myth making that it is. Only if language change is separated from 
the current hegemonic imperatives of the nation-state can the prospect of more representational 
multinational and multilingual states be secured. The politics of language need not always remain 
subsumed by the language of politics. As Tollefson concludes: 
the struggle to adopt minority languages within dominant institutions such as education, 
the law, and government, as well as the struggle over language rights, constitute efforts 
to legitimise the minority group itself and to alter its relationship to the state. Thus while 
language planning reflects relationships of power, it can also be used to transform them. 
(1991: 202) 
Changing the language preferences of the state and civil society, or at least broadening them, 
would better reflect the cultural and linguistic demographics of most of today's multinational (and 
polyethnic) states. Not only this, it could significantly improve the life chances of those national 
minority individuals and groups who are presently disadvantaged in their access to, and 
participation in public services, employment and education. As I have consistently argued, 
linguistic consequences cannot be separated from socio-economic and socio-political 
consequences, and vice versa. This hold true too, of course, for other ethnic minority groups. 
Indeed, in concentrating once again here on national minority ethnies, I am not wishing to ignore 
or diminish the language rights attributable to these other groups. After all, the strong arguments 
in favour of the link between cultural and linguistic identities, which I have outlined in this 
chapter, clearly point to the right of all ethnic minorities to retain and maintain their traditionally 
associated language should they so wish (see Chapter 5). Likewise, changing `the rules of the 
game' that automatically presume an exclusive relationship between dominant languages and 
modernity should make the process of maintaining minority languages a little easier. However, 
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as I have also consistently argued throughout this account, one can distinguish the rights of 
national minority ethnies from ethnic minority groups in relation to their formal inclusion in, and 
representation within the civic culture of the nation-state. As such, the specific emphasis here on 
the legitimation and institutionalisation of minority languages is necessarily limited to national 
minorities. 30 
That said, to effect a greater recognition and acceptance of the languages of national minority 
ethnies, let alone those of other ethnic minorities, remains an extremely tall order. The idea of 
national (and linguistic) congruence within the current nation-state system remains as deeply 
entrenched as ever and, crucially, continues to be rigorously defended by those majority groups 
who benefit most from it (see Chapter 5). Indeed, in the long term, one must always concede the 
possibility of failure -- given the weight of the various forces that continue to arraign themselves 
against minority ethnies and the languages they speak. In this light, I want to highlight briefly here 
one final, and perhaps obvious example of what minority languages have to contend with -- the 
position of English as the current lingua franca or world language. 
Rule Britannia: English in the ascendant 
It is indisputable (except perhaps to the French! ) that English is the international language of the 
modern world (Crystal, 1997a). From an estimated four million speakers in 1500 (Jespersen, 
1968), limited almost exclusively to the British Isles, English is currently spoken by at least 700 
million speakers worldwide, of whom approximately 300 million use English as a first language, 
300 million use English as a second language and a further 100 million use it fluently as a foreign 
language. This is an increase of40 per cent since the 1950s and an almost ten-fold increase since 
1900. Bolder estimates project the number of English speakers at nearer 1-1.5 billion, although 
this includes those who have lower levels of fluency in English as a foreign language (Crystal, 
1997b). While such numbers are undoubtedly significant, they are not the only, or even the 
principal reason for the current ascendancy of English (Mandarin Chinese still has far more first 
and second language speakers, for example). Rather, as David Crystal highlights in the 
Cambridge Encyclopedia of Language, the current ascendancy of English is demonstrated by its 
dominance in a wide range of key areas: 
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English is used as an official or semi-official language in over 60 countries, and has a 
prominent place in a further 20. It is either dominant or well-established in all six 
continents. It is the main language of books, newspapers, airports and air-traffic control, 
international business and academic conferences, science, technology, medicine, 
diplomacy, sports, international competitions, pop music, and advertising. Over two- 
thirds of the world's scientists write in English. Three quarters of the world's mail is 
written in English. Of all the information in the world's electronic retrieval systems, 80% 
is stored in English. People communicate on the Internet largely in English. English 
[language] radio programmes are received by over 150 million in 120 countries. Over 50 
million children study English as an additional language at primary [elementary] level; over 
80 million study it at secondary level... (1997b: 360) 
As a consequence of the increasing global ascendancy of English, the language has come to be 
linked inextricably with modernity and modernisation, and the associated benefits which accrue 
to those who speak it. In particular, the spread of English is linked to modernisation in two key 
ways. First, it is seen as a central tool by which the process of modernisation can be effected, 
particularly in developing societies. Second, and relatedly, monolingualism (preferably in English) 
is seen as a practical advantage for modern social organisation while multilingualism, in contrast, 
is viewed as a characteristic of `pre-modern' or `traditional' societies (Tollefson, 1991). We have 
already seen these arguments developed by Kay (1993) in relation to Africa. On this view, 
English is seen as a language which is neutral and pragmatic, beneficial, and freely chosen. 
Indeed, these underlying assumptions inform linguistics, applied linguistic and English language 
teaching circles to such an extent that their legitimacy is hardly ever questioned. Instead, much 
of the academic discussion in these areas over the last two decades has centred on the perceived 
threat to `standard English' of the proliferation of English (or Englishes) around the world (see 
Quirk 1981,1985; Kachru, 1982,1986,1990). 
However, this kind of hermetic analysis considerably underplays, if not simply ignores, the more 
problematic nature of the spread of English. For example, the view of English as freely chosen 
fails to address the wider economic, political and ideological forces which shape and constrain 
such a choice at both the individual and collective level. Likewise, treating English as natural and 
neutral rests on a structuralist and positivist view of language which ignores the wider historical, 
cultural and political forces that have led to the current dominance of English (cf. Bourdieu). And 
finally, the view of English as beneficial assumes, rather naively, that people and nation-states deal 
with each other on an equal footing when clearly they do not. As such, those who advocate the 
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`benefits' of English largely fail to address the relationship between English and wider inequitable 
distributions and flows of wealth, resources, culture and knowledge (Pennycook, 1994). " 
To illustrate this point, it is worth considering briefly the historical and political origins of English. 
After all, the fact that English is the pre-eminent international language, in whatever local form 
it might take, is far from accidental. As most of us know, it has much to do with the role of Great 
Britain as the dominant colonial power over the last three centuries. This saw English established 
as a key language of trade across the globe under the auspices of the expansionist British Empire. 
With the decline of Britain as a world power in the latter part of this century, this mantle has now 
passed to the United States. With its dominance since the Second World War, and its increasingly 
widespread influence over global trade, media and communications, the USA has ensured that 
English remains at the forefront of the world's languages. Having said that, the British Council 
continues to play a pivotal role in the widespread promotion of English for economic and political 
purposes. In any one year, the British Council helps a quarter of a million foreign students to 
learn English (Crystal, 1997b). The reasons behind this are clear enough and are outlined in the 
British Council Annual Report of 1983-84. The Report states that because the British `do not 
have the power we once had to impose our will ... cultural 
diplomacy must see to it that people 
see the benefits of English ... and the 
drawbacks with their own languages ... then, consequently 
[they will] want [to learn] English ... 
for their own benefit' (my emphasis). As a result, `Britain's 
influence endures, out of all proportion to her economic and military resources' (cited in 
phillipson, 1992: 286-287). 3' In a similar vein, Ndebele observes: `the British Council continues 
to be untiring in its efforts to keep the world speaking English. In this regard, teaching English 
as a second or foreign language is not only good business ... 
it is [also] good politics' (1987: 63). 
In short, the English language, and the ideology of modernisation it conveys, are far from neutral. 
Indeed, it is simply disingenuous to present English as some kind of a tabula rasa, available at no 
cost and for the benefit of all. Rather, this type of reasoning should be recognised 
for what it is: 
[a] part of the rationalisation process whereby the unequal power relations between 
English and other languages are explained and legitimated. It fits into the familiar ... 
pattern of the dominant language creating an exalted image of itself, other languages being 
devalued, and the relationship between the two rationalised in favour of the dominant 
language. (Phillipson, 1992: 287-288). 
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Phillipson, in his searing critique of the international English language teaching industry, 33 
proceeds to summarise the `glorification' of English linguistic hegemony, and the related 
devaluing of other languages. This summary is presented in the following table. 
Glorifying English Devaluing other languages 
World language 
International language 














Table 4.1: The labelling of English and other languages 
(Source: Phillipson, 1992: 282) 
Many of the juxtapositions highlighted here have already been encountered in relation to national 
and minority languages. The role of English as lingua franca merely extends these comparisons 
to the next level. In Alistair Pennycook's (1994) account of the cultural politics of English as an 
international language, further aspects of the pre-eminent position of English are highlighted 
which also resonate closely with our previous discussions. Drawing on Pennycook's excellent 
analysis, these include the following: 
1. The promotion of a continuing English language hegemony. As we have already seen, this 
acts to reinforce the dominant economic and political position of nation-states such as Britain and 
the USA in the modern world. It is also facilitated by the role that English has come to assume 
as the language of international capitalism (Naysmith, 1987). The combined result is the 
perpetuation of social, economic and political inequality between English and non-English 
speakers, both within and between nation-states. This process has been termed `English linguistic 
imperialism' or, more broadly, `linguicism' by Phillipson (1992). 34 
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2. The dominance of English in prestigious domains such as popular culture, academia, and 
electronic information transfer. Information on the Internet or World Wide Web, for example, 
is almost exclusively in English. Likewise, popular culture -- in the form of popular music, film 
and video -- is predominantly in English; so much so, in fact, that even countries like France are 
concerned by its impact on French language and culture (Flaitz, 1988; Truchot, 1990; Lamy, 
1996). 35 The result is a complex set of relationships between English and other local types of 
culture and knowledge, usually leading to the diminution in value of the latter. As Pennycook 
argues, `access to prestigious ... 
forms of knowledge is often only through English, and thus, 
given the status of English both within and between countries, there is often a reciprocal 
reinforcement of the position of English and the [associated] position of imported forms of culture 
and knowledge' (1994: 21). 
3. The related threat that English poses to the continuing viability of other languages -- what 
Day (1985) has termed the potential for `linguistic genocide'. In this regard, the pattern of 
English as a `replacing language' (Brenzinger, 1997) is increasingly evident, particularly among 
indigenous and other small and less powerful groups. The Australian Koori is one example I have 
already discussed, others include Maori in New Zealand and Celtic languages in Great Britain. 
Even when not directly threatening linguistic genocide, however, English may nonetheless 
contribute significantly to what Pennycook describes as `linguistic curtailment'; in effect, the 
restricting of competing languages to particular domains. 
4. The extent to which English fiurctionrs as a gatekeeper to positions of prestige within societies. 
Due to the central role that English often assumes within many education systems, it has become 
one of the most powerful means of inclusion into or exclusion from further education, 
employment or influential social positions. This pattern is particularly evident in many post- 
colonial countries where small English-speaking elites have continued the same policies as their 
former colonisers in order to ensure that (limited) access to English language education acts as 
a crucial distributor of social prestige and wealth. 
36 Indeed, Alexandre (1972) has gone as far as 
to suggest that in post-colonial Africa social class can be distinguished more clearly on linguistic 
than economic lines. However, as we will see, such patterns are by no means limited to post- 
colonial settings, being clearly evident in many developed countries in the western world as well. 
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Given this, I want to turn in the next chapter to the specific debates surrounding the role of 
minority language education in modern nation-states. In particular, I want to explore: 
the relationship between minority language education and the life chances of minority 
individuals and groups, and; 
the impact of minority language education on the formulation and conception of the 
nation-state. 
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Notes -- Chapter 4 
1. The boundary marking function of language has clear parallels with Armstrong's (1982) notion 
of `symbolic border guards', discussed in Chapter 2. 
2. This is no more clearly demonstrated than in the example of the Old Testament account of 
Judges (12: 4-6) where the Gileadites identified their enemies the Ephraimites (and killed them) 
by their pronunciation of the word `shibboleth'. 
3. Discussions on the Sapir-Whorf theory in linguistics, like discussions of linguistic nationalism 
in sociology, tend towards caricature on the basis that much of the analysis is predicated solely 
on the more extreme versions of the position. Concomitantly, the result in linguistic commentary 
has often been the instant and fatuous dismissal of the central interconnections between language, 
culture and thought. In the process, much gets distorted. For example, the linguistic merits of 
Whorf s work have been consistently misrepresented. Likewise, the political motivation of his 
struggle to support a view of difference and diversity -- developed principally in response to the 
genocide of Native American cultures and languages -- has been frequently overlooked (Fishman, 
1989d; see also Pennycook, 1994). 
4. The term `Gaeltacht' is taken to mean a substantially Irish-speaking community or district -- 
or, as I have paraphrased it more loosely here, the Irish language heartland. However, it should 
be noted that the term is now somewhat problematic since, traditionally, the Gaeltacht was viewed 
as a composite geographical area whereas currently many parts of Ireland which were once part 
of the Gaeltacht are no longer so. Accordingly, the plural term `Gaeltachtai' is increasingly used 
to describe present Irish-speaking communities (Ö Gadhra, 1988). These communities, which are 
situated mainly in coastal areas in the north-west, west, and south, currently constitute only 2.3 
per cent of Ireland's population but still account for 7.4 per cent of all Irish speakers and 45 per 
cent of all Irish-speaking families (Fishman, 1991). 
5. A more nuanced approach to core cultural values has been attempted in more recent times. 
While still holding that some cultures are more language-centred than others, Smolicz & Secombe 
(1988) differentiate four broad approaches to minority languages that are evident between and 
within ethnic minority groups. These comprise: negative evaluation of the language; indifference 
-- seeing no purpose 
in language maintenance and showing no interest in it; general positive 
evaluation -- regarding the language as a vital element of ethnicity but not being prepared 
personally to learn it; personal positive evaluation -- regarding the language as a core cultural 
value and putting this language commitment into practice (see also Clyne, 1990). 
6. Much of the following summary of the Irish context is drawn from Edwards (1984: 284-289, 
1985: 53-65). Additional references are cited in the text. 
7. Obviously, this period long predates the actual nation-state of Ireland. As such, I use the term 
here simply as a geographical referent to describe the island which presently includes the Irish 
Republic and Northern Ireland. 
8. Diglossia can be defined as the pattern of language behaviour within a bilingual community 
where one language is associated with certain domains of social activity (commerce, for example) 
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while the other language is usually associated with different domains (such as family life). As b 
Murchii (1988) observes, this appears to be the only instance of bilingual diglossia in Irish history. 
9. The Bord's remit involves the provision of language advice and information, language courses, 
and translation services. 
10. In relation to this point, Fishman provides us with a useful 8 point scale -- The Graded 
Intergenerational Disruption Scale -- which charts the levels, in descending order, at which a 
minority language is maintained within the nation-state (see 1991: 81-121). Stage 6 of this scale 
involves intergenerational family transmission. As Fishman argues, many language revitalisation 
movements tend to overlook this crucial stage in their rush to establish ostensibly more 
`advanced' stages such as minority language education (Stage 4). Invariably, he suggests, this 
proves counter-productive in the long term, as in the Irish case. 
11. There is an inevitable balance to be struck in any language planning effort between what 
might be termed language breadth and depth. It can be argued that the promotion of Irish at all 
levels resulted in an ostensibly wide but ultimately superficial use of the language. A contrasting 
approach would have been to foster the use of Irish in particular language domains (see below). 
12. The sometimes profound cultural dislocation that accompanies language shift for the 
individual in this context is illustrated well by the personal accounts of Hoffman (1989) and 
Rodriguez (1983,1993). Grosjean (1982) also provides examples of the psychological costs 
experienced by individuals as a result of language loss. 
13. This disparity is highlighted in the Irish context by the contrasting efforts of a small bilingual 
elite in Dublin, who were at the heart of nationalist efforts to promote the Irish language, and the 
rest of the population who were far more interested in acquiring English. 
14. Kay's Zambian case study demonstrates how the country is currently divided into 72 ethnic 
and seven regional languages but is united 
by one official language, English. 
15. Prior to the fourteenth century, English was not even taught as a language. Latin was 
regarded as the language of record, or the 
literary language. Moreover, due to the Norman 
invasion of 1066, French was the language associated with the nobility and thus social aspiration. 
Indeed, the first king of England since 1066 to speak English as a first language was Henry IV, 
who assumed the throne in 1399 (Graddol et al., 1996; see also McCrum et al., 1986). 
16. Admittedly, the sophistication of those who argue this position varies widely. Edwards, for 
example, provides us with a considered and nuanced defence of this particular view of language 
shift, although obviously I continue to remain unconvinced by it. However, far cruder versions 
of this general thesis are evident elsewhere. 
There is, of course, Schlesinger's account of 
bilingualism, discussed in Chapter 3. But for one of the crudest of all, see the various 
contributions on language in Frost 
(1997). 
17. Nathan Glazer argues, for example, in the US context, that most immigrants want `to become 
Americanized as fast as possible, and this [means appropriating] English language and culture.... 
while they often found, as time went on, that 
they regretted what they and their children had lost, 
this was their choice rather than an imposed choice' (1983: 149). 
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18. It should be pointed out, however, that many so called `national' language(s) hold de facto 
rather than de jure status (see Ruiz, 1990). In the UK, for example, English is the only accepted 
language of the state (except in Wales where Welsh has recently been recognised as having 
equivalent status; see Chapter 7) but the role of English is not constitutionally or legislatively 
enshrined. A similar situation pertains in the USA, although there have been recent attempts by 
pressure groups to have English made the only official language (see the discussion of the `English 
Only' movement in Chapter 5). 
19. The status of languages and dialects may also change as the result of changes in nation-state 
formation. In the former Czechoslovakia, for example, a common language was deemed to be 
spoken. However, with the breakup of the former nation-state into the Czech Republic and 
Slovakia, language differences are now being promoted (Tabouret-Keller, 1997). 
20. This is demonstrated by the fact that out of the 6000 or so living languages contained within 
approximately 200 nation-states, fewer than a hundred currently enjoy official status. Of these, 
120 nation-states have adopted either English, French, Spanish or Arabic as official languages, 
while some 50 nation-states have their own indigenous official language (15 per cent have two 
or more). Even when the 45 or so regional languages with official status are added, the combined 
total still only accounts for about 1.5 per cent of the total number of spoken languages (Mackey, 
1991; C. Williams, 1996). 
21. Giles et al. (1977) provide a more extensive socio-linguistic model to indicate ethnolinguistic 
vitality which is also broadly consonant with the position outlined here. They argue that 
ethnolinguistic vitality is based on a combination of the following components: economic status, 
self-perceived social status, socio-historical factors and demographic factors (including 
institutional support). I will explore some of these other dimensions of ethnolinguistic vitality in 
my ensuing discussion of Bourdieu's notions of linguistic markets and symbolic violence. 
22. De Varennes summarises the process and its implications thus: 
By imposing a language requirement, the state shows a definite preference towards some 
individuals on the basis of language.... In other words, the imposition of a single language 
for use in state activities and services is by no means a neutral act, since: 
1) The state's chosen language becomes a condition for the full access to a number of 
services, resources and privileges, such as education or public employment.... 
2) Those for whom the chosen state speech is not the primary language are thus treated 
differently from those for whom it is: the latter have the advantage or benefit of receiving 
the state's largesse in their primary tongue, whereas the former do not and find themselves 
in a more or less disadvantaged position.... Whether it is for employment in state 
institutions ... or the need to 
translate or obtain assistance ... a person 
faced with not being 
able to use his primary language assumes a heavier burden (1996a: 86-87; my emphasis). 
23. In effect, the limitation of a language to particular domains can mean the social and political 
impoverishment of the language concerned. Using it solely in the home domain, for example, 
limits its ultimate usefulness since speakers will be unable to deal adequately with the 
interpenetration of other domains such as talking about work or school at home (Clyne, 1997). 
The increasing marginalisation of a language thus limits the linguistic functions of the language 
itself while the latter, recursively, contributes further to the language's marginalisation. As Florian 
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Coulmas argues: `Today the future of many languages in uncertain not only because their 
functional range is scaled down, but because they are never used for, and adapted to newly 
emerging functions which are associated with another language.... Lack of functional expansion 
is thus a correlate and counterpart of scaled-down use' (1992: 170). 
24. As with many of Bourdieu's writings, Language and Symbolic 1'out'er is a reworking of Ce 
que parier vent dire rather than a simple translation of it. 
25. For an allied critique of the preoccupation with linguistic formalism at the expense of a wider 
analysis of the social and political social conditions in which language comes to be used, sec 
Vologinov (1973: 77-82) and Mey (1985). The latter observes, for example, `that linguistic 
models, no matter how innocent and theoretical they may seem to be, not only have distinct 
economical, social and political presuppositions, but also consequences.... Linguistic (and other) 
inequalities don't cease to exist simply because their socio-economic causes are swept under the 
linguistic rug' (1985: 26). 
26. This is not to suggest that Saussure's and Chomsky's conceptions are indistinguishable -- 
Chomsky's model, for example, is more dynamic in its attempt to incorporate the generative 
capacities of competent speakers. However, both approaches rest on the notion that language 
can be constituted as an autonomous and homogenous object, amenable to linguistic study 
(Thompson, 1991). 
27. In examining briefly the rise of French as a national language in what follows, I will draw not 
only on Bourdieu but also, as appropriate, on a range of additional commentary. 
28. Established by Cardinal Richelieu, the principal aim of the Academie Francaise was to 
promote its conception of clarity, simplicity and good taste in French. This led to the first French 
language dictionary in 1694. In modem times, the Academie has become best known for its 
prominent role in `protecting' French from foreign borrowing -- particularly English ones -- and 
creating equivalent French terms where necessary (Edwards, 1994; see also below). 
29. As Bourdieu observes, `measured de facto against the single standard of the "common" 
language, they are found wanting and cast into the outer darkness of regionalisms'. As a result, 
`a system of sociologically pertinent linguistic oppositions tends to be constituted which has 
nothing in common with the system of linguistically pertinent linguistic oppositions' (1991: 54). 
30. The different linguistic possibilities that hold for other ethnic minority groups will be further 
explored in relation to education in Chapter 5 and, more broadly, in Chapter 9. 
31. There is strong evidence to suggest, for example, that the adoption of English as an official 
language by nation-states has little influence on subsequent economic development. The poorest 
countries in Africa are for the most part those which have chosen English (or French) as an 
official language, whilst the majority of the Asian `tiger economies' have opted instead for an 
indigenous language. In short, their is simply no correlation between the adoption of English and 
greater economic well being (Phillipson & Skutnabb-Kangas, 1994). Other factors, particularly 
the relative powerlessness and disadvantage experienced by such states within the wider nation- 
state system, exert far greater long-term 
influence. 
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32. France's `mission to civilise' strategy is also a variant of this same theme. 
33. For ongoing debate on Phillipson's thesis, see A. Davies (1996), and Phillipson's (1997) 
reply. 
34. English linguistic imperialism operates when `the dominance of English is asserted and 
maintained by the establishment and continuous reconstitution of structural and cultural 
inequalities between English and other languages' Linguicism (of which English linguistic 
imperialism forms a part) is the process by which `ideologies and practices ... are used to 
legitimate, effectuate and reproduce an unequal division of power and resources (both material 
and immaterial) between groups that are defined on the basis of language' (Phillipson, 1992: 47). 
In the latter case, linguicism is also equated directly with other forms of inequality such as racism 
and ethnicism (see Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995: 105). 
35. Such has been the concern in France with the growing fashion for English words -- what has 
come to be known as `franglais' -- that legislative measures have been recently introduced in 
addition to the general policing role performed by the Academie Francaise. The (1975) Bas- 
Lauriol bill, for example, laid out a number of prescriptions in this regard but was never fully 
implemented. More recently, the (1995) Toubon law has decreed the following measures: 
consumer goods must not be sold without a set of instructions in French; all-English 
advertisements must not be published either in the French press or in French cinemas; and 
bilingual signs must not give less prominence to the French part of their message. Breaches can 
be referred directly to the police although its efficacy, and the opposition that it might generate, 
are as yet unclear. 
36. Examples of this pattern are described by Pattanayak (1969) in relation to India, Ngügi 
(1985) in relation to Kenya, and Tollefson (1991) in relation to the Phillippines. 
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Chapter 5 
LANGUAGE, EDUCATION AND MINORITY RIGHTS 
In the preceding chapter, we encountered an apparent conundrum in relation to the role that 
education plays in language maintenance and shift. On the one hand, the example of Ireland 
demonstrates that, however much one might want it to, education is not sufficient in itself to stem 
societal change. Indeed, a consistent weakness of many minority language movements has been 
an over-optimistic view of what education can accomplish in halting, and reversing, language shift 
(see Fishman, 1991). In short, the fate of a language cannot be borne on the back of education 
alone. And yet to dismiss education as simply peripheral to the process of minority language 
maintenance is also clearly wrong (cf. Edwards, 1985: Ch. 5). After all, education is recognised 
as a key institution -- perhaps the key institution -- in the apparatus of the modern nation-state, 
a point that is acknowledged by sociological commentators as diverse as Durkheim and Althusser 
(see May, 1994). Moreover, as we have already seen in Chapter 2, education has played a key 
role historically in effecting the homogenous civic culture of the nation-state, a process which has 
led to the advent of much minority language shift in the first place. As Gellner (1983) has 
outlined, the nationalist principle of `one state, one culture' saw the state, via its education 
system, increasingly identified with a specific language and culture. Indeed, a well-defined, 
educationally sanctioned and unified linguistic culture was seen as a prerequisite for modernity, 
a basis of political legitimacy, and a means of shared cultural identity. The example of France, 
discussed in the previous chapter, clearly illustrates how education was employed to promote a 
state sanctioned language, at the expense of other varieties, as a central part of a modernising 
nationalist project. 
Educating for the majority 
Similar examples of education's role in establishing and reinforcing the civic culture of the nation- 
state are legion, particularly in the nineteenth century which first saw the establishment of mass 
education systems. The English language National School system in Ireland, established in 1831, 
is another example we have already encountered. Similarly, the Welsh language was formally 
proscribed from schools via the (1870) Education Act of the UK parliament and did not re- 
emerge again until 1939 when the first private Welsh language primary (elementary) school was 
established. This legislation was the culmination of a long-standing vitiation of the Welsh 
language within the UK which dated back to the time of Henry VIII and the (1536) Act for the 
English Order, Habite and Language (see Chapter 6). In New Zealand a similar legislative 
pattern emerged in the nineteenth century with the (1847) Education Ordinance requiring that 
mission schools teach Maori children in English where previously they had taught in Maori. This 
was followed by the (1867) Native Schools Act which established state educational provision for 
Maori and formalised an English language only policy (R. Walker, 1990). Comparable 
educational legislation in Australia was enacted after the 1850s, leading to the `linguistic 
genocide' (Day, 1985) of most Australian aboriginal languages, also discussed previously. 
These educational developments are not confined to the nineteenth century, however. Spain, 
under Franco's rule, prohibited the Catalan and Basque languages from all formal domains, 
including education, in favour of Castilian. These edicts, which were implemented just prior to 
the Second World War, were draconian to say the least and included the threat to exclude from 
the profession any teacher -- even in private schools -- who used a language other than Castilian. 
As stated in an order issued 18 May, 1938: `the Spain of Franco cannot tolerate aggressions 
against the unity of its language' (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 22). Moreover, as recently as 
1997, Chinese authorities have proscribed the indigenous Tibetan language in Tibetan schools in 
favour of Mandarin Chinese. Ostensibly, this is a measure aimed at `improving' the educational 
attainment of Tibetan children. In reality, it is principally an attempt at curbing Tibet's nationalist 
aspirations for independence from China since language is a central feature of a separate Tibetan 
identity (The Independent: 5 June, 1997). 1 As Kedourie has observed: `On nationalist theory... 
the purpose of education is not to transmit knowledge, traditional wisdom, and the ways devised 
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by a society for attending to the common concerns; its purpose rather is wholly political, to bend 
the will of the young to the will of the nation' (1960: 83-84). Plus ca change. 
If education is used so effectively to these assimilationist ends, its significance as an alternative 
vehicle for minority language aspirations should not be underestimated. Those who dismiss the 
significance of education in this latter regard usually do so on the basis that education cannot be 
reasonably expected to cater for the language and identity needs of all pupils (see Edwards, 1985: 
130-131). The Swann Report on multicultural education in Britain clearly outlines this position 
when it concludes: `the role of education cannot be, and cannot be expected to be, to reinforce 
the values, beliefs, and cultural identity which each child brings to school' (1985: 321). However, 
this begs a key question: given that education accomplishes this for majority group members -- 
whose cultural and linguistic habitus are viewed as consonant with the school's -- why can it not 
do so for minority group members as well? As I have argued consistently elsewhere (May, 1994, 
1995,1998b), there is a strong argument for schools extending and reconstituting what counts 
as `accepted' and `acceptable' cultural and linguistic knowledge. Moreover, the charge that such 
recognition would inevitably lead to a rampant cultural and linguistic relativism does not 
necessarily follow. The differing rights attributable to various minority groups, discussed in 
Chapters 2 and 3, can be applied with respect to language and education. In short, greater 
ethnolinguistic democracy does not necessarily imply ethnolinguistic equality (Fishman, 1995) -- 
reasonable limits can still be drawn. Likewise, a recognition of minority habitus as cultural and 
linguistic capital in schools can co-exist, albeit not always easily, with an ongoing valuing of a 
common or `core' curriculum (see May, 1994). 
Educating for the minority 
In this light, the long-held assimilationist emphases apparent in education have come under 
increasing attack in recent years, particularly from minority groups themselves. This attack has 
been launched on two key fronts: 1) that assimilationist policies have failed to address and 
ameliorate the comparative social and educational disadvantages faced by many minority groups 
(May, 1994,1997); 2 2) that an education which requires minority students to dispense with their 
ethnic, linguistic and/or cultural identities is not necessarily an educational opportunity north 
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wanting (Howe, 1992). 3 In this latter respect, even if social and educational advancement were 
to be forthcoming -- and, as 1) above suggests, it most often is not -- the individual and collective 
costs of such cultural and linguistic evisceration are increasingly regarded by minority groups as 
too high a price to pay (see also Chapter 4). ` Under pressure from such groups, there has thus 
been a considerable expansion in more recent years of alternative policy approaches to minority 
education. In what still stands as one of the most comprehensive and informed accounts of its 
kind, Stacey Churchill (1986) outlines the six principal policy responses to the educational and 
language needs of minority groups within the OECD. While he suggests that the differences 
between the various stages are not always clear cut, he attempts the following ranking (in 
ascending order) by the degree to which such policies recognise and incorporate minority cultures 
and languages. 
0 Stage 1(LearningDeficit): where the educational disadvantages faced by minority groups 
are associated with the use of the minority language. Accordingly, rapid transition to the 
majority language is advocated. This is the assimilationist educational approach in its 
starkest form. 
" Stage 2 (Socially-Linked Learning Deficit): sometimes but not always arrived at 
concurrently with Stage 1, this stage associates a minority group's educational 
disadvantage with family status. Additional/supplementary programmes are promoted -- 
such as Headstart in the USA -- which emphasise adjustment to the majority society. This 
is a modified form of assimilation which still clearly views minority languages and cultures 
as a social and educational problem. ' 
0 Stage 3 (Learning Deficitfroni Social/Cultural Differences): most commonly associated 
with multicultural education, this stage assumes minority educational disadvantage arises 
from the inability of the majority society -- particularly the education system -- to 
recognise, accept and view positively the minority culture. However, a multicultural 
approach does not usually include a commensurate recognition of the minority language. 
The essence of the multicultural model is the recognition of the right to be different and 
to be respected for it, not necessarily to maintain a distinct language and culture. ' 
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0 Stage 4 (Learning Deficit fron: Mother Tomigue Deprivation): while still linked to the 
notion of deficit, the need for support of the minority language is accepted, at least as a 
transitional measure. Accordingly, transitional bilingual education programmes are 
emphasised. These programmes acknowledge the growing linguistic research consensus 
that instruction in one's first language is both linguistically and educationally beneficial 
(see Cummins & Swain, 1986; Appel & Muysken, 1987; Corson, 1993; Romaine, 1995; 
Baker, 1996). Nonetheless, they remain predicated on a `subtractive' view of individual 
and societal bilingualism. In other words, in assuming that the first (minority) language 
will eventually be replaced by a second (majority) language, bilingualism is not ißt itself 
regarded as necessarily beneficial, either to the individual or to society as a whole. In this 
respect, transitional bilingualism is little different from assimilationist perspectives in its 
(pejorative) view of minority languages within the nation-state. The (1968) Bilingual 
Education Act in the USA is an example of this approach and will be discussed more 
fully below in relation to the US `English Only' movement. 
0 Stage 5 (Private Use Language Maintenance): recognises the right of national and ethnic 
minorities to maintain and develop their languages and cultures in private life to ensure 
these are not supplanted by the dominant culture and language. A group maintenance 
approach to bilingual education is the most usual policy response here. In contrast to the 
`subtractive' view of bilingualism held in transitional bilingual programmes, a group 
maintenance approach regards bilingualism as an `additive' or `enriching' phenomenon for 
the individual. ' However, as its name suggests, the wider cultural and linguistic benefits 
of maintaining a minority language are also regarded as central, both for minority groups 
themselves and for their subsequent contribution to the nation-state. Accordingly, 
maintenance bilingual education is characterised by `minority language immersion' 
programmes where school instruction is largely or solely in the minority language. This 
ensures that the minority language is maintained and fostered, given that the majority 
language is usually dominant in most other social and institutional domains. 
0 Stage 6 (Language Equality): the granting of full official status to a national minority 
language. This would include separate language provision in a range of public institutions, 
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including schools, and widespread recognition and use in a range of social, institutional 
and language domains. Such an approach is usually based on one of two organising 
principles: 1) the `territorial language principle' grants language rights that are limited to 
a particular territory in order to ensure the maintenance of a particular language in that 
area. The most prominent examples of this principle can be found in Switzerland (in 
relation to German, French, Italian and Romansch)' and Belgium (French and Dutch), -' 
2) the `personality language principle' attaches language rights to individuals, irrespective 
of their geographical position. However, it is also often associated with the criterion 
`where numbers warrant' -- that is, that there are a sufficient number of particular 
language speakers to warrant language protection. Examples here include Finland 
(Swedish and Finnish), Canada (French and English), ` and India. " 
Churchill argues that Stages 1-4 all posit that minority cultural and language groups should seek 
the same social, cultural and linguistic outcomes as the majority; that is, that the instrumental 
objectives of education, as defined by the majority ethnic group, should be the same for all ethnic 
groups within the nation-state. The premise is thus the incorporation of minority groups into the 
hegemonic civic culture of the nation-state with minimal accommodation to minority languages 
and cultures. It is only as Stages 5 and 6 that objectives and outcomes also come to incorporate 
the cultural and linguistic values of minority groups and, by so doing, begin to question the value 
of a monocultural and monolingual society. Both stages thus assume that minority groups can 
(and should) maintain their language and culture over time, whereas Stages 1 through 4 clearly 
take the opposite approach. However, significant differences still remain between the latter two 
approaches. Stage 5 recognises, in addition to instrumental aims, the cultural value of retaining 
a minority language, at least in private domains. In so doing, it assumes that recognising language 
and culture is an enduring need for minority group members (cf. Margalit & Raz, 1995), although 
changes to the formal linguistic uniformity of the nation-state are not usually countenanced. Stage 
6 requires a far greater shift, with the majority ethnic group having to accommodate minority 
groups and their language(s) in all shared domains, a process which has been described elsewhere 
as mutual accommodation (May, 1994; Nieto, 1996). By this, Stage 6 assumes that the retention 
of a minority language and culture is an enduring need for the majority as well. A prerequisite 
for this more plurilingual view of the nation-state is the formal legitimation and institutionalism 
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of minority languages within both the state and civil society, as discussed in the preceding chapter 
(cf. Kymlicka, 1995). 12 
In this light, and bearing in mind the likelihood of significant inter- and intra-group differences, 
a broad parallel categorisation of minority group responses to minority language education can 
also be attempted (see Churchill, 1986: 48-49): 
0 Level 1, the recognition phase: the minority group seeks to obtain initial recognition of 
its distinct educational needs and, in many cases, of its very existence as a distinct cultural 
and/or linguistic group within the nation-state (cf the distinction between ethnic 
categories and groups discussed in Chapter 1). 
" Level 2, the start up and extension phase: having obtained some recognition from 
educational authorities, the minority group seeks to obtain the creation of minority 
language educational services or, where these already exist, their further legitimation, 
extension and improvement. At this stage, either transitional or group maintenance 
bilingual education aims can be pursued. As discussed previously, transitional bilingual 
education aims to expedite successful transference from the minority to the majority 
language by employing the minority language in the early years of primary schooling. This 
acts as a bridge for the child to transfer their first language skills to the replacing language 
and, while educationally sound, remains essentially assimilative in intent. In contrast, 
maintenance bilingual education aims `to the maximum extent possible, [to] involve use 
of the minority language as a means of instruction [in order] to resist assimilation 
pressures outside the school environment' (Churchill, 1986: 49). 
0 Level 3, the consolidation and adaptation phase: If Level 2 is principally concerned with 
increasing the quantity of minority language programmes, this level is concerned with 
enhancing their quality. In transitional terms, the emphasis may be placed on greater, 
more effective social and economic integration of the minority group within the nation- 
state (including a greater awareness and acceptance of the minority by the majority). In 
group maintenance terms, emphasis might be placed not only on fostering the minority 
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language as a medium of instruction but also on employing the minority culture as a 
specific source and context of instruction. 
" Level 4, the multilingual co-existence phase: At this level, distinct minority educational 
rights are legally and practically enshrined. Different language groups are accorded formal 
language and education rights on the basis of the principle of ethnoliiiguistic democracy 
(Fishman, 1995). As discussed above, this may not amount to actual ethnolinguistic 
equality, nor does it imply necessarily a lack of friction between the groups involved. 
Nonetheless, minority language rights are formally recognised and employed in state and 
civil society. In this regard, a considerable degree of autonomy is usually accorded to 
minority groups in relation to the actual control, organisation and delivery of minority 
language education. While granting a measure of control over their education holds 
considerable symbolic purchase for the minority group concerned, three other benefits 
have also been recognised as a consequence of this process: 1) while no causal link can 
be demonstrated, there appears to be a high correlation between greater minority 
participation in the governance of education and higher levels of academic success by 
minority students within that system; 13 2) the greater the participation in educational 
decision-making by minority group members the more likely the match between minority 
aspirations and subsequent educational provision; 3) direct involvement in the governance 
of minority education strengthens community links among the members of the minority 
group themselves. Such involvement may also ameliorate the negative historical 
experiences of education held by many within the community. 
This at least is the ideal. Churchill concludes his summary by suggesting that the discrepancies 
between minority education policy and practice, along with minority responses to them, remain 
significant. Notwithstanding the more pluralist approaches that have been promoted in more 
recent times, these discrepancies occur both within and between nation-states and within and 
between particular minority groups. In relation to different policy approaches, for example, only 
the very old bilingual or multilingual OECD states (Belgium, Finland and Switzerland) have 
reached Stage 6 in Churchill's study. Sweden is at Stage 5, at least in relation to its Finnish 
177 
minority (Skutnabb-Kangas, 1988), while Canada ranges from Stage 6 down to Stage 2 in relation 
to its Francophone minority, depending on provincial variations (Corson, 1993). 
In relation to differences between minority groups, the indigenous M iori are moving towards 
Stage 5, and ultimately Stage 6 in New Zealand, although the approach to other minorities, such 
as Pacific Island groups, is not so advanced (May, 1997). Likewise, while the USA's Bilingual 
Education Act officially sanctions a Stage 4 approach to minority education, the actual responses 
of many schools and local school systems are far more varied. Many Hispanic children, for 
example, are in schools which are still at Stages 1 and 2, promoting the merits of an English 
language approach. Even those which promote bilingual education vary widely between a 
transitional and group maintenance ethos (Edwards, 1985,1994; Dicker, 1996). Canada's 
approach of `multiculturalism within a bilingual framework' also illustrates well the discrepancies 
evident between different minority groups. Bearing in mind the caveat of provincial variation 
outlined above, Article 23 of the (1982) Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms advocates 
the right of English and French speakers, who represent 90 per cent of the country's population, 
to an education in their mother tongue `where numbers warrant'. However, the linguistic rights 
of Canada's indigenous peoples are far less clearly endorsed. 
Responses to minority language education approaches from within particular minority groups are 
also extremely varied, as one might expect. In the 1980s, the UK broadly adopted a Stage 3 
multicultural approach to education, as exemplified in the Swann Report (DES, 1985), although 
again actual school practice seldom reflected this, tending towards more assimilative models. The 
responses from within minority groups to even this limited form of multiculturalism, however, 
have ranged from enthusiastic endorsement (Verma, 1989) to outright rejection (Stone, 1981; see 
also Chevannes & Reeves, 1987). 14 Key arguments here have concerned the degree to which 
multiculturalism ameliorated or contributed further to the social and educational marginalisation 
of ethnic minorities in Britain (cf. Goulbourne, 1991 a). Likewise, in the USA some of the most 
prominent exponents against multicultural and bilingual education initiatives are from ethnic 
minority groups (cf. Rodriguez, 1983; D'Souza, 1991). 
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That said, the current variations in approach, and in their delivery, need not be seen as 
insurmountable. With regard to the latter, discrepancies between policy formulations and actual 
practice are increasingly being addressed by the concerted political efforts of minority groups 
themselves. For all their current inadequacies, minority language education policies are being 
shaped by the growing cultural and linguistic aspirations of minority groups. These aspirations 
are also, recursively, a product of the growing acceptance of minority rights in the wider social 
and political arena (cf. Chapter 3). With regard to the former, there is no necessary problem with 
differing policy approaches being directed at different minority groups. Indeed, it is my general 
position that variations of approach should exist between, for example, national and ethnic 
minority groups. Thus, while the ideal might be that nation-states provide a Stage S (Private Use 
LwIguage Maintenunnce) minority education policy approach for all minority groups, only national 
minorities could be reasonably expected to be entitled to a Stage 6 (Language Equality) policy 
approach. Likewise, all minorities might expect the right to mobilise to at least Level 3 
(Consolidation and Adaptations Phase) in terms of their own language and education 
requirements. However, again, only national minorities could legitimately claim a right to the 
Level 4 (Multilingual Co-existence Phase). 
Minority language and education in international law 
The broad position that I have outlined here accords with recent developments in international 
law with respect to minority language and education rights. Two broad approaches can be 
observed here: tolerance-oriented rights and promotion-oriented rights (Kloss, 1977; see also 
Macias, 1979). 15 Tolerance-oriented rights ensure the right to preserve one's language in the 
private, non-governmental sphere of national life. These rights may be narrowly or broadly 
defined. They include the right of individuals to use their first language at home and in public, 
freedom of assembly and organisation, the right to establish private cultural, economic and social 
institutions wherein the first language may be used, and the right to foster one's first language in 
private schools. The key principle of such rights is that the state does `not interfere with efforts 
on the parts of the minority to make use of [their language] in the private domain' (Kloss, 1977: 
2). 
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Promotion-oriented rights regulate the extent to which minority rights are recognised within the 
public domain, or civic realm of the nation-state. As such, they involve `public authorities [in] 
trying to promote a minority [language] by having it used in public institutions -- legislative, 
administrative and educational, including the public schools' (1977: 2). Again, such rights may 
be narrowly or widely applied. At their narrowest, promotion oriented rights might simply involve 
the publishing of public documents in minority languages. At their broadest, promotion-oriented 
rights could involve recognition of a minority language in all formal domains within the nation- 
state, thus allowing the language minority group `to care for its internal affairs through its own 
public organs, which amounts to the state's allowing self government for the minority group' 
(1977: 24). The latter position would also necessarily require the provision of state-funded 
minority language education as of right. 
As one might expect, given the debates outlined in Chapter 3, both sets of rights -- particularly 
the latter -- continue to face considerable opposition from some quarters. In this respect, the 
long-held liberal antipathy towards separate minority rights and entitlements has been particularly 
evident where language is concerned. As Fishman observes: 
Unlike `human rights' which strike Western and Westernized intellectuals as fostering 
wider participation in general societal benefits and interactions, `language rights' still are 
widely interpreted as `regressive' since they would, most probably, prolong the existence 
of ethnolinguistic differences. The value of such differences and the right to value such 
differences have not yet generally been recognised by the modern Western sense of 
justice... (1991: 72) 
Nonetheless, there is a nascent consensus on the validity of minority language and education 
rights. This is predicated on the basis that the protection of minority languages falls within 
generalist principles of human rights. Concomitantly, there is a growing acceptance of 
differentiated linguistic and educational provision for minority groups, along with the degree of 
institutional autonomy that such developments necessarily entail. Accordingly, ongoing disputes 
are increasingly concerned with the degree to which these activities should be state funded, not 
whether they should exist at all. 
The debates over minority language and education rights within international law can be traced 
back to the minority treaties overseen by the League of Nations prior to World War II (see also 
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Chapter 3). These treaties included two principal types of measures: 1) individuals belonging to 
linguistic minorities, amongst others, would be placed on an equal footing with other nationals 
of the state; 2) the means of preserving the national characteristics of minorities, including their 
language(s), would be ensured. In the most prominent legal ruling on these provisions -- the 
(1935) Advisory Opinion on Minority Rights in Albania -- the Permanent Court of 
International Justice stated that these two requirements were inseparable. It concluded that `there 
would be no true equality between a majority and a minority if the latter were deprived of its own 
institutions and were consequently compelled to renounce that which constitutes the very essence 
of its being a minority' (see Thornberry, 1991a: 399-403). On the basis of this judgement, 
linguistic minorities were confirmed in their right to establish private schools and institutions, a 
minimum tolerance-oriented right. However, where numbers warranted, public funding of 
minority language-medium schools was also advanced, a more promotion-oriented right. In 
respect of this, and other similar decisions, linguistic minorities were defined purely on a numerical 
basis -- that is, as constituting less that 50 per cent of the population. That said, freedom of 
choice as to membership in a minority also seemed to permeate the treaties, a point to which I will 
return. 
However, as we have seen, subsequent developments in international law were rapidly to 
supersede these treaties and the principles upon which they were based. Minority language and 
education rights were largely subsumed within the broader definition of human rights adopted by 
the United Nations since World War II. Human rights were thought, in themselves, to provide 
sufficient protection for minorities. Accordingly, no additional rights were deemed necessary for 
the members of specific ethnic or national minorities. 16 Nonetheless, even within this more 
generalist framework of rights, there have been echoes, albeit weak ones, of the principles of 
minority protection with respect to language and education. The most notable of these has 
perhaps been Article 27 of the (1966) International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
which imposes a negative duty on nation-states with respect to the protection of the languages 
and cultures of minority groups: 
In those states in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging 
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the other members of 
their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practise their own religion, or to 
use their own language. (my emphases) 
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I have already noted in Chapter 3 the problematic nature of the phrase `in those states in which 
ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist'. While seemingly innocuous, this caveat allows 
some nation-states to deny that any such minorities exist within their jurisdiction, and to thus 
conveniently avoid the obligations entailed by Article 27. However, here I am more concerned 
with what these actual obligations might involve -- in particular, to what extent these reflect a 
tolerance- or promotion-orientation to minority language rights. Likewise, I am interested in 
exploring further here the degree to which these rights attach to groups and/or to individual 
members of these groups. Dealing with the latter first, the process of agreeing the particular form 
of wording in Article 27 provides us with some important clues. As Patrick Thornberry explains, 
from an initial proposal that `linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right ... to use their own 
language' the final wording of Article 27 was arrived at as follows: 
The [UN] Sub-Commission preferred that `persons belonging to minorities' should replace 
`minorities' because minorities were not subjects of law and `persons belonging to 
minorities' could easily be defined in legal terms. On the other hand, it was decided to 
include `in community with other members of their group' after `shall not be denied' in 
order to recognise group identity in some form. (1991a: 149) 
The tension evident here between individual and group ascription is reflected in the question of 
who exactly can claim rights under Article 27. This question has been tackled on two fronts. 
First, following the precedent set by the earlier minority treaties, `minorities' in Article 27 have 
come to be defined strictly in numerical terms. A minority is defined as a group who share in 
common a culture, a religion and/or a language and who constitute less than 50 per cent of a 
state's population. Thus a minority may be numerically dominant in a particular province (as, for 
example, are the Quebecois in Quebec and the Catalans in Catalonia) but may still be classified 
as a minority within the nation-state. Second, any person may claim to be a member of a linguistic 
minority group on the basis of self-ascription. However, to benefit from Article 27 they must also 
demonstrate that some concrete tie exists between themselves and the minority group (cf. the 
limits of ethnicity discussed in Chapter 1). In relation to a minority language, this would require 
a real and objective tie with that language. It would not be sufficient, for example, to be a 
member of an ethnic group that is known to speak a particular language but which the individual 
does not. Nor are particular languages, and the rights associated with them, tied to specific ethnic 
groups since more than one ethnic group may speak the same language. Determining that an 
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individual belongs to a particular linguistic minority is thus not an issue of establishing some type 
of legal or political category, it is principally an objective determination based on some concrete 
link between an individual and a linguistic community (de Varennes, 1996a). 
The definition of what constitutes a linguistic minority for the purposes of Article 27 is important 
for another reason. It determines whether the rights to minority language and education are 
tolerance- or promotion-oriented rights. Two opposing schools of thought are clearly evident 
here. Following the influential review of the scope of Article 27 by Capotorti (1979), some 
commentators, including myself (see Thornberry, 1991a, 1991b; Tollefson, 1991; Sk-utnabb- 
Kangas & Phillipson, 1995; May, 1997), have argued that while the words `shall not be denied' 
could be read as imposing no obligation on a state to take positive action to protect those rights, 
an alternative and equally compelling view `is that to recognise a right to use a minority language 
implies an obligation that the right be made effective' (Hastings, 1988: 19). On this basis, it has 
been argued that Article 27 can be said to encompass a promotion-orientation to language rights, 
with attendant state support, rather than the more limited tolerance-oriented right that a solely 
negative duty implies. This promotion-oriented perspective on language rights has also been 
reinforced by the (1987) Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights, adopted in Recife, Brazil 
by the Association Internationale pour le developpement de la Communication Interculturelle 
(AIMAV), a UNESCO agency (see Fishman, 1991). AIMAV argued that explicit legal 
guarantees be provided for the linguistic rights of individuals and groups, and called on the United 
Nations to endorse this position. 
These arguments concerning language rights can also be linked directly to education. For 
example, Article 2(b) of the (1960) Convention Against Discrimination in Education 
specifically provides for the establishment or maintenance, for linguistic reasons, of separate 
schools, provided attendance is optional and the education is up to national standards. Moreover, 
Article 5 of this Convention recognises the essential right of minorities to carry on their own 
educational activities and, in so doing, to use or teach in their own language. It subsequently 
qualifies this right, somewhat contradictorily, by making it conditional on a state's existing 
educational policies, and by ensuring it does not prejudice national sovereignty and the ability of 
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minorities to participate in national life. However, the right to minority language education can 
nevertheless be established (Hastings, 1988). 
The question remains though -- to what extent should minority language and education be funded 
by the state, if at all? Promotion-oriented rights suggest they should but also necessarily impose 
limits on who is eligible. Capotorti's (1979) review, for example, was predicated on the 
understanding that Article 27 applied solely to national minorities -- immigrants, migrant workers, 
refugees and non-citizens were excluded. In contrast, tolerance-oriented rights imply no such 
obligation on the state. While necessarily more limited, such rights may at least have the 
advantage of being able to apply to a wider range of minority groups. And this brings us to the 
opposing school of thought on Article 27. De Varennes (1996a) argues that Capotorti's 
interpretation of a more active obligation by the state on behalf of national minorities, and the 
subsequent commentary which has endorsed this position, does not reflect the actual intentions 
of Article 27. Indeed, Capotorti admitted as much at the time of his review. In effect, he set aside 
what the drafters originally meant because of his concern that a negative duty was not sufficient 
to protect minority language and education rights. In hindsight, Capotorti's pessimism may have 
been misplaced. After all, the minorities treaties had already established the long-standing 
principle of private language and education for minorities, without any hindrance from the state. 
Indeed, where sufficient numbers warranted, there was also a recognition that some form of state- 
funded minority education could be established. As de Varennes concludes: `Article 27 thus 
appears to be part of a long-established and continuous legal continuum that the rights of 
linguistic minorities to use their language amongst themselves must necessarily include the right 
to establish, manage and operate their own educational institutions where their language is used 
as the medium of instruction to the extent deemed to be appropriate by the minority itself' 1996a: 
158). 
Needless to say, the debates on the merits of Article 27 as an instrument for promotion-oriented 
rights remain ongoing. Be that as it may, we can at least conclude that Article 27 sanctions a 
clear baseline for tolerance-oriented language and education rights. In this respect, Article 27 
allows for the possibility of Stage 5 minority language education policy and a Level 3 minority 
response, as discussed above, for all minorities within the nation-state. This level of protection 
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for minority language and education rights applies to all minority groups on the basis of the strict 
numerical interpretation of minorities within international law. As such, protection would be 
extended to include indigenous and immigrant minorities, as well as the established minorities who 
are more usually the beneficiaries of such measures (cf. Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1995). 
Indeed, where a minority has sufficient numbers, there remains some additional scope for state- 
funded language education, although given the emphases of Article 27 this decision remains at the 
discretion of the nation-states themselves. Which brings us to the central problem of Article 27 
and, indeed, most international law in this area. In short, much of the implementation of such 
measures is still dependent on what nation-states deem appropriate. " The result is thus left to 
the vicissitudes of internal national politics where the provision of minority rights is viewed 
principally as one of political largesse rather than a fundamental question of human rights. More 
often than not, this results in the adoption of the bare minimum level of rights required (and 
sometimes not even that). 
Notwithstanding this difficulty, the notion of a more promotion-oriented view of minority 
language and education does appear to be gaining some ground, at least for national minorities. 
The (1993) United Nations Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, for 
example, states in Article 15 that `all indigenous peoples have ... the right to establish and control 
their educational systems and institutions providing education in their own languages, in a manner 
appropriate to their cultural methods of teaching and learning' (see also Chapter 3). Likewise, 
the (1993) European Charter for Regional and Minority Languages provides a sliding scale 
of educational provision for national and regional minority language groups. This provision 
ranges from a minimal entitlement for smaller groups -- pre-school provision only, for example -- 
through to more generous rights for larger minority groups such as primary and secondary 
language education. Again, however, nation-states have discretion in what they provide, both on 
the basis of local considerations and the size of the group concerned. 
Developments in international law then are at once both encouraging and disappointing. The 
principle of separate minority recognition in language and education is legally enshrined at least 
as a minimal tolerance-oriented right -- that is, when restricted to the private domain. However 
more liberal interpretations of tolerance-oriented rights (involving some state support where 
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numbers warrant), and certainly more promotion-oriented rights, remain largely dependent on the 
largesse of individual nation-states in their interpretation of international (and national) law with 
respect to minorities. Having said that, there is undoubtedly increasing pressure from minority 
groups themselves for greater recognition of separate language and education entitlements and, 
where numbers warrant, for some form of state recognition and funding with respect to these. 
In this regard, while there may be no watertight legal guarantees to state-funded minority 
language education, there is concomitantly an increasing recognition within international and 
national law that significant minorities within the nation-state have a reasonable expectation to 
some form of state support (de Varennes, 1996a; see also Chapter 4). In other words, while it 
would be unreasonable for nation-states to be required to fund language and education services 
for all minorities, it is increasingly accepted that where a language is spoken by a significant 
number within the nation-state, it would also be unreasonable not to provide some level of state 
services and activity in that language. In addition, there are strong arguments for extending the 
strict numerical definition of minorities within international law, on which this notion of 
reasonableness is based, to include also the particular claims of'tational minorities (irrespective 
of number). As de Varennes observes of indigenous peoples, for example, although his argument 
can be extended here to all national minorities: 
Indigenous peoples, in particular, may have a strong argument that they should receive 
state services such as education in their primary language, beyond what a strictly 
`numerical' criterion would perhaps normally warrant. In the case of indigenous peoples 
[and national minorities more generally], the state may have a greater duty to respect their 
wishes in view of the nature of the relationship between the two, and of the duties and 
obligations involved. (1996a: 97-98; my emphasis) 
The claims of national minorities here are based, as we have seen in Chapters 1 and 2, on their 
historical rights as ethnies. They also gain credence from the wider political developments in 
relation to national and indigenous minorities discussed in Chapter 3. Given this, such arguments 
are increasingly having to be addressed by nation-states in some form or another. This is both a 
moral and a political choice for nation-states since the long-held practice of making no 
accommodations to minority demands is not so readily defensible in today's social and political 
climate. Ignoring such demands is also unlikely to quell or abate the question of minority rights, 
as it might once have done. Indeed, it is much more likely to escalate them. Under these 
circumstances, `any policy favouring a single language to the exclusion of all others can be 
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extremely risky ... 
because it is then a factor promoting division rather than unification. Instead 
of integration, an ill-advised and inappropriate state language policy may have the opposite clTect 
and cause a levee de bouclier' (de Varennes, 1996a: 91). The potential for unrest as a result of 
such a policy will be demonstrated in and through the arguments of the `English Only' movement 
in the USA, discussed below. 
The crux of majority opinion 
Before turning to this, one further issue needs to be addressed. The ongoing potential for 
controversy surrounding the question of minority rights returns us to a key feature of these 
debates, their essentially contested nature. Minority rights will always be controversial, it seems, 
no matter how valid are the arguments in its favour. For example, ongoing ambivalence about -- 
and, at times, outright opposition to -- `separate' minority language education initiatives remain 
prominent, principally (but by no means exclusively) from majority group members. As Churchill 
has observed, this is because responding to `the needs of linguistic and cultural groups outside the 
majority group ... often poses a serious threat to the status quo 
both of school practice and public 
attitudes to education' (1986: 33). More sceptically, Edwards comments: 
The brutal fact is that most `big' language speakers in most societies remain unconvinced 
of either the immediate need or the philosophical desirability of officially-supported 
cultural and linguistic programmes for their small-language neighbours. Some among the 
minority also share this doubt and it is, in many instances, a minority within a minority 
who actively endorse the use of schools as instruments of social engineering. (1994: 195- 
196). 
Setting aside the rather obvious point which seems to escape Edwards -- namely, that the 
exclusion of minority languages within education is just as much a process of social engineering 
as its promotion -- the issue of majority opinion remains a crucial one for minority language 
education initiatives. In effect, the long-term success of such initiatives may only be achieved (or 
be achievable) if at least some degree of favourable majority opinion is secured. " On this basis, 
what is needed is a greater degree of `tolerability' (Grin, 1995) on the part of wider public opinion 
towards specific minority initiatives or, more positively, a climate of `socially enlightened self- 
interest' (Secada & Lightfoot, 1993). This may be achieved in one of two ways. One potential 
avenue would be to point out that in this age of increasing globalisation, and with the burgeoning 
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spread of English as the world language, the question of retaining cultural and linguistic 
distinctiveness is increasingly becoming an issue for national majority groups as well as for 
minorities. This is evidenced in the European Union, for example, where its Parliament adopted 
in December, 1990 the `principle of complete multilingualism ... consistent with the respect which 
is owed to the dignity of all languages which reflect and express the cultures of the different 
peoples who make up the [EU]' (cited in Fishman, 1995: 49). The central principle involved here 
is the recognition of state languages as a symbolic reflection of the people who speak it (see 
Chapter 4). It does not necessarily entail ethnolinguistic equality -- English and French still 
dominate the operations of the European Union -- but it is consistent with the notion of greater 
ethnolinguistic democracy discussed above. What is pertinent for our purposes is that this 
principle can be applied equally to intra-state languages as to inter-state languages. If the 
Netherlands can argue that Dutch has a right to be represented as a working language of the EU 
then, by implication, Frisian has a right to be represented as a working language of the 
Netherlands. After all, it is clearly a national minority language which is predominantly spoken 
in the area of Friesland in the Netherlands (Fishman, 1995). In this way, the language rights of 
national majorities and minorities can be usefully allied while, at the same time, highlighting the 
inconsistencies between current inter-state and intra-state language policies. 
Another key avenue to pursue in relation to minority language and education rights is the issue 
of social justice. While important, it is not enough to argue simply for the merits of cultural and 
linguistic diversity, if only because this seldom addresses the terms on which such diversity is 
recognised. As multiculturalist approaches have found out to their cost, recognising diversity is 
all very well but this in itself does little, if anything, to change hegemonic power relations (see 
May, 1994). Moreover, as Edwards has already pointed out, it is highly unlikely that majority 
group members will accept minority rights on the basis of self interest alone. What is needed in 
addition then is some belief that the majority, or Staatsvolk (see Chapter 2), has an obligation of 
justice to accept such rights (Kymlicka, 1995a). It is my view here that the historical 
disadvantages faced by minority groups, and/or the rights of national minorities as ethnics, 
constitute a strong basis for such an obligation. 
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That said, one should be under no illusion that establishing the validity of minority rights remains 
a formidable task. As I have also consistently argued, the process of recognising minority rights 
contests the hegemonic construction of the nation-state and, by implication, the place of the 
majority ethnic group, or dominant ethnie within it. By definition, this will engender opposition. " 
Minority language education is particularly contentious in this regard because it may necessitate 
changes, within a given nation-state, to the balance of wider power relations between ethnic 
groups and the languages they speak. Thus, if significant progress is to be made, the common 
understanding of the nation-state, deriving from political nationalism, needs to be radically 
reconceptualised or reimagined. A very few nation-states have already undergone this process, 
or are presently embarking on such a course, although not without at times considerable difficulty. 
The remainder though continue to be welded to the 'philosophical matrix of the nation-state' 
discussed in Chapters 2 and 3. For this to change, much still needs to be accomplished. 
Education can play a key role here in promoting more pluralistic and plurilingual aims but it needs 
to be stressed again that it cannot in itself achieve such change. As Churchill concludes: 
In some cases, the educational response to minorities is in advance of public opinion to 
a certain extent, but the politicised nature of relations between ethnolinguistic groups and 
their surrounding societies sets strict limits on how far educational systems can go in 
responding to minority needs. The root issue is how far societies outside the education 
system are willing to modify their views of the roles of linguistic and cultural minorities 
within their countries. Educational systems cannot respond to minority needs unless 
societies are [also] prepared to respond to those needs. (1986: 163) 
This caveat, and the related importance of overcoming adverse majority (and, at times, minority) 
opinion, are both borne out starkly in the example that I now want to discuss in some detail: the 
`English Only' movement in the USA. 
Nativism reborn? The English Only movement 
I want to begin this section on the so-called Official English movement -- or, as I prefer to term 
it, the English Only movement20 -- with two revealing vignettes. The first concerns the New York 
State constitutional convention in 1916 where, during a debate on an English literacy requirement 
for voting, a proponent of the measure traced the connection between the English language and 
democratic values back to the Magna Carta: `You have got to learn our language [English] 
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because that is the vehicle of the thought that has been handed down from the men in whose 
breasts first burned the fire of freedom' (cited in Baron, 1990: 59). Irrespective of the merits of 
these sentiments (and there are not many), the key point to be made here is that the Magna Carta 
was actually written in Latin, not English. As I discussed in Chapter 4, English did not assume 
any prominence in Britain until the fifteenth century. 21 
The second example is far more recent. It concerns a 1995 court case in Amarillo, Texas where 
a judge ordered a mother not to speak Spanish to her child at home on the grounds that this was 
equivalent to a form of `child abuse': 
If she starts [school] with the other children and cannot even speak the language that the 
teachers and others speak, and she's a full-blooded American citizen, you're abusing that 
child.... Now get this straight: you start speaking English to that child, because if she 
doesn't do good in school, then I can remove her because it's not in her best interests to 
be ignorant. (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 165-166) 
The only ignorance demonstrated here appears to be the judge's. As de Varennes observes, the 
reasoning behind the judgement is bizarre, to say the least. However, what is most concerning 
is that it obviously never occurred to the judge that it may have been the state's school system 
which was `abusive' for not meeting adequately the linguistic and educational needs of its large 
Spanish-speaking population. Instead, he simply places the blame on the parent -" and, by 
extension, the child -- for their `willful' failure to assimilate. 
These examples usefully highlight four significant aspects of the English Only movement. The 
first is the historical inaccuracy which characterises many of their arguments about the role of 
English -- and, by implication, other languages -- within the United States. The second is the 
explicit link that is made between a lack of English language facility and subsequent educational 
failure, along with a related misrepresentation of bilingual education. The third is the inherent 
nativism of much English Only rhetoric; language is used, in effect, as a convenient proxy for 
maintaining racialised distinctions in the USA. And the fourth is the assumption that speaking 
English is a unifying force while multilingualism is by definition destructive of national unity, an 
assumption we have already seen expressed by Schlesinger in Chapter 3. Each of these 
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characteristics is highly problematic and, as such, bears closer examination. Before doing so, 
however, let me briefly sketch the origins of the English Only movement in its current form. 
The genesis of a movement 
In April 1981, Senator Hayakawa of California proposed an English Language Amendment (ELA) 
to the Constitution of the United States which would make English, for the first time, an official 
rather than a de facto national language. In his initiating speech, the senator gave the following 
reasons for his ELA (see Marshall, 1986: 23): 
`a common language can unify; separate languages can fracture and fragment a society'; 
learning English is the major task of each immigrant22 
only by learning English can an immigrant fully `participate in our democracy' 
Setting aside for the moment the fact that Hayakawa ignores national minority language speakers 
entirely, his principal concern in making English the official language of the USA was to help 
clarify the `confusing signals' being sent to immigrant groups over the preceding decade. Such 
signals included the provision of bilingual (voting) ballots which he considered `contradictory' and 
`logically conflicting' with the requirements of naturalised citizens to `read, write and speak' 
English. Group maintenance approaches to bilingual education were also regarded as `being 
dishonest with linguistic minority groups'. Accordingly, he was determined that only transitional 
forms of bilingual education should be allowed, if that, in order to `end the false promise being 
made to new immigrants that English is unnecessary to them'. 
The themes expressed by Hayakawa at the beginning of the 1980s were to spawn a movement. 
While his ELA failed, the publicity that it garnered led Hayakawa to join forces with Dr John 
Tanton to establish the organisation `US English' in 1983. US English is not the only 
organisation of its type ('English First' is another) but it is certainly the most prominent, having 
grown rapidly in both number and profile from the time of its inception. ' During the 1980s, a 
further five ELAs were tabled under the auspices of the English Only movement, a pattern that 
has continued into the 1990s. In 1996, for example, another variant of the ELA -- the English 
Language Empowerment Act -- was tabled to Congress. To date, none of these proposals has 
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been successful, largely due to the care and caution with which constitutional amendments are 
treated (see Marshall, 1986). However, the English Only movement has continued to lobby 
vigorously for such an amendment at the federal level while also increasingly focusing on changing 
state level language policies (Nunberg, 1989; Ruiz, 1990). In this latter regard, they have been 
far more successful, with 23 states and 40 cities having adopted English as their official language 
over the last decade (The Observer: 4 August, 1996). 24 Under the auspices of the English Only 
movement, the process of amending state-level language policy in favour of English began with 
California's Proposition 63 in 1986. This measure was overwhelmingly endorsed by 73 per cent 
to 27 per cent, including a large percentage of the Hispanic vote. 
In summary, the key objectives of the English Only movement, which have remained constant 
since its inception, are to: 1) adopt a constitutional amendment establishing English as the official 
language of the United States; 2) repeal laws mandating multilingual ballots and voting materials; 
3) restrict federal funding of bilingual education and, if possible, eliminate all forms of group 
maintenance bilingual education, and; 4) strengthen enforcement of English language civic and 
immigration requirements for naturalisation (Tarver, 1994). It should be stressed that these 
concerns are not particularly new in themselves. The primacy of English, and the links with 
nativist concerns about immigration, were clearly evident in the `Americanisation Movement' at 
the time of the First World War (Higham, 1963; see also Baron, 1990; Piatt, 1990; Crawford, 
1989,1992a, 1992b). Indeed, the above example of the New York State constitutional 
convention in 1916 suggests as much. However, what is distinct about the present English Only 
movement is its national profile and organisation (previous debates about language were usually 
confined to local or state arenas) and, relatedly, the increasingly wide support that it seems to 
have garnered among the American public (Padilla, 1991). Much of the success of the English 
Only movement here has been in its ability to articulate forcefully a particular view of the USA 
as a resolutely monolingual, English-speaking country, currently threatened by the (recent) rise 
of multilingualism. This multilingualism is also linked implicitly, and sometimes explicitly, with 
the growing number of Spanish-speaking Hispanic communities within the USA. The often 
alarmist rhetoric promulgated by the movement is thus endemically racist, as I will argue below. 
Here I want to explore further the historical amnesia which attends so much of this rhetoric. As 
we saw Ernest Renan observe in Chapter 2, `forgetting, I would even go so far as to say historical 
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error, is a crucial factor in the creation of a nation' (1990: 11). The nationalist myth making of 
the English Only movement certainly bears this out. 
Historical amnesia: The forgotten' languages of the USA 
The English Only movement makes three principal claims in relation to the language history of 
the USA. The first is that the USA is a monolingual, English-speaking country and alwcrys has 
been. The second is that the English language is a central and indispensable symbol of American 
national identity; a view, moreover, that has been consistently supported by historical language 
policy and practice. The third is that English is under serious threat for the first time as a result 
of the recent rise of bilingual voting and bilingual educational developments. Each of these 
propositions is fundamentally misplaced. 
First, it is clear that English is, and has been historically the dominant language in the USA. This 
point is not in doubt. However, to extrapolate from this the myth of English monolingualisin is 
another story entirely. And story it is, for the USA is not and never has been a monolingual 
country. Indeed, multilingualism has been a feature of US society since the colonial times of the 
eighteenth century (Kloss, 1977), a feature which should not surprise us given the USA's status 
as the largest immigrant country of them all. In American colonies between 1750 and 1850, non- 
English-speaking European settlers made up one quarter of the white population and Dutch (New 
York), Swedish (Delaware) and German (Pennsylvania) were widely spoken. Native Americans, 
and their languages, were still numerous and widespread at this time (see below). And Black 
Americans -- mostly slaves, and with their many African languages -- numbered more than one 
fifth of the total population (Shell, 1993). 25 Moreover, outside of the early colonies, Spanish and 
French language speakers predominated. Many of these language speakers were eventually 
incorporated into the United States as it expanded. For example, the (1803) Louisiana Purchase 
saw this territory, which included a majority of French speakers, acquired from France. Likewise, 
the (1848) Treaty of Guadalupe Hidalgo saw Mexico cede nearly half of its predominantly 
Spanish-speaking territory to the US, including areas of present day New Mexico, Texas, 
Arizona, Colorado and California. 
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To take just one example of the historical language diversity apparent in the United States, the 
case of Native American languages bears closer examination. When the Spanish first arrived on 
the North American continent, ' it is estimated that at least 500 Native American languages were 
spoken (Leap, 1981). The subsequent impact of European colonisation on Native Americans -- 
along with its usual corollaries of introduced diseases, land dispossession, and genocide -- were 
to change all that. By 1920, the Native American population reached a nadir of 400,000, having 
fallen from an estimated 30-40 million at time of contact (see McKay & Wong, 1988). An 
educational policy over this period of actively repressing Native American languages, and 
replacing them with English, also contributed significantly to the related decline and extinction 
of many Native American languages. 27 Notwithstanding this sorry history, Native American 
languages are still spoken today in the USA, although they are seldom commented upon. In the 
1990 census, 1,878,275 people identified as Native Americans of whom 331,600 over the age of 
five years reported speaking a Native American language. Altogether, 26 such languages were 
identified in the 1990 census as having at least 1000 speakers (Ricento, 1996). 
So much for the myth of a monolingual USA. But what of the pivotal role of English in US 
society, and the language policies and practices which have supposedly consistently supported 
this? Again, all is not as it seems. There are actually two clear countervailing tensions apparent 
historically in the USA's approach to language policy and planning. On the one hand, there has 
certainly been a clear drive towards English linguistic uniformity at various times in the USA's 
history. This drive has been characterised most often by a prominent advocacy of the role of 
English as a central organising symbol of American identity. In this context, much has been made 
of John Jay's assertion at the time of America's independence `that Providence has been pleased 
to give this one connected country, to one united people; a people descended from the same 
ancestors, speaking the same language, professing the same religion' (cited in Shell, 1993: 103; 
my emphasis). Likewise, Roosevelt's famous appeal `The Children of the Crucible' in 1917 is 
often invoked: `we have room for but one language here, and this is the English language, for we 
intend to see that the crucible turns our people out as Americans, of American nationality, and not 
as dwellers in a polyglot boarding house' (cited in Edwards, 1994: 166). 28 Relatedly, there has 
been a strong emphasis historically in American federal policy on fostering English as the language 
of administration, education and the legislature, a feature the English Only movement are only too 
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willing to point out. In effect, from the time of the Louisiana Purchase, English has been 
promoted as the language of government, voting and the courts, often in the face of strong local 
opposition. English has also been the recognised language of instruction in schools since the 
Constitution of 1868 (Hernandez-Chavez, 1995). The example of the trenchant assimilationist 
language and education policies directed towards Native Americans would also seem to bear out 
the general significance attributed to English in the educational domain. 
On the other hand, there have also been significant examples where minority language rights -- 
albeit limited ones -- have been specifically accommodated. These examples have simply been 
ignored by the English Only movement (as they were by Roosevelt before them) but they cannot 
just be wished away, much as some might want them to be. The historical language context of 
the USA is thus far more complex than English Only advocates would care to admit. For a start, 
one of the principal reasons that the English Only movement places such store in a constitutional 
amendment is because of the deliberate ambiguity of the Declaration of Independence and the 
Constitution in relation to the role of English in US society. Although the documents were 
written in English, neither the Declaration of Independence nor the Constitution specified an 
official language for the United States. This was not an oversight, as the English Only movement 
argues, but a planned political strategy (Heath, 1977,1981). Underpinning this decision of the 
Founding Fathers was the centrality of the principle of individual choice, exemplified in the notion 
of free speech, and the related adoption of a laissez-faire language policy, deriving from the 
British model, which eschewed the legislative formality of granting `official status' to English (see 
Marshall, 1986; Nunberg, 1992). Coupled with the widespread multilingualism described above, 
`the intellectual climate of the times, which depended upon communication across language 
groups ... supported maximum 
flexibility in language use' (Heath, 1977: 270). 
This `flexibility of language use' was also reflected in the well-established practice of granting 
limited minority language rights to (some) minority language speakers in the USA. The territory 
of Louisiana is a case in point. When Louisiana was annexed from France to the US in 1803, the 
then President, Jefferson, initially made few accommodations to the territory's Francophone 
majority. His first act, in fact, was to appoint a territorial governor who spoke no French and 
who proposed that English be the official language of the local government (Leibowitz, 1969). 
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In the face of strong opposition, this policy was subsequently modified. After Louisiana joined 
the Union in 1812, Louisiana's laws and other public documents were printed in French, and the 
courts and legislature operated bilingually. These concessions, along with the right to bilingual 
schooling, survived in Louisiana law until 1921 (Crawford, 1992a). However, despite the 
relatively liberal language policy adopted over this time, the eventual demise of French as a public 
language was seldom in any doubt (Ricento, 1996). 
The German-speaking minority in the USA was also accorded a measure of minority language 
protection, both prior and subsequent to the country's declared independence in 1776. Indeed, 
the strength of the German language in Pennsylvania led the essayist and publisher Benjamin 
Franklin to complain bitterly in 1750: `Why should Pennsyhwiia, founded by the English, become 
a colony of Aliens, who will shortly be so numerous as to Germanise us instead of our Anglifying 
them, and will never adopt our Language or Customs... ' (cited in Crawford, 1992a: 37). 29 Official 
proclamations were published in German until 1794 and at least 32 German language newspapers 
were published between 1732 and 1800 (Crawford, 1992b). While the process of anglicisation 
and assimilation had reduced the influence of German in public life by 1815, the language 
remained a strong, unofficial presence throughout the nineteenth century, both in Pennsylvania 
and elsewhere. The ongoing strength of the German language was attributable here largely to a 
new influx of German migrants, beginning in the 1820s, who settled in cities like St Louis, 
Milwaukee and Cincinnati as well as in the rural heartlands (Daniels, 1991). The German language 
dominated cultural and educational institutions in these areas and resulted in the widespread 
establishment of German language schools, both private and public. Beginning in 1839, a number 
of states passed laws allowing German as the language of instruction in public schools, where 
numbers warranted, a clear tolerance-oriented language right (Dicker, 1996). 
The growing acceptance of German language education may have continued well into the 
twentieth century had it not been for two events. From the 1880s, state legislation was passed 
in several states mandating English as the only language of public (and even private) education. 
These clearly restrictionist policies were directed principally against German language schools and 
formed part of a wider anti-immigration `Americanisation movement' that emerged at this time 
(Crawford, 1989; Baron, 1990; Piatt, 1990). Although many of these laws were subsequently 
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rescinded by the courts, the deleterious effects on German bilingual schooling were reinforced by 
the subsequent anti-German hysteria surrounding the First World War. The most famous case 
of language restrictionism at this time occurred in Nebraska. A 1913 state law required public 
schools to provide instruction in any European language if 50 or more parents requested it; 
German was the only language ever requested. In 1918 the law was repealed on the basis that 
it was pro-German and thus un-American. The legislation that replaced it went so far as to 
prohibit any public or private school teacher from teaching a subject in a foreign language or, 
indeed, from teaching a foreign language as a subject (Dicker, 1996). The severity of the 
approach is not dissimilar to those adopted in totalitarian regimes such as Franco's Spain. The 
new law was overturned in the Supreme Court in 1923 in the Meyer v. Nebraska case (see 
below). However, by then, the damage was done. By the 1930s, bilingual instruction of any type 
in German had all but disappeared in the United States, while the study of German as a foreign 
language had fallen from 24 per cent of secondary school students nationally in 1915 to less than 
one per cent in 1922 (Crawford, 1989). 
One further example of the formal recognition of minority language rights can be explored with 
regard to the use of Spanish in the state of New Mexico. Along with Hawai'i, New Mexico is one 
of two US states which are officially bilingual; a feature of US society seldom acknowledged by 
the English Only movement. Like Hawai'i's recognition of the indigenous Hawai'ian language, 
the official bilingualism in New Mexico acknowledges that Spanish is the language of an historical 
ethnie not (simply) an immigrant language. When the area was ceded to the United States by 
Mexico at the end of the Mexican-American war, via the (1848) Treaty of Guadalupe Ilidalgo, 
over half its population were Spanish-speaking. As with the incorporation of French speakers in 
Louisiana before it, local language use was at first ignored. However, Spanish soon came to play 
a more prominent role within the territory when the US Congress in 1853 authorised the New 
Mexico Assembly to hire translators and interpreters to conduct its affairs. Subsequent funding 
was provided in 1884 for the translation and publication of the Assembly's proceedings into 
Spanish (Marshall, 1986) and a school law passed in that year permitted either Spanish or English 
as the language of instruction (Hernandez-Chavez, 1995). With the eventual granting of 
statehood in 1912,30 these provisions were further formalised in New Mexico's constitution. All 
laws could be published in both English and Spanish on a 20 year `trial basis' and thereafter `as 
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the legislature may provide'. Given the relatively hostile climate towards minority languages at 
that time in the USA (see above), the ensuing decades saw the gradual ascendancy of English. 
Nonetheless, provisions for training teachers in both languages were established for the purposes 
of better serving Spanish-speaking pupils. Likewise, guarantees were provided to ensure that 
Spanish-speaking children were not discriminated against or segregated in schools. State statutes 
also called for the use of Spanish in a wide range of governmental activities, including elections, 
the posting of legal notices and bilingual/multicultural education (Dicker, 1996). In this last 
respect, the state's (1978) Bilingual-Multicultural Act specifically endorsed group maintenance 
approaches to bilingual education and has facilitated the ongoing formal presence of Spanish 
within New Mexico's schools. 3' Needless to say, as a result Spanish is still widely spoken in New 
Mexico, alongside English, in a wide range of language domains. 
Before examining the English Only movement's third claim in relation to the language history of 
the United States -- that bilingual practices such as these threaten for the first time the ascendancy 
of English in the US -- I want to refer briefly to two key Supreme Court cases in this century 
which also support some accommodation of minority rights. The first has already been 
mentioned, Meyer v. Nebraska (1923), which challenged the restrictionist language policies 
adopted by Nebraska at the end of the First World War - one of many states to do so at the time. 
The Supreme Court ruled in this case that the state uas able to restrict the language of instruction 
to English in state-funded schools but could not do so for private schools. The Court based its 
argument on the due process clause of the 14th Amendment which protects certain substantive 
individual liberties from restrictive state policies. 32 Since language is not specifically mentioned 
in this clause, an important precedent was thus established with regard to the protection of private 
minority language education. 33 That said, the judgement was also clearly sympathetic to the 
general tenor of the state language policy in question, with its strong emphasis on the centrality 
of English: `Perhaps it would be highly advantageous if all had ready understanding of our 
ordinary speech, but this cannot be coerced by methods which conflict with the Constitution -- 
a desirable end cannot be promoted by prohibited means' (cited in Marshall, 1986: 15). Thus, the 
decision upholds only the most minimal interpretation of tolerance-oriented language rights, 
although this in itself remains an important guarantee in the US context. 
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Another landmark decision was Lau v. Nichols (1974) where the Supreme Court ruled in a case 
brought by Chinese-American parents that the English-only education policy in the San Francisco 
Unified School district effectively excluded Chinese-speaking children from meaningful 
participation in the education system. The Court concluded that this constituted a violation of 
equality of treatment under the (1965) Civil Rights Act: `Under these state-imposed standards 
there is no equality of treatment merely by providing students with the same facilities, textbooks, 
teachers, and curriculum; for students who do not understand English are effectively foreclosed 
from any meaningful education' (cited in de Varennes, 1996a: 197). The decision was interpreted 
by proponents and opponents alike as at least tacit endorsement of bilingual education. However, 
the Court specifically refrained from ordering any particular educational remedy. As Macias 
observes, `it is tempting to say that somehow the Lau decision created some [minority] language 
rights ... 
it did not. The plaintiffs sought no specific remedy [from] the School District and the 
Court demanded none' (1979: 92). In effect, the court did not make it a legal requirement for 
schools to provide bilingual education but simply ruled on the illegality of excluding minority 
language students from such programmes. 34 While still limited, this position nonetheless extends 
Meyer v. Nebraska considerably. Lau at least allows for the possibility of some state-funded 
provision of bilingual education even if the non-specificity of the decision has meant that the 
standards of compliance associated with it remain somewhat varied (see Feinberg, 1990). 
There is clearly then a precedent in both law and state policy and practice for a limited recognition 
of minority language and education rights in the USA. But this might appear to confirm the fear 
expressed by the English Only movement that such concessions, along with the provision of 
bilingual voting ballots, threaten the ascendancy of English in the USA (see, for example, Bikales, 
1986: 84-85). Not so. If it is not already apparent by now, such an assertion is simply nonsense. 
Linguistic shift fron: minority languages to English -- what Gorlach (1986) has described as 
`reduced multilingualism' -- is the dominant pattern in the USA. In this regard, less than four per 
cent of the population are actually non-English speakers (Amastae, 1990). According to the 1990 
census, 80 per cent of those over the age of five for whom English is not a first language speak 
English `well' or `very well' (Ricento, 1996). Immigrants are actually currently shifting to English 
at a faster rate than was true of European immigrants at the turn of the century (Baron, 1990). 
Indeed, 75 per cent of all Hispanic immigrants -- who cause the most `concern' for English Only 
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advocates -- speak English frequently each day (Veltman, 1983,1988). The only distinction of 
Hispanic communities to this general pattern of language shift is that it takes perhaps one further 
generation to occur fully -- that is, four as opposed to two or three -- given the continued influx 
of monolingual Spanish speakers (Fishman, 1992). As Veltman sensibly concludes, the only 
languages that are threatened in the USA are languages other than English. 
Misrepresenting bilingual education 
The historical fictions perpetuated by the English Only movement in relation to minority language 
policy and practice are thus plain to see. However, it does not end there. A similar approach is 
adopted in arguing about the link between English language facility and subsequent educational 
achievement. Not only this, English Only advocates also proceed to actively misrepresent the 
educational (and psychological) merits of bilingual education; an approach which has been aptly 
described by Cummins (1995) as a deliberate `discourse of disinformation'. This dual strategy 
can now be examined. 
A key tenet of much English Only rhetoric is that English is essential for social mobility in US 
society, or rather, that a lack of English consigns one inevitably to the social and economic 
margins. As Linda Chavez, who was the President of US English from 1987 until her resignation 
the following year (see below), has argued: `Hispanics who learn English will be able to avail 
themselves of opportunities. Those who do not will be relegated to second class citizenship' 
(cited in Crawford 1992c: 172). We have also seen this argument expressed by Schlesinger in 
Chapter 3 in relation to the `ghettoisation' of minorities. There is certainly a measure of truth in 
the claim that learning standard English in the USA is an important prerequisite for participating 
in the social and economic `mainstream'. Moreover, this conception is not the sole preserve of 
conservative commentators (see Macedo, 1994; McLaren, 1995; May, 1994,1998b). Donaldo 
Macedo, a trenchant critic of English Only, has argued, following Gramsci, that bilingual 
`educators should understand the value of mastering the standard English language of the wider 
society. It is through the full appropriation of the standard English language that linguistic- 
minority students find themselves linguistically empowered to engage in dialogue with various 
sectors of the wider society' (1994: 128). However, where the intellectual dishonesty of the 
English only movement becomes apparent, and where critics like Macedo and myself would beg 
200 
to differ, is in the two allied claims that are then made: 1) that a mastery of English is the key 
determinant in effecting the social and economic `betterment' of marginalised minority language 
speakers, and; 2) that the best means of achieving such mastery is via English-only educational 
policies. 
Guy Wright, a prominent media supporter of English Only policies, argued in a 1983 editorial in 
the San Francisco Examiner that `the individual who fails to learn English is condemned to semi- 
citizenship, condemned to low pay, condemned to remain in the ghetto' (cited in Secada & 
Lightfoot, 1993: 47). What this argument conveniently overlooks is the central question of the 
wider structural disadvantages facing minority language speakers. Indeed, on this question, 
English Only advocates are almost wholly silent. Mastery of English, while important, is only one 
variable in the equation (see Chapter 4). After all, African Americans have been speaking English 
for two hundred years and yet many still find themselves relegated to urban ghettos (Macedo, 
1994). Likewise, English is almost as inoperative with respect to Hispanic social mobility as it 
is with respect to black social mobility. 25 per cent of Hispanics currently live at or below the 
poverty line, a rate that is at least twice as high as the proportion of Hispanics who are not 
English-speaking (Fishman, 1992). As Macedo concludes: 
It would be more socially constructive and beneficial if the zeal that propels the US 
English movement to spread the `English only' gospel were diverted toward the struggle 
to end violent racism, to alleviate the causes of poverty, homelessness, and family 
breakdown, among other social ills that characterise the lived experience of minorities in 
the United States. If these social issues are not dealt with appropriately, it is naive to 
think that the acquisition of the English language alone will, somehow, magically eclipse 
the raw and cruel injustices and oppression perpetrated against the dispossessed class of 
minorities in the United States. (1994: 128; see also Kozol, 1991). 
As for sustaining the merits of an English-only educational approach, this is only achieved by a 
deliberate misrepresentation of, and polemical attack on bilingual education. The strategy 
adopted here by the English Only movement is effected on two key fronts. First, English Only 
advocates imply that, given sufficient motivation, anyone can master English in an English-only 
environment, a position which is usually tied to the related lament that bilingual education has 
replaced the beloved `sink or swim' approach (see Imhoff, 1990; Porter, 1990). In effect, the 
argument is that `children of normal intelligence' are sure to learn English if they are exposed to 
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it. As Donahue (1985) argues, this position conveniently blames the victim and, in so doing, 
masks a deeply racist attitude to non-English speakers. " We need only recall the judge's 
reasoning in the Amarillo, Texas case to confirm this. Second, the English Only movement 
continues to argue on this basis that bilingual education disadvantages minority children both 
educationally and socially. The position adopted here stands in sharp contrast to the bulk of 
academic research on the topic which points strongly to the attested social and educational merits 
of learning in one's first language and to the particular benefits of maintenance bilingual 
programmes. Such research began with UNESCO's (1953) unequivocal endorsement of `mother- 
tongue teaching' and has been consistently reinforced since (see Genesee, 1987; Corson, 1993; 
Baker, 1996 for useful summaries; see also my discussion earlier in the chapter). Given this, the 
only way that the English Only movement can sustain its position is by deliberately ignoring these 
widely attested conclusions. As Cummins (1995) observes, drawing on Chomsky (1987), the 
`threat of the good example' must be neutralised. This is achieved by the use of a limited number 
of deeply flawed US government sponsored research studies which cast (some) doubt on bilingual 
education. To explore these studies further, and their inherent limitations, it is necessary to sketch 
briefly the political background which led to their commissioning. 
Much of the concern expressed by English Only advocates about the emergence of bilingual 
education relates to its apparent endorsement in the (1968) Bilingual Education Act. The Act 
was actually an extension (Title VII) of an earlier one -- the (1965) Elementary and Secondary 
Education Act (ESEA) -- established by Lyndon Johnson in his `war against poverty' 
programme. In this respect, both its remit and underlying philosophy were directed at rectifying 
the poor educational performance `of limited English-speaking ability' students. These students 
were also equated, more broadly, with the economically disadvantaged. Critics like Hayakawa 
argued that the Bilingual Education Act thus facilitated the development of not only transitional 
bilingual programmes but also group maintenance bilingual approaches, depending on how one 
interpreted its rather vague remit. In fact, there is a convincing argument that this was not the 
case. Initially, these broad provisions did allow for the establishment of federally funded group 
maintenance programmes, developments that were reflected in the 1974 reauthorisation of the 
Act. However, with the increasing political hostility towards group maintenance bilingual 
education over the course of the 1980s, allied with the Reagan presidency of the time, the 
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emphases increasingly shifted to transitional and English-only programmes. By the time of the 
1988 reauthorisation of the Act, these views had become so firmly entrenched that advocates of 
bilingual education were having to fight to defend even transitional programmes. In this respect, 
the vagueness of the Act's remit has actually militated against, rather than fostered the extension 
of bilingual education initiatives (Moran, 1990; Secada & Lightfoot, 1993). The implicit deficit 
approach underlying what remit there is within the Act also lends itself far more easily to a 
subtractive view of bilingualism and bilingual education than to an enrichment perspective. Add 
to this a pattern of consistent under-funding for what was to begin with only a modest grant-in-aid 
programme anyway, and it is not hard to see that the Act's influence on group-maintenance 
bilingualism is far less than is often claimed by its opponents. 
Part of the success in neutering what little impact the Bilingual Education Act might have had 
is related to the English Only movement's mobilisation of two high profile federally funded 
reports critical of bilingual education. The first of these, the American Institute for Research's 
(AIR) evaluation of bilingual education programmes, was commissioned by the United States 
Office of Education and published in 1978. It provided an overview of federally funded bilingual 
programmes operating at the time and found that such programmes had no significant impact on 
educational achievement in English, although they did enhance native-like proficiency. It 
furthermore suggested that pupils were being kept in transitional bilingual programmes longer 
than necessary, thus contributing to the segregation of such students from `mainstream' classes 
(Moran, 1990). Despite significant criticism of its methodology (see below), these findings dealt 
a considerable blow to bilingual education advocates and led Congress in 1978 to begin the 
process of shifting the remit of the Bilingual Education Act towards a more English-only 
approach. 
The conclusions of the AIR study were seemingly replicated by a second piece of federally 
commissioned research by Baker & de Kanter (1981,1983) who reviewed the literature and 
likewise concluded that bilingual education was not advancing the English language skills and 
academic achievements of minority language students. In short, Baker & de Kanter argued that 
students had no clear advantage over those in English-only programmes. Given the increasingly 
sceptical political climate of the time, this research generated enormous publicity and exerted even 
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more influence on subsequent federal policy. However, as Crawford (1989) observes, while the 
Baker & de Kanter (1983) report is easily the most quoted federal pronouncement on bilingual 
education, it is probably the most criticised as well. As with its predecessor, much of this criticism 
had to do with the methodology that was employed. For example, as with the AIR study, Baker 
& de Kanter specifically rejected the use of data gathered through students' first languages. They 
also failed to account for the fact that two thirds of the comparison group in English-only 
education programmes had previously been in bilingual programmes where, presumably, they 
had benefited from first language instruction (Crawford, 1992a). Moreover, in failing to 
differentiate between transitional and maintenance bilingual programmes in their analysis, the 
somewhat lesser educational effectiveness of the former, which constituted the majority of the 
programmes under review, inevitably subsumed the better educational results of the latter 
(Cummins, 1995). Overall, the inadequacy of Baker & de Kanter's findings has been confirmed 
by Willig's (1985,1987) subsequent meta-analyses of their data. Willig controlled for 183 
variables that they had failed to take into account. She found, as a result, small to moderate 
differences in favour of bilingual education, even when these were predominantly transitional 
programmes. 
Willig's conclusions, which confirm what is elsewhere widely acknowledged, are also replicated 
in the most recent federally funded bilingual research. In the largest study yet, Ramirez et at. 
(1991) compared English-only programmes with transitional and group maintenance bilingual 
programmes, following 2,300 Spanish-speaking students over four years. The findings clearly 
supported bilingual education and found that the greatest growth in mathematics, English 
language skills and English reading was particularly evident among students in late-exit [group 
maintenance] bilingual programmes where students had been taught predominantly in Spanish. 
By implication, the Ramirez study also confirmed another feature which is widely corroborated 
by other research on bilingual education, that minority language students who receive most of 
their education in English rather than their first language are more likely to fall behind and drop 
out of school. ' What is so interesting here is that this research has generated far less interest and 
had far less impact on subsequent federal policy than its two predecessors. As Ricento observes 
of this, in spite of an impressive amount of both qualitative and quantitative research now 
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available on the merits of bilingual education, `the public debate (to the extent that there is one) 
[in the USA] tends to focus on perceptions and not on facts' (1996: 142). 
The English Only movement thus continues to insist in the face of consistent published research 
to the contrary that English-only programmes are the best educational approach to adopt for 
minority language students. In so doing, it uses to great effect the few high profile but 
methodologically suspect studies which appear to support its case. This would seem to amount 
to little more than cynical (although highly successful) political manipulation, an assertion that is 
confirmed when one looks at the movement's failure to fund the English-only programmes for 
minority students that it so vociferously advocates. In this respect, English Only is clearly found 
wanting. Many of the public who supported the establishment of official state-level English 
policies logically assumed that a principal concern of the legislation was to expand the 
opportunities for immigrants to learn English. However, logical or not, this was the case. While 
US English spent lavishly to get these measures on the ballot, in 1988 it declined to support 
legislation creating a modestly funded federal programme for adult learners of English (Crawford, 
1992c). As a result of public criticism at the time, US English did make some subsequent effort 
to fund similar ventures, but these efforts have remained largely desultory and continue to 
constitute only the barest minimum of their total funding efforts. The attitude adopted here 
appears to be that English language programmes should be the sole responsibility of Spanish- 
speaking volunteers! Guy Wright, who we have already encountered, wrote somewhat wistfully 
along these lines in his media column in 1986, suggesting that a grassroots volunteer movement 
was by far the best solution since `the legislature will balk when it realises how much it would cost 
to hire enough credentialed teachers and professional administrators to cope with the waiting lists 
for English classes'. Taking the latter route was also not necessary in his view since `the 
immigrant doesn't need to learn perfect English ... 
[only] survival English'. Accordingly, 
`volunteers will need some guidance from the state. But not too much. A simple briefing and a 
handbook that set out the lessons should do' (cited in Tollefson, 1991: 124). The sentiments 
expressed here are clear enough and illustrate well the underlying racism and indifference towards 
minority language speakers that are evident in so much of English Only rhetoric (see below). As 
James Crawford concludes: 
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One thing is clear. Rather than promote English proficiency, 99 per cent of the 
organisation's efforts go toward restricting the use of other languages. Certainly there is 
nothing in Official English legislation to help anyone learn English. On the other hand, 
there is much to penalise those who have yet to do so.... English Only is a label that has 
stuck, despite the protests of US English, because it accurately sums up the group's logic: 
That people will speak English only if they are forced to. That the crutch of bilingual 
education must be yanked away or newcomers will be permanently handicapped. That 
immigrants are too lazy or dim-witted to accept `the primacy of English' on their own. 
(1992c: 176) 
The return of the nativist 
The nativism that informs the English Only movement should by now be readily apparent. After 
all, if US English is not actually concerned with extending opportunities to minority language 
speakers to learn English, there must be another, more sinister agenda at work. In this respect, 
it is interesting to note that all previous movements which advocated English-only policies did so 
as part of a wider nativist and anti-immigrationist agenda. The current English Only movement, 
despite its disavowals, is no exception to this trend -- in effect, it provides us with a modern 
variant of the Americanisation Movement which swept the country around the turn of the century. 
The links that the organisation US English has with anti-immigrationist groups would appear to 
confirm this. The co-founder of US English, John Tanton, was also previously the founder of a 
smaller anti-immigration organisation, `Federation for American Immigration Reform' (FAIR), 
as well as being a former President of a similar organisation, `Zero Population Growth'. 
37 
The principal concern of Tanton, and other anti-immigrationists involved in the English Only 
movement, is the rapidly rising Hispanic population in the United States -- what Tanton has 
termed `the Latin onslaught' on the USA. " These views were exposed when an internal 
memorandum written by Tanton in 1986 was made public two years later. The racist content of 
the memorandum resulted in his resignation. In it, he discusses a range of cultural threats posed 
by `Spanish-speaking immigrants', including a lack of involvement in public affairs, Roman 
Catholicism, low `educability', high school-dropout rates and `high fertility' (Crawford, 1992c)39 
A number of notable public supporters of the organisation also resigned at the time because of the 
anti-Hispanic and anti-Catholic sentiments expressed, including Linda Chavez, the then President 
of US English. 
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Despite this setback, US English has continued to garner increasingly wide support. And this is 
where the present English Only movement differs from its predecessors. In short, it cannot simply 
be a nativist movement -- or, rather, it cannot just be a simple (transparent) nativist movement -- 
since, one would expect, it would not have generated the broad following that it has. This would 
appear to be confirmed by the extent of the movement's appeal to many minority language 
speakers themselves, as we saw previously with the success of California's Proposition 63. 
Indeed, its prominent minority supporters have been regularly paraded by the movement as the 
epitome of the `good alien' (Tarver, 1994); the success stories of immigration and the 
embodiment of the American dream. These have included Fiayakawa himself -- although, as 
Donahue (1985) points out, he actually came from British Columbia -- Gerda Bikales, and Linda 
Chavez. 
How is the movement able to generate this wide appeal, among both majority and minority 
language speakers? One way it does so is by inverting the usual immigration and language axis. 
Where previous movements concentrated primarily on concerns over immigration, from which 
arose (subsequent) language policies, the English Only movement attempts the reverse, thus 
making it far more politically palatable. In short, it concentrates almost solely on the status of the 
English language in the USA as a convenient proxy for a more overtly racial politics. The 
approach adopted here is similar to the `new racism' which substitutes (at least ostensibly) 
culturalist arguments about `race' for biological ones (see Barker, 1981; Donald & Rattansi, 1992; 
Small, 1994; Gillborn, 1995). Deutsch has observed that `language is an automatic signalling 
system, second only to race, in identifying targets for privilege or discrimination' (1975: 7; see 
also Chapter 4). James Crawford argues, along more specific lines: 
The English Only movement, an outgrowth of the immigration-restrictionist lobby, has 
skilfully manipulated language as a symbol of national unity and ethnic divisiveness. Early 
in this century, those who sought to exclude other races [sic] and cultures invoked claims 
of Anglo-Saxon superiority. But in the 1980s, explicit racial loyalties are no longer 
acceptable in political discourse. Language loyalties, on the other hand, remain largely 
devoid of associations with social injustice. While race is [supposedly] immutable, 
immigrants can and often do exchange their mother tongue for another. And so, for those 
who resent the presence of Hispanics and Asians, language politics has become a 
convenient surrogate for racial politics. (1989: 14)40 
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The `curse' of multilingualisnº 
Which brings us to the fourth and final dimension of the English Only movement that I want to 
examine here, its argument that multilingualism and minority language rights are inherently 
destabilising to the nation-state. As we saw in Chapter 3, this is a view that is widely shared by 
both liberal and conservative commentators. Given its common sense assumptions, it also garners 
considerable support from among the wider public, providing another reason for the English Only 
movement's wide appeal. Thus, Kathryn Bricker, former executive director of US English, can 
assert: 
Language is so much a part of our lives that it can be a great tool either for unity or 
disunity. And we are getting close to the point where we have a challenge to the common 
language that we share.... We are basically at a crossroads. We can reaffirm our need for 
a common language, or we can slowly go down the road of division along language lines. 
(cited in Secada & Lightfoot, 1993: 46) 
Other assertions are even more apocalyptic -- emphasising the potential nightmares of separatism 
and civil strife apparent in prominent `ethnic conflicts' elsewhere in the world. Gary Imhoff, for 
example, baldly states that `language diversity has been a major cause of [international] conflict.... 
Any honest student of the sociology of language should admit that multilingual societies have 
been less united and internally peaceful than single-language societies' (1987: 40). Likewise, 
Hayakawa has argued: 
For the first time in our history, our nation [sic] is faced with the possibility of the kind 
of linguistic division that has torn apart Canada in recent years; that has been a major 
feature of the unhappy history of Belgium, split into speakers of French and Flemish; that 
is at this very moment a bloody division between the Sinhalese and Tamil populations of 
Sri Lanka. (cited in Nunberg, 1992: 492) 
However, as I have already indicated in the preceding chapter, the position painted here is simply 
wrong -- both in its historical and comparative 
dimensions. Historically, the principal cause of 
most language-based conflicts has been the denial of legitimate minority language rights rather 
than their recognition. This is true of Canada, Belgium and Sri Lanka. 41 Relatedly, the 
comparisons drawn between the USA and these examples are also misplaced and misleading. In 
Canada and Belgium, minority language claims centre on the rights of historical ethnies who are 
formally recognised, at least ostensibly, in the bicultural and bilingual frameworks of the countries 
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concerned. The question is thus not about the eventual linguistic assimilation of these minority 
language speakers, and the best way(s) this might be achieved, as in the USA. Rather, it concerns 
how separate language recognition as befits their status as ethnics can be achieved, and how past 
injustices which have militated against such recognition can be rectified (sec Taylor, 1992; 
Coulombe, 1995). Although there are also historical ethnics within the USA, notably Native 
Americans and some Spanish speakers, the principal concerns of the language debates there 
remain focused on new minorities. Likewise, the erosion and infringement of existing 
constitulioiral minority language rights, leading to the threat of conflict and secession, has no 
precedent in the USA, not even with the Louisiana Purchase or the Treaty of Guadalupe 
Hidalgo (Magnet, 1990). 
Contrasting Quebec 
These distinctions can be highlighted further by a closer examination of the language debates in 
Quebec, along with their broader impact on Canada. Francophones in Quebec at the time of the 
1990 census constituted a clear majority (83 per cent) in the province, and a considerable minority 
(23 per cent) throughout the whole of Canada (Forbes, 1993). Along with the historical status 
of Francophones as one of the two colonial charter groups of Canada, these numbers might 
suggest a measure of cultural and linguistic security for French. Not so. The history of 
Francophones in Canada conforms broadly to the experiences of minority language speakers 
elsewhere. Since the defeat of the French in Quebec in 1759, and with its subsequent 
incorporation into the Canadian Confederation in 1867, Francophones have clearly been the 
minority partner in Canadian institutional life. In short, they have been subject to the political, 
cultural, and economic dominance of English-speakers (Anglophones) throughout Canada and, 
until recently, in Quebec itself. However, it is true to say that Francophones, at least in Quebec, 
have also consistently achieved, and been able to maintain a considerable degree of institutional 
autonomy (C. Williams, 1994). Initially, this was the result of the relative isolation of Quebec; 
an isolation that was due to its predominantly rural outlook and its Catholicism. Thus, during this 
time, Quebecois identity was defined primarily by its rural and religious associations. 
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However, with the emergence of the `Quiet Revolution' in the 1950 and 1960s -- which saw the 
transformation of Quebec into a modern western economy -- the role of the church faded rapidly 
and language came to replace it as the key indicator of Quebecois identity. The latter 
development was reaffirmed by two important commissions at that time. The Parent Commission 
of 1966 recommended that the major responsibility of the provincial government was to protect 
the French language, regulate its use, encourage its improvement, and ensure the fullest possible 
development of the culture it expressed (Mallea, 1989). The Laurendeau-Dunton Commission, 
which first reported in 1967, found that the wider principle of French/English language equality 
enshrined in the Confederation could only realistically be achieved within Quebec, let alone 
elsewhere in Canada, when the marked economic and educational disparities between 
Francophones and Anglophones were addressed. In Quebec, for example, the Catholic church 
had historically discouraged Francophones from involvement in the business sector. This had 
resulted in a cultural division of labour in which an Anglicised elite dominated the economy, and 
where English had accordingly become inextricably associated with social mobility. French was 
further threatened by a declining birth rate among the Francophone population, by increased 
emigration to other provinces, and by an increasing pattern of new minorities in Quebec choosing 
to send their children to English-speaking schools. These immediate concerns were also framed 
within a wider scepticism towards the Canadian federal government's bilingual policy which 
seemed to be doing little to redress the decline of French throughout Canada. Indeed, given the 
predominance of English elsewhere in Canada, and in prestigious institutional domains within 
Quebec, only an active promotion-oriented language policy in favour of French could redress the 
balance. This was the conclusion of the Laurendeau-Dunton Commission since, in its view, `the 
life of the French-Canadian culture necessarily implies the life of the French language' (cited in 
Coulombe, 1995: 75). 
As a result of this increasing focus on language as the core of Quebecois identity, a range of 
significant language legislation actively promoting French was enacted in the 1970s. These 
legislative developments were also facilitated by the rise of the nationalist Parti Quebecois to 
provincial government for the first time in 1976. The most prominent of the language laws passed 
at this time, Bill 101(Charte de la langue Franr aise, 1977), has also been the most controversial. 
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The Bill aimed to address the historical cultural division of labour in Quebec by formalising French 
in economic, educational and political domains. As the Bill's architect, Camille Laurin, argued: 
The Quebec we wish to build will be essentially French. The fact that the majority of its 
population is French will be clearly visible -- at work, in communications and in the 
countryside. It will also be a country in which the traditional balance of power will be 
altered, especially in regard to the economy ... this will accompany, symbolise and support 
a reconquest by the French-speaking majority in Quebec of that control of the economy 
that we ought to have. (Laurin, 1977; cited in C. Williams, 1994: 196; my emphasis) 
Specifically, the Bill entailed that all children, except those whose parents had themselves been 
taught in English in Quebec, attend Francophone schools - requiring, in effect, all new minorities, 
and other Canadians, to be educated in French. All commercial signs were to be solely in French. 
And all businesses with over 50 employees had to undertake `francisation' programmes so as to 
ensure the right of any Quebecker to be able to work in French, in both the public and private 
sector. Needless to say, the Bill's requirements generated considerable opposition, particularly 
from the Anglophone minority in Quebec and the Anglophone majority elsewhere in Canada. 
Subsequently, aspects of Bill 101 have been ruled unconstitutional. The educational restrictions 
were deemed by the Canadian Supreme Court in 1984 to contravene Clause 23 of the (1982) 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, protecting the rights of minority language 
speakers. The provincial government was able to disregard this ruling, however, by using the 
`notwithstanding clause' of Canada's constitution, arguing that Bill 101 was in the best interests 
of Quebec's distinct character (Lemco, 1992). The commercial signage restrictions were also 
deemed discriminatory by the Supreme Court in the Ford v. Quebec (1988) case. The general 
scepticism in Canada towards the arguments employed in defence of Bill 101 was also to result 
in the eventual failure of the (1987) Meech Lake Accord. The Accord had attempted to 
reconcile Quebec's aspirations as a `distinct society' with the federalism of the Canadian state as 
represented by the Canadian Charter of Rights. However, it lapsed when 3 provinces failed 
to sign it over concerns about the `distinct society' clause (see C. Williams, 1994: 210-212). The 
Accord's failure has had ongoing ramifications for the increasingly fraught question of Quebec's 
relationship to Canada, fuelling calls among Quebec nationalists for independence, and resulting 
in the 1995 referendum on independence which was only very narrowly lost. 
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In fairness to the English Only movement, the language laws of Quebec are far from 
unproblematic, certainly. However, it is surely ironic that the most problematic aspects of these 
language policies -- and certainly, the most criticised -- are those which most closely reflect the 
majoritarian tendencies of the English Only movement itself. The Quebec language laws have 
largely achieved their intention of raising the public profile of French within Quebec. In effect, 
the previously marginalised status of French within the economy and within education has been 
reversed. 42 But they have done so apparently at the expense of certain individual freedoms with 
regard to language choice. 43 
Even here though the comparison is somewhat strained since the Quebec laws are not as 
exclusionary as they might at first appear. For example, aboriginal peoples in Quebec are also 
accorded distinct language rights on the basis that they are also historical ethnics. The architect 
of Bill 101, Laurin, admitted as much when observing: `the Amerindians and the Inuit are the only 
ones who ... can consider themselves as peoples separate 
from the totality of Quebecois and in 
consequence [can] insist on special treatment under the law' (cited in Coulombe, 1995: 119). 
Similarly, the intent of the legislation is not to curb the use of minority languages themselves, as 
is the case with English Only. Rather, it argues for the use of the majority French language within: 
Quebec in all public domains. This constitutes a central part of the wider political question raised 
by Francophones' minority position within Canada and is entirely consistent with the granting of 
promotion-oriented rights in international law to minority language speakers, where numbers 
warrant. In this respect, the questions raised here are inevitably related to the broader issue of 
the degree to which Francophone speakers in Quebec (and elsewhere in Canada) can maintain 
their autonomny, and the language and cultural rights attendant on this, as a legitimate part of the 
historical power-sharing agreement with Anglophone Canadians. Any ongoing discontents 
concern the failure adequately to ensure these protections. 
It should thus be clear that the example of Quebec bears little actual relation to the alarmist claims 
invoked by English Only advocates, both in substance and effect. While clearly not without its 
tensions, it should be stressed again that where these do arise, they relate principally to the denial 
rather than the recognition of minority language claims. Such a conclusion also points to a second 
fundamental weakness of the English Only position on multilingualism. If this contra-indicated 
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position is actually the case, then far from ensuring national unity, restrictionist language policies 
are much more likely to precipitate disunity. In short, attempting to enforce language 
homogeneity is far more likely to foster disunity than to ameliorate it. Indeed, of all possible 
scenarios, this one is likely to be the most divisive, the most contentious and fractious (Donahue, 
1985). As Donahue proceeds to argue: `The final irony of [the English Only] approach to the 
matter of language use is that by ... aligning 
itself with a theory which holds that all ethnic 
intergroup behaviour is inevitably conflict producing, [it] forecloses itself from the possibility of 
unifying American society' (1985: 107). 
In contrast, a `language competent society' (Padilla, 1991) -- where all minority language 
speakers are able to learn English, while also retaining their first language -- is far more likely to 
result in both social mobility for minority speakers and a more flexible and less contentious 
national language policy overall. " As Marshall & Gonzalez conclude, `it is not multilingualism 
itself that is disruptive, but denying a group that speaks a different language from participating 
in greater social mobility' (1990: 33). Given the distinctions that I have consistently drawn 
between national and ethnic minority groups, one can also add here the historical claims of ethnies 
which, while they may incorporate issues of social mobility, are not principally dependent upon 
them. 
A question of democracy 
Which brings me to my final point. Why does the English Only movement persist in peddling its 
position in the face of seemingly insurmountable evidence to the contrary? `Why', as Fishman 
despairingly asks, `are facts so useless in this discussion? ' (1992: 167). The answer returns us to 
the wider social, economic and political context within which all debates on minority language and 
education are embedded. The principal motivation which underlies the rationale of so much of 
the English Only movement is to ensure that the dominant group, or Staatsvolk, maintains 
political, social and economic control of the civic realm of the United States. After all, what else 
could explain the deliberate amnesia about minority language rights in the USA, the spurious 
association of multilingualism with conflict and fragmentation, and the rejection of the educational 
approach -- group maintenance bilingualism -- that has been widely attested as most likely to 
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benefit minority language students? Jim Cummins candidly observes of this last feature that such 
empowerment pedagogy will continue to be resisted simply because empowered people arc more 
difficult to exploit: `if minority groups develop the confidence in their own identity [which 
includes valuing their language and culture] and the knowledge and critical awareness to articulate 
their rights, then they become resistant to exploitation at the hands of the dominant group' (1995: 
160). 
I am not suggesting, by this, some kind of grand conspiracy theory, although conspiratorial (anti- 
immigrationist) elements do clearly exist within the English Only movement. Rather, I wish to 
highlight that the question of minority rights is not about a neutral, disinterested state responding 
to the claims of vociferous, `politically motivated' minorities. It is about a contest in which all 
players are culturally and politically situated and one in which much is at stake on all sides. 
Specifically, it is a contest for recognition, for resources, and for justice, fairness and equity. As 
such, it is perhaps not surprising that many within the dominant ethnie are unwilling to renegotiate 
the terms of agreement which have served them so well in the past. However, do so they must. 
Otherwise, the greatest fear of many opponents of minority language and education rights will be 
realised; the eventual break-up of the nation-state that they are so intent on defending. This is 
simply because national and ethnic minority groups are increasingly unwilling to settle for the 
degree of marginalisation and cultural and language evisceration which have historically 
characterised their incorporation into modern nation-states. As I have argued in Chapter 2, many 
of these groups are not actually seeking independent statehood -- the sine qua non of political 
nationalism -- but they are seeking greater elimocultural and ethnolinguistic democracy. 
The litmus test facing the USA and so many other nation-states today is their capacity to move 
from political democracy to this wider recognition and incorporation of cultural and linguistic 
democratic rights. Such change involves reimagining the nation-state and the role of minority 
languages and cultures within it. It means balancing the at times countervailing demands of 
individual and group rights. And it requires broadening the conception of what constitutes social, 
cr1ltural mid linguistic capital, and how these may be defined and used in the private and public 
realms. At stake here are questions of individual and collective social mobility. Also at stake, 
however, are the wider questions of minority inclusion within, and exclusion from the nation-state, 
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and the historical power relations upon which these are predicated. Accordingly, no one is 
suggesting that reimagining the nation-state along these lines will be an uncontested and 
unproblematic task -- or, indeed, a panacea once accomplished. But if the obstacles are complex 
and daunting, and the implications of a reconstituted nation-state remain uncertain, the 
possibilities that inhere in such a task -- for both minorities and majorities -- arc nonetheless 
significant enough to warrant a serious attempt. The stakes are high but the potential rewards arc 
even more so. Just how high -- in both respects -- can be demonstrated by the in-depth case study 
of Wales which follows. 
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Notes - Chapter 5 
1. A similar situation presently exists in Turkey in relation to the 15 million Kurdish minority. 
In March, 1997 secret Turkish interior ministry documents were made public which stated: 
`administrative and legal measures should be taken against those attempting to propagate the 
Kurdish language' (The Guardia,:: March 29,1997). 
2. While there are inevitably many intra- as well as inter-group differences, a general palleri: of 
differential status and achievement is clearly apparent among many minority groups. In short, 
minorities tend to be over-represe, ik'd in unfavourable social and educational indices in 
comparison to majority group members. As Churchill observes: 
policy making about the education of minorities must cope with an overriding fact: almost 
ewryjurisdiction in the industriali. ed ivorld is failing adequately to meet the educational 
greeds of a significant number of members of linguistic and cultural minorities .... Measured against the criterion of ensuring linguistic and'or cultural survival in the long 
term, the shortfall is much more serious... (1986: 8; emphasis in original). 
3. As Howe argues: `The principle of equal educational opportunity can only be realized for 
cultural minorities by rendering educational opportunities worth wanting, and rendering 
educational opportunities worth wanting requires that minorities not be required to give up their 
identities in order to enjoy them' (1992: 469). 
4. Secada & Lightfoot (1993) observe, for example, that the purported trade-off between 
minority cultures and languages and access to opportunity is increasingly being seen (and rejected) 
as uneven by minority groups: give up your language and culture and you might have opportunity. 
When the latter is not forthcoming, communal anger has developed in response to prior 
generations being duped by this promise. 
5. Research on `family status' has included examination of the family environment, child-rearing 
practices, and linguistic repertoires used in working-class and ethnic minority homes. Particular 
interest was expressed in the supposedly poor language development of children from these family 
environments as explained by one, or a combination, of the above variables. The debates and 
counter-debates over these issues, particularly in sociolinguistics, are well documented (see 
Valencia, 1997 for a useful review). However, whatever variables were used, the starting premise 
was invariably one of cultural and linguistic deficit in relation to majority group `norms'. 
6. For a fuller discussion of multiculturalism, and its limitations see May (1994,1998c). 
7. It is now widely recognised that bilinguals mature earlier than monolinguals in acquiring skills 
for linguistic abstraction, are superior to monolinguals on divergent thinking tasks and in their 
analytical orientation to language, and demonstrate greater social sensitivity than monolinguals 
in situations requiring verbal communication (see Corson, 1993; Romaine, 1995; Baker, 1996). 
8. The territorial language principle ensures that particular languages are given official status 
within particular regional areas of the nation-state. However, it cannot necessarily ensure that 
these languages are equally, or even adequately supported. Thus, in Switzerland there remain 
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significant infra-structural differences between the most widely spoken language, German, and 
the least widely spoken, Romansch. So much so, in fact, that this has led to a recent overhaul of 
Swiss language policy to provide more support for Romansch (Rossinelli, 1989; Switzerland, 
1989; Grin, 1995). Questions of flexibility also arise in relation to territorial language policies. 
While most Swiss citizens are multilingual, the Swiss cantonal structure, on which the territorial 
language principle is based, is not. In effect, most Swiss cantons stick rigidly to their rule of one 
official language per territory (Churchill, 1986). 
9. Belgium differs from Switzerland in that linguistic conflict between its two principal language 
groups - the French and Dutch -- has been a prominent feature since the inception of the Belgian 
state in 1830. However, much of this had to do with the de facto supremacy of French and the 
concomitant marginalising of Dutch throughout its history, despite the fact that Dutch speakers 
were a numerical majority. This ongoing conflict led eventually to the adoption of linguistic 
legislation in 1962-1963 which enshrined the territorial principle in Belgium, thus ensuring equal 
linguistic status for Dutch speakers. This legislation divided the country into three administrative 
regions: Walloma and Flanders which are subject to strict monolingualism (Dutch to the north and 
French to the south), and the capital, Brussels, which is officially bilingual. However, even in 
Brussels the French/Dutch linguistic infrastructure is quite separate, extending to the workplace 
as well as to the more common domains of administration and education. In short, this means that 
in the whole country there are only monolingual educational institutions, while administration is 
also monolingual, even in multilingual regions. That said, it is also clear that the territorial 
principle adopted in Belgium has contributed significantly to its socio-political and economic 
stability by ensuring the maintenance of group language rights (Baetens Beardsmore, 1980; Nelde, 
1997). 
10. Canada adopts the personality language principle, where numbers warrant, in relation to 
French speakers outside of Quebec. Within Quebec, however, the territorial language principle 
operates (see below). 
11. India is not included in Churchill's study, being beyond its purview of OECD countries. 
Nonetheless, it provides an excellent example of the numerical language principle. The 
Constitution of India (Article 350A) directs every state, and every local authority within that 
state, to provide `adequate' educational facilities for instruction in the first language of linguistic 
minorities, at least at primary (elementary) school level. This is in addition to the division of 
India's states along largely linguistic lines. These political divisions result in local linguistic 
communities having control over their public schools and other educational institutions. This, in 
turn, ensures that the primary language of the area is used as a medium of instruction in state 
schools (de Varennes, 1996a). 
12. A parallel perspective of these various stages can be drawn from Ruiz's (1984,1990) well 
known categorisation of language policy orientations: language-asproblem (Stages 1-4) where 
the targets of language policy are construed as a social problem to be identified, eradicated, 
alleviated, or in some other way resolved; language-as-right (Stage 5) which confronts the 
assimilationist tendencies of dominant language communities with arguments about the legal, 
moral and natural right to local identity, and language-as-resource (Stage 6) where language, and 
the communities which speak them, are viewed as a social resource. 
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13. Jim Cummins asserts for example, that `widespread school failure does not occur in minority 
groups that are positively oriented towards both their own and the dominant culture, that do not 
perceive themselves as inferior to the dominant group, and that are not alienated from their own 
cultural values' (1986: 22; see also Ferdman, 1990). 
14. Maureen Stone, an African-Caribbean educator, argued that multicultural education was far 
too preoccupied with affirming social and cultural idemity. This led to the stressing of affective 
goals (self expression, self fulfilment etc. ) rather than core competencies (such as reading and 
writing) and did little to change the life chances of African-Caribbean children in British society. 
In response to both the continuing educational failure and the resulting high levels of 
unemployment faced by their children, African-Caribbean parents withdrew their support from 
multicultural programmes and established supplementary schools which concentrated on 
`traditional' skills. As Maureen Stone concluded, pluralism devoid of academic rigour is no 
substitute for equality (see also Burtonwood, 1986). These criticisms have also been echoed from 
more radical perspectives. However, the solutions offered are considerably different since they 
advocate a more cogent form of multiculturalism - one that combines a pedagogy of social access 
with cultural and linguistic difference -- rather than its abdication (see May, 1994,1998c). 
15. Macias distinguishes between two broadly comparable sets of rights: the right to freedom 
from discrimination on the basis of language, and the right to use your language(s) in the activities 
of communal life (1979: 88-89). 
16. As we saw in Chapter 3, this has not proved to be the case. Indeed, the United Nations itself 
has admitted as much in recent times: The Hunian Rights Fact Sheet on Minorities (No. 18, 
March 1992: 1) states, for example: `the setting of standards which create additional rights and 
make special arrangements for persons belonging to minorities and for the minorities as groups -- 
although a stated goal of the United Nations for more than 40 years -- has made slow progress'. 
17. The UN's (1992) Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, 
Religious and Linguistic Minorities provides a similar example. Here, the promotion and 
protection of the rights of persons belonging to minorities is recognised as contributing to the 
political and social stability of the states in which they live (Preamble). In this vein, the 
Declaration goes somewhat further than Article 27 by replacing `shall not be denied' with the 
more positive `have the right to' and by adding that these rights apply `in private and in public, 
freely and without any form of discrimination' (Article, 2.1). However, the actual article which 
deals with minority language education (Article 4.3) qualifies this generally positive intent 
considerably: `States should take appropriate measures so that, wherever possible, persons 
belonging to minorities have adequate opportunities to learn their mother tongue or to have 
instruction in their mother tongue' (see Skutnabb Kangas & Phillipson, 1995: 97). 
18. Churchill, in his OECD study, certainly admits as much when he observes that `public support 
seems more important than the objectives of educators or of the minority group members 
themselves' (1986: 63). 
19. The potential for outright opposition to minority rights has already been discussed to some 
extent in Chapter 3 and will be explored further in the ensuing case study of Wales. However, 
a contemporary example of such opposition which may bear brief comment here is the racist 
rhetoric directed principally against Aboriginal peoples (Koori) and Asian immigrants that has 
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emerged in recent years in Australia (see The Guardian: June 18,1997; G2, p. 4). Fronted by 
Pauline Hanson, who was elected in 1996 as MP for Oxley in rural Queensland (she is described 
as the Oxley-moron by her opponents), this view has gained considerable public support in 
Australia. Despite being deselected from the Liberal (conservative) party for her outspoken views 
prior to the election, she gained selection as an independent candidate and has since started her 
own `One Nation' party. Much of her rhetoric is predicated on the `equal treatment for all' 
principle and the related idea that Koori, (Asian) immigrants, and other minorities receive special 
treatment and benefits that are not available to `ordinary' Australians. This forms the basis of her 
excoriating attack on these minority groups, while completely ignoring, for example, that the life 
expectancy and chronic health problems of Koori compare unfavourably with many developing 
countries; a consequence, moreover, that can be traced directly to their long-standing colonial 
exploitation. The result has been to put in jeopardy the recent gains made by the Mabo Decision 
in 1992 concerning Aboriginal Land Title (see Chapter 3). Likewise, Asian migration and wider 
links with Asia have been detrimentally affected. The thin veneer of racism that underlies much 
of her position has also been weakly repudiated by the current conservative government and 
brings into serious question the policy of multiculturalism and multilingualism fostered in Australia 
over the last two decades (see Lo Bianco, 1987; Ozolins, 1993; Herriman, 1996; Kalantzis & 
Cope, 1998; Clyne, 1998). 
20. `Official English movement' is the preferred designation adopted by its proponents in the 
USA. However, opponents use the phrase `English Only movement' in order to highlight the 
exclusionary linguistic (and political and social) motives behind the movement. These motives 
will be highlighted in what follows. 
21. A far more recent, although perhaps apocryphal example of this kind of historically 
inadequate thinking is the story told of the US congressman who argued on a talkback show that 
`if English was good enough for Jesus, it's good enough for me'. 
22. In the English Only debates in the USA, the term `immigrant' is consistently used to describe 
(all) minority ethnic groups. This is problematic on two counts: 1) it elides ethnic and national 
minority groups; 2) the nomenclature employed ties in with a broader anti-immigrationist stance. 
I will explore both of these dimensions more fully below. Meanwhile, despite significant 
reservations about the term -- I prefer `new minorities', or `urban ethnic minorities' (see Chapter 
2) -- I use it in the 
following discussion in keeping with the debates. 
23. In 1983, US English reported having 300 members, in 1984,35,000 (Marshall, 1986). By 
1994, its numbers had grown to some 400,000 members (Edwards, 1994). Over the course of 
this time, the organisation has also attracted to its ranks many well know public figures. 
24. These statutes and amendments vary considerably from state to state. However, all are 
concerned to declare English as the official language of the state and most are concerned with 
ensuring that English is the only language of government activity (see Adams & Brink, 1990). 
25. The exigencies of the slave trade meant that Africans from widely different geographical 
areas, ethnic affiliations, and language groups were transported to the USA. Upon arrival, 
slaveholders deliberately and actively separated any Africans from the same tribal or family groups 
in order to destroy any remaining potential for communication and thus reduce the possibility of 
insurrection (Thompson, 1987). 
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26. The Spanish were the first of the colonial powers to establish a permanent presence in North 
America, discovering Florida in 1513 (see Conklin & Lourie, 1983). 
27. As a federal commissioner of Indian Affairs, J. D. C. Atkins, observed in his annual report 
for 1887: `schools should be established, which [Native American] children should be required 
to attend, [and where] their barbarous dialects should be blotted out and the English language 
substituted' (reprinted in Crawford, 1992b: 48; my emphases). Note here, the deliberate 
relegation of Native American language varieties to mere `dialects' in contradistinction to the 
English `language', along with all this implies about language hierarchy (sec the discussion on 
language and dialects in Chapter 4). Although the Bureau of Indian Affairs formally rescinded 
this assimilationist education policy in 1934, punishment for native language use in schools 
continued through to the 1950s (Crawford, 1989). Interestingly, this assimilationist approach -- 
which, along with fostering language loss, has not served the educational needs of Native 
American students at all well -- stands in sharp contrast to a Cherokee educational initiative 
implemented prior to this policy. This self managed policy, based on first language principles, 
achieved a 90 per cent literacy rate in Cherokee as it-ell as `a higher English literacy level than the 
white populations of either Texas or Arkansas' (Crawford, 1989: 25; see also Fuchs & 
Havighurst, 1972; Szasz, 1974). 
28. It is important to point out here that like Hayakawa's more recent English Only arguments, 
Roosevelt's notion of the American crucible assumes that all Americans are willing immigrants. 
This completely ignores the subjected status of African Americans, and the various national 
minorities -- including Native Americans and Puerto Ricans -- who have been incorporated by 
conquest into the United States (see Chapter 2; see also below). 
29. There is some suggestion that Franklin's increasingly trenchant views on multilingualism were 
linked to his bitterness over a business failure in publishing. In the 1730s Franklin did not seem 
at all averse to multilingualism, teaching himself French, German, Italian, Spanish and Latin. He 
also launched the first German language newspaper in North America, the Philadelphische 
Zeitung. However, this venture failed and a `better qualified German printer' cornered the 
German book market. It was from this time that Franklin's writings about American `foreign' 
language speakers took its sharply xenophobic turn (Shell, 1993). 
30. Because New Mexico comprised predominantly `mexicanas' (a term of self-identification 
among the Spanish-speaking population) and was also poor, it had to wait some 64 years for 
statehood. Statehood was only granted after 50 previously unsuccessful petitions to Congress 
(Hernandez-Chavez, 1995). 
31. This applies predominantly to Spanish, as one might expect. However, the recognition of 
other minority language groups, including Native Americans, is also included (see Marshall, 1986: 
43). 
32. The relevant part of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: `No states shall make or enforce any 
law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens; nor shall any state deprive any 
person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny any person within its 
jurisdiction to equal protection of laws' (my emphasis). 
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33. It should be pointed out, however, that because language is not specifically mentioned in the 
14th Amendment some subsequent Supreme Court decisions have simply refused to address the 
issue of language discrimination. In Garcia v Spun Steak (1993), for example, a claim of 
discrimination on the grounds that the employer prohibited Spanish speakers from speaking 
privately in Spanish to each other while at work was unsuccessful. This was because the Court 
declined to examine the principal point raised by the Spanish-speaking workers: that is, if some 
employees have the privilege of conversing with others privately at work in their primary 
language, they should not be denied the same privilege (see de Varennes, 1996a: 116). 
34. The judgement states: `No specific remedy is urged upon us. Teaching English to the 
students of Chinese ancestry who do not speak the language is one choice. Giving instructions 
to this group in Chinese is another. There may be others. Petitioners ask only that the Board of 
Education be directed to apply its expertise to the problem and rectify the situation' (cited in 
Crawford, 1989: 36). 
35. Comparisons can be drawn here with the use of `intelligence tests' to screen immigrants to 
the USA in the early part of this century. These supposedly `objective' measures of intelligence 
took no account of the disadvantages faced by those who had to answer the tests in a language 
unfamiliar to them (see Gould, 1981). 
36. It is important to note here that the English-only programmes used for comparison in the 
Ramirez study were not typical to the extent that while the teachers taught in English, they 
nonetheless understood Spanish. This suggests that in the far more common situation where the 
teacher does not understand the students' first language, the trends described here are likely to 
be further accentuated. 
37. See Jaimes & Churchill (1988) for an extended discussion of these links. 
38. Spanish speakers currently number 17 million in the USA and US census forecasts suggest 
that by the year 2005 Hispanic Americans will surpass Black Americans as the largest minority. 
It is further suggested that by the year 2050 Hispanic communities will have increased from 10.7 
per cent of the total population to 25 per cent, outnumbering the combined total of African 
Americans, Asian Americans and Native Americans. This will coincide with a concomitant 
decline in the number of white Americans (The Guardian: 31 March, 1997) It is this population 
growth which is the real concern of many English Only advocates. 
39. Among a range of questions raised in relation to these concerns were: `Perhaps this is the first 
instance in which those with their pants up are going to get caught with their pants down'. `Will 
the present [white] majority peaceably hand over its political power to a group that is simply more 
fertile? T 'As whites see their power and control over their lives declining, will they simply go 
quietly into the night? Or will there be an explosion? ' (cited in Crawford, 1992c: 173). 
40. The argument that English Only may appeal to racist beliefs is supported by a study by Huddy 
& Sears (1990). The authors examined the attitudes of white Americans towards bilingual 
education and found that opposition was strongest among those who looked down on minority 
groups, particularly immigrants, and who opposed any federal support for them. In addition, 
these attitudes were most strongly represented in areas with a high Hispanic population (see also 
MacKaye, 1990). 
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41. Like Belgium (see n. 9) and Quebec (see below), the conflict in Sri Lanka between the 
Sinhalese majority (comprising 75 per cent of the population) and the Lankan Tamils (who 
comprise 12.5 per cent of the remaining Tamil-speaking population) was precipitated by, but not 
limited to the language question. In 1956, eight years after independence, Sinhala was made the 
sole official language, replacing English. This language law created much discontent among Tamil 
speakers who, with limited access to land, had previously looked to the civil service for 
employment. With the implementation of the official language law, this option was increasingly 
foreclosed to them also. Moreover, the language measure was the first of many that restricted 
the rights and opportunities of Tamil speakers. The subsequent Tamil independence movement, 
which emerged formally in 1973, thus draws its grievances from this wider background of the 
apparent denial of minority Tamil aspirations by the majority Sinhalese (see Fishman & Solano, 
1989). 
42. French now features as both a functional and legitimate language in commerce and industry 
(C. Williams, 1994) while there is a pattern of increasing enrolment in French language schools, 
even by those eligible for English language education (Coulombe, 1995). 
43. However, for an erudite defence of these language policies, see Coulombe (1995). 
44. This position is exemplified by `English Plus', a movement set up to counter the English Only 
vanguard. English Plus is equally concerned with fostering the acquisition of English, and wider 
social mobility, among minority language speakers. However, it does so by promoting the clear 




A DISUNITED KINGDOM? THE WELSH IN BRITAIN 
The Welsh, as a people, were born disinherited. 
(G. A. Williams, 1985: 45) 
On September 18,1997 the Welsh electorate voted in a national referendum in favour of a 
devolved Welsh Assembly. The result constitutes an unprecedented development in the history 
of Wales. For the first time since the (1536) Act of Union, Wales -- or Cymru, to give it its 
Welsh name -- will have a formalised degree of self government, however limited, within the 
British state. Or, as a pro-devolution campaigner observed of the result at the time, `for the first 
time ever we've had a Welsh decision to stick up for ourselves' (77re Guardian, 20 September, 
1997: 8). 
But only just, since the vote for devolution was achieved by the narrowest of margins. Of the 
51.3 per cent of the electorate who actually voted' -- 559,419 voted for a Welsh Assembly and 
552,698 against (50.3 per cent to 49.7 per cent), a majority of less than 6,000. Indeed, the 
contest was so close that it came to hinge on the result from the last of the 22 Welsh counties2 to 
declare, Carmarthenshire. This predominantly Welsh-speaking area in west Wales voted in favour 
in sufficient numbers to allow the `yes campaign' which, until that time had been trailing, to win 
through at the last. Even so, the final `yes vote' comprised only 25.2 per cent of the total 
electorate in Wales -- a point that opponents were subsequently to point out repeatedly -- 
although the referendum had always rested on the premise of a simple majority. Moreover, clear 
regional differences were evident between the more anglicised east and north-east of Wales 
bordering England, whose counties voted no, and the more Welsh-speaking west and north-west 
of Wales who, allied with the Labour heartlands in the southern Welsh valleys, voted yes (see 
Appendix a). Monmouthshire, on the south-eastern border of England, for example, voted 68 per 
cent to 32 per cent against an Assembly, in stark contrast to Carmarthenshire and Gwynedd to 
the west, which voted 65 per cent and 64 per cent, respectively, for an Assembly (Fin ancial 
Tieres, 21 September, 1997: 8). As many media commentators observed at the time, Wales 
seemed a nation divided. 
The degree of surprise surrounding the closeness of the Welsh vote, voiced by these same 
commentators, was at one level understandable. After all, the referendum had been instigated by 
the newly elected Labour government in Britain as part of a wider package of constitutional 
reform, devolving power to the constituent nations and regions of Britain. The constitutional 
reform programme had been widely trailed and had formed a central feature of the Labour party's 
election policy in May of that year. In that election, Labour had won an unprecedented 179 seat 
majority over their main rivals, the British Conservative Party, decisively ending the latter's 
eighteen previous uninterrupted years in power. Such was the scale of Labour's victory that in 
Wales -- admittedly, a traditional Labour stronghold anyway -- the Tories had lost all their 
parliamentary seats. This, in itself, should have augured well for a comfortable endorsement of 
devolution in Wales for what, after all, was a central Labour policy. And if this was somehow not 
enough, as many pro-devolutionists indeed feared (see below), the example of Scotland should 
also have acted as a strong precedent. Just the week before, ' the Scottish electorate in a parallel 
referendum for a fully fledged Scottish Parliament, had delivered a decisive vote in favour of 
devolution at 74.3 per cent to 25.7 per cent. ` Given that 60.1 per cent of the Scottish electorate 
voted in the referendum this also constituted an endorsement by 45 per cent of the total 
electorate. 
And yet at another level, the closeness of the vote, or the fact that Welsh devolution succeeded 
at all, was not so surprising. Objections were consistently raised in the campaign, for example, 
about the inadequacies of the Welsh devolution package itself. In contrast to Scotland's 129 seat 
Parliament -- with its ability to enact primary legislation and vary taxes -- the Welsh were only to 
have a 60 seat Assembly, with all that the difference in nomenclature implies. The Welsh 
Assembly, to be elected in May 1999, will assume responsibility for the administrative powers 
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currently exercised by the Welsh Secretary of the British government in Westminster, London -- 
a not insignificant development since it involves direct control of an annual budget presently 
estimated at £7 billion. However, it will also have no legislative and tax varying powers beyond 
the enactment of secondary legislation. `Welsh devolution is essentially the Home Rule sideshow' 
as Roy Hattersley accurately observed in a national newspaper at the time (Me Observer, 24 
August, 1997, p. 18). This clear disparity between the Scottish and Welsh devolution proposals 
led to the criticism, effectively employed by the anti-devolution campaign in Wales, that the Welsh 
Assembly would be a `mere talking shop', and thus an expensive and unnecessary economic and 
administrative burden. This charge could never have been made successfully against the proposed 
Scottish Parliament. 
The disparity between the Scottish and Welsh devolution proposals also points to another, more 
crucial reason for the close result of the 1997 Devolution Referendum in Wales. Historically, 
there has always been a much greater ambivalence in Wales towards self government than in 
Scotland -- ironically, most notably in the Labour Party itself, the dominant political party in 
Wales since early this century. Indeed, this is graphically illustrated by the result of the only other 
instance of a Devolution Referendum -- in 1979, under the previous Labour government. At that 
time, the Welsh electorate convincingly rejected devolution, by over four to one, voting 956,000 
to 243,000 (46.5 per cent to 11.8 per cent) against an elected Welsh Assembly. Even Gwynedd, 
the most Welsh-speaking county, voted two to one against. Moreover, the most notable feature 
of the campaign was the vociferous opposition to devolution, led by Neil Kinnock, mounted from 
within the Welsh Labour party. Like Aneurin Bevan before him, Kinnock argued passionately 
that the best interests of Wales lay in British (as opposed to Welsh) socialism. In contrast, the 
parallel Scottish Referendum saw a narrow vote in favour (52 per cent) although at only 33 per 
cent of the total electorate this still fell short of the 40 per cent threshold required for change at 
the time. 
I will return in more detail to the 1979 referendum in due course. Suffice it to say, that the 
greater ambivalence towards devolution per se in Wales was also clearly reflected in the 1997 
referendum. Again, some Welsh Labour MPs publicly opposed devolution, although not to the 
same extent as in 1979. Moreover, in the campaign, and in the government's white paper itself, 
A Voice for Males (Stationery Office, 1997a), almost no mention was made of Welsh national 
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identity as a basis for supporting devolution. Instead, the stress was placed on the economic and 
administrative benefits of devolution and its proposed effect in redressing `the democratic deficit' 
in Wales -- the latter a legacy of the raft of unelected, Tory dominated `quangos'' which had been 
established during the long tenure of the previous Conservative government (Adonis, 1997; 
Freedland, 1997; A. Thomas, 1997). Scotland's Parliament (Stationery Office, 1997b), the 
equivalent white paper for Scotland, was markedly different in this respect. As with the Scottish 
referendum campaign more broadly, the case for devolution was underpinned at all times by the 
question of Scottish national identity -- framed principally in relation to Scotland's claim to 
historical nationhood -- and the political rights attendant on it (Tlre Times Higher, 12 September, 
1997: 7). Concomitantly, the charge that devolution would lead inexorably to the `breakup of 
Britain' had little purchase in the Scottish campaign, in contrast to Wales where this fear was 
more effectively mobilised by anti-devolutionists. 
What lies behind these clear differences between Wales and Scotland -- with respect both to 
enthusiasm for devolution itself, and to the status and powers ascribed to their respective 
legislative bodies? To answer these questions we need to examine the historical antecedents 
which have shaped the Welsh political and cultural context and its relationship to the British state. 
Two key features stand out here. The first is the long history of Wales' institutional incorporation 
within Britain. The second is the vexed and at times vexatious question of Welsh national identity 
itself and, in particular, the role of the Welsh language within it. It is these two issues, and their 
complex interconnections, which constitute the principal focus of this chapter. 
English/British identity 
Before proceeding further, however, some caveats are in order. As we saw in Chapter 2, one 
problem which often occurs in any discussion of British history is the conflation of the notions of 
British and English identities. British identity is really a state identity since Britain is actually a 
multi, iational state comprising England, Scotland and Wales. ' In effect, `British' describes the 
legal institutional framework, and the specific political allegiances, that bind together the 
constituent nations of the British state, along with the autochthonous and immigrant peoples living 
within them (Miller, 1995). However, the concept of Britishness has often come to be equated 
with, and represented by an English national identity, the latter usually culturally defined -- or, 
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rather, a particular class-based notion of English national identity, reflecting the social and 
cultural mores of the English elite (R. Williams, 1985). This process of elision has its origins in 
the historical dominance of England -- particularly London and south-cast England -- in the 
construction of the British state, and the related position of the English ruling class as a dominant 
ethnie. Consequently, much of British history has tended to concern itself with the expansion of 
the English state and its assumption of power over the other peoples of the British Isles (Davies, 
1989). Relatedly, British identity has often been constructed in such a way as to exclude or 
devalue Welsh, Scottish or Irish national identities, as well as those ethnic minorities which do not 
`fit' the culturally prescribed form of Englishness (Crick, 1991,1995; Miller, 1995; Miles, 1996). 
In the process, English national identity becomes a form of banal nationalism (Billig, 1995); a 
nationalism which recognises all others but its own. The Welsh nationalist and poet, R. S. 
Thomas, observes rather acidly to this end: `Although they deny it, [the English] are among the 
most nationalistic people in the world. But I imagine it is largely unconscious. That is their 
strength' (1992: 31-32). Having a national identity does not necessarily imply having a sense of 
national identity (Mason, 1995), particularly for members of the dominant ethnie (see Chapter 2). 
British `national' history 
The tendency to assume the homogeneity of Britain, as represented by England and the English, 
can be taken a step further. Not only does British identity comprise a range of national identities, 
these latter identities are themselves cross-cut by extensive internal variations. In this respect, 
there has been a prominent tendency in recent British history, as elsewhere, to superimpose 
nineteenth century conceptions of nationhood retrospectively on the constituent areas of England, 
Scotland, and Wales. As Hugh Kearney observes of this in his excellent historical account of the 
British Isles: 
For much of the twentieth century, indeed, within the British Isles, history has been taught 
and written along national lines, and hence tied, often unconsciously, to national 
ideologies and nation-building.... The concept of `nation' provided modern historians with 
a convenient framework around which to organise their materials but a price had to be 
paid. What became later national boundaries were extended backwards into a past where 
they had little or no relevance, with the consequence that earlier tribal or pre-national 
societies were lost to sight. (1989: 3,4) 
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Kearney proceeds to argue that the respective `national' histories of England, Scotland, and 
Wales' are thus best understood in terms of 'cultures' and `sub cultures'. On this basis, `what 
seem to be "national" units dissolve into a number of distinctive cultures with their own 
perceptions of the past, of social status ... of religion and of many other aspects of 
life' (1989: 10). 
Linda Colley (1992), in the other outstanding account of British history in recent times, makes 
exactly the same point. As she observes, Welshness, Scottishness, and Englishness remain 
powerful divides within Britain but regionalisms and localisms have also exerted considerable 
influence over time. Indeed, the notion of `Britain' itself only arose, somewhat uneasily, out of 
the (1707) Act of Union between Scotland and the by then already incorporated `England and 
Wales' (see below). As such, she argues, it was inevitably superimposed on much older 
allegiances. I will proceed to explore in particular relation to Wales what some of these, at times, 
countervailing allegiances comprised. Suffice it to say at this point that these arguments bear 
close similarity to the discussions on the ethnic origins of nationalism, outlined in Chapter 2. In 
effect, the formation of modern nations and nation-states rests on the prior appropriation and 
incorporation of pre-modern ethnic identities, or ethnies (R. Jenkins, 1995; Smith, 1995a). 
Britain, and the nations which comprise it, are no exception to this process. 
English imperialism 
The unproblematic assertion of `national' identity in Britain may thus have been brought into 
question by recent revisionist historians. What is not in dispute, however, is the dominance of 
England within the British state -- more specifically, the south-east of England. Britain may well 
be a multinational state but historically the metropolitan centre in and around London was 
immensely powerful and it had a limited territory to overwhelm (Evans, 1989a). This is well 
illustrated by the four major regions which could lay claim historically to a separate cultural 
identity from the metropolitan core: Cornwall, Wales, the north of England and Scotland. Of 
these, Scotland is distinguished from the other three by its relatively late incorporation into the 
British state and by the related fact that it already had by then a well-established capitalist class 
and a separate institutional framework (Nairn, 1981; McCrone, 1992). Consequently, this meant 
that Scottish culture did not have to carry the primary burden of maintaining a separate Scottish 
(national) identity (Davies, 1989; Osmond, 1989). 
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The other three regions, however, were incorporated within the British state much earlier -- their 
subjugation largely completed by the end of the sixteenth century (Bulpitt, 1983; Bartlett, 1993). 
Wales, the only one of these latter regions to subsequently attain nationhood, had been brought 
to heel in the late thirteenth century by the Norman king, Edward 1 (1239-1307). In 1282, 
Edward mounted a successful campaign against the still independent Welsh kingdoms of 
Gwynedd and Deheubarth which saw the death in battle of the last Welsh prince, Llywelyn ap 
Gruffydd. The defeat of these Welsh kingdoms by Edward was to accelerate a process of 
colonisation which had begun in south Wales as early as the eleventh century. ` The influx of 
English settlers which had accompanied it had led to the occupation of most of the best land in 
Wales by the Normans and their tenants; the distinction being formalised by the terms `Englishry' 
(good land) and `Welshry' (poorer land). As Kearney observes, by the end of the fourteenth 
century, `colonial society was delineated more clearly in Wales than anywhere else in the British 
Isles' (1989: 93). The only time that this inexorable process of colonisation was to be interrupted 
came through the brief uprising in 1400 of Owain Glyndwr. His revolt was to be eventually 
defeated in 1408, although not before the first -- and, until 1997, the only -- Welsh `parliament' 
had been established, at Machynlleth. The colonising of Wales was officially confirmed by its 
incorporation within Britain during the reign of the Tudor king, Henry VIII (1491-1547), via the 
(1536) Act of Union. Wales was not to be regarded again as a distinct region, let alone a nation, 
until the nineteenth century. 
However, the ongoing process of colonisation -- or nationalisation -- to which Wales and the 
other peripheral regions of Great Britain were subject was not a uniform one. On the one hand, 
there was clearly a strong emphasis on political incorporation and an allied process of cultural 
homogenisation; the latter, as I have already discussed, based on a metropolitan conception of 
Englishness. Thus, in Wales, only a few distinct Welsh institutions survived the Act of Union -- 
the most prominent being the Courts of Great Sessions, eventually abolished, amid much local 
protest, in 1830. Likewise, the ruling elite within Wales, the landed gentry, increasingly adopted 
the language and customs of their English counterparts, in contrast to the vast majority of the 
peasant population who remained Welsh-speaking (Morgan, 1995). In this sense, the historical 
development of `Britain' -- and the peripheries within it -- conforms to the central tenets of 
modern nationalist theory in its construction of the culturally homogenous nation-state. 
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On the other hand, much of this nationalisation remained uneven and incomplete, thus allowing 
the retention of separate `national' and/or regional identities and cultural forms beyond the centre. 
As Robert Miles argues, specifically in relation to Scotland and Wales: `Because nationalisation 
has failed to eliminate distinct national identities and cultural forms, and has been unable to 
construct a rational, unified political structure, things are often different in the peripheries of 
[Britain], although rarely absolutely different' (1996: 236). In short, the process of political 
incorporation in Britain, while centralising power in London and England, has also granted 
varying degrees of political autonomy and cultural distinctiveness to the `nations' so incorporated 
(see also Kellas, 1991; McCrone, 1992). The Welsh language -- still spoken by a majority in 
Wales until the early part of this century -- provides a clear example of the latter here. Its 
remarkable resilience -- having survived against considerable odds and in the face of consistent 
negative attribution -- will be explored more fully below. 
Internal colonialism 
Meanwhile, staying with the notions of core and periphery for a moment, it is worth returning to 
Hechter's (1975) model of `internal colonialism', first introduced in Chapter 2. Hechter's central 
argument was that British capitalist development, allied principally to the industrial revolution of 
the nineteenth century, produced a set of `internal colonies' in Scotland, Wales and Ireland -- the 
so called `Celtic fringe' -- in much the same way that it had created external colonisation 
elsewhere. The economic exploitation of these internal colonies resulted in economic dependency 
on the core, lower levels of prosperity, and a stratified `cultural division of labour' where ethnic 
differences were superimposed on class lines. By this, Hechter sought to explain the rise of 
nationalist movements in the Celtic fringe in the nineteenth century, arguing that the mobilisation 
of such movements occurred because of economic inequalities that were also expressed at the 
cultural level. As a result, the economic disadvantages faced by the periphery were attributed to 
its cultural distinctiveness; an attribution, moreover, that was made both from outside, and within 
the periphery itself While many within the periphery thus shed their cultural distinctiveness in the 
pursuit of social mobility, others -- usually the intellectual elite -- attempted to revalue the culture 
and language by using it as a basis for nationalist expression. 
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This model provides us with a useful addendum to the previous discussion of colonialism within 
Britain. However, its inadequacies have also been well documented. Theoretically, it has been 
criticised for its inability to account for wide internal variations within the periphery (C. Williams, 
1982) and, more seriously perhaps, for those ethnonational movements which have arisen in areas 
of relative economic prosperity (see Chapter 1). Historically, the notion of internal colonialism 
in the Celtic fringe of Britain has also been contested. Applied to Wales, for example, the notion 
of an internal colony simply does not fit well, at least in relation to nineteenth century 
industrialisation. As I discussed briefly in Chapter 2, the centrality of Wales -- specifically, south 
Wales -- to the industrial revolution in Britain militates against a simplistic notion of economic 
exploitation. Wales was no mere economic satellite of an imperial core based in London. Quite 
the reverse, in fact. From 1840 to 1926 it constituted the industrial heartland of the British export 
economy, first through iron and then through coal. As a result, it was the only area in Britain that 
experienced significant in-migration in the late nineteenth century. Concomitantly, it was least 
affected by the rural economic crisis of the 1880s which resulted in mass emigration from 
elsewhere in Britain to countries like the USA (G. A. Williams, 1982,1985). 9 
The rise of nationalism in Wales in the nineteenth century cannot thus be explained in solely 
economic terms. As Nairn succinctly concludes, Hechter's analysis may be effective ideology 
but it rests on rather poor history' (1981: 201-202). In this regard, the theory of internal 
colonialism can also be criticised for its tendency towards historical teleology. In similar vein to 
the critique of Gellner's theory of nationalism (see Chapter 2), its preoccupation with the 
industrial revolution considerably understates the longer historical patterns of economic and social 
inequality that have existed in Britain (cf the `Englishries' and `Welshries'). 
The forgotten nation 
With this background in mind, I want now to examine the Welsh context in more specific detail. 
Of all the United Kingdom's constituent members (which, along with the nations of Britain, 
includes Northern Ireland), Wales is the one most often overlooked. The difficulties in Northern 
Ireland have dominated the British political landscape in this century, as did previously the 
concerns of Ireland as a whole. The vexed question of `Irish Home Rule', for example, 
preoccupied much of nineteenth century Westminster politics and was only finally resolved with 
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the secession of the Irish Free State (now the Irish Republic) in 1922. Scotland, as we have seen, 
enjoyed a far greater degree of institutional autonomy, and therefore maintained a considerably 
higher profile within both British politics and the corpus of British history itself. And England, 
of course, has been the dominant partner -- or simply, dominant -- for much of the modern history 
of the British state. 
Which leaves Wales; unremarked and, to many, unremarkable. 10 As Kenneth Morgan, the noted 
Welsh historian, poignantly observes in an essay written in 1971 on the origins of Welsh 
nationalism: 
`For Wales -- see England'. This notorious directive in the early editions of the 
Encyclopaedia Britannica crystallises all the emotion, the humiliation, and the patronising 
indifference which helped to launch the national movement in Wales. (1995: 197) 
That these attitudes still remain today is clearly illustrated by the controversial English literary 
critic and columnist, A. N. Wilson. Writing in the London daily paper 771e Evening Standard in 
1994, he comments disparagingly on the cultural contribution of the Welsh (or lack thereof) to 
British life: 
The Welsh have never made any significant contribution to any branch of knowledge, 
culture or entertainment. Choral singing -- usually flat -- seems to be their only artistic 
achievement. They have no architecture, no gastronomic tradition and, since the Middle 
Ages, no literature worthy of the name. Even their religion, Calvinistic Methodism, is 
boring. (cited in Moss, 1994: 26) 
The misplaced attempt at humour aside, Wilson's comments are simply wrong. The one thing, 
above all else, that has distinguished the Welsh from their other British partners has been their 
cultural distinctiveness; most significantly, their language (see below). The fault lies not so much 
with a lack of Welsh cultural expression, as Wilson suggests, but with the failure historically to 
recognise and accord value to it. I will deal with the notion of cultural value in due course. 
Meanwhile, a key reason for the failure to recognise the contribution of Wales, and Welsh culture, 
to wider British life resides in its long history of political incorporation within the British state. 
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The institutional incorporation of Wa1cs 
The degree of Welsh political incorporation into the British state is clearly illustrated by the 
administrative term `England and Wales' which is employed to describe a wide range of shared 
institutions and programmes. It is also exemplified by the fact that Wales was the last of all the 
nations constituting the United Kingdom to be recognised as such. Until the mid-nineteenth 
century, the UK was regarded for formal purposes as comprising only three nations -- England, 
Scotland and Ireland. There simply was no `Welsh question' in British politics comparable to the 
question of Irish Home Rule, for example. Indeed, the reiterated litany of Westminster politicians 
was that `there was no such place as Wales' (Morgan, 1995). " As a long regarded `non-historic 
nation', Wales was simply not seen as having a necessary, sufficient or legitimate claim to 
independent statehood. To this end, Frederic Engels -" whose views on non-historic nations we 
have already encountered in Chapter 1 -- avers: 
The Highland Gaels and the Welsh are undoubtedly of different nationalities to what the 
English are, although nobody will give to these remnants of people long gone the title of 
nations [nation-states].... [To do so would mean] the Welsh and Manxmen, if they desired 
it, would have an equal right to independent political existence, absurd though it be, with 
the English! The whole thing is absurdity. ([1866]; cited in Fishman, 1989e: 14). 
Setting aside the clearly pejorative tone of Engels' assertions, there is some basis for this view. 
After all, as I have already discussed, Wales was brought increasingly into the ambit of English 
rule from the time of Edward 1. The subsequent colonisation of Wales in the fourteenth and 
fifteenth centuries, via the Englishries and Welshries, led to the area's increasing anglicisation, at 
least in an economic sense. South and east Wales, in particular, were drawn into a close 
relationship with the English economy - trading with Bristol and Devon, and supplying wool and 
cattle for English markets (Kearney, 1989). Relatedly, while much of Wales continued to speak 
Welsh -a language spoken since the sixth century and for which written records exist from the 
eighth century12 -- Welsh/English bilingualism became an increasing feature in these areas (P. 
Jenkins, 1992). These developments were the prelude to the area's formal incorporation within 
the British state in the sixteenth century. The (1536) Act of Union, and the related act of 1542, 
firmly situated Wales within the political, legal and administrative jurisdiction of the British Crown 
and Parliament. 13 
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As a result of these acts, the Norman empire in Wales, which had been in existence since the late 
eleventh century, was brought to an end. The Marcher Lordships, which had been established by 
the Normans to act as a geographical buffer between England and the interior of Wales, and 
which had developed a considerable degree of power and autonomy, were subsumed within the 
English shire system. The Welsh legal code -- which dated back to its founder, I lywel Dda, in the 
tenth century -- was abolished and replaced by English common law. The Welsh language was 
proscribed from the courts, and from all official domains, in favour of English. And finally, 
virtually all separate Welsh institutions were eliminated -- the only exceptions being a Council for 
Wales which survived until 1689 and the Court of Sessions, mentioned previously, which was 
eventually abolished in 1830. '+ 
The instructions of the Act of Union directly affected only a small number of Welsh elite -- those 
who held or sought property or position. However, with the dismantling of any separate 
institutional focus, the establishment of a political norm soon became a powerful social norm as 
well (Butt Philip, 1975). As we saw Iris Young observe in Chapter 3, if particular groups `have 
greater economic, political or social power, their group related experiences, points of view, or 
cultural assumptions will tend to become the norm, biasing the standards or procedures of 
achievement and inclusion that govern social, political and economic institutions' (1993: 133). 
This describes well the English/Welsh relationship. In effect, the Welsh elite became assimilated 
into the English class and political system -- eventually adopting both the latter's mores and 
language (C. Williams, 1982). Concomitantly, Welsh language and culture -- still strongly evident 
among the peasantry (Y Werin) -- were deemed of little value, both by the Welsh elite themselves 
and by the English political system to which they were increasingly beholden. As Morgan 
concludes: `Wales continued to be regarded as a remote tribal backwater, economically backward, 
adhering obstinately to its antique language in the face of the "march of intellect"' (1995: 198). 
It was not until the rise of religious Nonconformity's in the early half of the nineteenth century, 
and the industrialisation of Wales in the latter half, that this state of affairs was to change 
significantly. These two developments provided the basis for a new Welsh national (and 
nationalist) movement -- a movement whose characteristics I will explore more fully below. For 
the purposes of this present discussion, it is enough to point out that an important consequence 
of the rise of nineteenth century nationalism in Wales was the re-establishment of separate Welsh 
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institutions and legislative measures. These were primarily cultural, religious and educational -- 
reflecting the particular emphases of the nationalist movement of the time. Nonetheless, they 
proved to be something of a watershed, providing a nascent institutional framework from which 
an alternative interpretation of Welsh history eventually emerged (Davies, 1989). Legislation 
specific to Wales along these lines included the (1881) Welsh Sunday Closing Act, the (1888) 
Local Government Act and the (1889) Welsh Intermediate Education Act. 16 More 
significantly perhaps, a range of national institutions were created over this period, including: the 
University of Wales (1883), the Board of Education, a national library and a national museum (all 
1907), and a Department of Agriculture (1912). 
Despite these advances, the basic political and social organisation of Wales remained largely 
indistinguishable from England's. For example, it was not until 1956 that a Welsh capital 
(Cardiff) was officially designated. Indeed, it was only after the Second World War that a 
specifically Welsh institutional framework was to emerge. As Charlotte Aull Davies (1989) 
argues, this development was tied principally to the expansion of the British welfare system which 
saw many government departments reorganised on a regional basis. In most cases, 'Vales came 
to be treated as a single administrative unit, resulting in the steady growth of Welsh bureaucracy 
and, for the first time, a coordinated degree of economic planning in Wales. Easily the most 
prominent of the newly emergent organisations was the Welsh Office, established in 1964 and 
headed by a Welsh Secretary of State. As long ago as the unsuccessful (1892) National 
Institutions (Wales) Bill, Welsh nationalists had campaigned for a Welsh Secretary with 
comparable powers to that of the Scottish Office, established in 1886. Questions were again 
asked by individual MPs at Westminster in 1928 and 1930 about the possibility of a Secretary of 
State for Wales but these generated little enthusiasm (Butt Philip, 1975). It was not until the 
1950s, that this idea was given serious consideration by the London-based political elite. While 
the then Conservative government turned down a recommendation in 1957 from the advisory 
Council for Wales for a Welsh Office, Harold Wilson's Labour government was finally to accede 
to such a request in 1964. Even here though, the Labour government initially envisaged the role 
of the Welsh Office as a largely symbolic one since its own political interests continued to be 
resolutely British and centralist (G. A. Williams, 1985). As Davies summarises it: 
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... the Labour government 
initially stressed that the position was created primarily out of 
respect for Welsh national sentiment and as a recognition of Welsh nationhood. This 
reflected Labour's intention to limit the office to a symbolic role, confining the secretary's 
powers to general oversight of government policies in Wales. However, once established, 
the office gradually began to aggrandise power. (1989: 87) 
The gradual enlargement of the Welsh Office's administrative responsibilities led, in turn, to the 
introduction of a range of legislative measures specific to Wales and, in particular, the Welsh 
language (Williams & Raybould, 1991). Building on the precedent of the (1942) Welsh Courts 
Act which had finally revoked the language provisions of the Act of Union, these included: the 
(1967) Welsh Language Act, offering `equal validity' for English and Welsh in Wales; the (1988) 
Education Reform Act which incorporated a specifically Welsh (and Welsh language) dimension 
into the newly established National Curriculum of England and Wales; and the (1993) Welsh 
Language Act which extended the 1967 Act considerably in its support for Welsh in the public 
domain. Thus, after centuries of proscription and neglect, the institutional infrastructure 
administered by the Welsh Office came to be increasingly identified with the re-emergence of the 
Welsh language into the public or civic realm (see Chapter 7). 
It must be said though that these developments were also to some extent the result of the strong 
political pressure exerted by the Welsh language movement in the 1960s and 1970s. This 
movement coalesced around Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Society) which 
had been established in the wake of Saunders Lewis' famous BBC Wales radio broadcast in 1962. 
In this broadcast -- entitled `Tynged yr laith' (The Fate of the Language) -- Lewis had outlined 
the parlous state of the Welsh language and the need to defend it from encroaching anglicisation. 
The subsequent advocacy of the Welsh language by Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg -- often through 
direct action -- contributed to the establishment of Welsh-medium language schools, Welsh 
language media (notably, the Welsh language television channel, Sianel Pedwar Cymru [S4C]), 
the Welsh Language Board, and to an increasing demand for public services available in Welsh. 
The initial reaction to the direct action campaigns of the language movement was widely negative, 
and the electoral support for Welsh nationalism with which it was closely associated remained 
minimal (see below). Nonetheless, the pressure exerted was also ironically a significant influence 
in forging a new institutional identity based, to some extent at least, on the Welsh language. 
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Welsh nationalism 
I will return in more detail to the nascent institutionalisation of the Welsh language in the 
following chapter. Here, I want to concentrate on the principal features of Welsh nationalism and 
its complex, and at times contradictory relationship to Welsh language and identity. Much of this 
complexity resides in the relationship of Welsh nationalism to the long political incorporation of 
Wales within Britain. On the one hand, it can be argued that political incorporation has actually 
facilitated the cultural distinctiveness of the Welsh -- principally, through the maintenance of their 
language and cultural traditions. Richard Jenkins (1991) argues, for example, that Welsh 
incorporation within the British state may have actually created the social and economic space 
within which the Welsh language and culture could survive. The Welsh language may have been 
formally proscribed from the civic realm from the time of the (1536) Act of Union, and may have 
been regarded, along with its culture, as antediluvian (see below). However, it was not viewed 
as a threat to the state. In contrast, the far more problematic (and contested) political 
incorporation of Scotland and Ireland -- and, relatedly, the close association of Gaelic language 
and culture in these areas with Catholicism -- may have contributed to the more rapid and 
widespread decline of these latter features within the (Protestant) British state. 
Cultural nationalism 
On the other hand, the degree of political incorporation within the British state has both limited 
the political ambitions of Welsh nationalism and fractured its constituency -- features which, as 
the 1997 Devolution Referendum demonstrates, are still clearly evident today. As a result, Welsh 
nationalism has had little influence on British politics as a whole and only marginally more on the 
Welsh people themselves. The long political incorporation of Wales also helps to explain why 
Welsh nationalism has come to be described as a form of cultural nationalism (see Chapter 2). 
In effect, Welsh nationalism has sought its legitimacy primarily in `cultural continuity' and 
collective memory (C. Williams, 1994), notably via the promotion (and, at times, invention) of 
Welsh cultural traditions, and in the importance placed on the Welsh language. While I argued 
in Chapter 2 that these culturalist emphases need not necessarily result in a nostalgic and romantic 
form of nationalism, it appears in the Welsh context -- at least historically -- to have done so. 
This is particularly evident in the antiquarian preoccupations of eighteenth century Welsh 
237 
nationalists and in the influence of religious Nonconformity on their nineteenth and twentieth 
century successors. 
This Welsh national (and nationalist) movement began in the late eighteenth century in, of all 
places, London. It was principally London-based Welsh intellectuals who invented -- or, rather, 
re-invented -- an historic Welsh tradition at this time via their involvement in the Welsh Societies 
of Cymmrodorion and Gwyneddigion, established in 1751 and 1771 respectively. Most notable 
among this group was Edward Williams, more commonly known by his bardic name `lolo 
Morgannwg'. He was responsible in 1789 for reviving the Eisteddfodau -- cultural gatherings 
which featured poetic and musical competitions, last seen in the sixteenth century -- as an annual 
celebration of Welsh culture and tradition. He was also responsible for creating the gorscdd -- 
Order of Bards -- whose elaborate, mystical and invented druidic ceremonies were added to the 
Eisteddfodau in 1819 and continue to the present day (Mayo, 1979). 
Despite the more obvious attempts at invention, most notably associated with Iolo Morgannwg, 
this group of intellectuals did foster a distinctive scholarship of Welsh history and literature, albeit 
of a highly romanticised kind. This was, for them, the first step in constructing a sense of Welsh 
national identity (R. Williams, 1985). In so doing, they came to highlight what I discussed in 
Chapter 1 as the central features of an historical ethnie: a collective proper name, a myth of 
common ancestry, shared historical memories, one or more differentiating elements of common 
culture, an association with a specific `homeland', and a collective sense of solidarity. To this 
end, they placed great emphasis on the distinctive contribution of the Welsh to British history as 
a whole, something hitherto largely ignored. " Also central to their project of establishing a 
distinctive Welsh identity was the valorisation of a strong pastoral dimension, fostered principally 
through bardic literature that dated back to the eighth century, and encapsulated particularly by 
the Welsh-speaking rural areas of mid and north Wales. In addition, the historic influence of the 
Welsh language was emphasised as perhaps the most salient distinguishing feature between the 
Welsh and the English -- a key boundary marker (see Chapter 4). 1= To this picture was added in 
the nineteenth century the rapid rise of religious Nonconformity in Wales which came to be 
employed as a further distinguishing feature of Welsh identity. The historical antiquarians of the 
eighteenth century were thus replaced by a Nonconformist intelligentsia in the nineteenth century 
but not much else was to change (Morgan, 1995). Meanwhile, the characteristics of the rapidly 
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expanding industrial south of Wales -- both far more heavily anglicised and far more British in 
orientation - was ignored (Davies, 1989; Evans, 1989b). This is a problematic feature of Welsh 
nationalism to which we will regularly return. 
The almost exclusively culturalist emphases evident in Welsh nationalism were also the inevitable 
result of the long ascendancy of the British state in Wales. The legitimacy of the state was seldom 
questioned by Welsh nationalists; in stark contrast, for example, to those in Ireland (see R. 
Jenkins, 1991). In short, nineteenth century Welsh nationalism had no significant constitutional 
aspirations in relation to Wales (Evans, 1989b). When it came to the question of Wales' role in 
the United Kingdom, the principal object of Welsh national (and nationalist) leaders was equality 
within the UK, not severance from it (Butt Philip, 1975). As such, the ambitions of nineteenth 
century Welsh nationalists were -- as we have already seen -- largely limited to the quest for 
separate legislation, and some institutions, which represented their particular cultural, linguistic 
and religious characteristics and concerns. Principal among these was the quest for religious 
disestablishment from the state Anglican church; a formal recognition, in effect, of Welsh 
Nonconformity. These broadly culturalist aims were reinforced by the close association of Welsh 
nationalism with its primary political expression in the British Liberal Party. Most leading Welsh 
nationalists of the day were also British Liberals -- David Lloyd George, who later became British 
Prime Minister, being the most prominent. This association, which created Liberal Nonconformist 
Wales as its fiefdom, was to enjoy a political hegemony from 1880 to 1922 (E. Williams, 1989). 
Cy inru F}'dd 
The question of self government, let alone independent statehood for Wales thus received little 
attention in the nineteenth century, and generated even less enthusiasm. The only prominent 
advocacy of Welsh Home Rule (self government) during this period in fact came from the brief, 
and ultimately unsuccessful attempt to establish the nationalist party Cymru Fydd (Young Wales). 
Founded after the Irish Home Rule crisis of 1886 by Welsh exiles living in London and Liverpool, 
it was alone in arguing for a measure of Welsh separation from the British state. Cymru Fydd, 
although part of the wider Liberal political movement, promised to transform Welsh Liberalism 
into a united nationalist movement under the twin banners of `Home Rule' and `Disestablishment' 
(C. Williams, 1982). Its leader, Tom Ellis, was elected to Parliament in 1886 and Lloyd George 
first entered Parliament as a Home Ruler in 1890, before returning to mainstream Liberalism. 
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However, both the tenure and influence of Cymru Fydd were to be short lived. Effectively, the 
movement collapsed in 1895 as a result of a dispute between Lloyd George, whose power base 
was in north Wales, and the south Wales liberals, led by D. A. Thomas. The latter's principal 
concerns centred on the fear that any move to national self government would result in the 
industrial counties of south Wales being unfairly dominated by rural mid and north Wales (Davies, 
1989); a concern, as it happens, which was well founded. 
Indeed, the demise of Cymru Fydd can in fact be explained largely by its preoccupation with rural 
mid and north Wales. Like Welsh nationalism more broadly, Cymru Fydd was almost entirely 
consumed by the problems of the rural counties and seemed uninterested in the problems facing 
industrial Wales (Kearney, 1989). By this time, for example, the industrialised areas of Wales 
were already beginning to experience the economic downturn that would become a crisis after the 
First World War. The failure of Cymru Fydd to address adequately these concerns was also a 
harbinger for the wider demise of Welsh nationalism in the guise of Liberal Nonconformity. As 
the fortunes of British Liberalism went into rapid decline at the end of the nineteenth century so 
too did those of Welsh nationalism with which it had been so closely associated. Disestablishment 
may have been eventually achieved in 1920 but, by then, it had far less resonance than in the 
previous century. Meanwhile, the Welsh Labour Party -- with its constituency principally in the 
industrial south of Wales, and with its emphasis on British (as opposed to Welsh) working-class 
interests -- was already in the ascendancy. Committed specifically to an `international' socialism, 
it regarded Welsh nationalism as little more than a nostalgic, bourgeois illusion, irrelevant to the 
struggles of the working-class that by now made up so much of the Welsh population (Morgan, 
1995). 
Plaid Cymru 
An emphasis on greater self government was not to reappear in Welsh nationalism until 1925, 
with the establishment by Saunders Lewis of the Welsh Nationalist Party, Plaid Cymru (The Party 
of Wales). Even here though, the initial concerns of Plaid Cymru were again primarily cultural 
rather than political. Like its nineteenth century predecessors, the nationalism of Plaid Cymru was 
predominantly intellectual and moral in outlook, and socially conservative (Butt Philip, 1975). 
Its model was once again a Welsh-speaking Liberal Nonconformist nationalist identity; its 
principal concerns were the Welsh language, Welsh identity and Christianity in Wales; and its 
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principal constituency was still rural mid and north Wales (C. Williams, 1982; C. Williams, 1989). 
While it subsequently came to endorse and actively promote the notion of Welsh self government, 
self government was primarily conceived not as an end in itself but as a means of strengthening 
(this particular form of) Welsh identity. Indeed, it was not until 1932 that self-government in its 
own right became part of the Blaid's official platform. The original aims of Plaid Cymru in 1925 
were solely to do with the Welsh language. These included: 'keeping Wales Welsh-speaking ... 
by a) making the Welsh language the oily official language of Wales ... 
b) making the Welsh 
language a medium of education in Wales from the elementary school through to the university' 
(cited in Williams, 1982: 148; my emphasis). As Butt Philip observes of this: 'A Welsh nation- 
state is conceivable without a Welsh language but Saunders Lewis and his sympathisers were 
Nationalists because they believed the survival of the Welsh language was inconceivable without 
a Welsh nation-state' (1975: 16). 
Plaid Cymru was successful in attracting support from a wide range of Welsh intellectuals but 
little else (Morgan, 1981). The majority of the Welsh electorate had by now moved its allegiance 
to Labour and were, relatedly, much preoccupied with improving their socio-economic position 
within the wider British state; a concern made more imperative through the economic decline of 
the industrialised south of Wales from the 1920s onwards. To counter this, Saunders Lewis, who 
was president of Plaid Cymru from 1926-1939, placed great emphasis on creating an awareness 
of Wales' historic nationhood, believing that this would result in increased popular support. It 
did not. Indeed, it was not until 1966 that Plaid Cymru was to have its first elected MP in Wales 
when his successor as president, Gwyn-for Evans, won the Carmarthen seat. As Davies 
comments: `Plaid Cymru's emphasis over several decades on educating the people of Wales in 
their country's history produced few active nationalists and no popular support' (1989: 32). 
Much of this also had to do with the rapid decline of both Welsh Nonconformity and the Welsh 
language over the course of this century. For many within Wales, the Welsh identity being 
promoted by Plaid Cymru seemed increasingly irrelevant in the modem world. More pertinently, 
it seemed increasingly irrelevant in much of Wales itself. The once strong Welsh-speaking 
heartland (y fro Gymraeg) was retreating in the face of English into the western and northern rural 
margins. Meanwhile, the already largely anglicised south and east were increasingly looking to 
England and Britain for its own sense of collective identity (see below). 
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Given this, Plaid Cymru began moving in the 1970s to a broadly socialist position in an attempt 
to offer a more effective alternative to the Labour Party political hegemony in Wales. This change 
of direction was sanctioned by the revision of the Blaid's constitution in 1981 where the aim of 
`self government for Wales' was amended to establishing `a democratic Welsh socialist state' 
(Davies, 1989). It was further entrenched by the election of the socialist, Dafydd Elis Thomas, 
as president in 1984. Consequently, in the last decade or so, Plaid Cymru has shed many of its 
prior associations with a narrow language-based nationalism. Before his subsequent move to the 
House of Lords in 1993, Elis-Thomas was instrumental in accomplishing this central change in 
direction. He placed particular emphasis on an inclusive notion of Welsh citi: enuhip as the basis 
of the Blaid's new political platform, although one that respected the language and cultural 
traditions of Wales. For Elis-Thomas, being Welsh was now no longer a question of nationality, 
language, or even birth. It was a status achievable by anyone who claimed the right and who 
acknowledged, in so doing, the general cultural distinctiveness of the country (Borland et at., 
1992). 
As a result of these changes, Plaid Cymru did manage to draw to it some of the new working class 
disaffected with the ideology of Labourism (Adamson, 1991). But, for all that, Plaid Cymru has 
continued to remain a marginal player in Welsh politics. Much of this can be explained by its 
ongoing association, at least in the public mind, with a particular language-based conception of 
Welsh identity, despite the party's recent attempts at reinvention. In particular, the Welsh 
language movement which emerged in the 1960s-1970s around Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg (the 
Welsh Language Society), and its policy of direct action on behalf of the language, had negative 
electoral consequences for Plaid Cymru (Balsam et al., 1982). Consequently, there are still only 
four Plaid Cymru MPs in the current British Parliament, elected in May 1997, all representing 
constituencies in west and north-west Wales. Its support remains strong in these particular 
constituencies but it still lacks widespread electoral appeal throughout Wales as a whole. In 
contrast, the Scottish Nationalist Party -- the equivalent political party in Scotland -- while also 
a minor political party, is seen as having more consistent and widespread electoral support. '9 
The 1979 devolution referendum 
It was this general scepticism towards political nationalism (and its cultural antecedents) in Wales 
that was to culminate in the decisive rejection of Welsh devolution in the 1979 referendum. Like 
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its 1997 counterpart, one reason for this was that Welsh devolution was very much an 
afterthought -- and seen to be as such -- to the question of Scottish devolution at the time. For 
example, the (1976) Devolution Bill proposed by the Labour government as the basis for the 
1979 referendum drew back from the full implications of the (1973) Kiffircinclon Commission 
Report on Scottish and Welsh Home Rule on which it had originally been based. The A'ilbrandon 
Commission had actually recommended full legislative powers for both Scottish and Welsh 
Assemblies, along with considerable fiscal freedom. However, the Devolution Bill, while 
proposing elected assemblies for both Scotland and Wales, differentiated between the two. The 
Welsh Assembly was to have only executive functions, whereas the Scottish Assembly was to be 
granted legislative powers (Davies, 1989). 
This distinction was made by the then Labour government ostensibly on the basis of the 
institutional, legal and historical differences between the two nations. A more cynical 
interpretation is that it was due to the stronger support for nationalism in Scotland and the greater 
likelihood of an anti-devolution vote in Wales (C. Williams, 1982). In this respect, not much has 
changed. However, a key difference in 1979 was that the Devolution Referendum had been 
instigated in the dying days of an exhausted Labour government -- racked with internal division 
and soon to be comprehensively defeated by the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher. This 
did not augur well for its success. Neither did its associations with the culturalist and language 
emphases of Welsh nationalism, represented by the political activities of Plaid Cymru and the 
direct action tactics in support of the Welsh language carried out by Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg 
(see below). 
The question of Welsh nationalism and its potential divisiveness within Wales, while still evident 
in 1997, also loomed much larger in the public consciousness of the late 1970s. Indeed, the 
debates of 1979 occurred in a political climate which was consumed by the perceived links 
between devolution and Welsh nationalism, and the potential consequences that might ensue from 
these. For many in the south and east of Wales, there was the fear that a Welsh Assembly would 
be dominated by Welsh nationalists -- this was certainly the principal concern of the block of 
(south) Welsh Labour MPs, led by Neil Kinnock and Leo Abse, opposing devolution. In effect, 
the group contended that a Welsh Assembly would be `a sellout to nationalism' and the first step 
onto the `slippery slope to separatism' (Davies, 1989), and argued instead for the primacy of 
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British class-based interests. 20 As Gwyn Williams comments, this group `played largely on the 
fears of the Welsh language and (rather oddly) of corruption, fears of being taken over by north 
Walian Welsh speakers with double-barrelled names, [and] fears of losing hold on Britain' (1985: 
294). Ironically, many in the Welsh-speaking heartland of Wales, y fro Gymraeg, voted against 
devolution because of the opposite fear -- that any subsequent Assembly would be dominated by 
the interests of the more populous industrialised and anglicised south (Osmond, 1989). When 
these two trends combined, the overwhelming defeat of Welsh devolution became inevitable -- 
confirming, it seemed, the principal allegiance of the Welsh electorate to British interests (G. A. 
Williams, 1985). As Balsom et al. conclude in a survey of public attitudes in Wales at the time: 
`There is almost a complete lack of political will for self-determination' (1982: 19; sec also Butt 
Philip, 1975: 125-129). 
The result of the 1979 Devolution Referendum was to reiterate, in their starkest form, long 
demonstrated tensions surrounding the question of Welsh identity -- tensions which echo still, 
although with somewhat less resonance. Incorporation within the British state may well have 
contributed to the retention over time of Welsh language and culture, and to the related historical 
predominance of cultural nationalism. However, it also contributed significantly to a 
countervailing anglicisation -- particularly in south and east Wales -- and thus to alternative, 
equally powerful conceptions of Welsh identity. Allied to long-standing regional distinctions 
within Wales (see below), the resulting disjuncture between language and identity explains the 
limited impact of Welsh nationalism, and the even more limited enthusiasm for self determination. 
As Gwyn Williams drily observed: `the long and dismal history of indifference and contempt 
towards English-speaking Welsh people which had been a disturbing feature of Welsh nationalism 
and much language-focused Welsh national feeling ... 
[duly reaped] its dragon's teeth of harvest 
[in the 1979 Referendum]' (1985: 291). And much more besides. It is to these issues of language 
and identity in Wales that I now want to turn. 
The problem of Welsh identity 
The political influence, or lack thereof, of Welsh nationalism points to the wider question of 
collective identity in Wales. In short, what does it mean to be Welsh? There is no easy answer 
to this question since Welsh identity is cross-cut with numerous internal divisions. Raymond 
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Williams argues, for example, that Welsh culture 'is the complex of forced and acquired 
discontinuities: a broken series of radical shifts, within which we have to mark not only certain 
social and linguistic continuities but many acts of self definition by negation, by alternation and 
by contrast' (1985: 23). Remembering also Kearney's observation that 'what seem to be 
"national" units [may] dissolve into a number of distinctive cultures... ' (1989: 10), we can begin 
to explore the various sub-cultures evident in Wales which contribute to, and at times compete 
against a wider sense of corporate identity. 
Dealing with the latter first, it might be considered surprising that a distinct (and distinctive) 
collective identity has survived at all. After all, other once culturally distinct areas in the British 
Isles such as Cornwall and the North of England have long come to think of themselves as British, 
if not English. And yet, against the odds, a Welsh identity -- or, more accurately, Welsh identities 
-- have survived over time, albeit in markedly modified forms. Moreover, these local Welsh 
identities -- although not always easily reconciled -- have nonetheless sufficient corporate 
purchase to allow us now to talk of a Welsh rational identity. Industrial Wales may have far 
more in common with the neighbouring English counties that comprise the West Midlands than 
with the rural north and north-west of Wales, yet those who live there still think of themselves 
principally as Welsh (Crick, 1995). 
A key part of the ongoing maintenance of a distinct Welsh national identity here lies in its, at 
times, uneasy relationship with its English counterpart -a relationship at once both symbiotic and 
oppositional. Linda Colley (1992) argues in her excellent historical account, Britons, that British 
identity was formed principally in contradistinction to the French. Much the same can be said of 
Welsh identity in relation to the English. As Fiona Bowie observes, `the English are an essential 
ingredient in Welsh identity, not in making the people what they are, but in providing a symbol 
of what they are not. It is in opposition to Englishness that Welshness is defined' (1993: 190), 
Likewise, Butt Philip argues that it is the `contrast with the English culture that gives the Welsh 
and their culture their dynamism' (1975: 41). In this respect, a distinct Welsh identity can be 
traced as far back as 597 AD when Bede commented on the sense of difference between the 
Welsh and Anglo Saxons at the time of Augustine's coming to Britain (Morgan, 1995). Such 
differences were also to provide a constant theme for Welsh poetry and prose from the sixth 
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century on, centring predominantly on Welsh language and culture (see G. A. Williams, 1985); a 
distinguishing feature later enthusiastically employed, as we have seen, by Welsh nationalists. 
But this is also to oversimplify since contrasting identities within what has now come to be known 
as Wales also have long historical precedent. The most notable of these is the distinction between 
the north and south of Wales, already alluded to at various points in this account. While much 
of this distinction has come to be represented by the contrast between an industrialised, anglicised 
south and a still rural, Welsh-speaking north, the differences between these regions actually go 
back much further. Kearney (1989) argues, for example, that linguistic differences and political 
allegiances had divided different areas of Wales since the sixth century. At this time, the Kingdom 
of Gwynedd in north-west Wales looked to the Celtic influences of northern Britain for its origins 
while the Kingdoms of Powys in mid-Wales, and Gwent and Dyfed in the south looked elsewhere 
to Mercia, southern England, and Ireland, respectively. The different political and cultural sub- 
cultures that this inevitably produced were again highlighted in the failure of the ninth century 
king of Gwynedd, Rhodri the Great, and the tenth century king of Dyfed, Hywel Dda (from whom 
came the Welsh legal code) to unify the various kingdoms of `Wales'. 
By the time of the Norman conquest the regional differences evident in Wales had coalesced into 
four major political units -- Gwynedd in the north-west, Deheubarth in the south-west, Morganwg 
in the south and south-east and Powys in the east. These distinct regional sub-cultures remained 
clearly in evidence up to the incorporation of Wales within Britain, and well beyond. They help 
to explain the genesis of eighteenth century Welsh nationalism in London, for example, since local 
identities still remained dominant at that time in Wales itself. More significantly, they have laid 
the basis of the geographical, cultural and linguistic divisions so clearly evident still in 
contemporary Wales. It is to these ongoing divisions that I now want to turn. 
The case of three Wales 
Given this historical background, it is not surprising that the issue of Welsh identity has been a 
particularly contested one. This point is exemplified linguistically by the fact that Welsh has at 
least three words for `identity', the most common of which, `hunaniaeth', dates back to the 
eighteenth century. There is not one but many ways of being Welsh and not all are 
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complementary (Bowie, 1993). In this respect, the north/south divide continues to dominate any 
discussion of what constitutes `Welshness'. However, following Balsom et al. (1982; see also 
Balsom, 1985), it is perhaps more accurate to identify three broad regional variations which have 
laid the basis for differing contemporary conceptions of Weishness. Divided by geography, 
language and history, these three areas comprise y fro Gymracg (the Welsh-speaking heartland 
in west and north-west Wales), Welsh Wales (the industrial valleys of south Wales), and British 
Wales (south and east Wales). 21 
Y fro Gy mraeg 
Y fro Gymraeg, as its name suggests, is largely linguistically defined. The term was first 
employed by Bowen (1959) to describe areas where over 80 per cent of the inhabitants spoke 
Welsh; a benchmark subsequently reduced to 70 per cent (Bowen & Carter, 1974). Even under 
this adjusted criterion, the areas that can still be designated as part of y fro Gymraeg are 
predominantly confined to the rural west and north-west of Wales -- in particular, the counties 
of Anglesey, Gwynedd, Ceredigion, and Carmarthenshire (Pembrokeshire, in the far south-west, 
has been historically far more heavily anglicised). Indeed, the key feature of y fro Gymraeg has 
been its rapid diminution and increasing fragmentation over the course of this century; a 
reflection, in turn, of the wider decline of Welsh speakers over the same period (see Chapter 7). 
Relatedly, while local authorities within y fro Gymraeg remain at the forefront of Welsh language 
maintenance -- in Gwynedd, for example, 61 per cent of its population could still speak Welsh at 
the time of the last census in 1991 -- there are now a greater number of actual Welsh speakers in 
and around the capital, Cardiff in the south-east (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). Much of the recent 
resurgence of Welsh has likewise occurred in the more anglicised areas of Wales; a result of the 
nascent Welsh institutional framework discussed earlier and to which I will return in more detail 
in the following chapter. 
The fragmentation of y fro Gymraeg began in the nineteenth century, however, with the impact 
of the industrialisation of south Wales on its own largely rural economy. During this period, wage 
labour remained relatively uncommon in the Welsh-speaking western and northern counties of 
Wales. The social structure was not too dissimilar to the Irish Gaeltacht, with its division into Ile 
mawr (large farms), Ile bach (small farms) and pobol tai bach (cottagers: literally, people of the 
little houses). As such, it remained a heavily localised economy and society (Kearney, 1989). Y 
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fro Gymraeg did contribute briefly to the industrial revolution, via slate quarrying in the north- 
west, but this was quickly eclipsed by the burgeoning iron and coal industries in the southern 
valleys. As a result, the Welsh-speaking heartland experienced extensive emigration to the south 
from the mid 1800s onwards, accounting eventually for up to three quarters of the existing Welsh 
population at that time (G. A. Williams, 1985). Many of these emigrants subsequently became 
anglicised (although not immediately; see below), thus creating linguistic as well as socio- 
economic distinctions between the two regions. 
Large in-migration of English speakers to rural west and north Wales in more recent times has led 
to y fro Gymraeg's own inexorable anglicisation. Nonetheless, Balsom et al. 's (1982) analysis 
found that the area still retains a strong sense of Welsh identity, while continuing to equate this 
identity inextricably with the Welsh language. For many in y fro Gymraeg, to be fully Welsh one 
must be a Welsh speaker. This connection is illustrated by the common practice of classifying all 
non-Welsh speakers -- including second language learners, and those who come from anglicised 
areas of Wales -- as `Sais' (`English'). In effect, `Welsh' and `English' are used as ciphers for 
`insider' and `outsider' -- a linguistic Offa's Dyke. ' The usual question asked in Gwynedd, for 
example, is not `Are you Welsh? ' (Cymro/Cymraes `dach chi? ) but `Are you Welsh-speaking? ' 
(Cymraeg `dach chi? ), the latter, until recently, automatically implying the former (Bowie, 1993). 
Given the long political and linguistic history of the area, its historical association with Welsh 
cultural nationalism, and the increasing threat of anglicisation to the Welsh language, this view 
of non-Welsh speakers is perhaps not surprising (see N. Thomas, 1992). However, its 
exclusionary overtones have been widely criticised (see D. Smith, 1984; G. A. Williams, 1985; 
Osmond, 1989; Borland, et al., 1992). The historian, Gwyn Williams, is particularly disparaging 
of this process of labelling people as in some sense unwelsh or `di Gymraeg' (Welshless), 
regarding it as demeaning, unwarranted and adversarial. The result, he concludes rather gloomily 
in his history of Wales, is a schizophrenia at the heart of Welsh identity which `threatens to 
extinguish not simply a Welsh nation but a Welsh people itself as an historic entity' (1985: 236). 
The industrial valleys 
For Williams, and other like-minded critics (see D. Smith, 1984), the valleys of south Wales 
provide an equally valid form of Welsh identity. The valleys were the core of the industrial 
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revolution in nineteenth century Wales and the core of Labour's electoral stronghold in the 
twentieth. Since the 1920s, however, the area has experienced considerable economic decline, 
subsequent emigration and, unlike rural Wales, little in-migration. As I have already discussed, 
the economic difficulties encountered over this period also convinced many living in the valleys 
of the merits of British socialism over Welsh nationalism; an allegiance which remains strong to 
the present day. In effect, the politics of class became more important in south Wales than the 
politics of ethnicity, religion, or language (Kearney, 1989; Adamson, 1991). 
With regard to language, much of the industrialised area of Wales remained predominantly Welsh. 
speaking, at least initially, given that most migration to the area in the nineteenth century was 
internal to Wales. In this sense, the linguistic contrast between the south and north of Wales is 
often historically overstated. Indeed, B. Thomas (1959,1987) contends that the Welsh language 
was actually saved in the nineteenth century by industrialisation. While this position understates 
the impact that migration had on the demographic base of y fro Gymraeg (C. Williams, 1990), it 
is nonetheless widely accepted. Gwyn Williams, for example, argues along similar lines that the 
internal, rural-urban migration in Wales meant that the Welsh, unlike their Gaelic neighbours, the 
Scots and Irish, did not have to abandon the language by seeking employment elsewhere, notably 
in the new world (1985: 180; see also Morgan, 1981: 7). Certainly, Welsh continued to be the 
language of the coalfield, the workplace, the home, the chapels, and of social life generally, in the 
early years of industrialisation in the south Wales' valleys (Davies, 1990). 
However, as the demand for workers increased, so too did the number of English immigrants to 
the valleys. Until the early part of this century, many of these were simply assimilated into Welsh- 
speaking communities but their increasing number soon became such that it was no longer 
necessary for them to learn Welsh. The anglicisation of the area inevitably followed although it 
was initially uneven, spreading first from the eastern valleys nearest England. It was only in the 
wake of the subsequent economic decline in the 1920s and 1930s, and the mass emigration from 
the industrial valleys which ensued, that Welsh was more widely abandoned by those who 
remained there. This occurred principally because of the assumption that a knowledge of English 
might be a more useful basis for social mobility (see below). 
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These trends have meant that the industrial valleys arc now predominantly English-speaking as 
a result. In Blaenau Gwent, for example, the most eastern of the valley areas, only 2.3 per cent 
of the population could still speak Welsh at the time of the 1991 census. In the adjacent Merthyr 
Tydfil and Rhondda areas, the percentages were 7.5 and 8.2 respectively (Aitchison & Carter, 
1994). And yet, for all that, the people of the valleys remain identifiably Welsh. Remembering 
Fishman's analysis of the link between language and identity (sec Chapter 4), it may be a cliffc'rent 
kind of Welshness from those who continue to speak Welsh but it is no less strongly felt. 
Moreover, traces of the Welsh language clearly remain in the cadences and vocabulary of Welsh 
English ('Wenglish'; see Coupland, 1990); what Griffith (1950) describes, in terms not dissimilar 
to Bourdieu, as a form of `accumulated capital'' Raymond Williams likewise observes that the 
Welsh language `remains critical to cultural identity ... even 
in many of those to whom it is now 
lost and marginal' (1985: 21). 
That said, the English language Welsh identity of the valleys is far from unproblematic. A direct 
fink between Welsh language and Welsh identity is firmly rejected by many of these Anglo-Welsh, 
as they have come to be known. However, even the many who contest this historical association 
do not necessarily wish to diminish the status of the Welsh language as such (Aitchison & Carter, 
1994). In addition, there are also few who would not admit that if a fluent knowledge of Welsh 
could be acquired quickly and without difficulty they would welcome the opportunity to speak 
the language and, crucially, would feel more Welsh because of it (Bowie, 1993; see also Giles & 
Taylor, 1978; Khleif, 1978). In this latter respect, there is an awareness that the Welsh language 
as the principal medium of the literature, history and mythology of the country has contributed 
significantly to a separate sense of collective identity. More crucially perhaps, it has acted 
historically as a key boundary marker, or `symbolic border guard' (Armstrong, 1982), in 
distinguishing the Welsh from the English. Its loss therefore inevitably involves a loss of heritage 
while also blurring the line between the Anglo- Welsh and their English neighbours. As Bowie 
observes, these difficulties, and the ambivalences to which they give rise, are poignantly reflected 
in the Welsh and English names for the nation itself: 
To the outsider or the native English speaker the people are `Welsh', derived from the 
Anglo-Saxon word wealth, `foreigner'. To the Welsh speaker they are C)-tnry, tile 
`kinsfolk' who inhabit not the `land of strangers' (Wales) but `the land of fellow 
countrymen/women' (Cymru). English speakers can only describe themselves as 
`foreigners'. (1993: 186). 
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The result is that while south Wales is very conscious of itself as an industrial society, its sense 
of its own distinctive place in the world, and of what it means to be Welsh, remain under- 
developed (Evans, 1989b; Osmond, 1989). It may no longer relate easily to the traditional, 
Welsh-speaking milieu of y fro Gymraeg, and it may reject outright the claim that Welsh speakers 
are the only true Welsh. But it is also an identity which remains firmly rooted in the language and 
traditions which it has only recently discarded. The Anglo-Welsh arc currently in a position where 
they have experienced the loss of the traditional language-identity link but have yet to articulate 
with confidence their own anglicised variant. 
British {Vales 
And then there is the third area of Wales, broadly identified by Balsom et al. (1982) as `British 
Wales'. Linked directly to England by arterial transport routes, " British Wales comprises the 
southern coastal belt (in which lie the port cities of Swansea, Cardiff and Newport), the northern 
coastal belt, and the east and north-east counties bordering on England. The majority of the 
population in British Wales tends currently to be involved in expanding state, educational or 
service industries, in multinational companies based in Wales, or have moved there for lifestyle 
reasons, usually from England (Day, 1989; Osmond, 1989; Symonds, 1990). The population is 
also significant for its majority of monolingual English speakers. In the old county of Gwent 
(encompassing Monmouthshire and Newport), only 2.4 per cent of the population were able to 
speak Welsh at the time of the 1991 census (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). This feature is not 
surprising, given that the areas comprising British Wales have been subject historically to the 
greatest amount of English in-migration and subsequent anglicisation. The displacement of Welsh 
by English near the English border and in the southern coastal strip, for example, was evident 
from 1750 onwards (C. Williams, 1990; see also below). " In this sense, British Wales is not 
dissimilar to the southern valleys. However, unlike the latter, the degree of anglicisation has been 
such that this broadly defined area tends now to reject a specifically Welsh identity in favour of 
a British one. 26 This is evidenced in particular by the active opposition to the maintenance and 
extension of the Welsh language. In Monmouthshire, for example, vehement opposition from 
English-speaking parents to the teaching of Welsh in schools has meant that the majority of 
schools in the area have had no formal Welsh component until quite recently (see Chapter 7). 
Such attitudes suggest that a central aim in adopting a specific British/English identity is to 
marginalise the Welsh-speaking minority and to deny, in so doing, any sense of a distinct Welsh 
251 
identity at all. The question 'What usc/value is Welsh? ' is the most common refrain adopted here 
in relation to the language. 
Language and identity in Wales 
Of course, the broad categories described above are both overstated and oversimplified (cf. Glyn 
Williams, 1994). Allegiances and identifications at both the individual and collective level are 
neither as straightforward nor as consistent as the above designations suggest. Moreover, like 
many discussions of Welsh identity, the designations employed do not account adequately for the 
contributions of women and ethnic minorities to Wales. Women arc still largely absent from the 
dominant symbolic representations of Welsh identity, enshrined as these are in the masculinist 
historical conceptions of both rural, non-conformist Wales and the industrialised southern valleys 
(Aaron et al., 1995, Betts, 1996; see also Yuval-Davis, 1997). Ethnic minorities are likewise 
seldom acknowledged (see Bourne, 1989; Tarrow, 1992; Charlotte Williams, 1995,1997). 
Predominantly of South Asian ancestry, 27 such minorities currently comprise 1.3 per cent of the 
population (OPCS, 1991). The majority live in Cardiff (where they constitute 6 per cent of the 
local population) and Swansea in the south, and Bangor in the north. 
I will return to the educational implications of these omissions more fully in the next chapter. 
Suffice it to say at this point that the above analysis, whatever its limitations, at least points to the 
elusiveness of a coherent notion of Welshness, or `Cymreictod', (a term which carries a much 
fuller meaning in Welsh than in English; see Bowie, 1993). Rather, there are many conflicting and 
interlocking definitions of Welsh identity which actively compete for symbolic space and public 
recognition (Bowie, 1993; Glyn Williams, 1994). Crucially, many of these competing definitions 
of Welshness are inextricably tied to the relationship between language and identity. As Fiona 
Bowie concludes: 
For the 80 per cent of the population of [Wales] for whom Welsh is a foreign language 
any definition of Welshness which gives priority to the Welsh language poses a potential 
threat to their own sense of identity. The vexed question of the extent to which the Welsh 
language can be taken as the prime mediator of Welshness and chief criterion of 
nationhood, reveals deep and unresolved tensions at the heart of Welsh identity. (1993: 
169). 
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There are historical reasons for this ambivalence, most notably to do with the widespread 
anglicisation of many areas of Wales. This process of anglicisation -- by which the Welsh people 
became increasingly assimilated into an English-dominated cultural and ideological system (C. 
Williams, 1990) -- was most often embarked on in the name of modernity and with the aspiration 
of long term social mobility. However, the benefits attached to this process have been less, and 
the costs greater, than perhaps many expected. 
The anglicisation of Wales 
As should already be clear by now, the anglicisation of Wales has been a prominent feature of the 
nation's history. In this respect, the Welsh nationalist R. S. Thomas despondently observes about 
the English language: `this is the major language, spoken by hundreds of millions of people with 
enormous resources devoted to it, that our small, bullied and embattled nation is called upon to 
maintain itself in the face of. And that is the way of it' (1992: 15; sec also N. Thomas, 1992). 
Although not entirely, since it is not the spread of English which has been crucial in anglicising 
Wales, at least not up until this century. After all, Wales remained 90 per cent Welsh-speaking 
in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries (P. Jenkins, 1992) and as late as 1880, three out of four 
Welsh people still spoke the Welsh language by choice (Morgan, 1981). 2* Rather, it has been the 
diminution of the status of Welsh and its restriction to private, low status language domains 
which has proved to be more debilitating historically. In short, the rapid language loss which has 
occurred this century with regard to Welsh is to a large extent the product of the much longer 
historical devaluation and restriction of Welsh in formal domains (cf. Chapter 4). 
This latter process began as early as the Norman colonisation of Wales in the late eleventh 
century. During that time, the prestige languages were Latin and French and to speak a local 
vernacular language such as Welsh was seen as a mark of bondage (Kearney, 1989). 
Consequently, Latin and French quickly acquired the status of formal languages of administration 
and documentation in Wales, a mantle which English would subsequently assume by the 
fourteenth century. This marked the first significant restriction of Welsh within formal language 
domains -- domains which had previously been represented, for example, by the customary law 
of Hywel Dda. With the emasculation of legal and administrative systems in Welsh, such as they 
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were, only the literary tradition remained as a formal linguistic indicator of Welshncss (Aitchison 
ý; Carter, 1994). 
The exclusion of Welsh from the public realm was formalised by the (1536) Act of Union. The 
language provisions outlined in the Act made English the sole language of government. In so 
doing, the Act was unequivocal about the status (or lack thereof) of the Welsh language, viewing 
it as a key obstacle to successful incorporation of the new dominion within Britain: 
... 
because the people of the same Dominion (Wales) have and do daily use a speech 
nothing like or consonant to the natural mother tongue used within this Realm 
(England).... to reduce them to perfect order notice, and knowledge of the laws of this, 
his Realm... and utterly to extirpate all and singular the sinister usages and customs 
differingfrom the sane ... 
bringing all the citizens of this Realm to amiable concord and 
unity.... From henceforth, no person or persons that use the Welsh speech or language 
shall have or enjoy any manor, office or fees ... unless 
he or they use and exercise the 
speech or language of English. (Henry VIII, Acts of Incorporation of Wales with England, 
1536; cited in Williams & Raybould, 1991: 2, my emphasis) 
The effect of the Act was to exclude Welsh from the public realm for the next four centuries. Or, 
as Gwyn Williams observes, `Welsh ceased to be an official language and had to retreat into the 
kitchen' (1985: 121). Concomitantly, English came to be seen as the language of preferment (D. 
Edwards, 1993). The only formal arena where the Welsh language continued to be recognised -- 
that is, beyond the private and low status domain of the family -- was the church. Ironically, this 
was because Henry VIII's successor, Elizabeth I, had authorised a Welsh translation of the Bible 
in 1563.2' The translation which was to emerge subsequently in 1588 became the `sheet-anchor' 
(G. A. Williams, 1985) of the language. Crucially, it allowed Welsh to remain a standardised 
literary language, with the capacity to be used in any domain (even if it was not so used). Despite 
its ongoing lowly regarded status (see below), the literary standard provided by the 1588 
translation prevented the language from diverging into mutually incomprehensible dialects and/or 
atrophying altogether (Morgan, 1981). The significance of the translation also helps to 
explain the subsequent close association of the Welsh language with religion and, from that, of 
religious education (Glanmor Williams, 1979). 30 
That said, the Welsh language continued to face considerable opposition and consistent negative 
attribution as a perceived low status language. While Wales remained predominantly Welsh- 
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speaking up until this century, the Welsh landed gentry were the first to adopt English as first an 
additional, and then a substitute language. This pattern was well established by the eighteenth 
century (P. Jenkins, 1992). Concomitantly, the use of Welsh was invariably equated with 
backwardness and inferiority (Morgan, 1995; Miles, 1996). This pejorative view of the Welsh 
language (not to mention, the Welsh themselves) is ably demonstrated by William Richards, in his 
lVallography of 1682: 
The Native Gibberish is usually prattled throughout the whole of Taphydome, except in 
their Market Towns, whose inhabitants being a little raised, and (as it were) pullt up into 
Bubbles, above the ordinary scum, do begin to despise it.... 'Tis usually cashier'd out of 
Gentlemen's Houses... the Lingua will be Englishd out of Wales. (cited in Aitchison & 
Carter, 1994: 27). 
These sentiments continued to be echoed in succeeding centuries. In 1866, The Times newspaper 
thundered that `The Welsh language is the curse of Wales' (Mayo, 1979). Likewise, the 
nineteenth century English educationalist and literary critic, Matthew Arnold, while paying tribute 
to the Welsh literary classics in his Study of Celtic Literature, could also state: 
The fusion of all the inhabitants of these islands into one homogenous, English-speaking 
whole, the breaking down of barriers between us, the swallowing up of provincial 
nationalities, is a consummation to which the natural course of things irresistibly tends. 
It is a necessity of what is called modern civilisation.... The sooner the Welsh language 
disappears as an instrument of the practical, political, social life of Wales, the better; 
the better for Esigland, the better for Males itself. (cited in Griffith, 1950: 71; my 
emphasis). 
Similar views on the Welsh language were also clearly apparent in an influential nineteenth century 
review of the state of education in Wales. Published in 1847 as Reports of the Commissioners 
of Enquiry into the State ofE. ducation in Males, it has since come to be known as `Brad y Lyfrau 
Gleision' (The Treachery of the Blue Books). The Reports were compiled by three young English 
and Oxford educated lawyers and their terms of reference were to conduct `an inquiry ... 
into the 
state of education in ... 
Wales, especially into the means afforded to the labouring classes of 
acquiring a knowledge of the English language' (cited in Jones, 1997: 14-15). To this end, they 
made some well-merited criticisms of the limited and variable educational provision of the church- 
based schools in Wales at that time (Morgan, 1995; Jones, 1997). However, they also proceeded 
to include an excoriating wider attack on Welsh language and culture as the principal explanation 
for these inadequacies. Indeed, all the social, cultural and economic disadvantages the three 
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commissioners saw in Wales were, in one way or another, attributed to the language: `Ills 
language keeps him under the hatches, being one in which he can neither acquire nor communicate 
the necessary information'. They concluded: `The Welsh language is a vast drawback to Wales, 
and a manifold barrier to the moral progress and commercial prosperity of the people.... It 
dissevers the people from intercourse which would greatly advance their civilisation, and bars the 
access of improving knowledge to their minds' (cited in Evans, 1978: 14). 
Not surprisingly, the Reports caused an uproar in Wales and are credited with giving considerable 
momentum to the Welsh nationalist movement of the day (G. A. Williams, 1985; Morgan, 1995). 
Their publication also led to successful campaigns for improving educational provision in Wales -- 
via the (1889) Welsh Intermediate Act, for example -- and to the eventual establishment of the 
University of Wales (Jones, 1997). However, the longer term effects of the Reports -- on the 
Welsh language, in particular -- were largely deleterious. Most significantly, they provided the 
intellectual background and rationale for the (1870) Education Act. This Act, which established 
the joint state elementary system in England and Wales, formally excluded Welsh from the 
pedagogy and practice of Welsh schools. This, in turn, led to the notorious practice of the `Welsh 
Not', where a wooden halter was placed over the shoulders of children heard speaking Welsh in 
school. The last child to be wearing the halter at the end of the day was caned. 
The subsequent valorisation of English within state education -- and, concomitantly, the specific 
proscription of Welsh -- continued well into this century. It has only been in the last 50 years that 
Welsh has effectively re-emerged as a school language, a development I will examine in more 
detail in the following chapter. In this respect, the educational policy of Welsh language 
proscription was itself merely a reflection of the wider, long-established hierarchising of English 
over Welsh, along with the accompanying belief that in the English language lay the route to 
social and economic mobility. The seventeenth century views of William Richards above are 
testimony enough to this. However, a monolingual English educational policy was also to 
entrench the view among many that the very retei: tioit of Welsh itself was actively 
disadvantageous. Thus, where previously Welsh monolingualism and de facto bilingualism had 
been the norm, English monolingualism was increasingly to replace them both. Many Welsh- 
speaking parents, for example, while continuing to speak Welsh among themselves, stopped 
speaking it to their children. This practice was particularly evident in the southern valleys during 
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the inter-war period (1918-1945) of economic decline and, with the reinforcement of monolingual 
English education, helps to explain the area's current wide anglicisation (Davies, 1990; C. 
Williams, 1990). The result at the individual level, as for so many other minority language 
speakers (cf. Chapters 4& 5), was a generational loss of the language. As Gwyn Thomas 
poignantly observes of this process: `My father and mother were Welsh-speaking, yet I did not 
exchange a word in that language with them. The death of Welsh ran through our family like a 
geographical fault' (quoted in Osmond, 1988: 149). This vignette also illustrates writ large the 
rapid decline of Welsh over the course of this century (see Chapter 7). 
To many this decline was viewed as a positive trend -- English was perceived as the language of 
progress, equality, opportunity, the media and mass entertainment (C. Williams, 1990). Even 
today, the practice of unfavourably comparing the utility and status of Welsh to English remains 
commonplace. One contemporary example can be found in the assertions of the Welsh 
sociologist, Christie Davies: 
English became a world language ... as part of a spontaneous order emerging 
from the free 
interaction of individuals and corporations. Men and women have voluntarily learned to 
speak English because there are gains to them as individuals that stem from the world's 
dominant patterns of spontaneous interactions. The ancestors of today's Welsh people 
shifted from speaking Welsh to speaking English, not because of external political 
pressure, but in order to take advantage of economic and educational opportunities. 
English and Welsh are, in a quite objective sense, not equal languages. Welsh people who 
become fluent in English gain enormously, whereas English people learning Welsh gain 
very little. (1997: 42) 
Davies' comments bring us up to date with this particular perception of the Welsh language. 
Their facility and fatuousness aside, his views stand well within the long tradition of negative 
attribution towards Welsh that I have briefly outlined here. To this end, I do not want to 
deconstruct his, or the preceding arguments further. I have already dealt at length in previous 
chapters with the misconceptions and misrepresentations within them as they relate to minority 
languages in general: notably, the unquestioned primacy of an homogenous, unilingual nation- 
state, the equation of majority languages -- particularly, English -- with modernity, progress, and 
social mobility, and the notion of `free', `spontaneous' language choice. What I do want to 
highlight again briefly here is the process of symbolic violence, as described by Bourdieu (see 
Chapter 4), which has occurred historically in relation to Cymraeg -- the Welsh language. In 
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effect, the English language came to be seen by the Welsh as a form of cultural and linguistic 
capital, an escape from primitivism, and a demonstration of having embraced the `modern' way 
of life (Miles, 1996). Concomitantly, a Welsh linguistic habitus was increasingly regarded as 
having little cultural, social and economic value. As Bourdicu argues, to understand the nature 
of symbolic violence, it is crucial to see that it presupposes a kind of active complicity, or implicit 
consent, on the part of those subjected to it. This is clearly the case historically in Vales where 
Welsh speakers themselves came to `collaborate in the destruction of their [own] instruments of 
expression' (Bourdieu, 1991: 49). 
This is not to apportion blame in any way. After all, as Joshua Fishman has argued, the choice 
facing minority language speakers like the Welsh has often been presented as an intractable one: 
`either to reman loyal to their traditions and to remain socially disadvantaged (consigning their 
own children to such disadvantage as well), on the one hand; or, on the other hand, to abandon 
their distinctive practices and traditions, at least in large part, and, thereby, to improve their own 
and their children's lots in life via cultural suicide' (1991: 60, see Chapter 4). R. S. Thomas 
echoes this analysis, in relation to class, when he observes: `A Welshman or woman was faced 
with a partial choice. He could, by remaining loyal to his or her native speech, be dubbed a 
member of an inferior class, or by assiduously imitating the English upper class could be admitted 
to it, generally at the expense of Welsh' (1992: 13). Given the long historical vitiation of Welsh, 
that so many adopted this latter option is perhaps not surprising. What is surprising is that it took 
so long for them to do so, and that despite it all, Welsh remains a living language, still spoken 
today as a language of everyday life by 20 per cent of the Welsh population. Moreover, in the 
1991 census, this decline has for the first time this century been, if not reversed, at least abated 
(Aitchison & Carter, 1994). This encouraging counter-trend is related to the influence of Welsh- 
medium education, and the wider institutionalisation of Welsh of which it is a part, that I will 
discuss in the next chapter. 
Before examining these issues, however, I want to turn finally in this chapter to the key 
contribution of the VVelsh language movement in bringing both about. As I discussed earlier, the 
political impact of Welsh nationalism has been largely negligible and the language movement with 
which it has been closely associated has also faced considerable opposition. In particular, the 
latter's policy of non-violent direct action on behalf of the Welsh language has proved extremely 
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controversial. Nonetheless, without such action, it is not likely that the present nascent 
renaissance of the Welsh language, and its increasing institutionalisation within the civic realm, 
could have been achieved. 
The Welsh language movement 
The Welsh language movement had its genesis in a radio broadcast by Saunders Lewis, 'Tyngcd 
yr laith' (The Fate of the Language). The lecture was delivered in Welsh by Lewis on 13 
February, 1962, nearly 20 years after he had given up the leadership of Plaid Cymru and 
subsequently retired from public life. In it, Lewis stressed that the Welsh language was facing 
extinction. In so doing, he reversed his earlier position which had formed the basis of his 
establishment of Plaid Cymru; namely, that only self-government could save the Welsh language: 
In my opinion, if any kind of self-government for 'Vales were obtained before the Welsh 
language was acknowledged and used as an official language in local authority and state 
administration in the Welsh-speaking areas of the country, then the language would never 
achieve official status at all, and its demise would be quicker than it will be under English 
rule. (cited in Davies, 1989: 45). 
In this respect, the speech was directed primarily at Plaid Cymru since Lewis had increasingly 
come to see the futility of the Blaid's efforts to gain electoral representation, let alone have a 
political impact in Wales and Britain (Davies, 1973). In contrast, he issued a direct call to arms 
on behalf of the Welsh language which by then he saw as the only political issue with which 
nationalists should be concerned. This call included a campaign of direct action and civil 
disobedience as a means of winning official recognition for the Welsh language in Wales. 
Ironically, his views were to have little impact on the organisation and activities of Plaid Cymru 
itself. However, they did lead a number of disaffected Plaid Cymru members to establish 
Cymdeithas yr Iaith Gymraeg (The Welsh Language Society) later that year, an organisation 
dedicated to just such a campaign on behalf of the language. Its specific aims were to `attain 
official status for the Welsh language equal with that of English within Wales', and to see that the 
Welsh language could and would be used by public bodies throughout Wales (Butt Philip, 1975). 
Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg was not the only nationalist protest group to be established at this 
time but it was by far the most prominent. There were a number of small activist organisations, 
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also established in the 1960s, whose concerns were wider than language and who engaged 
in 
violent forms of protest action along the lines of the IRA. The Free Wales Army and 
Mudiad 
Amddiffyn Cymru (The Movement for the Defence of Wales) were two such organisations, 
although they had limited impact and even less support, and their tenure was consequently short 
lived (see Butt Philip, 1975: 263-268). There have also been other language-based pressure 
groups which have been formed subsequently to Cymdeithas. One such group, Adler 
(Reconstruct), advocated throughout the 1970s what amounted to a territorial language policy 
(cf. Chapter 5). It argued that the `real' Wales could be equated only with y fro Gymraeg and 
that, as such, this area should be officially recognised and delineated as a monoglot Welsh- 
speaking area. Again, however, this group gained little public support. The already widespread 
interspersion of Welsh and English by this time -- even within y fro Gymraeg, let alone beyond 
it -- militated against a simplistic notion of territorial monolingualism 
in Wales (C. Williams, 1982, 
1987,1994). In addition, the basis of Adfer's conception of Welshness as comprising only those 
who were Welsh-speaking was viewed as exclusionary (Denney, 1991; Borland, et al., 1992). 
But if other nationalists groups struggled to make an impact, Cymdeithas yr laith Gymraeg did 
not. One reason for this was Cymdeithas' commitment to n o,: -violent direct action. Like Plaid 
Cymru, Cymdeithas rejected the use of violence both on pragmatic grounds, as a likely 
obstruction to the movement's goals, and on moral grounds, reflecting the strong thread of 
Christian pacifism which has always existed within Welsh nationalism (R. Jenkins, 1991). This 
allowed the organisation to mount high-profile campaigns of civil disobedience on behalf of the 
language which drew to the group a wide range of committed, often young student activists. The 
first of these campaigns, advocating court summonses in Welsh, resulted in a sit-down 
demonstration on Trefechan Bridge on the edge of Aberystwyth in February, 1963. No arrests 
were made on that day but subsequent campaigns were to see numerous Cymdeithas members 
arrested, and some imprisoned. The first Cymdeithas member was imprisoned in 1966, for 
example, for protesting the lack of motor vehicle tax forms in Welsh (Davies, 1989; Harrison, 
1997). 
These initial campaigns, while controversial, were to have an immediate effect. Shortly after the 
Trefechan Bridge demonstration the Hughes-Parry Committee was convened by the British 
government to review the status of the Welsh language. It reported back in 1965 and its 
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recommendations led directly to the (1967) Welsh Language Act, granting Welsh `equal validity' 
with English in the courts and in the provision of statutory forms. It must be stressed that this Act 
did not make the notion of equal validity effective as of right -- there was no mechanism, for 
example, to compel state agencies to enforce the principle. Nor did its effect reach beyond the 
clearly delineated and limited areas mentioned above. As Glyn Williams (1987) observes, the Act 
was more a 'policy of containment' by the British government than a positive development in its 
own right. Nonetheless, the Act constituted a significant concession to the use of Welsh in the 
public domain, and was due in no small part to the protest activities of Cymdeithas (Butt Philip, 
1975; Davies, 1989,1990; A. Thomas, 1997). 
The Act did not assuage the Welsh language movement, however, particularly given its limited 
remit. Thus, in 1969 Cymdeithas began a new high profile campaign against English language 
road signs in Wales, although only after first unsuccessfully petitioning the Welsh Office to 
establish bilingual road signs (Butt Philip, 1975). This campaign initially involved painting out 
English language road signs and later involved removing them completely. Along with the 
opposition of Cymdeithas to the Investiture of the Prince of Wales at Caernarfon Castle in 1969 -- 
primarily, because he could not speak Welsh -- this produced significant publicity and resulted in 
a considerable number of arrests (Davies, 1973). Again, however, the campaign proved 
successful in achieving its aims. In 1972, the Bowen Committee Report, drawing on the 1967 Act 
as precedent, recommended bilingual road signs throughout Wales, with Welsh given priority. 
The report constituted a complete victory for Cymdeithas yr Iaith (Davies, 1989). 
And it was to be one of many. During the 1970s and 1980s, Cymdeithas campaigns focused on 
establishing and entrenching a bilingual base for the provision of public services in Wales (C. 
Williams, 1994). One such campaign centred on the demand for greater representation of the 
Welsh language in the media. " This involved numerous protests throughout the 1970s, notably 
against BBC Wales, and culminated in the establishment of a Welsh language channel, Sianel 
ped, vvar Cymru (S4C), in 1982. Having said that, the establishment of S4C also had much to do 
with the threat by the then leader of Plaid Cymru, Gwynfor Evans, to fast to the death if 
permission for the channel was not granted. " Despite initial scepticism (see J. Edwards, 1985), 
the subsequent influence of S4C -- which currently broadcasts over 30 hours a week in Welsh, 
including children's viewing and peak evening slots -- has been particularly significant in raising 
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the status of the Welsh language (G. Awbery, 1987; D. Edwards, 1993). If print capitalism was 
the motor of the rise of vernacular languages in an earlier epoch (Anderson, 1991; see Chapter 
2), then the influence of the technological media is today's equivalent. S4C thus not only provides 
a media language service for the approximately 600,000 Welsh speakers in Wales but also visibly 
promotes and `normalises' the presence of the Welsh language throughout Wales. In so doing, 
it acts as a bridge between the two linguistic communities (C. Williams, 1994). In this respect, 
the control of the media constitutes a significant stage in the process of reversing minority 
language shift (Fishman, 1991); a point that Cymdeithas was quick to grasp. " 
Also prominent throughout the 1970s and 1980s was a campaign against the proliferation of 
`second homes' in Wales (see Bollom, 1978). To this end, Cymdeithas campaigned against the 
practice of non-local people buying second homes in traditionally rural, Welsh-spcaking areas. 
The arguments employed against this practice were both economic and cultural. The practice 
increased local housing prices and thus precluded local buyers from entering the housing market. 
Together with rural unemployment, the emigration which ensued resulted in a loss to the area of 
Welsh speakers and thus its further decline (R. Jenkins, 1991). " The lack of affordable housing 
also remains an ongoing concern of Cymdeithas and has led to a more recent campaign aimed at 
influencing local authority housing policies to give precedence to local buyers (Cymdeithas yr 
Iaith Gymraeg, 1992). 35 Another recent, and high profile campaign has centred on advocacy of 
a new Language Act with far more extensive powers than its 1967 predecessor. This was 
accomplished with the passing into law of the (1993) Welsh Language Act -- a development I 
will examine more fully in the next chapter -- although, as we shall see there, even this Act still 
has its limitations. 
The Welsh language movement over the last four decades has thus proved to be enormously 
successful in its stated aims of raising the profile of the language, and promoting its 
institutionalisation in the public domain (Davies, 1990; A. Thomas, 1997). So much so, in fact, 
that the scale and intensity of its activities in the 1990s have diminished in direct relation to the 
extent of the gains that have been made on behalf of the language. Earlier, in the 1980s, it led the 
now late Gwyn Williams -- himself, no great fan of a language-based Welsh identity -- to 
conclude: 
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The consequences have been extraordinary. In response to a militant campaign whose 
hunger has been insatiable, the British state, ruling a largely indifferent or hostile Welsh 
population, has in a manner which has few parallels outside the [former] Soviet Union, 
countenanced and indeed subsidised Welsh cultural nationalism. 1 Pales In crow officially, 
visibly and audibly a bilingual country. The equal status of Welsh is nearing 
achievement. Whole Welsh language structures, serviced by an effective training and 
supply apparatus, exist in education, administrative life and the media. The issue of the 
Welsh language, in many fields of Welsh action, blots out all other political considerations. 
(1985: 292-293; my emphasis) 
This return of the Welsh language to the civic realm, after four centuries of proscription, has been 
reinforced even further since Williams made his observations over a decade ago. A Welsh 
Language Board (Bwrdd yr laith Gymraeg) has since been established and is becoming an 
increasingly influential arbiter of the language in the public domain. This is closely allied to its 
central role as the key government agency charged with implementing the provisions of the new 
(1993) Welsh Language Act. The implementation of a new National Curriculum for England 
and Wales in 1988 has also recognised for the first time a distinct Welsh school curriculum, and 
the specific role of Welsh as a school language. And a burgeoning Welsh-medium education 
movement has seen the continuing rise, in both provision and popularity, of Welsh-medium 
schools in Wales. These crucial developments, their implications, and the responses to them, are 
the focus of the following two chapters. 
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Notes -- Chapter 6 
1. The electorate at the time of the referendum amounted to 2.2 million people. I lowcvcr, tile 
total population of Wales is currently estimated at 2.8 million, one fifth of whom are born outside 
of Wales, principally in England (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). 
2. The 22 counties are detailed in Appendix a. Prior to the reorganisation of local government 
in 1996, Wales comprised 8 much larger counties -- Gwynedd (incorporating Anglesey and 
Conwy), Dyfed (incorporating Ceredigion and Pembrokeshire), South, Mid and West Glamorgan 
(incorporating the south coast, the southern valleys, and Cardiff), Gwent (incorporating 
Monmouthshire and Newport), Powys, and Clwyd (incorporating Wrexham, Flintshirc and 
Denbighshire). 
3. The staggering of the referenda one week apart was in fact deliberate. Holding the referendum 
a week earlier in Scotland -- where a `yes vote' was expected -- was seen as a way of providing 
momentum for a similar outcome in Wales. 
4. There were actually two votes cast in the Scottish Referendum, one for the Scottish Parliament 
itself and a second to determine whether it should have tax-varying powers. The latter question, 
while not gaining quite as much support, was still convincingly passed by 63.5 per cent to 36.5 
per cent (The Guardia,:, 13 September, 1997: 1). 
5. An acronym for `quasi autonomous non-government organisations'. At their height, there 
were 1600 board members appointed to these organisations in Wales covering such areas as 
health, housing, economic development, the arts, broadcasting, education, and so on. All 
appointments were made directly by the Welsh Secretary of State, hence the dominance of Tory 
place men and women in the Conservative years. One of the Labour government's key arguments 
in promoting the Welsh Assembly was for the dismantling of these unelected bodies in favour of 
a democratically elected (and accountable) Assembly. This also accorded more broadly with their 
drive to decentralise power and bring it `closer to the people'. 
6. `Great Britain' can be differentiated here from the `United Kingdom' which also includes 
Northern Ireland. Prior to the secession of the Irish Free State in 1922, the whole of Ireland was 
regarded as part of the UK. 
7. Kearney also includes Ireland in his discussion since his concern is with the UK as a whole. 
8. The Normans had gained control of south Wales by the end of the eleventh century as part of 
their general ascendancy in Britain at that time. They had been less successful with the northern 
Welsh kingdoms, however, and had thus been content with `indirect rule', tolerating the autonomy 
of Welsh princes as long as they 
did not openly constitute a threat. It was only with Edward's 
successful campaign some two centuries 
later that the independence of these kingdoms was finally 
brought to an end (Kearney, 1989). 
9. The one notable exception in this period is the emigration in 1865 of a group of Welsh settlers 
to the Chubut valley in Patagonia in Argentina, led by the Revd. Michael Daniel Jones. 
Nationalist rather than economic considerations were the prime consideration of the group's 
exodus, however. Their aim was to establish a pure Homeland, a `gwladfa', there. Indeed, the 
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settlers made exclusive use of Welsh in education and government until the 1930s, when 
Argentina enforced Spanish upon the community for official purposes. As a result, Welsh 
gradually fell into decline from that time (see Jones, 1988). 
10. Apart from the efforts of Welsh historians themselves - most notably, in recent times, Gwyn 
Williams (1985) and Kenneth Morgan (1995) -- Wales has been disproportionately under- 
represented in accounts of British history. Most, as Kearney (1989) and Crick (1991,1995) point 
out, have been preoccupied historically with England. However, even those which have 
attempted a more inclusive perspective do not always give Wales its due. Only Kearney's (1989) 
excellent revisionist account provides some semblance of balance here. Even Linda Colley's 
(1992) acclaimed history is predominantly concerned with the role of Scotland in the construction 
of Britain. 
11. It can be argued that the British ruling class did not formally recognise the existence of a 
distinct Welsh nation prior to 1886. Even then, this recognition had its origins elsewhere, being 
precipitated by the Irish crisis of 1885-1886. In the wake of the Irish crisis, Gladstone -- the 
British Prime Minister at the time - was led to re-examine his assumptions and publicly recognise 
Welsh nationality for the first time (E. Williams, 1989). 
12. Welsh emerged in the sixth century when the Brythonic branch of Celtic began to separate 
into distinct languages. While the first written records date back to the eight century, it was not 
until the Middle Welsh period (1150-1400) that a standardised language began to develop; the 
result, principally, of bardic writings (V. Edwards, 1991). 
13. The Act of Union is widely regarded as a pivotal event in Welsh history and I see no reason 
to dissent from this view. However, for an alternative perspective, see Glanmor Williams (1987). 
14. For useful historical summaries, see G. A. Williams (1985), Kearney (1989), Jenkins (1992). 
15. Religious Nonconformity in Wales was based on evangelical Protestantism and its principal 
expression was the culture of the chapel. Calvinistic Methodism was the most prominent of these 
groups although Independents and Baptists were also significant. The influence of 
Nonconformism was felt extensively in both industrial and rural areas of Wales and was 
increasingly contrasted with the established state Anglican church (see Glanmor Williams, 1979). 
16. These three acts all strengthened a distinct Welsh identity within Britain. The Welsh Sunday 
Closing Act reflected the strength of Nonconformity in Wales by enforcing the closure of public 
houses on Sunday. The Local Government Act created new county councils for Wales, thus 
formalising a cohesive administrative identity, while the Intermediate Act likewise created a 
network of Welsh `county schools' (see Morgan, 1995). 
17. Much was made, for example, of the Welsh ancestry of Henry Tudor (Henry VII, 1457-1509) 
and the use of this ancestry to support his rather tenuous claim to the British Crown after his 
defeat of Richard III at Bosworth Field (Kearney, 1989). 
18. Having said that, the Welsh nationalists themselves did not necessarily see any particular 
value for its ongoing use in the present, nor did they make any serious effort to protect the 
language against increasing anglicisation. Their interest in the language was largely confined to 
promoting its study as a romantic and esoteric pursuit (Davies, 1989). 
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19. While only winning 6 parliamentary seats out of 72 in Scotland in the 1997 British General 
Election, the Scottish Nationalist Party won 22 per cent of the popular vote in Scotland. In so 
doing, it polled better than both the (British) Liberal Democrat and Conservative parties (the latter 
gained only 18 per cent of the popular vote and lost all its scats in Scotland). In a newly 
established Scottish Parliament it is likely that the Scottish Nationalists will thus form the official 
opposition to a Labour/Liberal Democrat ruling alliance (The Guardia,:, 13 September, 1997: 4). 
20. In 1979, Neil Kinnock argued in the British commons: The emancipation of the class which 
I have come here to represent can best be achieved in a single nation and in a single economic 
unit' -- one uniting `the combined strength of working class people throughout the 
United 
Kingdom' (cited in Adonis, 1997: 23). 
21. Balsom et al. 's (1982) study of Welsh national identity was based on an electoral survey 
conducted in the late 1970s. The three broad distinctions in relation to national identity that 
ensued from the study were clearly regionally based, a feature that Balsom (1985) develops more 
explicitly in his `three Wales' model. However, Balsom (and his collaborators) would also be the 
first to admit that all three identifications can be found throughout Wales and may constitute a 
significant minority in other areas (see also n. 26). 
22. Offa's Dyke was built at the end of the eighth century by Offa, the king of Mercia, to 
establish a defensive border between his kingdom and those of the Welsh. While it no longer acts 
as an actual border, it has come to symbolise in popular expression the geographical separation 
of England and Wales (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). 
23. Writing some 50 years ago, Wyn Griffith's description of the relationship between the Anglo- 
Welsh and Welsh-speaking Welsh has clear resonances with Bourdieu's notion of habitus: 
those who have not the [Welsh] language are in effect living on accumulated capital: they 
are sharing a way of He whose fundamentals were established for them. They are drawing 
upon sources of which they may but dimly be aware, but even they would not be exactly 
as they are now were it not for the generations before them who contributed to the fund 
upon which both they and their Welsh-speaking neighbours draw. (1950: 65) 
24. It is important to note the influence of transport links in contributing to the regional variations 
evident in Wales. All major links run east/west, between England and Wales, and it is still 
reasonably difficult to travel north/south since this involves having to negotiate the Welsh 
mountains. As such, it is perhaps not surprising that northern and southern Wales have 
maintained an historical distance from each other and that the eastern areas of Wales should be 
so anglicised (C. Williams, 1982,1990). 
25. Williams also notes that in the nineteenth century industrialisation of south Wales, English- 
speaking migrants would tend to settle in the ports of Cardiff, Swansea, Newport and the like, 
while Welsh-speaking migrants from elsewhere in Wales were more likely to settle in the industrial 
valleys. 
26. Balsom et al. (1982) are quick to point out that these `British identifiers' maintain a 
substantial presence throughout Wales (at 38 per cent). They can be found in y fro Gymraeg (26 
per cent) and in the valleys (34 per cent). However, they are most prominent in the lower south 
of Wales (46 per cent) and in the east and north east (49 per cent). 
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27. That said, Cardiff also has one of the longest established African-Caribbean communities in 
the UK, located in Butetown (more commonly known as Tiger Bay; see Charlotte Williams, 
1995). The African-Caribbean population has been associated with this area since the last century 
and many now identify specifically as `Black-Welsh' (see, for example, Sinclair, 1993). 
28. This compared dramatically with the ten per cent in Scotland who still spoke Gaelic by the 
late nineteenth century (P. Jenkins, 1992). 
29. While the authorisation of the Welsh translation of the Bible might appear contrary in intent 
to the preceding Act of Union it was not actually so. As with its predecessor, the principal 
reason for the concession had to do with facilitating integration of the Welsh into Britain 
(Williams & Raybould, 1991). More pertinently, the authorisation was trot an endorsement of the 
Welsh language but was, again, specifically assimilationist in intent. The provisions for the 
authorisation state clearly that its purpose was `such as do not understand the said Language 
[Welsh] may be conferring both Tongues together, the sooner attain to the Knowledge of the 
English Tongue' (cited in Jones, 1997: 15). In this it was to some extent successful, since 
bilingualism became an increasing feature of life in Wales from this time. However, that it also had 
the effect of maintaining the Welsh language in the face of English was something not 
countenanced by its proposers. 
30. The most prominent example of the latter was perhaps the circulating schools of Griffith 
Jones, established in the mid-eighteenth century. While primarily aimed at Christian evangelism, 
the schools -- comprising itinerant teachers and based on a simple Biblical curriculum -- were 
enormously successful in promoting literacy in Welsh. By 1771, the year of Griffith Jones death, 
it has been estimated that at least 200,000 -- half the population of Wales at that time -- had 
attended the schools (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). As a result, by the end of the century a majority 
of the adult population had probably become literate in Welsh (G. A. Williams, 1985). 
31. It should be noted that concerns over the media had long exercised Welsh nationalists. Plaid 
Cymru was active in campaigning for greater Welsh language representation when broadcasting 
services to Wales were first established in the 1920s (see Morgan, 1981). 
32. In the run-up to the 1979 election, the Labour Government had acceded to a Welsh language 
television channel being established. However, when the Conservatives under Margaret Thatcher 
won the election, they revoked the commitment. Gwynfor Evans, who had been in Parliament 
since 1966 for Plaid Cymru and had only just lost his seat of Carmarthen in the election, vowed 
that unless the Conservatives changed their position within six months, he would fast to the death. 
Realising the potential public relations damage that such an incident could create for a newly 
elected government, Thatcher reversed her decision. This was to be one of the few, if only times 
she would do so in her subsequent 12 year reign as British Prime Minister. 
33. In addition to S4C, Radio Cymru (the BBC Welsh language service) has been broadcasting 
since 1977, with currently over 60 hours a week of Welsh language broadcasts. While there are 
no Welsh language daily newspapers, national weekly, and local monthly newspapers in Welsh 
(papurau bro) are also widely available (V. Edwards, 1991). That said, media in Wales continues 
to be far more widely represented by its English language variants (see R. Jones, 1997). 
34. The Cymdeithas campaign involved occupying second homes and disrupting auctions of such 
properties (Davies, 1989). However, a separate, more militant group, Meibion Glyndwr (The 
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Sons of Glyndwr), emerged in the 1980s and proceeded to conduct a fire-bombing campaign on 
such homes (R. Jenkins, 1991). Meibion Glyndwr's actions have since largely abated, however, 
and its more peripheral influence can be equated with the other fringe nationalist groups that I 
discussed briefly above. 
35. This campaign -- called `Wales is not for sale' -- has argued both that priority be given to 
local people and that Welsh language considerations be taken into consideration in planning 
matters. In response to criticism that the campaign is racist, Cymdeithas have countered by 
arguing that 1) local people include both Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, and 2) that a language 
consideration is not racist since anyone can learn the language (Interview, Welsh Language 
Society, Aberystwyth, January 1995). I will explore the link between language and racism more 
fully in Chapter 8. 
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Chapter 7 
BUILDING A BILINGUAL STATE: POLICY AND PRACTICE 
We were a people, and are so yet. 
When we have finished quarrelling for crumbs 
Under the table, or gnawing the bones 
Of a dead culture, we will arise, 
Armed, but not in the old way. 
From `Welsh History' (RS. Thomas, 1955). 
What we are presently seeing in Wales -- slowly, tentatively -- is the emergence of a bilingual 
state. This development is not based on some nostalgic, romanticised notion of Welsh identity, 
as in earlier conceptions of Welsh cultural nationalism, but on the revaluing of the Welsh language 
within a modern, urban context. Accordingly, the current position in Wales can be increasingly 
equated with Stage 6 (Language Equality) of Churchill's minority language policy typology 
where a national minority language is both legitimated and institutionalised within a wide range 
of formal language domains (see Chapter 5). In the case of Wales, this is not being pursued on 
the basis of a territorial language principle (as in Switzerland or Belgium, for example) -- given 
that y fro Gymraeg (the Welsh-speaking heartland) has increasingly withered and fragmented -- 
but via the personality principle, allowing individuals the right to exercise full choice in their 
personal use of Welsh in any language domain (cf. the arguments on individual and collective 
rights in Chapter 3). This also means that Wales is increasingly moving towards Level 4 
(Multilingual Co-existe)ice Phase) in Churchill's parallel typology of responses to language 
policies. Welsh language and educational rights are becoming legally and practically enshrined 
on the basis of the principle of ethnolinguistic democracy (Fishman, 1995; cf. Chapter 5). That 
said, these rights are still primarily located within the public sector domain at present. If the 
`normalisation' of the Welsh language is to occur fully, as Colin Williams (1994) describes it, one 
final development required will be the extension of these public sector rights into the private and 
commercial sector. At present, the latter still tend to reinforce the hegemony of English. 
This chapter aims to explore the constituent elements which have led to this process of Welsh 
language legitimation and institutionalisation. In particular, I want to examine the influence of 
the (1993) Welsh Language Act and the (1988) Education Reform Act. The pivotal role of 
Welsh-medium education will also be highlighted. In the following chapter, I will explore 
attitudes and responses to these developments among a cohort of 494 teacher trainees in four 
Welsh tertiary institutions. Drawing on language attitude research, and supplemented by fifty 
individual interviews, I will highlight the implications of these attitudes, and the views 
underpinning them, for the growing institutionalisation and normalisation of bilingualism in Wales. 
This allies with Colin Williams' observation that: 
one of the critical features to be addressed ... 
in constructing a fully functional bilingual 
social order, is the social psychological ramification of language choice..... social context 
and inter-group perception may be just as important as the creation of opportunity and 
legislative right in encouraging the normalization of bilingual services. (1995: 70) 
But more on this later. Meanwhile, I want to begin here with a brief overview of recent language 
trends in Wales with regard to Welsh. 
Language trends 
Wales can be presently described as a linguistically plural society characterised by a monolingual 
(English-speaking) majority and a bilingual (Welsh/English-speaking) minority (C. Williams, 
1995). ' This has not always been the case. As I discussed in the previous chapter, as late as 
1880, the preferred language of three out of four Welsh people was Welsh (Morgan, 1981). This 
was all to change over the course of this century, however. Since 1911, inter-censal decline has 
been the most prominent feature of census evidence on the Welsh language (Aitchison & Carter, 
1994; C. Williams, 1990,1994,1995). 2 Most prominently, the percentage of the population able 
to speak Welsh had diminished from 43.5 per cent in 1911 (977,400 Welsh speakers) to only 18.7 
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per cent at the time of the 1991 census (590,600 Welsh speakers) -- a loss of 24.8 per cent. Not 
only that, Welsh monolinguals -- who, in 1911, still constituted 8.5 per cent of the population 
(190,300 speakers) -- have now all but disappeared. Put simply, virtually all Welsh speakers 
today are bilingual in English as well. 
However, the 1991 census has also revealed some important, albeit nascent counter-trends. First, 
for the first time in nearly a century, the 1981-1991 intercensal period saw a reduclioll in the 
decline of Welsh speakers. While language loss continued to occur between the intcrccnsal period 
1981-1991, the decrease was only 1.4 per cent compared with 6.3 per cent for the previous 
intercensal period. As Colin Williams comments, `this is a welcome arrest in the ... pattern of 
decline and should be seen as the turning of the tide [as well as the] beginning [of] significant 
long-term shifts in the distribution and structure of the Welsh-speaking population' (1994: 136). 
In this latter regard, a second key feature of recent language trends has been the growing urban 
base of the Welsh language. The traditional Welsh-speaking areas within y fro Gymraeg continue 
to decline but still remain proportionately the strongholds of the language -- accounting for 55 
per cent of all Welsh speakers. However, the majority of Welsh speakers, in absolute terms, are 
now to be found in urban and sub-urban areas. Most notable among these is the capital city, 
Cardiff, which has become the administrative centre for the Welsh language. The growing 
urbanisation of the Welsh language thus highlights the significance of the institutionalisation of 
Welsh, particularly in the public sector where the ability to speak Welsh is viewed increasingly as 
a form of linguistic and cultural capital. To this end, Aitchison & Carter observe that while the 
long demonstrated detraction of the language is still extant, `it is by no means as powerful as it 
was, and there is [now] a widespread awareness of the advantages of a knowledge of Welsh, 
especially in public employment' (1994: 115). These developments also present us with a central 
irony, since the decline of the traditional Welsh-speaking heartland, so long associated with the 
fate of the language, is continuing apace at the same time as the language is being regenerated 
in urban contexts. This fascinating dualism between a declining heartland and a resurgent 
periphery constitutes the present core of contemporary Welsh life (C. Williams, 1995). 
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Third, the most rapid growth in the Welsh language can be found in the 3-15 year age group 
which saw an increase between 1981-1991 of 6.7 per cent -- rising from 17.7 per cent to 24.4 per 
cent. When compared with the continuing (albeit diminishing) overall decline in the Welsh 
language, this strong counter-trend becomes even more significant (Edwards, 1993). The 
burgeoning use of the Welsh language in this age group -- which now constitutes 22 per cent of 
the Welsh-speaking population -- is largely attributable to the influence of Welsh-medium 
education, particularly in the anglicised areas of south and north-cast Wales where it has been 
widely promoted in recent times (see below). Accordingly, many of these speakers are second 
language learners of Welsh, a feature that is increasingly evident in the adult population as well, 
where language courses for adult learners are growing in popularity. ' 
The emergence of these counter-trends from the 1991 census is also reiterated, and enhanced, by 
a more recent, non-census-based social survey of 19,000 households conducted by the Welsh 
Office (1993). This survey actually estimated a higher percentage of Welsh speakers in the total 
population at 21.5 per cent; the difference between this and the census figures (at 18.7 per cent) 
being attributable perhaps to the tendency of many Welsh speakers to under-report their ability 
in the language to the census (Williams & Raybould, 1991). Of this group, 55.7 per cent 
(representing 12 per cent of the total population) spoke Welsh as their first language, although 
there were considerable differences between age groups. Thus, while the 3-15 year age group had 
the greatest percentage of fluent speakers, at 32.4 per cent, it also had the least percentage of first 
language speakers, at 27 per cent. Again, both these features point to the significant influence of 
Welsh-medium education which I will explore more fully below. 
The Welsh Office Survey also examined actual language use of Welsh. On the basis of self 
assessment, 368,000 (13.4 per cent of the total population) indicated that they were fluent in 
Welsh. A further 94,900 (3.5 per cent) described themselves as being able to speak quite a lot 
of Welsh, while 467,300 (17 per cent) said they spoke some Welsh. This indicates that a total of 
930,200 (34 per cent of the total population) were able to speak at least some Welsh, with 
462,900 (17 per cent of the total population) fluent in Welsh or able to speak Welsh with a 
considerable degree of proficiency. These figures are significantly higher than the normally cited 
Welsh-speaking population of 600,000 and may prove a more useful guide to the potential 
272 
number of Welsh speakers who might avail themselves of Welsh language public services in Walcs 
(C. Williams, 1995). 
There are some caveats to be made here. One is that the dominance of the public sector, at ]east 
to date, in fostering the renaissance of the Welsh language may tie it too closely to a particular, 
class-based bilingual elite -- as, for example, happened historically in Ireland (see Chapter 4). 
Another is the potential backlash that such an association may generate among English speakers. 
Indeed, this is already evident in charges of `reverse discrimination', and even `racism', at 
recruitment policies which give preference to bilinguals within the public sector (cf. Chapter 8). 
A third caveat has to do with the efficacy of Welsh-medium education. While it has proved 
crucial in promoting Welsh/English bilingualism, especially in the anglicised areas of 'Vales, it 
does not ensure that those for whom Welsh is principally a school language will continue to speak 
the language in other social contexts (Baker, 1992; Jones, 1995; C. Williams, 1994,1995). 
I will return to each of these concerns in due course. Meanwhile, it is still possible to state that 
the prospects for the Welsh language itself, and the possibilities of successfully developing a 
bilingual Welsh state, have never looked better. A recent national survey on attitudes to the 
language, for example, found widespread support across Wales (71 per cent) for the use of Welsh. 
Similarly strong support (75 per cent) was found for making Welsh co-equal in status with English 
in Wales, while almost nine out of ten (88 per cent) agreed that the Welsh language is something 
to be proud of (NOP, 1995). This remarkable turn around in the fortunes of the Welsh language, 
and for the prospects of state bilingualism, are underpinned by recent legislation in Wales -- 
notably, the (1993) Welsh Language Act and the (1988) Education Reform Act -- and by the 
rapid expansion, and widely acknowledged success, of Welsh-medium education. It is to these 
specific developments that I now want to turn. 
The Welsh Language Act 
Colin Williams has argued, in relation to Wales, that `if a fully functional bilingual society [is to 
be achieved], where choice and opportunity are the twin pillars of individual language rights, then 
clearly that possibility has to be constructed through both the promotional and regulatory powers 
273 
of the state' (1994: 162; my emphasis). This analysis accords closely with the notion of group- 
differentiated rights, discussed in Chapter 3, and the related argument that such rights (including 
the right to use a language) may be exercised by individuals (Kymlicka, 1995). It also accords 
with the notion of promotion-oriented language rights (Kloss, 1977), discussed in Chapter 5. 
Promotion-oriented rights involve public authorities in trying to promote a minority language by 
having it used in a wide range of public institutions -- legislative, administrative and educational. 
A significant step in establishing such rights in Wales occurred in October 1993, when a new 
Welsh Language Act (Mesur yr laith Gymraeg) passed into law. The Act replaced its more 
limited 1967 predecessor and repealed all previous legislation to do with the Welsh language, 
including the original Acts of Union. The new Act's genesis, under the then Conservative 
government, was the result of a more sympathetic approach to Wales and the Welsh language by 
the British government in general (A. Thomas, 1997), and of the cumulative influence of the 
Welsh language lobby in particular (see Chapter 6). While still limited in some respects, as we 
shall see, it nonetheless clearly reflects the significant advances made on behalf of the Welsh 
language in recent times. 
In the Act, Welsh is treated for the first time as having `a basis of equality' with English within 
Wales although it qualifies this equality as being that which is appropriate within the 
circumstances and `reasonably practicable'. To this end, the new Act provides for the right to use 
Welsh in courts, given suitable notice, and also states that public documents in Welsh should carry 
the same legal weight as those in English. However, perhaps its most significant feature is the 
statutory recognition provided to Bwrdd yr laith Gymraeg (the Welsh Language Board). Bwrdd 
yr laith had originally been established in July 1988, although merely as an advisory body on the 
language, with little status and power. In this respect, it was not too dissimilar initially to its Irish 
equivalent, Bord na Gaeilge (Irish Language Board; see Chapter 4). Under the Act's aegis, 
however, Bwrdd yr laith is now authorised not only to promote and facilitate the use of the Welsh 
language but also to etwire its adoption within the public sector. The latter is to be achieved via 
formal language schemes provided by public organisations to the Board. These schemes are to 
specify the measures each organisation aims to take in order to provide effective bilingual public 
services in Wales. ' Again, there is the caveat invoked that such bilingual services will be provided 
`so far as is both appropriate in the circumstances and reasonably practical'. However, as the 
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subsequent Draft Guidelines for implementation of the Act outline, it is llwrdd yr laith, crucially, 
not the organisations, which determines the parameters of reasonableness and practicality: `lt will 
not be acceptable for those preparing schemes to adopt a highly subjective and restricted view of 
what is appropriate in their circumstances or reasonably practicable' (Welsh Language Board, 
1995: 6). Likewise, the Draft Guidelines stipulate that organisations should not rely on the 
current demand for services in Welsh as a basis for their schemes, on the premise that once more 
effective bilingual services become available so too will demand increase: 
It is acknowledged that, in the past, many Welsh speakers turned to English in dealing 
with public organisations because they were not certain what services were available in 
Welsh. Some were also concerned that using Welsh could lead to delay or a lower 
standard of service. " Therefore, whatever their experience to date, organisations should 
plan for an increase in demand and respond accordingly. (1995: 5; my emphasis) 
The end result envisaged for each organisation is that public service provision through Welsh 
should be a natural, integral part of the planning and delivery of that service. For this to occur, 
a sufficient number of Welsh-speaking staff is required, particularly in regional areas where the 
number of Welsh speakers from which to draw has been traditionally low. This, in turn, will 
require the active recruitment of Welsh-speaking staff. As the Guidelines again state: 
`Organisations may need to adopt positive action strategies which publicise the fact that job 
applications from Welsh speakers are welcomed. This will reflect the fact that Welsh will 
increasingly be a regular part of public life -- especially as organisations implement the 
requirements of the Welsh Language Act through their individual Welsh language schemes' 
(1995: 24). Moreover, in the context of the language schemes, if an organisation concludes that 
it cannot reasonably meet its obligations under the Act without having Welsh speakers in certain 
posts `then, as a general rule, appointing persons able to speak Welsh to these posts will be 
justifiable' (1995: 24). 
As one might perhaps expect, this position is not entirely uncontroversial. Indeed, the question 
of whether a knowledge of Welsh can be stipulated as a requirement of employment has faced a 
number of legal challenges in Wales. In one prominent case in 1985, Jones v. Gwynedd County 
Council, Gwynedd county council was taken to court by two disgruntled English-speaking 
applicants when they failed to secure a council position working with senior citizens (many of 
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whom were Welsh-speaking). They argued that the Welsh language requirement for the position 
was discriminatory under the British (1976) Race Relations Act. The initial Industrial Tribunal 
upheld the complaint on the basis that Welsh speakers formed a `sub-ethnic' group -- thus 
suggesting that differentiation on the basis of ethnicity had occurred. Ilowever, this was later 
overturned on appeal. In this latter ruling (in 1986) it was concluded that language differences 
within an ethnic group were not applicable under the Race Relations Act. 7 
The Welsh Language Board Draft Guidelines also specifically adopt this position, stating that 
`distinguishing between Welsh people on the grounds of their ability or inability to speak Welsh 
does not.. amount to racial discrimination' (1995: 24). The Guidelines further assert that `under 
the law of the European Union, it will not be discriminatory to insist that a post-holder should be 
able to speak a specific language if linguistic knowledge is required to fulfil the duties of the post' 
(1995: 24). In other words, language qualifications in the labour market are no more or less 
restrictive than other professional qualifications required for specific forms of employment and 
are entirely applicable, and defensible, when bilingualism and/or multilingualism are a functional 
necessity. Levelling charges of `racism' with regard to such language requirements can thus be 
seen as a manifestation of narrow monolingualism rather than a legitimate argument (Glyn 
Williams, 1994). 
In this respect, it should also be noted that stipulating certain Welsh language requirements merely 
accords with the widely accepted principle that employees should have an adequate knowledge 
of the official or common language(s) of the state (cf. Chapter 4). Furthermore, the basis of these 
requirements can be fundamentally distinguished from the discriminatory tenets of organisations 
like the US English Only Movement, for example (see Chapter 5). The obvious point of 
distinction here is that the requirements of the Welsh Language Act aim to effect bilingualism 
not monolingualism. English is not realistically threatened in Wales whereas a minority language 
such as Welsh clearly is. Without some formal protection and promotion for Welsh, English 
would inevitably come to dominate all facets of Welsh life at the expense of Welsh; indeed, it very 
nearly did so, and may do so still. Relatedly, such requirements are not concerned with penalising 
someone for speaking English (or any other language for that matter), in contrast to the intent of 
English only policies which specifically pitch one language against another. Rather, the Act can 
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be considered a measure of `external protection' -- an attempt to put the Welsh language on a 
more equal footing with English -- rather than a measure of `internal restriction' which unduly 
limits the individual rights of English speakers per se (Kymlicka, 1995a; see my discussion of this 
distinction in Chapter 3). 
That said, there remain limitations in the scope of the Welsh Language Act and in the related 
remit of Bwrdd yr laith. For example, in contrast to two equivalent private members bills on the 
Welsh language, tabled unsuccessfully to the British parliament in the 1980s, the Act does not 
accord official status to Welsh. This omission, along with the various caveats evident in the Act, 
suggest that the status of the Welsh language remains subsidiary to English. Conspicuously, the 
Welsh Language Board's remit also does not extend to the private business sector -- unlike in 
Quebec, for example (see Chapter 5). This means that businesses may, if they choose, remain 
largely untouched by Welsh language requirements. While many are beginning to respond 
positively to such requirements, often as the result of local pressure, ' the opposition to the 
mandatory use of Welsh by industry and business on grounds of practicality and profitability 
remains strong and consistent (Aitchison & Carter, 1994). Moreover, even in the state sector, 
the Board only has the right to investigate organisations which fail demonstrably to meet the 
requirements outlined under the Act and, subsequently, to recommeizd remedial action. ' There 
is also no general clause which guarantees an individual the right to use the Welsh language in 
their interactions with any public body, or to insist on a Welsh-medium education for their 
children. 
Nonetheless, the significance of the Welsh Language Act and the functions of Bwrdd yr laith 
Gymraeg should not be underestimated. As Colin Williams argues, `the reconstituted Welsh 
Language Board looks set to become the most critical government agency yet in the social history 
of Wales' (1995: 65). In effect, Bwrdd yr laith is in the vanguard of a new approach to language 
planning in Wales. Attention has shifted away from the old, increasingly sterile debates about the 
threat that anglicisation poses to the Welsh language -- as seen historically in the position of 
Saunders Lewis and in debates about the preservation of y fro Gymraeg (see Chapter 6). Instead, 
support for the Welsh language is becoming deeply imbued in the process of state socialisation 
itself (C. Williams, 1995). The result is that language policy in Wales now centres increasingly 
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on the relegitimation of Welsh in a specifically bilingual context. Bilingualism is no longer 
viewed negatively - as the prelude to the inexorable loss of the Welsh language -but as a positive 
dimension of contemporary Welsh life. 10 To this end also, the language focus in Wales has 
broadened beyond the needs and interests of Welsh speakers, with the exclusive overtones that 
this preoccupation necessarily suggests, to include a more systematic recognition of the needs of 
second language learners and non-Welsh speakers. Williams concludes that the increasing 
professionalisation, or institutionalisation of the Welsh language `has severed the intimate link 
between language promotion and the nationalist programme and offers a more promising basis 
for Welsh development precisely because it has been embraced by a wide spectrum of public and 
political agencies in Wales' (1994: 142). 
Welsh-medium education 
This more inclusive approach to Welsh language planning is also clearly evident in the rapid 
growth of, and associated burgeoning support for Welsh-medium education -- that is, an 
education where pupils are taught wholly or partly through the medium of Welsh. 
" For example, 
the greatest growth of Welsh-medium education -- and, by extension, of Welsh speakers -- has 
occurred in the historically anglicised areas of Wales. Thus, Welsh-medium education has been 
crucial in providing an expanding base of Welsh-speakers in these anglicised areas and, more 
broadly, in contributing to the abatement of the long history of Welsh language decline. The 
increasingly widespread support for Welsh-medium education -- among both English- and Welsh- 
speaking parents, many of whom are middle-class -- also has much to do with the educational 
success of the movement (Lyon & Ellis, 1991; Packer & Campbell, 1993). In short, Welsh- 
medium education has shown that academic success and the retention of a minority language are 
not incompatible aims (cf. Chapter 5). In so doing, it has also demonstrated more broadly how 
the legitimation and institutionalisation of Welsh can be successfully achieved within the public 
or civic realm. While there remain limits to 
its influence, as we shall see, Welsh-medium 
education has for these reasons provided the 
bedrock for the nascent bilingual Welsh state. 
The genesis of Welsh-medium education -- which Colin Baker (1990) has described as a `gentle 
revolution' - is most often associated with the establishment of the 
first Welsh-speaking primary 
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school, Ysgol Lluest, in Aberystwyth in 1939. The opening of this small, private school -- a 
seemingly insignificant event at the time -- was to presage a fundamental shift in educational 
practice in Wales. Prior to this development, Welsh education had been dominated for nearly a 
century by the conclusions of the Blue Books in 1847 on the manifold disadvantages of the Welsh 
language (see Chapter 6). These conclusions had provided the intellectual basis for the 
subsequent establishment of state schooling in `England and Wales' which, via the (1870) 
Education Act, had seen English enforced as the sole language of instruction in Welsh schools. 
Welsh was granted the status of a special subject in the 1880s, and eventually a class subject 
(although taught through Englishl), but the impact of the Welsh language on the curriculum of 
Welsh schools remained negligible. 
The result was an educational system in Wales which was largely indistinguishable from that in 
England (Jones, 1997). Not only that, it was a system which actively promoted a view of Welsh 
as a low status language and, relatedly, a social and educational disadvantage. As Jones notes 
elsewhere, in the years following the (1889) Intermediate Education Act Welsh was widely 
regarded by educational professionals `as an inferior language -- and certainly an unnecessary one: 
it was of no help in "getting on" ... 
[a] low status irrelevancy' (1982: 18). The broad educational 
approach adopted was thus starkly assimilationist in both intent and practice and can be equated 
directly with the first two stages of Churchill's typology of minority language education policy 
(see Chapter 5). 
That said, there had been some notable exceptions to the assimilationism of this period; exceptions 
which were to act as important antecedents to the eventual 
development of Welsh-medium 
education. The first of these was closely related to the establishment of the Welsh Department 
of the Board of Education 
in 1907 and, in particular, the influence of its first Chief Inspector of 
Schools, Owen M. Edwards. Edwards, a successful academic in his own right, who had as a child 
suffered the indignities of the 
`Welsh Not', campaigned actively for a greater role for the Welsh 
language in schools. His advocacy was motivated principally by a desire to see the curriculum 
in schools more closely reflect the local Welsh 
(and Welsh-speaking) communities. While his own 
idea of what constituted Welshness allied closely with the romanticised, rural conception of the 
cultural nationalists of the 
day, his voice was nonetheless an important one. But it was also, at 
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that time at least, a rather solitary one -- the notion of upward social mobility through the 
acquisition of English continued to be strongly held by parents, and the wider educational 
administration. As such, his efforts to promote the language and to integrate schools and their 
communities more closely came to nothing (Jones, 1997). 
It was not until the publication of the Welsh Department of the Board of Education's report Y 
Gyniraeg meivn Adysg a Bytivyd (Welsh in Education and Lt(e) in 1927, seven years after 
Edwards death, that the role of the Welsh language in schools was once again raised. The Report 
was a formal milestone in the development of Welsh-medium education (Baker, 1990). On the 
basis of its survey of 135 secondary schools in Wales, none of which employed Welsh as the 
everyday language of the school, the report specifically argued for a more distinctly JVels1, school 
curriculum, within which the Welsh language would enjoy a significantly enhanced role: 
Unless ... Welsh acquires an 
honoured, or even a predominant part in the education of our 
boys and girls, it will fall in the general estimate, to a position below anything that may be 
called a national culture. (1927: 188; cited in Baker, 1990: 80) 
To this end, the Report urged that educational policies should more closely reflect the fact that 
both Welsh and English were, for different groups of children, first languages; that the child's first 
language should be the sole medium of instruction in the early years of schooling; and that the 
second language should be gradually introduced. The Report also specifically argued the case for 
establishing `centrally situated schools set apart as Welsh schools' in anglicised areas of Wales 
(Evans, 1978). While these recommendations were to provide the specific rationale for the 
subsequent development of Welsh-medium education after the Second World War (Morgan, 
1981; see below), its immediate influence and effect, like Edwards' efforts before it, were 
minimal. Indeed, as discussed in the previous chapter, the period 1921-1939 saw for the first time 
a widespread generational loss of Welsh, the result of both parental rejection of the language and 
a still largely unresponsive school system (C. Williams, 1995). 
It is against this background then that the first Welsh-speaking primary school in Aberystwyth was 
established -- a venture so small 
initially, that its first pupils amounted to only seven in number. 
The parents of the school's first pupils were mostly staff' from the local university whose 
attachment to Welsh led them to this experiment of educating their children through the medium 
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of a language untested in formal education (Edwards, 1993). Despite initial scorn from Welsh 
and non-Welsh speakers alike, the school soon proved an academic success -- the result of both 
active support from middle-class parents and a dedicated teaching stall. Consequently, it began 
to attract pupils from English-speaking as well as Welsh-speaking homes. I lowever, its parlous 
financial position was not secured until its eventual adoption by the local authority in 1951. By 
then, the success of the Aberystwyth venture had already led to the development of state-funded 
Ysgolion Cymraeg (Welsh-medium schools) elsewhere in Wales -- the first being opened in 
Llanelli (in Carmarthenshire) in 1947. As Charlotte Davies argues, the Aberystwyth school's 
`primary contribution to the postwar development of the Welsh schools movement was to 
demonstrate the feasibility of Welsh-medium education and, through the support given it by 
middle-class parents, to help dispel fears that children in such a school might be retarded in 
general academic growth' (1989: 52). 
With the advent of the (1944) Education Act, the locus of Welsh-medium education shifted to 
the anglicised areas of Wales where, surprisingly perhaps, it was to stay. The Act did not address 
language of instruction as such but did direct local authorities to establish schools in their areas 
which accorded with the wishes of parents. As a result of just such parental pressure, Welsh- 
medium schools were established in 1948 in Cardiff, and in Llandudno in the anglicised north-east 
of Wales. At the same time, the local authority of Flintshire, which incorporated Llandudno, 
established a policy to open an ysgol Gymraeg within travelling distance of every home. This led, 
in turn, to a call for similar provision at the secondary level. It was once again to be in anglicised 
areas of Wales that such developments took hold -- Flintshire pioneered the first Welsh-medium 
secondary school in 1956 at Rhyl on the north coast. 
Within the space of two decades, a century's proscription of Welsh language from schools, and 
its more widespread derogation, had begun to be turned on its head. Moreover, Welsh-medium 
schools, while initially established to serve the needs of Welsh-speaking children, particularly in 
non-Welsh-speaking areas, were increasingly attracting children from English-speaking homes. 
12 
The leadership given by the Welsh-speaking professional middle class, and the high academic 
standards associated with the movement, were proving to be a compelling combination. The 
initial predominance of Welsh-medium education in anglicised areas also provided a Welsh-based 
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educational infrastructure which effectively bridged, for the first time, the two linguistic 
communities in Wales (Davies, 1989). Indeed, it was only after Welsh-medium schools had 
become well established in anglicised areas of Wales that they began to be established more widely 
in Welsh-speaking areas where English still predominated in schools. " This development 
illustrates, writ large, how the anglicised periphery in Wales has come to be in the forefront of the 
Welsh language renaissance. 
Throughout this initial period, a number of key pressure groups were also instrumental in 
generating and maintaining this broad-based support for Welsh-medium education. One such 
group can be traced back to the initial school at Aberystwyth itself, since Ifan ab Owen Edwards 
(the son of Owen M. Edwards), who was the driving force behind the school's establishment, was 
also the founder (in 1922) of Urdd Gobaith Cymru -- the Welsh League of Youth. This 
organisation was a non-political movement which aimed to promote Welsh among young people 
(the 16-25 age group) via a range of social, cultural and educational activities. So popular did 
it prove that by 1934 Urdd could boast 50,000 members (G. A. Williams, 1985). Not only that, 
Urdd also established itself as an effective pressure group for the Welsh language, arguing for the 
publication of more Welsh language books and magazines for example, and actively promoting 
first the establishment and then the extension of Welsh-medium education (Morgan, 1981). 
The Urdd's natural constituency was in Welsh-speaking areas of Wales. However, it was also to 
provide the impetus for the subsequent establishment of the Welsh Schools Movement in the early 
1960s (Butt Philip, 1975). The principal aim of this latter group was to promote the expansion 
of Welsh-medium schools in the anglicised areas of Wales -- a process which, as we have seen, 
was by then already well under way. However, the interests of Welsh-medium schools in both 
anglicised and Welsh-speaking areas were united when the organisation became Rhieni dros 
Addysg Gymraeg (Parents for Welsh-medium Education) in 1984 (Williams & Raybould, 1991). 
A parallel organisation, Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin (The Welsh Nursery Schools Association), 
was also an important influence in promoting Welsh in the pre-school sector. This voluntary 
organisation was founded in 1971, although the first cylchoedd meithrin (nursery groups) were 
actually established soon after the first ysgolion Cymraeg -- one example being at Maesteg in 
1948 (PDAG, 1993a). Mudiad Ysgolion Meithrin's principal role has been to organise these 
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nursery schools and pre-school playgroups into a cohesive national network. Its primary aims, 
in so doing, have been to develop social and linguistic skills in Welsh for children from Welsh- 
speaking backgrounds, and to introduce Welsh to those from non-Welsh-speaking backgrounds, 
prior to their arrival in Welsh-medium primary schools (Williams & Raybould, 199 1). 
The cumulative result of these various organisations' efforts and advocacy has been to secure 
Welsh-medium education as an established, and prominent, feature of contemporary Welsh life. 
Indeed, the actual growth of Welsh-medium education, particularly in recent years, can be 
regarded as nothing short of spectacular. Cylchoedd meith in (nursery groups), for example, have 
seen a growth throughout Wales from a base of 67 in 1971 to 617 in 1992. In 1992, these groups 
reached over 10,000 children, 60 per cent of whom came from non-Welsh-speaking backgrounds 
(PDAG, 1993a). Similarly, in 1993 there were 538 Welsh-medium primary schools, constituting 
33.3 per cent of the total number of primary schools in Wales and 19.8 per cent of the total 
primary school population (PDAG, 1993b). 14 Moreover, the majority of pupils being educated 
in these Welsh-medium schools (59 per cent) actually spoke English at home (PDAG, 1994). A 
similar story is evident in secondary education where 58 secondary schools (25.5 per cent of the 
total number of secondary schools) are designated as Welsh-medium schools (PDAG, 1993b). 
Welsh medium education is also increasingly available at tertiary level, albeit still in a limited 
capacity. A range of traditional university subjects can be taken in Welsh at the University of 
Wales at Aberystwyth and Bangor. " There is also special provision for training teachers through 
the medium of Welsh at Trinity College, Carmarthen and Coleg Normal in Bangor (the latter 
having amalgamated with the University of Wales at Bangor in 1997). 
Perhaps just as significant as the rapid growth of Welsh-medium education, however, has been 
the concomitant establishment of a distinct institutional framework to service and support such 
schools. One of the most important of the Welsh organisations within this structure was the 
Welsh Joint Education Committee (WJEC), established in 1948 under the (1944) Education Act. 
The primary responsibility of the WJEC was to prepare course syllabi and set examinations for 
schools in Wales. As a result, it faced increasing demands for materials and examinations in 
Welsh arising from the expansion of Welsh-medium schools. 16 These demands led, in turn, to the 
establishment in 1964 of a permanent Committee for Wales within the British Schools Council, 
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the only sub-committee on the Council based on a geographical area rather than a subject or age 
group (Davies, 1989). A further crucial development occurred in 1970 when responsibility for 
the Welsh Department of Education was shifted from the Department of Education and Science 
in London to the Welsh Office in Cardiff. 
This trend towards a distinct Welsh educational infrastructure was also reinforced in 1986 when 
the WJEC created Pwyllgor Datblygu Addysg Gymraeg (PDAG), the Development Board for 
Welsh Education. PDAG was given specific responsibility for coordinating developments in 
Welsh-medium education, advising government on language policy, identifying further 
development and research needs, and providing a general forum for discussing Welsh language 
education policies (Edwards, 1993; C. Williams, 1994). In effect, PDAG acted as both a 
campaigning body and a forum for Welsh medium education (Interview, Bill Raybould 16 March, 
1994), and a highly effective one at that. However, it was eventually disbanded in 1994, with its 
functions being appropriated by the reconstituted Bwrdd yr laith Gymraeg (Welsh Language 
Board) and the newly formed Awdurdod Cwricwlwm ac Asesu Cymru (ACAC), the Curriculum 
and Assessment Authority for Wales. Considerable concern was expressed at the time about the 
demise of PDAG on the basis that the move appeared to diminish the importance of Welsh- 
medium education (PDAG, 1993c; C. Williams, 1994). However, the expanded role of Bwrdd 
yr laith -- which encompasses responsibility for education -- should prove an adequate enough 
replacement. The concomitant establishment of the National Curriculum in Wales, which I will 
discuss in the next section, should also ensure the central ongoing role of Welsh-medium 
education within the Welsh school system. 
What we have thus seen established in Wales is, at the very least, a Stage 5 (Private Use 
Language Maintenance) approach to minority language education with regard to Welsh. The 
rapid growth of Welsh-medium education over the last 50 years, and its associated infrastructure, 
have resulted in the promotion of Welsh within education via a group maintenance approach to 
bilingualism. However, there remain limits to both the influence and efficacy of Welsh-medium 
education. One limitation was raised at a more general level in Chapter 4 -- that is, the extent to 
which education can influence wider language use. While education is a key element of any 
attempt to reverse minority language shift, it can only do so much. This is evidenced in Wales by 
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the fact that while the rapid growth of Welsh-medium education has clearly had a mitigating effect 
on Welsh language decline, it has not been able to halt, let alone reverse this decline as yet. Part 
of this can also be explained by the largely piecemeal development of Welsh-medium education 
which has resulted in considerable variation of provision from region to region (Rawkins, 1979, 
1987). 17 Add to this the fact that even now Welsh-medium education only reaches approximately 
20 per cent of the school population and it is not hard to see the limits of its reach and influence. 
In short, the majority of children in Wales are still educated through the medium of English, a 
point that should not be forgotten. 
For those pupils from English-speaking homes who learn Welsh through school, and even for first 
language speakers of Welsh, there is the additional question of whether they will continue to use 
the language once they have left school. Numerous language attitude surveys in Wales (Sharp 
et al., 1973; Lewis, 1975; Baker, 1985,1992), and wider sociolinguistic research (Gardner & 
Lambert, 1972; Edwards, 1985; Fishman, 1991; Harley, 1993), suggest that education by itself 
is not enough to maintain minority language use. This is particularly so for Welsh-medium 
schools in anglicised areas. Such schools may well have contributed to the creation of a new 
generation of Welsh speakers in the post-war period. However, they also epitomise the 
fragmentation of the wider bilingual community within Wales since these schools often provide 
the only significant domain where a predominantly Welsh-medium milieu can be experienced (C. 
Williams, 1995). 
The increasing institutionalisation of Welsh in the public domain is a key here to providing more 
opportunities and incentives to maintain the use of Welsh after school. However, even this has 
limitations. The institutionalisation of Welsh does not extend as yet to the corporate sector and, 
along with the genesis of Welsh-medium education, it also tends to reinforce the perception that 
a knowledge and use of Welsh is a peculiarly middle-class preoccupation. The latter perception 
arises to some extent from the close historical association of the middle-classes with Welsh- 
medium education (see above). This association is further reflected in the growing development 
of a bilingual elite within the public sector -- a Welsh `tafiia' as it is sometimes called. 
'$ To this 
end, Colin Williams cautions that because the growth in the educational sector has outpaced 
concomitant developments in the world of work and social interaction: 
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we are faced with a generation of bilingual school leavers who have been socialised into 
believing that their bilingualism is prized by a society, which on examination turns out to 
be a rather narrowly constructed, middle-class public sector society, which rewards its 
own as purveyors of information and knowledge. There arc clear class implications in the 
development of an administrative bureaucracy which is both the principal agency for 
change and the principal net beneficiary of [such] change. (1994: 168) 
Williams suggests that there may be no other way forward but nonetheless argues that too great 
a reliance on the public sector may be detrimental to the language in the long tern. As such, 
much of the present advocacy of Welsh language planning is directed towards extending the use 
of Welsh into other domains (Aitchison & Carter, 1994; C. Williams, 1994,1995; Jones, 1995; 
see also Baker, 1992). The central premise of this new approach is encapsulated by Williams: 
`although great strides have been made ... within the 
"Welsh schools" system, we now need to 
refocus our central goal as language planners from bilingual education in Males to education for 
a bilingual Males' (1994: 143). 
One other observation on the limits of Welsh-medium education relates to the educational 
implications for ethnic minorities within Wales. While the formal development of Welsh/English 
bilingual education is no bar necessarily to the recognition and use of other minority languages 
within Welsh education, such languages have to date received little formal recognition. In this 
respect, Wales is not much different to England in its marginalisation of community language 
education (Bourne, 1989; Verma et al., 1998) and what little of such education there actually is 
continues to operate largely outside of the formal Welsh school system (Tarrow, 1992). Indeed, 
even at the ostensibly more superficial level of multiculturalism, there has been little formal 
progress made in establishing a consciously multicultural curriculum in Wales. Norma Tarrow 
argues, for example, that the major barrier to implementing effective multicultural policies `is the 
widely held belief that there is little representation in Wales of groups other than English, Welsh 
and long-standing assimilated ethnic minorities' (1992: 502). As I have already discussed, this 
position is indicative of the wider invisibility of ethnic minorities within Wales (cf. Charlotte 
Williams, 1995). It may also well accord with the variety of approaches to minority language 
education adopted towards different minority groups within nation-states (see Chapter 5). But 
it remains, nonetheless, a serious omission and I will return again to it in more detail, in Chapter 
9. 
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While much of the educational interest in Wales has centred then on Welsh-medium education, 
these caveats point to the need for an educational approach with concerns that are broader than 
just language. Crucially, this is also now beginning to occur in Wales, principally as a result of 
the (1988) Education Reform Act and its subsequent impact on the organisational and curricular 
development of Welsh education. 
The Education Reform Act 
For all the significance of developments relating to Welsh-medium education, what remained 
lacking was a formal distinction between the English and Welsh education systems. Welsh- 
medium education may have established a significant niche for itself, and generated a related 
educational bureaucracy. However, distinct educational provision in Wales was still primarily 
dependent on internal advocacy from parents and educationalists and, more crucially, external 
largesse from the British government (Jones, 1997). In this respect, the control and direction of 
Welsh education continued to reflect the wider incorporation of Wales within a British state 
dominated by England (see Chapter 6). The (1988) Education Reform Act was to change all 
this, albeit accidentally. 
The Act, a centrepiece of the Conservative Thatcher administration, established a National (sic) 
Curriculum for England and Wales. " The deliberate qualification in the title of the `National' 
Curriculum is important here. Like all previous major educational reform affecting `England and 
Wales', the whole thrust of the Act was actually concerned with the needs of the English 
(national) curriculum (Jones, 1997). Ironically, as it turns out, this is perhaps where it has been 
least successful. The New Right ideology underpinning the Act -- an unwieldy combination of 
laissez faire economics and social conservatism -- led on the one hand to an emphasis on the 
increased marketisation and commodification of education and, on the other hand, to the 
promotion of a centralised, highly prescriptive, `traditional' curriculum. This dual emphasis, and 
its sometimes conflicting demands, resulted in both considerable controversy about, and active 
opposition to the subsequent implementation of the National Curriculum within England (see Ball, 
1990; Flude & Hammer, 1990; Lingard et al., 1993). 
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In marked contrast, the Act has been received in Wales with considerably more enthusiasm. Many 
of its more controversial New Right elements have simply not been pursued within Wales, thus 
avoiding the controversies apparent in England, while debates about curriculum content have also 
proved less problematic (Daugherty, 1993; Reynolds, 1994; see below). More crucially, the Act 
has achieved what no other previous major legislation had come near to doing -- the establishment 
of a Welsh education system in its own right. That this development was not envisaged by its 
original proponents makes the end result even more remarkable. 
In short, the 1988 Act has accomplished a fundamental transformation of Welsh education within 
the last decade. This is most evident in the curriculum where the Welsh language is now not only 
formally recognised as a principal language of instruction within Welsh-medium schools, but also 
as a national language that should be taught as of riglst to all pupils within Wales. Despite 
recommendations from previous educational reports along these lines, including both the (1927) 
IVelslh irr Educations and Life and the (1967) Primary Education in Males (commonly known as 
the Gittins Report), 2° little actual progress had been made prior to the Act in this latter regard. 
The formal recognition of Welsh throughout all schools in Wales occurred because at the time of 
the drafting of the National Curriculum in the mid-1980s there were a sufficient number of Welsh- 
medium schools to ensure that the government of the day could not define the core language 
component of the National Curriculum (at least in Wales) as solely English. Conceding that 
Welsh was now the language of instruction and initial study for a significant minority of schools 
in Wales meant that Welsh had to be recognised as a `core subject' in these schools under the Act 
(Williams & Raybould, 1991). Following from this, Welsh has also been given the status of a 
`foundation subject' within all other schools in Wales, to be compulsorily studied by all non- 
Welsh-speaking children as a subject (National Language Forum, 1991). As an official report on 
the place of Welsh within the National Curriculum summarised it at the time: `Our objective is to 
ensure that non-Welsh-speaking pupils 
in Wales, by the end of their compulsory schooling at 16, 
will have had the opportunity 
to learn sufficient Welsh to enable them to use it in their everyday 
life and to feel part of a 
bilingual society' (cited in Edwards, 1993: 264). 
There remain ongoing concerns about whether there will be a sufficient number of teachers and 
resources to staff and support such a wide ranging language-based programme (Williams & 
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Raybould, 1991; PDAG, 1993c). The requirement that Welsh be studied to Stage 4 of the 
National Curriculum -- that is, up to GCSE level at 16 years -- has also since been downgraded 
to Stage 3 (14 years); the result of an amendment to the Act in 1993. The latter legislation can 
be regarded as yet another example where the needs of the English curriculum have detrimentally 
affected Wales (Jones, 1997), since the amendment was itself a response to an official review, 
headed by Sir Ron Dearing, on the many difficulties encountered in the original implementation 
of the National Curriculum in England. Nonetheless, the key feature of the Education Reform 
Act, at least with regard to the language, remains intact -- for the first time, Welsh has been 
established as a compulsory element of the curriculum within all schools in Wales. In contrast, 
the earlier advances of Welsh-medium education, important though they were, remained 
dependent on sufficient local parental demand and/or the beneficence of individual local head- 
teachers for their successful enactment (Rawkins, 1979,1987; Baker, 1995). 
The formal elevation of Welsh as both a core and foundation subject within the National 
Curriculum is all the more surprising given that so much of the political rhetoric surrounding the 
Act centred on `parental choice'. One might thus have expected this principle to have continued 
to frame the delivery of Welsh within schools in Wales, particularly given that parental choice was 
such a prominent feature historically in relation to Welsh-medium education. Such an outcome, 
however, would have proved problematic in the longer term for the consistent provision of a 
Welsh language education. While the notion of parental choice has clearly worked to the 
advantage of Welsh-medium education in the past, it has also long worked to its detriment. Some 
parents in anglicised areas of Wales, for example, have consistently rejected the validity and value 
of learning Welsh -- a position which meant that until the Act's implementation some schools did 
not include Welsh in their curriculum in any form. Indeed, in 1987-1988, just prior to the Act, 
Welsh was still absent form the education of one out of three (32.4 per cent) of all primary age 
pupils (PDAG, 1993b). 
A general antipathy to Welsh language education has also been prominently reflected in 
educational pressure groups such as Education First, a small but vociferous parent organisation 
committed to resisting the extension of Welsh language teaching -- both as a subject and a 
medium of instruction -- within the education system. Such long-standing opposition meant that 
many proponents of Welsh language education feared that the notion of parental choice, coupled 
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with the related move under the Act towards devolution of administration and funding to the 
school level, might have resulted in parents (and thus schools) `opting out' of any formal Welsh 
language requirements. This fear has not materialised, given the subsequent direction of the Act. 
However, opposition to the formalisation of Welsh within the school curriculum on the basis of 
a curtailment of `choice' has not abated entirely. Some parents continue to actively oppose the 
emphasis given to Welsh language education, usually via local campaigns (see, for example, Times 
Education Supplement, 15 December, 1996: 5; The Western Mail, 29 April, 1997: 7). 
The implications for the Welsh language then of the Education Reform Act cannot be 
overestimated. However, crucially, the influence of the Act, and the National Curriculum to 
which it has given rise, has not ended there. The advent of the National Curriculum has led to the 
further administrative differentiation of the Welsh and English education systems, resulting for the 
first time in all levels of education, from pre-school to university, coming under direct Welsh 
control (Jones, 1997). 21 Central to these administrative developments was the establishment in 
1988 of the Curriculum Council for Wales (CCW) -- which acted as a counterpart to the National 
Curriculum Council for England (NCC) -- and its successor, Awdurdod Cwricwlwm ac Asesu 
Cymru (ACAC), the Curriculum and Assessment Authority for Wales, established in 1994. These 
organisations have been responsible for implementing the National Curriculum as it applies to 
Wales. In so doing, they have developed a Welsh curriculum that is distinct not only in terms of 
the role of the Welsh language but also with regard to other key subject areas of the curriculum. 
Pivotal to the emergence of this broadly articulated Welsh curriculum has been the concept of 
`Cwricwlwm Cymreig'. 
Cwricwlwm Cymreig 
What has emerged from the Education Reform Act is not simply a curriculum in Welsh but a 
curriculum for Wales (Jones, 1997). 
fl This process was set in motion by the establishment of 
CCW as part of the Act. Under its influence, the subsequent discussion on what might comprise 
the curriculum content of the ten designated subjects in the National Curriculum (11 in Wales with 
the addition of Welsh) diverged significantly from its English counterpart the NCC, both in tenor 
and substance. Thus, much of the market-driven philosophy and social conservatism underlying 
debates on the National Curriculum in England was eschewed by CCW and its successor ACAC. 
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As David Reynolds observed of this at the time: `What seems to be happening currently in Wales 
is that an increasing number of audiences and groups in the country are realising that the way to 
avoid the problems and difficulties generated by the introduction of market-based philosophies 
in England is to develop a distinctively different set of policies in Wales' (1994: 8). 
In addition, while the content of some of the designated subjects in the National Curriculum -- 
Science, Technology, Mathematics and Physical Education -- were to remain the same for both 
England and Wales, separate Statutory Orders for Wales were achieved for other subjects -- 
notably History, Geography, Art and Music. In history, for example, a separate working group 
for Wales had been convened in the initial consultative process, thus allowing the group to pursue 
an entirely independent line over the curriculum content for the subject. The result was the 
development of a distinctly Welsh history within a British and European context for delivery in 
Welsh schools. While geography did not achieve a separate working group, the final report on 
the subject nonetheless recommended that Welsh pupils should study Wales as a separate 
geographical entity rather than merely study their own immediate locality. 
This assertion of difference between the English and Welsh versions of the National Curriculum 
which, admittedly, developed in a somewhat ad hoc way to begin with, was further formalised by 
a CCW position paper in 1993, Developing a Curriculum Cymreig. The starting point of the 
document was that all pupils in Wales were entitled as of right to a `Cwricwlwm Cymreig' -- that 
is, a distinctively Welsh curriculum. While the Welsh language would constitute an important 
component of such a curriculum, it would not be its sole concern. Rather, Cwricwlwm Cymreig 
would comprise the following key characteristics: a sense of place and heritage, a sense of 
belonging, a knowledge of the distinctive contribution of both the Welsh language and Welsh 
literature to Wales (and Britain), and an awareness of the historical role and influence of religion 
in Welsh life (CCW, 1993; see also 1994). Given this, it was argued that such an approach would 
be as relevant to non-Welsh speakers as to Welsh speakers. On this basis, the CCW document 
proceeded to outline how this curricular approach might be accomplished. While the continued 
maintenance and development of distinct subject orders under the National Curriculum was seen 
as critical, so too was an ongoing emphasis on the Welsh language as a visible component of 
school life, and the promotion, wherever possible, of a broadly whole-school and cross-curricular 
approach. 
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The evocation of heritage, place, language, and specific historical and cultural features as 
constituting key elements of'Welshness' in Cwricwlwm Cymreig clearly resonate with the central 
attributes of an ethnie, discussed in Chapter 1. However, such an approach also lays itself open 
to the charge of cultural nostalgia and to the potential perpetuation of an insular, exclusive 
`nationalism'. Having finally freed itself from a conception of Welshness restricted to the 
language is Wales simply embarking on a recidivist venture in romanticised cultural nationalism, 
albeit in somewhat different form? This is an important question and one that has been raised in 
relation to Cwricwlwm Cymreig in general and the Welsh history curriculum in particular 
(Phillips, 1995a, 1995b, 1996). The historian Robert Phillips, for example, provides a cautious 
welcome to Cwricwlwm Cymreig but argues that its development must guard against the `cultural 
restorationism' apparent in the debates surrounding the National Curriculum in England (Tate, 
1994,1997; see Short & Carrington, 1998 for a useful review). The term `cultural 
restorationism' was coined by Stephen Ball (1990,1993) to describe attempts in England by New 
Right ideologues to revalorise `traditional' forms of education in defence of a `common culture' 
(cf. Schlesinger's position on US education in Chapter 3). Phillips argues that these reactionary 
and nostalgic elements are also potentially present in Cwricwlwm Cymreig: `because it is involved 
in a project in the elevation of a distinctive culture, "Curriculum Cymreig" has many of the 
features of New Right discourse; potential at least exists for the creation of an inward looking and 
parochial view of history and the wider curriculum' (1996: 394). However he also concedes that, 
unlike developments in England, this potential may well be avoided in Wales. 
Two principal reasons for this are offered. First, much of the distinctive development of a Welsh 
curriculum has been radical rather than reactionary; that is, it has been a countervailing response 
to Anglocentric cultural restorationism rather than a valorisation of it, as in England (Jones & 
Lewis, 1995; Jones, 1997). While this does not preclude the development of an insular, 
introspective Welsh cultural nationalism, the concomitant emphasis on the situaledness of Welsh 
history, particularly within a British and European context, does militate against this occurring. 
Indeed, Welsh history and the Welsh curriculum more broadly have come to be situated 
increasingly within a wider European context (Jenkins, 1991; Bowie, 1993). For example, the 
Welsh History syllabus for the National Curriculum (Welsh Office, 1995) is praised by Philips 
(1996) precisely for its outward, European focus. In this view, a focus on Wales and Welshness 
acts as a base from which to understand the world rather than a means by which to delimit it. 
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Such an approach also accords with the notion of cultural nationalism which, as I discussed in 
Chapter 2, can be seen as an attempt to modernise the national community from within 
(Hutchinson, 1994). In the process, what constitutes Welshness is valued and/or revalued on 
one's own terms rather than, as in the past, on terms dictated by others. 
Relatedly, there is a conscious attempt within Cwricwlwm Cymrcig to emphasise the dyy»aniic and 
diverse nature of `Welshness' within contemporary Wales. This diversity and dynamism is clearly 
demonstrated in long-standing linguistic and regional differences, as we have seen, and in the 
ongoing transition from rural, Nonconformist identities to increasingly secular and urban ones 
within Wales. Conceived in this way, Cwricwlwm Cymreig has the potential to explore the 
complex, and at times conflictual identities which have resulted from the central Wclsh/Anglo- 
Welsh nexus and how these might be outworked in new forms of contemporary Welsh identity 
based on a bilingual Wales. In addition, such a curriculum might also move on to address, and 
redress, the ongoing `invisibility' of women, and other ethnic minority groups within Wales; 
exploring, in so doing, the implications of a more self consciously gendered and multicultural 
Wales. 
Responding to change 
David Miller, writing on national identity, makes the following observation: 
a national identity helps to locate us in the world; it must tell us who we are, where we 
have come from, what we have done. It must then involve an essentially historical 
understanding in which the present generation are seen as heirs to a tradition which they 
then pass on to their successors. Of course the story is continually being rewritten; each 
generation revises the past as it comes to terms with the problems of the present. 
Nonetheless, there is a sense in which the past always constrains the present: present 
identities are built out of materials that are handed down, not started from scratch. (1995: 
165) 
Bikhu Parekh argues, along similar lines: `A community's identity is subject to constant change.... 
Every community must wrestle with it as best it can, and find ways of reconstituting its identity 
in a manner that is both deeply sensitive to its history and traditions and fully alive to its present 
and future needs' (1995b: 267). These positions have a close resonance with my discussion of 
habitus in Chapter 1. Moreover, they appear to encapsulate what is currently occurring in Wales 
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as the key emphases in Cwricwlwm Cymreig coincide with those in contemporary Welsh language 
planning for the development of a formal bilingual state. A bilingual Wales, based on a new set 
of urban Welsh identities (C. Williams, 1995), offers an alternative both to a narrow language- 
based conception of Welshness and to its opposite, the disavowal of any public role for Welsh 
within contemporary Wales. The result, as Fiona Bowie outlines, is that 
Wales is increasingly looking out, towards Europe, as well as within, at its own mixed 
population, its bilingualism, and its cultural roots. I perceive a new confidence and 
determination by Welsh-speakers, incomers and English-speaking people alike, to forge 
a Welsh identity which builds on all these disparate groups and experiences. It will be 
different from the Wales of the imagination and from the 'Vales of the past, but it will also 
be distinctively and assertively Welsh. (1993: 191) 
However, the process of change is far from unproblematic and antagonisms and prejudices 
continue to run deep, on both sides of the old divide. Thus the Welsh nationalist R. S. Thomas 
can still assert that the language is all: `So where do we go from here? One must make a stand. 
Hyphenisation is betrayal. Whatever the situation may be in other countries, in Wales we now 
only have the language to distinguish us. One cannot be too inflexible' (1992: 30). While others, 
such as John Osmond, argue instead for a `civic nationalism' where, by implication, the language 
has at best only a marginal place, if any at all: `the modern 'Vales of the 21st century will be one 
whose territory is more defined by the institutions that govern it than by a separate language' 
(1989: 89; see also 1994). 
Of course, there is no reason why the linguistic and civic dimensions cannot actually be combined. 
Indeed, this is what the development of a bilingual Wales aims specifically to accomplish (cf. A. 
Thomas, 1997). But these ongoing frictions point to the contest and conflict which necessarily 
attach to any such enterprise. Achieving a Welsh bilingual state requires far more than the public, 
formal acknowledgement of language rights, public services and educational opportunities, 
important though these are. Rather, as Colin Williams observes, its legitimacy `will always be 
subject to fierce debate about a contested social reality, namely the sort of 
Vales we are 
constructing together' (1995: 67). It 
is to this actual debate that I now want to turn. 
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Notes -- Chapter 7 
1. While I adopt this widely accepted formulation of the language situation in Wales here, it 
needs to be borne in mind that there are also other groups of minority language speakers within 
Wales. I return to the implications of their `absence' from such analyses more fully in my 
discussion of Welsh-medium education below. 
2. Unless otherwise specified, the language trends detailed in this chapter arc drawn from these 
sources. 
3. It is important to note that there are also a considerable number of Welsh speakers currently 
living outside Wales, including a large, albeit fragmented Welsh speaking population in London 
(V. Edwards, 1991). 
4. Many adult language courses in Welsh adopt the Wllpan method of teaching, based on the 
Ulpan immersion approach to teaching Hebrew in Israel. The first Wllpan course was set up in 
Cardiff in 1973 and was subsequently incorporated within the teaching programmes of the 
University of Wales, Cardiff. Such has been their popularity that, along with Welsh-medium 
education, adult language courses now constitute a significant source of second language learners 
of Welsh. It has been estimated that as many as 10,000 trainees now attend such courses 
annually, 35 per cent of whom are aged between 26-35 years, with 24.8 per cent aged 36-45 years 
(Welsh Joint Education Committee, 1992; Edwards, 1993). This growth is also reflected in the 
1991 census which records ten per cent of Welsh speakers as having being born outside of Wales, 
suggesting that many of these are likely to be second language learners. 
5. Only the following public bodies are officially included within the Act's remit: local authorities, 
police and fire authorities, health authorities and trusts, education funding councils, and school 
and college governing bodies. However, other bodies not formally included -- such as 
government departments and the new Assembly -- are still strongly expected to prepare language 
schemes in accordance with the Act. 
6. This trend is supported by the recent NOP survey (1995) on attitudes to the Welsh language. 
The survey found that among Welsh speakers confidence in the use of the language was highest 
at home, shopping, or out socially, but lower when contacting public services. 
7. The public furore surrounding the case also led to the founding of Cefn, an organisation intent 
on defending the civil rights of Welsh speakers. This organisation formed part of the wider 
campaign throughout the 1980s 
for greater recognition of Welsh language rights, leading 
eventually to the new Welsh Language 
Act (Interview, Dafydd Olwig, January, 1995). 
8. One such example centres on the British supermarket chain, Safeways, which opened a new 
store in Caernarfon in North Wales in October, 1994, a town where 90 per cent of the population 
speak Welsh. Originally, the store employed a number of non-Welsh speakers and 
had no 
bilingual signs. However, as a response to a local campaign boycotting the store, organised by 
Cefi (see n. 7), the manager instigated Welsh language training classes for employees who did not 
speak Welsh and introduced bilingual signs. 
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9. At present Bwrdd yr laith is accountable directly to the Welsh Secretary of State to whom any 
such recommendations would be directed. It is likely that the Welsh Assembly will assume this 
role in due course. 
10. Recalling the discussion in Chapter 5, one could say that the notion of additive bilingualism -- 
where bilingualism is seen as a social and educational advantage -- has increasingly taken hold in 
Welsh language policy. 
11. There is considerable variation within schools broadly designated as Welsh-medium as to the 
actual extent to which the language is used. Two broad areas of differentiation can be discerned, 
particularly at the secondary school level. One concerns the number of subjects that are taught 
through the language which may vary from school to school. The other is that in some schools 
a subject may be available as an option in both English- and Welsh-medium (Jones, 1995). These 
latter schools are thus, strictly speaking, closer to a bilingual model of education than a minority 
language immersion model of education as such. That said, those pupils opting for Welsh- 
medium in these schools would still experience a maintenance approach to bilingual education 
(see Chapter 5). 
12. In 1980, for example, a Welsh-medium school was established in the Rhondda -- one of the 
first industrial valleys in the south to become anglicised -- which did not have a single child from 
a Welsh-speaking home. Ysgol Gyfun Rhydfelen, one of the first Welsh-medium secondary 
schools to be established (in 1962), also had over 90 per cent of its intake from non-Welsh 
speaking homes (Davies, 1989). 
13. Welsh-medium schools in anglicised and in Welsh-speaking areas of Wales were distinguished 
historically by the terms `designated bilingual schools' or `Welsh schools' for the former and 
`natural Welsh schools' or `non-designated bilingual schools' for the latter. Since the (1988) 
Education Reform Act, discussed below, the more inclusive `Welsh-speaking schools' has been 
adopted (Jones, 1995). 
14. This discrepancy is a consequence of the large numbers of Welsh speakers in small rural 
schools (PDAG, 1993b). 
15. The University of Wales is, as its name suggests, a national university organised along federal 
lines. It was one of the key national institutions established towards the end of last century (see 
Chapter 6). There are currently five major university colleges, each with their own charter: 
Cardiff and Bangor were first established in 1883, Aberystwyth joined them ten years later, 
Swansea was founded in 1920 while the smallest, Lampeter was established in the 1960s. While 
there has been some agitation in the past to create a single Welsh-medium university college this 
has been resisted on the grounds that the rest of the university would be deprived of much of its 
Welshness (Evans, 1978; V. Edwards, 1991). 
16. One example of the WJEC's significance in this regard is its establishment of the Welsh 
Textbook Scheme. This scheme guaranteed the sale of approved Welsh language texts to all 
schools in Wales, providing in effect a subsidy for the what would otherwise have been an 
uneconomic venture for publishers (Baker, 1990). 
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17. These variations are demonstrated starkly by the differences between the old counties of 
Gwynedd (incorporating Conwy and Anglesey) and Gwent. Gwynedd, for example, has had a 
formal language policy since 1975 with the aim of making `every child in the county thoroughly 
bilingual'. The policy -- carried on by the new, smaller county -- has seen the creation of 
reception centres for monolingual English pupils to aid their transition to bilingual classrooms and 
has required that Welsh is taught as a compulsory subject until the end of the fifth year of 
secondary school. In contrast, as late as the mid-1980s, less than 2 per cent of primary classes 
in Gwent provided tuition in Welsh (Baker, 1985,1990). 
18. `Taf a', seldom a complimentary term, is a combination of `hiafIla' and the river Tafl'which 
runs through Cardiff It is thus principally used to describe the Cardiff -based civil service, many 
of whom are bilingual speakers. 
19. As I discussed in the preceding chapter, the greater institutional autonomy enjoyed by 
Scotland within Britain is reflected in the fact that it has a separate educational system. 
20. The Gittins Report, so named after its chair Professor Charles Gittins, was commissioned in 
1967 by the Central Advisory Council for Education (Wales). The Report argued for the early 
introduction of Welsh as a subject across all Welsh primary schools, and for its extension as a 
medium of instruction wherever possible (V. Edwards, 1991). These recommendations were an 
extension of an earlier report, The Place of Wels!: and English in the Schools of Wales, 
commissioned by the same agency in 1953. 
21. This system is currently administered under the auspices of the Welsh Office. however, with 
the eventual transfer of responsibility to the Welsh Assembly, the development towards local 
autonomy will be further enhanced. 
22. Unless otherwise indicated, the following summary of the developments surrounding the 




BUILDING A BILINGUAL STATE: PERCEPTIONS OF PRACTICE 
In this chapter, I report on the results of a language attitude survey completed in January 1996 
by 494 teacher trainees in four teacher training institutions in Wales. ' Before doing so, however, 
it may be useful to outline briefly the key features of `language attitude research', as it has come 
to be known, and the degree to which these features are adopted and/or adapted in the ensuing 
analysis. 
Language attitude research 
Language attitude research (LAR) has emerged in the last 30-40 years as a particular subset of 
social psychology (Edwards, 1985). Its principal concerns have been to explore the social 
psychological ramifications of language choice -- highlighting, in so doing, the interrelationship 
between language attitudes, language values and language use. To this end, LAR, as with social 
psychology as a whole, has been preoccupied with the interstices between the `individual' and the 
`social' (Wetherell & Potter, 1992). That is, LAR has been intent on exploring the background 
factors -- age, sex, ethnicity, language background, language ability, etc. -- which contribute to 
the individual's language choices. Wider social, historical and political factors -- such as the 
position of a minority language within the nation-state -- have not usually been addressed. 
Central to LAR is the concept of `attitude'. While this remains a contested one in social 
psychology, we can distinguish between three key components as they affect LAR -- thoughts 
(cognitive), feelings (affective), and predisposition to act (behavioural) (see Warren & Jahoda, 
1973; McGuire, 1985; Ajzen, 1988). The important point here is that these three dimensions may 
not always correspond. For example, one might express a favourable attitude to Welsh language 
education, or a belief in its value, while at the same time holding negative feelings towards such 
education, perhaps as a result of one's own experience of it. Likewise, favourable attitudes to a 
language do not necessarily translate into active support for, or retention of that language. We 
saw this clearly demonstrated in the case of Irish in Chapter 4, when a decline in the use of Irish, 
and active opposition to its retention, were situated alongside a general valuing of the language 
at a symbolic level (CLAR, 1975). 
The latter example also points to a distinction between levels of attitude. At a general level, or 
as a broad principle, one might value a particular minority language. This is clearly reflected for 
example in the recent NOP (1995) survey conducted in Wales which found that 88 per cent of the 
815 respondents agreed with the statement that `the Welsh language is something to be proud or. 
Strong support (75 per cent) was also found for the notion of making Welsh co-equal in status 
with English in Wales -- a proxy measure, in effect, for formal bilingualism. While these attitudes 
vary in relation to particular indices such as ethnic identification, region, and whether one can or 
cannot speak Welsh, ' they nonetheless indicate strong and broad support for Welsh and, by 
extension, for a move towards more formal bilingualism in Wales. What this particular survey 
does not address, however, is that these general attitudes may well be negated, or at least 
modified, by countervailing responses to particular social and political manifestations of 
bilingualism. Language compulsion in education, or the requirement to be bilingual for certain 
employment positions, may elicit quite different responses from respondents, particularly as these 
impinge on individual rights, so strongly held in liberal democracies. These more particularistic 
responses are not solicited by the NOP survey. Thus, this particular survey tells us little, if 
anything of value about the practical effects of, and potential obstacles to the actual 
implementation of Welsh bilingual policy, a point to which I will return. 
LAR is also concerned with the actual use of a particular language -- including frequency, and 
domains of use -- and the motivation underlying it. The common distinction employed here has 
been between integrative and instrumental motivation -- a distinction that was pioneered by 
Gardner & Lambert (1972; see also Gardner, 1985) in their work on attitudes to second language 
acquisition. Gardner & Lambert argue that second language learners are motivated either by 
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broadly utilitarian reasons such as employment, income, career, and educational objectives 
(instrumental), or by social, cultural and afliliative reasons -- wanting to identify more closely with 
a particular language group (integrative). Their conclusions tend to suggest that integrative 
motives provide a stronger basis for successful language learning. I lowevcr, other research (see 
Oiler, 1981; Au, 1988) argues that the instrumentaLrintegrative distinction oversimplifies. The 
distinction may be a convenient a priori conception but it is actually far more difficult to 
operationalise in practice. This is because integrative and instrumental attitudes are often 
combined within an individual's motivations for learning a particular language (Baker, 1992). 
The dimensions of belief, affect, and action -- coupled with levels of generality, and differing 
motivations -- suggest that the interrelationship between language attitudes, language value, and 
language use is a necessarily complex one. Moreover, as the limitations already discussed above 
suggest, LAR has not alway accounted adequately for these complexities. In this latter regard, 
previous research in the area has been characterised by the following additional limitations. First, 
and perhaps surprisingly, LAR has not always drawn effectively on the wider tenets of attitude 
theory within social psychology. As a result, it has tended to be both atheoretical and piecemeal 
(for a useful critique here, see Baker, 1992). Second, LAR has had very little to say on attitude 
clunrge, a dominant theme within attitude theory, when clearly this has important implications for 
the question of minority language shift, and its possible reversal. Third, LAR has been 
characterised by a predominance of attitude studies to single (minority) languages, as opposed to 
bilingualism (the two are not the same, although they have often been treated as such). Thus, in 
Wales for example, there have been numerous studies which have explored attitudes to Welsh in 
relation to English (see, for example, Jones, 1949,1950; Sharp et al., 1973; Lewis, 1975,1981). 
However, until Colin Baker's (1992) ground-breaking study, none had examined attitudes to 
English/Welsh bilingualism as a separate phenomenon. ' 
While drawing on some of the standard survey instruments and procedures of LAR, the following 
analysis attempts to address the various limitations outlined above. To this end, the questionnaire 
which forms the basis of analysis (see Appendix b) features modified versions of the three 
language attitude scales developed by Baker (1992). ` These include a general language attitude 
scale, a uselvalue status attitude scale, and a bilingualism attitude scale. As Baker argues, these 
three scales should be seen as discrete. The first scale attempts to distinguish between general 
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and specific attitudes to Welsh, since these are not necessarily congruent. The second scale 
distinguishes between language attitude and use. The last scale attempts to measure attitudes to 
Welsh/English bilingualism. 
In addition, the questionnaire includes a number of open-ended questions on attitudes to Welsh 
devolution and independence, the link between the Welsh language and Welsh national identity, 
the advantages and disadvantages of a bilingual state, and the impact of the compulsory language 
elements in the Welsh National Curriculum. This is a departure from previous language attitude 
research and reflects the more qualitative concerns of the study in exploring the sociological and 
educational -- as well as the (individual) social-psychological -- ramifications of language 
attitudes and language choices in Wales. My use of 50 additional semi-structured interviews with 
both trainees and staff members at these various institutions, as well as teachers, civil servants, 
and those involved more broadly in the Welsh language movement, also enables a more in-depth 
exploration of these issues. ' 
Unlike much previous language attitude research then, I am less interested in what follows in 
exploring the individual/social nexus with regard to language choice. As such, while I do 
highlight the influence of language ability on particular language attitudes, for reasons which will 
become apparent below, I do not attempt to explore in detail the broader intersections between 
language background, language use, gender, and so on. Nor do I attempt a multidimensional 
analysis, as Baker (1992) has for example, although the data certainly provide the scope for doing 
both. Rather, I approach the data with one principal objective in mind -- to situate attitudes to 
the Welsh language, to bilingualism, and to the effects and consequences of bilingual policy, 
within broader sociological and political parameters. Such parameters include the historical 
meconnaissance (misrecognition) and symbolic violence perpetrated against minority languages 
such as Welsh, the relationship between the growing legitimation and institutionalisation of Welsh 
and (a changing) Welsh national identity and, crucially, the tensions that arise at the intersection 
of group differentiated language rights and individual rights in the promotion of minority language 
policy. In so doing, I aim to highlight the key strengths and weaknesses of current bilingual policy 
in Wales, the principal areas of consensus and ongoing conflict in relation to it and, in light of 
both, the means by which such policy might proceed. 
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Background factors 
These broader sociological concerns also serve to explain why teacher trainees have been chosen 
as the basis of study. It is not because they are representative of the wider population. Indeed, 
teacher trainees tend to be located in the 18-25 age group and are, more often than not, female. 
The former trend is an obvious consequence of studenthood, the latter a consequence of the 
gendered nature of the teaching profession. This is confirmed by the sample with 84 per cent of 
the cohort between 18-25 years6 and a 75/25 per cent split between female and male respondents 
respectively. 
Rather, teacher trainees have been chosen because they constitute a key group of prospective 
public sector workers in Wales. Put simply, on completion of their training, many of them will 
be instrumental in delivering and shaping a bilingual educational service within Wales. Given that 
education may play a significant role in reversing minority language shift, their attitudes should 
thus act as a wider indicator of the potential long-term success (or otherwise) of Welsh bilingual 
policy. Indeed, if support is not forthcoming from this group -- which should, by implication, be 
broadly predisposed towards Welsh bilingual policy -- then one might infer that the long-term 
success of such policy is seriously threatened. 
The four teacher training colleges were selected for their geographic spread and for their broad 
representation of the different social and language contexts of north, south and west Wales (see 
Chapter 6). These regional differences in social and language context are reflected in the 
institutional cultures of the respective colleges with regard to the Welsh language. This can be 
seen, for example, when the highly anglicised Swansea Education Department is compared with 
the designated bilingual college, Bangor Normal. The education departments at Aberystwyth and 
at Bangor university colleges are located somewhere between these two positions. While both 
these departments run Welsh-medium programmes alongside their English language programmes, 
the wider institutional culture of the university colleges in which they are situated is predominantly 
anglicised. 
The number of questionnaires distributed varied from college to college, depending on the size 
of the actual programme, the availability of teacher trainees at the time, and/or the capacity of the 
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colleges to accommodate the time needed for trainees to complete the questionnaire. Thus, 400 
questionnaires were distributed at Bangor Normal (300 English language questionnaires, 100 
Welsh language questionnaires), 225 at Swansea (200 English, 25 Wclsh), 100 at Aberystwyth 
(75 English, 25 Welsh), and 75 at Bangor University (40 English, 35 Welsh). ' Of the 800 
questionnaires distributed in total, 494 were completed and returned -- a response rate of 61.75 
per cent, well within the acceptable range for a survey of this type (Babbie, 1989). Of these actual 
responses, a clear majority of 56.5 per cent (279 -- 207 English, 72 Welsh) came from Bangor 
Normal. Swansea comprised 27.5 per cent (136 -- 125 English, 11 Welsh) of the total sample, 
while Aberystwyth and Bangor University comprised 9.5 per cent (47 -- 39 English, 8 Welsh) and 
6.5 per cent (32 -- 11 English, 21 Welsh), respectively. Response rates per institution were as 
follows: Bangor Normal, 69.8 per cent; Swansea, 60.4 per cent; Aberystwyth, 47 per cent; and 
Bangor University, 42.6 per cent. ` 
Further to the questions of representation raised above, the marked differences between 
institutions, in both distribution and response patterns, suggest a degree of caution in interpreting 
the following results. In effect, the clear dominance of Bangor Normal, the most `Welsh' of the 
colleges, may skew results in favour of the Welsh language and bilingualism. This appears to be 
reinforced by a significantly higher proportion of Welsh speakers within the cohort than in the 
Welsh population as a whole. When asked about their language ability in Welsh, 31.6 per cent 
(155) describe themselves as fluent Welsh speakers, with 8.4 per cent (41) indicating that they 
spoke `much Welsh' -- a combined `Welsh-speaking' total of 40 per cent (196). The remaining 
60 per cent -- still a significant majority -- are divided between the 30 per cent (147) who can 
speak no Welsh and the 30 per cent (147) who indicate they can only speak a `little Welsh'. The 
influence of Bangor Normal is clearly apparent here since 131 out of the 196 Welsh-speaking sub- 
group -- that is, 66.8 per cent of all those who 
identified as Welsh speakers -- come from this 
institution. That said, Bangor Normal also contributes 50 per cent of the non-Welsh-speaking 
subgroup (147 out of 294), suggesting that 
its overall influence on the cohort in favour of Welsh 
and bilingualism may not be as significant as 
first indications suggest. The fact that Swansea, the 
most anglicised of the colleges, also provides 36.1 per cent of the non-Welsh-speaking category 
may act as a further counter-balance. These patterns are outlined in Table 7.1 below. 
' 
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JABILITY TO SPEAK WELSH 
INo Little Much Fluent 
Welsh Welsh Welsh Welsh Row 
Total 
INSTITUTION --+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
51 I 55 I 10 I 18 I 134 
Swansea IIIII 27.3 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
18 I 15 I3I 11 I 47 
Aberystwyth III1I9.6 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
74 I 73 1 24 I 107 1 278 
Bangor Normal III1I 56.7 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
4I4I4I 19 I 31 
Bangor University I1I6.3 
------------------------------------- 
Column 147 147 41 155 490 
Total 30.0 30.0 8.4 31.6 100.0 
Number of Missing observations: 4 
Table 7.1: Crosstabulation of institution with ability to speak Welsh 
The proportion of Welsh speakers within the cohort, and the potential future participation of the 
group in Welsh education, 1° suggest that responses as a whole will tend to favour Welsh language 
and bilingual measures. However, in other ways the sample is weighted against those who might 
be predisposed to such measures, both within and beyond education. For example, because 
teacher trainees in Welsh institutions may come from all over Britain, there is within the cohort 
a significantly higher percentage of those born outside Wales, notably in England, than in the 
Welsh population as a whole. Thus, in the cohort, 40.1 per cent (193) were born in England" 
compared to only 25 per cent in the wider population at the time of the 1991 census (Aitchison 
& Carter, 1994). Indeed, only a bare majority -- 263, or 54.7 per cent -- were actually born in 
Wales. 12 When this is combined with national affiliation, the following picture emerges, as 
detailed in Table 7.2: 
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COUNTRY OF BIRTH 
Wales England Ireland/ Other 
Scotland Row 
NATIONAL IiII Total 
AFFILIATION --+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
230 13 I1I3I 247 
Welsh IIIII 51.4 
------------------------------------- 
6I 87 II2I 95 
English IIII 19.8 
------------------------------------- 
14 I 75 I3I4I 96 
British IIiII 20.0 
------------------------------------- 
Dual I6151I 11 
(English/Welsh) iII1 2.3 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1I2I7II 10 
Scottish/Irish IIIII 2.1 
------------------------------------- 
6I 11 I1I4I 22 
Other IIIII 4.6 
------------------------------------- 
Column 263 193 12 13 481 
Total 54.7 40.1 2.5 2.7 100.0 
Number of Missing Observations: 13 
Table 7.2: Crosstabulation of national affiliation with country of birth 
I acknowledge that the use of the identifier `British' in the above table refers to a state identity 
rather than a national one (cf. Chapter 2). However, I use it here because it has been so used in 
previous analyses (see, for example, Balsom et al., 1982; Balsom, 1985) and because it relates 
directly to the issues of identity discussed in Chapter 6 with regard to `British Wales'. Indeed, 
these issues become apparent when national affiliation is compared with length of residence in 
Wales. As Table 7.3 makes clear, the vast majority -- 94.3 per cent (233 out of 247) - of those 
who identify as Welsh have lived 
in Wales for over ten years. However, there are also a 
significant minority of English, and particularly British 
identifiers who have lived in Wales for a 
similar period -- at 10.75 per cent 
(10 out of 93), and 31.3 per cent (30 out of 96) respectively. 
While the number of those who identify as having a dual Welsh/English identity is considerably 
smaller, it should also be noted that a clear majority of these -- 72.7 per cent (8 out of 11) -- 
have 
also lived in Wales for over 10 years. The total number of those who have lived in Wales 
for over 
ten years also amounts to a clear majority at 60.1 per cent of the total sample. 
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LENGTH OF RESIDENCE IN WALES 
0-1 1-3 4-6 7-10 10+ 
year years years years years Row 
NATIONAL IIIII Total 
AFFILIATION - -+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
11I1II 12 I 233 1 247 
Welsh IIIII 151.6 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
29 I 33 I 18 I3 10 I 93 
English IIIII 119.4 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
22 I 27 I 13 I4I 30 I 96 
British IIIII 120.0 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
1I1I1I8I 11 
Dual IIIII 12.3 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
Scottish/ I7I2III1I 10 
Irish IIII1 12.1 
---------------------------------------------- 
10 I3I2I1I6I 22 
Other IIII1 14.6 
+--------+--------+--------+--------+--------+ 
Column 69 67 34 21 288 479 
Total 14.4 14.0 7.1 4.4 60.1 100.0 
Number of Missing Observations: 15 
Table 7.3: Crosstabulation of national affiliation with length of residence in Wales 
To recapitulate, these background factors, taken collectively, suggest that any general trends 
which might be inferred from the following analysis should be treated circumspectly. The sample 
clearly does not reflect the wider population of Wales in terms of age, gender, occupational status 
and percentage of Welsh speakers. Accordingly, the pattern of responses outlined below should 
not be interpreted as necessarily holding wider currency. That said, the cohort does constitute 
a key group of prospective public sector employees, many of whom will be responsible for the 
future delivery and development of bilingual education in Wales. On this basis, their language 
attitude responses provide a crucial indicator of the likely long-term success of wider Welsh 
bilingual policy. It is to these responses, and the implications that can be drawn from them, that 
I now want to turn. 
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Charting language attitudes 
The questionnaire administered to the cohort (see Appendix b) includes within it variants of the 
three language attitude scales employed by Baker (1992). 1 will deal with each of these in turn. 
The first language attitude scale attempts to measure language attitudes to Welsh and to 
differentiate between general and specific attitude levels. With regard to the former, 20 items 
from the attitude scale are deemed to reflect general attitudes to Welsh. 13 This broad grouping 
is determined principally by the content of particular statements and/or by their similar designation 
in previous language attitude surveys (see Sharp et al., 1973; Baker, 1992). It also exhibits a high 
internal reliability factor of . 9567 using Cronbach's Alpha, suggesting that the items in this 
grouping are all measuring the same dimension. However, it is also acknowledged that a latent 
variable analysis is required to determine whether this is actually so (sec Baker, 1992). " 
The overall response patterns to this particular subset indicate, as did the recent NOP (1995) 
survey, that there is considerable support for the Welsh language at this general level. Using a 
five point Likert scale, ranging from `strongly disagree' to `strongly agree', the following 
responses show a clear majority who support -- that is, either agree (A) or strongly agree (SA) 
with" -- these positive general statements about Welsh: 
We need to preserve the Welsh language (87.2 per cent) 
The rights of people to use Welsh in public life must be protected (81 per cent) 
The Welsh language should be maintained because it is a sign of Welsh nationhood (75.4 per cent) 
Welsh is a language worth learning (75.3 per cent) 
I like hearing Welsh spoken (71.4 per cent) 
Likewise, a clear majority oppose -- that is, either disagree (D) or strongly disagree (SD) with -- 
the following negative statements about Welsh: 
It is a waste of time to keep the Welsh language alive (92.1 per cent) 
Welsh should be limited to the private domain (family, friends etc. ) (84 per cent) 
Learning Welsh is unnecessary because Britain is mainly English-speaking (75 per cent) 
It is only traditionalists who want to keep the Welsh language alive (73.4 per cent) 
Less clear cut, but nonetheless still favourable attitudes towards Welsh are also found for the 
following statements, outlined in Table 7.4 below: 
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Welsh is not relevant to the modern world 11.6% 24.2 % 64.2 % 
I like speaking Welsh 58.3% 31 % 10.7% 
The government spends too much money on 
promoting the Welsh language 
6.2 % 38.2 % 55.6 % 
There should be more Welsh in public life 52.8 % 33.7 % 13.5% 
1 
Table 7.4: General attitudes in support of the Welsh language 
Taken collectively, these responses indicate a number of important features. For a start, it is clear 
that there is widespread support for, and goodwill towards the Welsh language within the cohort. 
Or, to put it another way, there is a high degree of `tolerability' towards Welsh (cf. Chapter 4). 
Welsh is clearly regarded as important and its promotion no longer appears linked to a narrow 
nationalism or traditionalism (although see my discussion of the qualitative data). This augurs 
well for the future development of Welsh bilingual policy in Wales, a point also made by the NOI' 
(1995) survey in relation to the general population. 
More striking perhaps in this regard is the strong support evident for the principle of Welsh as 
a public language in Wales. This is clearly reflected, in particular, in the responses to the two 
countervailing statements `The rights of people to use Welsh in public life must be protected', and 
`Welsh should be limited to the private domain' (see above). The strong overall support for, and 
opposition to these respective statements continues even when language ability is taken into 
consideration. If we take, as a measure of comparison, the broadly Welsh speaking (fluent and 
much Welsh) cohort and the non-Welsh-speaking (no and little Welsh) cohort, the following 
pattern emerges. 93.8 per cent of Welsh speakers are in favour of Welsh language rights in public 
life, compared with 72.3 per cent of non-Welsh speakers. Likewise, 92.3 per cent of Welsh 
speakers oppose the limitation of Welsh to the private domain, compared with 78.2 per cent of 
non-Welsh speakers. While, not unexpectedly, Welsh speakers exhibit stronger support for these 
items than non-Welsh speakers, majority support among the latter clearly remains considerable. 
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However, while there is clear support in principle for Welsh language rights in the public domain, 
the perception of the cuirenrt reality is less favourable. For example, in response to the statement 
`Welsh is essential for participating fully in Welsh life', 39.3 per cent are in favour, 27.7 per cent 
are neutral, and 33 per cent against. More significantly, differences in relation to language ability 
are apparent here with a significantly higher percentage of Welsh speakers in favour (68.9 per 
cent) and a higher percentage of non-Welsh speakers against (49 per cent). Likewise, overall 
responses to the statement `there are more useful languages to learn than Welsh' divide 38.5 per 
cent in favour, 28.1 per cent neutral, and 33.4 per cent against. This suggests that the general 
perception of the wider status and utility of Welsh remains a contested one. It also demonstrates 
a clear distinction between principle and practice since a far higher majority (75.3 per cent) saw 
Welsh as a language tis, orth learning. A similar pattern also emerges here in relation to language 
ability, with a considerably higher percentage of Welsh speakers against (61.5 per cent) and a 
higher percentage of non-Welsh speakers in favour (47.3 per cent). 
When language ability is considered, even more marked distinctions emerge with regard to the 
future extension of the Welsh language in the public domain. While 52.8 per cent of the total 
sample support the statement that `there should be more Welsh in public life', much of this 
support is sustained by Welsh speakers, 86.2 per cent of whom are in favour, compared with 30.3 
per cent for non-Welsh speakers. Similarly, of the admittedly small number opposed -- 13.5 per 
cent of the total sample -- only one per cent are Welsh speakers, compared with 22 per cent of 
non-Welsh speakers. The latter also make up the bulk of the neutral category, with 47.6 per cent 
compared with 33.7 per cent overall. In short, many non-Welsh speakers appear unconvinced as 
yet about the future development and extension of a bilingual state in Wales. I will return to this 
more fully in the ensuing analysis of the qualitative data. 
On this basis, we should be cautious in assuming that the battle over Welsh bilingual policy has 
already been won (an implication drawn by the NOP survey, for example). Far from it. Attitudes 
in principle do not always translate into attitudes in practice and language ability, as we have seen, 
remains a pertinent distinguishing factor. This caution is further supported when we examine the 
subset of responses in this attitude scale which relate to specific aspects of bilingual policy. This 
grouping, which comprises eight items, exhibits an internal reliability factor of . 
8559, using 
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Cronbach's Alpha, and reveals a more ambivalent picture with regard to the particular 
consequences of, and implications for Welsh bilingual policy. " 
What is apparent from responses to this subset is considerable support for the op porlunity to learn 
Welsh (although see below). In relation to schools at least, this `opportunity' is also seen to 
involve an element of compulsion. Thus, 83.1 per cent of the sample support the statement that 
`Welsh should be taught to all pupils in schools', with only 5.3 per cent against. Likewise, 80 per 
cent support the statement that `All schools should provide the opportunity for pupils to learn in 
Welsh' (i. e., provide Welsh-medium education). However, this support also appears conditional 
on the provision of a range of learning options since Welsh-medium education as the only option 
was not favoured by the cohort. In this respect, 59.2 per cent oppose the statement `All pupils 
in Wales should be taught in Welsh', with 22.9 per cent in support. Language ability is also a 
factor here, since 50.5 per cent on Welsh speakers support this principle while 78.8 per cent of 
non-Welsh speakers oppose it. 
Even more interesting are a number of countervailing trends in relation to the idea of language 
compulsion. We have already seen, for example, an apparent endorsement of some element of 
compulsory language learning in schools, at least if this learning is provided in a variety of forms. 
However, this is contradicted to a certain extent by a much lower majority of 55.1 per cent who 
oppose the statement `Pupils should not be made to learn Welsh', with a concomitantly larger 
percentage (24.1 per cent) in support. When language ability is added as a factor we again find 
a clear distinction between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers. A higher percentage of Welsh 
speakers -- 68.9 per cent -- oppose this statement. Likewise, a lower percentage support it -- 
16.6 per cent. For non-Welsh speakers, the reverse applies, with 29 per cent supporting the 
statement and 45.7 per cent opposing it. 
This counter trend is even more apparent in responses to statements about language choice in the 
wider context. In this regard, 57.1 per cent of the sample support the statement that `The learning 
of Welsh should be left to individual choice', 18.7 per cent are neutral, and 24.2 per cent are 
against. Similarly, 41.8 per cent oppose the statement that `In-migrants to 'Vales should learn 
Welsh', 26.8 per cent are neutral, and 31.4 per cent are in support. When the opposed and neutral 
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categories are combined in this latter item, those in favour of some clement of language 
compulsion for in-migrants, or even simply an expectation that they should learn Welsh, arc 
clearly in the minority. 
These more contested responses indicate that the notion of individual choice with regard to 
language learning continues to exert significant influence, ev e? t among a group that is largely well 
disposed to afornialised bilingual policy. More significantly perhaps, clear differences remain 
between Welsh and non-Welsh speakers, as detailed in Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 below. From 
these we can see clearly that non-Welsh speakers are far more attached to the notion of individual 
language choice. As Table 7.5 reveals, 67.8 per cent of non-Welsh speakers support individual 
choice with regard to Welsh language learning while only 12.3 per cent oppose it. In contrast, 
the Welsh-speaking sample is far more evenly split at 41 per cent and 42 per cent respectively. 
This suggests that the principle of language choice remains important for this group as well but, 
nonetheless, the differences between the two groups remain stark. Starker still, however, are the 
differences apparent on the question of language requirements for in-migrants to Wales, as 
detailed in Table 7.6. Here, an almost inverse relationship applies, with 60.2 per cent of non- 
Welsh speakers against, while 61.9 per cent of Welsh speakers are in favour. 
Language Ability 
The learning of Welsh INon 
should be left to IWelsh Welsh 
individual choice Ispeaking I speaking) 
+----------+----------+ 
36 I 82 I 118 
Oppose I 12.3% 42% 124.2% 
+----------+----------+ 
58 I 33 91 
Neutral I 19.9% I 17% 118.7% 
+----------+----------+ 
198 I 80 I 278 
Support I 67.8% I 41% 157.1% 
----------------------- 
Column 292 195 487 
Total 60% 40% 100% 
Number of Missing observations: 7 
Table 7.5: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 q) by language ability 
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Language Ability 
In-migrants to Wales 







Ispeaking I speaking) 
+----------+----------+ 
177 I 27 
60.2% I 13.9% I 
+----------+----------+ 
84 I 47 I 
28.6% I 24.2% 
+----------+----------+ 
33 I 120 
11.2% I 61.9% 
+----------+----------+ 
Column 294 194 
Total 60.2% 39.8% 









Table 7.6: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 w) by language ability 
The contradictions surrounding choice and constraint are also reflected in two final items in this 
subset. When asked whether `legislation protecting the Welsh language is necessary, even if it 
limits the choices of some English speakers in 'Vales', 48 per cent are in favour, 30.3 per cent are 
neutral, while 21.6 per cent are against. If the supporting and neutral categories are combined 
this suggests a strong basis for pursuing such legislation. That said, differences are again apparent 
with regard to language ability. The broad non-Welsh-speaking category is relatively evenly split 
- 30.9 per cent are opposed, 
35.8 per cent are neutral, and 33.3 per cent are in favour. The broad 
Welsh-speaking category is far more supportive with only 8.3 per cent against, 22.3 per cent 
neutral, and 69.4 per cent in favour. 
A different response pattern emerges, however, with regard to the question of whether certain 
jobs should be reserved for, or limited to Welsh-speaking people (that is, to bilingual speakers of 
English and Welsh). Given that this is a likely result of Welsh language legislation -- particularly 
in relation to the Welsh Language Board's (1995) Draft Guidelines (see Chapter 7) -- the cohort's 
overall responses are far more evenly divided, with 41.3 per cent against, 19.4 neutral, and 39.2 
in favour. Even more significantly, another almost inverse relationship between Welsh and non- 
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Welsh speakers occurs here, with 56.8 per cent of non-Welsh speakers opposed and 62.6 per cent 
of Welsh speakers in favour. These differences are detailed in Table 7.7 below. 
It is right that some 









Ispeaking I speaking) 
+----------+----------+ 
167 I 35 I 
1 56.8% I 17.9% I 
+----------+----------+ 
57 ( 38 I 
19.4% I 19.5% 
+----------+----------+ 
70 I 122 
23.8% I 62.6% I 
+----------+----------+ 
Column 294 195 
Total 60.2% 39.8% 









Table 7.7: Crosstabulation of responses to questionnaire item 7 v) by language ability 
These trends are also broadly reflected in the other two language attitude scales. In the Welsh 
use language scale, two subsets of items can be distinguished -- one subset of 13 items relating 
to integrative attitudes to Welsh (internal reliability, . 9470), another subset of seven items relating 
to more instrumental attitudes (internal reliability . 
8859). " With regard to the former, a clear 
majority considered the following uses of Welsh as important or relatively important: 
being involved in Welsh cultural activities (92 per cent) 
living in Wales (78.6 per cent) 
being accepted in the community (63.2 per cent) 
bringing up children (61.5 per cent) 
The strong association here with traditional Welsh language domains, such as the family and 
Welsh cultural activities (eisteddfodau etc. ), should not surprise us. However, other traditional 
domains, notably the church/chapel, fare less well, with a majority of 52.6 per cent of the sample 
regarding the use of Welsh in this area as unimportant or relatively unimportant. The diminishing 
importance of Welsh in this long-recognised stronghold would tend to suggest that the traditional 
conception of a Nonconformist Wales is indeed in the process of being replaced by a more secular 
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society, as has been noted elsewhere (C. Williams, 1994; cf. Chapter 6). 11 Moreover, the general 
acknowledgement that Welsh is useful for living in Wales -- although again marked by language 
ability19 -- points to the expansion of Welsh into other language domains. This process of 
expansion, and concomitant modernisation of Welsh, is further supported by 56.1 per cent who 
regard Welsh as important or relatively important for watching television and an almost even split 
on the usefulness of Welsh with regard to contemporary popular culture -- with 49,8 per cent of 
the sample regarding it as important or relatively important. The former may reflect the growing 
influence of S4C (cf. Chapter 6), while the latter is particularly significant given that this is an area 
which has hitherto been dominated in Wales, as elsewhere, by the English language (cf Chapter 
4). As a result, it has often been regarded as a principal cause of Welsh language loss (Baker, 
1992). 20 
A recognition of the expansion and modernisation of Welsh is also evident in the instrumental 
subset of responses. For example, a clear majority of respondents regarded the following uses 
of Welsh as important or relatively important for instrumental purposes: 
getting a job in Wales (88.5 per cent) 
teaching in schools (75.3 per cent) 
getting a job in the public sector (74.8 per cent) 
getting a job in industry/commerce/management (59 per cent) 
Schools, and the public sector more broadly, are perceived here as the principal source of job 
opportunities for bilingual speakers in Wales -- a perception that is consonant with the general 
thrust of bilingual policy in Wales to date. Nonetheless, the acknowledgement (albeit to a lesser 
degree) of the usefulness of Welsh in industry and commerce is a significant finding, and augurs 
well for the extension of bilingual policy to these areas. 
Other areas where a majority regarded a knowledge of Welsh as important or relatively important 
include doing tertiary study with 52.6 per cent and, to a lesser extent, having an intellectual 
discussion with 48.4 per cent. Indeed, only `success at college' returns a negative instrumental 
result, with 38.6 per cent. Viewed collectively, these latter responses are perhaps a reflection of 
the still limited provision of Welsh-medium courses in Welsh higher education. Nonetheless, they 
should give some cause for concern since higher education institutions, as designated `public 
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bodies' under the (1993) Welsh Language Act, are charged with preparing and implementing 
effective policies promoting the use of Welsh in the provision of their scrviccs. 
In the final language attitude scale, on attitudes to bilingualism, two broad subsets can again be 
identified. As with the Welsh language attitude scale, these groups are distinguished by their level 
of generality. Thus, the first group -- comprising 14 items and exhibiting an internal reliability 
factor of. 8704 - relates to general attitudes toward bilingualism. 21 In line with previous results, 
responses within this broad grouping suggest strong support at the general level, with a clear 
majority agreeing or strongly agreeing with the following statements: 
Speaking both Welsh and English is an advantage in seeking employment (87.2 per cent) 
Both English and Welsh should be important in Wales (83 per cent) 
Young children learn to speak Welsh and English at the same time with ease (70.8 per cent) 
Knowing Welsh is an intellectual advantage (70.7 per cent) 
Speaking two languages is not difficult (62.3 per cent) 
Less substantial majorities are also registered in favour of the following: `I would want my 
children to speak both English and Welsh' (56.6 per cent); `it is important to be able to speak 
English and Welsh' (53.4 per cent); `being able to write in English and Welsh is important' (51.7 
per cent). A clear majority also oppose two countervailing statements: `children get confused 
when learning English and Welsh' (65.1 per cent); and `people only need to know one language' 
(61.9 per cent). Only three items in this subset do not elicit absolute majorities in favour of 
bilingualism, as detailed in Table 7.8 below: 
Attitudes to Bilingualism (General) Support Neutral Oppose 
(SA, A) (N) (SD, I)) 
I would like to be considered as a speaker of 48.5% 21.4% 30.1 % 
English and Welsh 
People who can speak Welsh and English can 45.2 % 27 % 27.8 % 
have a wider social circle than those who speak 
one language 
All people in Wales should speak English and 32.2 % 28.2 % 39.6 % 
Welsh 
Table 7.8: General attitudes to bilingualism 
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The response patterns to the item on personal bilingualism reflect to some extent the mixed 
linguistic ability of the group. Nonetheless, the results remain more positive than the actual 60/40 
split of linguistic ability in Welsh would suggest. The idea that bilingualism might extend one's 
social circle also has some support. However, the idea that all people in Wales should be bilingual 
elicits the only significant negative response in this subset, with language ability again an 
important factor. The non-Welsh-speaking cohort divide 56.3 per cent against, 29.7 per cent 
neutral, 14 per cent in favour. The Welsh-speaking cohort divide along the reverse lines with 14.9 
per cent against, 25.8 per cent neutral, and 59.3 per cent in support. The implicit notions of 
choice and compulsion may also be contributing influences here, given the mixed responses seen 
previously in the Welsh language attitude scale to its wider implications and consequences. 
These at times countervailing trends are also evident in the final subset of 7 items relating to more 
specific aspects of bilingual policy in Wales. ' With one exception, this grouping, with an internal 
reliability factor of . 8637, elicits clear majorities 
in favour of the following bilingual practices: 
Road signs in Wales should be in English and Welsh (85 per cent) 
All printed forms in Wales should be in English and Welsh (81.3 per cent) 
All public services in Wales should be available in both Welsh and English (79.5 per cent) 
All jobs should in Wales should be advertised in both English and Welsh (75.4 per cent) 
All schools in Wales should teach pupils to speak in both English and Welsh (73.6 per cent) 
Children in Wales should learn to read in English and Welsh (71.7 per cent) 
The ability to speak and read in English should be a requirement for public sector jobs in Wales 
(41.2 per cent) 
The strong support elicited for these items indicates that most of the battles fought over the last 
30 years by the Welsh language movement -- particularly with regard to visible bilingualism and 
the provision of bilingual services -- have now come to be accepted as the norm. This provides 
a solid foundation on which to pursue a formal bilingual policy in Wales -- the caveat on the wider 
generalisability of the language attitudes of this cohort notwithstanding. However, a further 
qualification may be in order here. The two items relating to schools and children respectively 
suggest that an element of language compulsion may be deemed acceptable within education (see 
also below). However, the other items all implicitly retain within them still a strong element of 
individual language choice. Thus, what is perhaps being endorsed here is the availability of 
bilingual provision, not bilingual provision itself. 
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This would appear to be confirmed when the one notable exception in this subset is examined. 
When asked whether `the ability to speak and read in both English and Welsh should be a 
requirement for public sector jobs in Wales', only 41.2 per cent are in favour, 25.4 per cent are 
neutral, and 33.3 per cent are against. This is a slightly more favourable response to the 
comparable question in the Welsh attitude survey, with 41.2 per cent against and 39.5 in favour 
there. Nonetheless, the adverse reaction, which clearly runs counter to the widespread support 
for other specific aspects of bilingual policy, suggests that the notion of a bilingual language 
requirement at work remains a controversial one. Moreover, differences on the basis of language 
ability continue to be a prominent factor. The Welsh-speaking cohort divide 69.9 per cent in 
favour, 19.4 per cent neutral, and 10.7 per cent against. The non-Welsh sample divide somewhat 
more evenly with 21.5 per cent in favour, 29.7 per cent neutral, and 48.8 per cent against. 
In short, the idea of minority language compulsion, even within a bilingual framework, still 
engenders considerable opposition. This, in turn, leads one to speculate further on the role and 
influence of individual language rights, and the importance of choice, constraint and opportunity 
with respect to the development of bilingual policy in Wales. For example, do Welsh and non- 
Welsh speakers continue to hold different perceptions of the link between the Welsh language and 
Welsh national identity, as has historically been the case in Wales? To what extent do majority 
English language speakers conceive of individual choice and language rights as a means by which 
to opt out of bilingual policy requirements? More broadly, how solid is support among English 
speakers for bilingual policy in Wales -- given that majority support has been identified as a key 
factor in the potential success of minority language policy (Churchill, 1986; Grin, 1995; see 
Chapter 5). Moreover, to what extent does this support remain dependent on an implicit 
voluntarism beyond the realm of the school? Indeed, is the compulsory language element in 
Welsh education an ongoing area of contest? And finally, how should bilingual policy proceed 
in light of these considerations? 
While some broad trends have clearly emerged from the preceding analysis, answers to these 
various questions can only be surmised from the quantitative data. They become far more 
apparent, however, when the qualitative questionnaire responses and the individual interviews are 
examined. It is to these that I now want to turn. 
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Emergent discourses on language and language policy 
A number of emergent, and at times competing discourses can be asccrtaincd from the qualitative 
data. Again, these discourses differ to some extent on the basis of language ability in Welsh. In 
order to highlight some of the differences which emerge on this basis, the following analysis 
distinguishes between two broad groupings -- those who answered the open-ended questions in 
Welsh and those who answered them in English. This broad distinction is by no means an exact 
match of linguistic ability, as seen in Table 7.9 below, but it is sufficiently representative to act 
as a useful means of comparison. Additional material from individual interviews is also included. 
LANGUAGE OF QUESTIONNAIRE 
(English Welsh 
I Row 
ABILITY TO SPEAK I1I2 Total 
WELSH --+--------+--------+ 
1I 147 II 147 
No Welsh III 30.0 
------------------- 
2I 147 II 147 
Little Welsh III 30.0 
------------------- 
3I 37 I4I 41 
Much Welsh III8.4 
------------------- 
4I 48 I 107 I 155 
Fluent Welsh II1 31.6 
------------------- 
Column 379 111 490 
Total 77.3 22.7 100.0 
Number of Missing Observations: 4 
Table 7.9: Crosstabulation of ability to speak Welsh with language of questionnaire 
Language, culture and identity 
When asked what was most distinctive about Welsh culture and society, clear differences emerged 
between the two broad groups. In the Welsh language questionnaires, 23 much emphasis was 
placed on the unique heritage and traditions of Wales, including its literature and distinctive 
cultural practices such as the eisteddfod. Also consistently emphasised was the closeness of 
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Welsh communities which, while viewed positively by Welsh language respondents, may also 
suggest an ongoing degree of insularity in Welsh-speaking communities (cf Denney, 1991; 
Borland et al., 1992; Charlotte Williams, 1995). What comes through most prominently in this 
particular set of responses, however, is the view that the Welsh language is a central, perhaps the 
central aspect of Welshness. Three key aspects are highlighted here. Its foundational importance 
to a Welsh identity -- 'the language is the focal point of our culture and society and everything 
should be done to ensure its survival'. Its role as a language of everyday life -- 'the fact that we 
have our own language which we can use in both the social and the cultural aspects of our lives'. 
And its usefulness as a boundary marker -- 'the Welsh language expresses the unique culture and 
traditions of Wales in a way that no other language could'. 
These links between language and identity are reiterated in the responses of this group to the 
question about whether one needs to speak Welsh to be Welsh. Three broad positions can also 
be identified here. First, that knowledge of the language is essential to be `truly Welsh': 
Welsh people who can't speak Welsh consider themselves Welsh but THEY ARE NOT. 
A person is not Welsh unless he/she can speak Welsh and uses it regularly. 
Being born in Wales does not give a person the right to call themselves Welsh. You must 
be able to speak Welsh and be aware of Welsh culture. 
A person must have mastered the Welsh language fully before being regarded as Welsh. 
English people who have learned Welsh but continue to speak English among Welsh 
people cannot be regarded as Welsh. 
Being able to speak Welsh gives people a closer relationship with Welsh people and their 
community. Being Welsh means speaking Welsh. 
A second, slightly less intransigent position is that while the Welsh language is not the sole 
criterion of Welshness, without it one cannot be `completely Welsh': 
It is possible for a person who was born in Wales to be Welsh even if they can't speak the 
language. However, I believe that for a person to be truly Welsh he/she must have been 
born in Wales and he/she must be able to speak Welsh. 
I don't think that you must be able to speak Welsh to be regarded as Welsh. However, 
a person cannot be 100 per cent Welsh without any knowledge of the Welsh language 
which is such an important part of our culture. 
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You can't be totally Welsh if you can't speak Welsh. Despite the fact that the people of 
south Wales are Welsh, they are not completely Welsh because they can't speak the Welsh 
language. 
Being able to speak Welsh is a very important part of being Welsh but I know many 
people who are very enthusiastic about the Welsh nation and yet they can't speak Welsh. 
I think that this is a great pity. 
I think that it is important to be able to speak Welsh in order to be able to take part in 
community life. People who can't speak Welsh can be regarded as Welsh but an 
important part of their understanding of what it meads to be JVelsh is missing. (my 
emphasis) 
Being able to speak Welsh is not essential but I believe that it makes a person completely 
Welsh. 
A third position is also evident -- a knowledge of Welsh is advantageous and/or important but its 
lack does not necessarily make one less Welsh. However, this latter accommodation is also 
linked with a proviso -- one must still respect the Welsh language. ' 
I think that it is important for any person living in Wales to be able to speak Welsh and 
communicate through the medium of Welsh. However, there are many people who have 
lived in Wales all their lives and yet they can't speak Welsh -- as long as these people have 
respect for Welsh traditions and the culture of the Welsh language I am willing to accept 
them as Welsh. 
No -- it is our feelings and beliefs which make us Welsh. However, enthusiasm towards 
learning Welsh shows that a person is committed to and respects the nation to which 
he/she belongs. 
Being able to speak Welsh is not essential but it helps. The people from the valleys of 
south Wales can be regarded as Welsh even though they can't speak Welsh because marry 
of then: wish that they could. People's attitudes are what make them Welsh. (my 
emphasis) 
A very controversial question! It is not essential for a person to be able to speak Welsh 
but he/she should respect the language and the people who speak it. These feelings could 
lead to an eagerness to learn Welsh. 
No - but it is important that Welsh people have respect for Welsh culture and traditions 
and are willing to take part in Welsh activities. It is also important that they are willing 
to send their children to Welsh schools. 
No -- what makes people Welsh is their respect for 'Vales, Welsh people, the Welsh 
language, Welsh culture and Welsh traditions. 
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Some of these themes are also apparent in individual interviews with staff and trainees, For 
example, the notion of community is clearly expressed in the following two observations: 
I do believe strongly in fostering the Welsh language.... I do believe that people who move 
into [a Welsh-speaking] area, it is one of their responsibilities to learn the language, not 
to expect to be sort of taken into the heart of the community without a willingness to learn 
the language, to show that you're willing to understand how that language is part of the 
community. M O'C (Swansea trainee). 
If they've been there for twenty years, they should have learnt the language. They are 
living in a community, we are Welsh-speaking, to be part of that community.... You've 
got to approach it that they see the need to learn Welsh, and if they see the need then 
they'll accept the situation. It is important though isn't it that if you're living in a 
community that you're part of the community, that you're able to take a full part in that 
community, anything that's going on. [Otherwise] things will die out. TN (Bangor 
University staff). 
Likewise, the pivotal link between language and identity is stressed, although usually on the basis 
that it constitutes a `di 'erent kind of Welshness'. As one Welsh-speaking interviewee observes, 
`I don't think because we speak Welsh that we're more Welsh than the next person. It's just 
different' (SE: Swansea trainee). Others reiterate this conception: 
There are things that don't translate and there's certain bits of the Welsh culture which 
are unique to the language which don't really carry over into the non-Welsh-speaking 
Welsh identity. Yes, it's given me a far deeper sense of being Welsh and belonging to 
somewhere. I wouldn't say that you have to speak Welsh to be Welsh, but it's being 
richer, it's another badge, it's another identity... SB (Swansea trainee). 
Although a lot of non-Welsh-speaking Welsh people would think that we [Welsh 
speakers] thought that we were much better, I don't think that we [are]. But we've had 
the opportunity and it's made things, it's given us a much broader outlook on life. It's 
given us a whole other culture that non-Welsh speakers wouldn't understand. AG 
(Swansea trainee) 
You can have people who say they are as Welsh as anybody, who don't speak the 
language but if you don't speak the language you're missing out a lot on Welsh literature 
and you can translate the legends and the folk tales yes, but they lose something in the 
re-telling. To get the essence of Welsh, I think you do have to have it at a personal... 
Interviewer 
A South Walian might say they're just as Welsh... 
Oh yes, yes, they do, but sorry if you're that Welsh, you'd go to the trouble of learning 
it. NG (Bangor Normal trainee) 
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The responses of Welsh speakers then still closely resemble many of the attributes associated 
historically with Welsh cultural nationalism. Language is seen by many as the d'jliiing 
characteristic of Welshness -- thus excluding non-Welsh speakers, and in some cases even second 
language learners. This position is consonant with the process of linguistic demarcation often 
employed by minority group members in the face of a majority culture (Khlcif, 1979, see Chapter 
4). However, it considerably understates the internal linguistic diversity within Wales, while 
highlighting at the same time the traditional North/South divide. Concomitant emphases on the 
role of heritage and culture also tend towards a static conception of Welshness and, interestingly, 
there is no mention in the Welsh language responses of a multicultural dimension. I laving said 
that, there is some recognition of the need for cultural and linguistic change. As one questionnaire 
response states, `in order to secure the future of the Welsh language we should be prepared to 
adapt to changing times and to create a culture of our own'. Likewise, a Welsh-speaking trainee 
observes in an interview: 
We have to change the attitudes just to make the language live because if you have Welsh 
people thinking like that, we absolutely have no future at all for the language. Instead of 
sitting behind this barrier, and making things, keeping our traditions alive, which is very 
very important, we've also got to make it the language of everyday life.... It's two 
different things, and we've got to have life for both. Tradition is great and we do need 
to keep it alive, but you've got to have the balance right or we're going to stay behind. 
BA (Bangor University trainee) 
However, questions about inclusiveness and exclusiveness, the recognition of Wales' internal 
linguistic diversity, and a more situated role for the Welsh language, are far more apparent among 
the English language questionnaire responses. In addition, opposition is actively expressed 
towards a language-based conception of Welsh identity, particularly with regard to the potential 
for hostility towards, and/or discrimination against English speakers. Thus, while English 
language responses also highlight notions of community, heritage and language as key elements 
of Welsh culture/society, they do so only on a provisional basis: 
The most distinctive feature of Welsh society, in my opinion, is the closeness generally 
associated with Welsh communities. I do think this is important, but it shouldn't include 
the exclusion or discrimination of others. 
Welsh culture is unique and has different qualities to other cultures -- It should be 
preserved. Language is a part of this -- A PART. 
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Wales has an identity and character of its own but I do not feel that this hinges any longer 
on the language element. I consider myself Welsh even though I have only just begun 
learning the language. Wales has a distinctive history and character of which I feel 
language is only a small part. 
This provisional stance is allied with a scepticism towards the singularity of Welsh culture. Three 
dimensions are highlighted here. First, the relationship between the historical and contemporary 
dimensions of Welsh culture is problematised: 'Welsh culture is currently based on historical 
aspects (coal mines, valleys, choirs) -- the typical stereotyped image -- and now needs to continue 
in progression to establish modern day aspects of their culture'. Second, a propensity for 
provincialism and insularity is highlighted. As one respondent sourly observes of the distinctive 
attributes of Welsh culture: `insularity, insecurity, dour, miserable and depressed'. And third, the 
use of Welsh as a boundary marker which excludes English speakers is strongly criticised: 
The only feature that distinguishes the Welsh from English is the language, the division 
between Wales and England is only pronounced in north Wales, much I think to the 
detriment of Wales. North Wales' people are closed and hostile to the English -- their loss 
not ours. 
I think the language is very important, but it should be accepted that English speakers u-ill 
come and live in Wales and that they shouldn't ham to learn Welsh. There should be a 
compromise between the English and the Welsh to end the hostility. 
Issues surrounding the deliberate exclusion of, and active hostility towards English speakers also 
surface clearly in responses from this group to the question of whether one needs to speak Welsh 
to be Welsh. Three broad positions can be discerned here. First, there is a direct rejection of the 
language-identity link, which is deemed to be indicative of a narrow Welsh nationalism: 
Absolutely not, I do not speak Welsh but my sense of nationality is no less than the next 
Welsh-speaking person, although Welsh Nationalists would disagree. 
No, just because a person can speak fluent Welsh and I cannot does not make them a 
better Welsh person. What God-given right enables them to call themselves Welsh and 
consider me to be a lesser version? 
No. I have some knowledge of the Welsh language (i. e., I'm not fluent) but I definitely 
consider myself to be very much Welsh. But again many Welsh speakers (Nationalists) 
would disagree and say that you're not Welsh if you can not speak the language!!! 
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Second, there is an acknowledgement of the usefulness of Welsh, for both integrative and 
instrumental reasons. However, this acknowledgement is also allied with a pcrccption that the 
need to learn Welsh arises from a (negative) pressure to do so and/or to avoid discrimination: 
You don't get accepted by the Welsh unless you at least speak it. But you just have to 
get on whether you speak Welsh or not. You learn to ignore the snide remarks. 
No, but in order to be accepted as Welsh, you need to be ablc to speak Welsh. 
Yes, or locals can be offensive and biased. 
No but it helps. Many Welsh speakers consider non-Welsh-speaking Wclsh people as 
English which can be a bit offensive. 
No, but I find that you are not as easily accepted if you don't speak Welsh. 
A third broad position is a rejection of the language-identity link on the basis that the strength and 
visibility of Welsh varies widely within Wales. This is usually identified on the basis of regional 
variation (the traditional North/South divide). However, class is also mentioned as a factor: 
It helps in some parts of Wales but isn't essential. 
Not necessarily, I can get by but the majority of people speak English anyway and we do 
all belong on the whole to Great Britain. Welsh is really for the Welsh people to claim 
their heritage. I have nothing against the language but consideration is needed by Welsh 
speakers that not everyone can speak their language. 
No -- English plays just as important a part in Wales as Welsh does. In south Wales very 
little Welsh is spoken but its residents are still, in many cases Welsh. 
No, it helps you appreciate Wales more and it's identity and is another obvious badge of 
identity -- but 4/5 of Welsh people don't speak it yet are validly `Welsh' all the same. 
No, many Welsh people do not speak Welsh it is dependent where you live and is still 
predominantly a middle-class culturally desirable aim. 
These responses, taken collectively, suggest that considerable differences remain between the 
perceptions of Welsh speakers and non-Welsh speakers over the role of the Welsh language 
within Wales. Of course, the concerns raised about the singularity of Welsh culture and the 
potential exclusiveness of the language-identity link are not the sole preserve of the latter group. 
As we have already seen, the modernisation of Welsh language and culture, and its disassociation 
324 
from a narrow, language-based Welsh cultural nationalism, are also key concerns of contemporary 
Welsh language planning and education in Wales, as is the concern that a knowledge of Welsh 
should not solely be a middle-class phenomenon (cf. Chapter 7). Likewise, charges of insularity 
and provincialism also reflect long-held biases against minority languages and those that speak 
them. As I discussed in Chapter 4, this process has resulted in the consistent depiction of the use 
of minority languages as both antediluvian and exclusive by definition. In contrast, the use of 
majority languages such as English has been regarded unproblematically as indicative of a more 
modern, inclusive, and cosmopolitan lifestyle. Both the positive and negative dimensions of this 
general critique of Welsh language maintenance are clearly evident in the following interview 
observation from a mature student at Bangor -- an English (and English-speaking) in-migrant to 
Wales whose partner and children are Welsh speakers: 
If you said that everybody in Wales has got to speak Welsh, there arc going to be some 
who won't be able to no matter how hard they try so you're going to exclude them. I 
don't think that you should have to speak Welsh. What makes somebody Welsh? It 
certainly isn't tied to language, although that's one of the aspects that people identify with 
being Welsh. I think that certainly in north Wales and mid Wales where there is a strong 
Welsh-language presence, they feel quite strongly about language. But if you look at the 
history of the borders where English and Welsh are spoken ... 
I don't know if it will 
actually survive, even if you tried pushing it, making it compulsory to speak Welsh in the 
schools, making compulsory Welsh for say county councils. I don't know if it will work. 
I don't know if there's another way of viewing the Welsh language, but I don't think they 
should force it on people. Voluntary and encouraged, but not penalised for not being able 
to speak it. Certainly not in going towards Welsh as the primary language that it leaves 
you at a detriment [in relation] to English, which is really a worldwide language isn't it. 
MT (Bangor University trainee). 
Choice and opportunity 
This observation also points to another principal and ongoing area of contention around Welsh 
bilingual policy, already highlighted in the quantitative responses -- that is, the debate between 
compulsion and voluntarism with regard to learning Welsh. Again, two distinct, and competing 
discourses are clearly evident here. On the one hand, being required to learn Welsh, particularly 
at school, is seen as providing the individual with the opportunity to be bilingual. Whether 
individuals subsequently pursue, or capitalise upon this opportunity is seen as their choice, but 
without a compulsory language element at some point, no such choice would be available in the 
first place. On the other hand, there is a strong alternative discourse about individual choice as 
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a means of opting out of Welsh language requirements and an associated assertion of the rights 
of English speakers in Wales to remain English-speaking. 
These countervailing discourses are most apparent in responses to the open-ended questions on 
the potential advantages and disadvantages of a bilingual Wales, and the more specific role of the 
National Curriculum in Wales. Moreover, each discourse is again predominantly associated with 
a particular language cohort. The discourse of opportunity, for example, is far more evident 
among those who answered the questionnaire in Welsh. In response to the implications of a 
bilingual Wales, this cohort strongly emphasises the additional options that bilingualism gives the 
individual. As one respondent observes: `the ability to speak two languages gives people more 
chances and more choices'. Indeed, in contrast to some of the preceding views about language 
and identity, bilingualism is seen by some in this group as a safeguard against insularity -- both 
`broadening personal horizons' and allowing collective communication across linguistic 
communities. This allies with my argument in Chapter 4 that those who wish to maintain an 
historically associated language, alongside that of another more dominant language, actually 
exhibit a greater ability to manage multiple cultural and linguistic identities. More traditional 
concerns are expressed, however, over the potential further dilution of Welsh as a result of 
bilingualism: `English is a powerful language and there is a danger that it could undermine the 
Welsh language'. It is also pointed out that informal bilingualism allows English speakers to avoid 
Welsh -- a concern which 
has some validity, as we shall see below. 
The messages from the English language responses to the possibilities and pitfalls of a bilingual 
Wales are far more mixed. Bilingualism is again seen as a bridge between the two principal 
linguistic communities in Wales. However, English is also constructed in this scenario as the 
mitigating and modernising influence -- Welsh may still be 
important for the purposes of `identity' 
but continues to be juxtaposed against modernity: 
A bilingual Wales would keep its own identity and stay in touch with its past whilst 
playing a part in modern society -- i. e., media, business etc. 
Welsh allows Wales to keep a separate identity from England although English seems to 
be the major language used. The use of English in Males keeps ! 'ales moderst and up to 
date with the rest of the world. (my emphasis) 
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The Welsh language adds a richness and potential deeper sense of pride and belonging to 
a culture, but Wales should retain English (and undeniably will) for its economical and 
social well-being as part of Britain. Only a bilingual Wales can achieve both these 
advantages. 
Being a bilingual country can only be seen as an advantage. Our Welsh allows us the 
security and the huxury of keeping one foot in the past, while English keeps us sensibly 
in the present. (my emphases) 
A bilingual Wales means that an important part of Welsh culture is preserved, at the same 
time as making Wales accessible to English people (and England accessible to the Welsh). 
The notion of `choice' is also a prominent feature of the English language responses to a bilingual 
Wales. However, it is often framed negatively: `There is a lack of choice. You should choose 
to learn Welsh, not be forced into it'. Or, when viewed positively, it is usually regarded as a 
means by which English speakers can continue to speak English: `Both languages should be 
spoken so that English-speaking people can still live in Wales without being excluded from Welsh 
society'. In addition, while the instrumental advantages of Welsh, particularly with regard to 
employment, are acknowledged, opposition is expressed to the consequences of such 
requirements for monolingual English speakers: `It means that Welsh/English speakers may be 
seen in a preferential light over English speakers'. More trenchant examples of this position also 
suggest that bilingual requirements amount to a deliberate policy of exclusion: 
Welsh people who've lived in Wales but cannot speak Welsh are often excluded from jobs 
if a bilingual policy is in operation. 
Bilingualism [with regard to employment] excludes everyone who is not Welsh from even 
applying. This is an anti-English and a xenophobic attitude that excludes the rights of the 
mass unemployed from different parts of the country [Britain]. The Welsh are able to 
apply for English jobs. Advantage for them but disadvantage for others. 
A bilingual requirement for public service employment is by no means a fair system, it 
promotes cultural insularity, is divisive and fails to recognise individual merit. It is, in 
effect, an expression of the Welsh `ghetto' mentality that predominates in many levels of 
society. 
These differing discourses around choice, compulsion and opportunity are even more starkly 
apparent in individual interviews. Welsh speakers consistently stress, for example, the fact that 
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Welsh is a national language and should be treated as such. As one Wclsh-speaking trainee 
argues, in response to a question on whether in-migrants to Walcs should Icarn Welsh: 
I think that the very least they could do is respect the language ... English people come 
in and not just English people, but people come in and they don't even acknowledge it, 
They don't even stop to think, now wait a minute there's a different language here, should 
we make the effort. I think there's a lot of responsibility on Welsh-speaking people's 
shoulders as well because we make it far too easy for them to, because we turn to English. 
I think we should insist more that they learn basic conversational Welsh. I think there is 
a responsibility [to ensure that]. If you went to France, you'd be expected to learn it 
wouldn't you? When in Rome... AG (Swansea trainee) 
In contrast, two English in-migrants, while tacitly accepting that Welsh merits the description of 
a national language, can still argue against compulsion on the basis of its minority status: 
I don't think you should compel. I feel quite strongly about that... The matter of 
compulsion of a minority language [is] about statistical significance, about pushing a 
minority language and making it compulsory. I think it is difficult because you do have 
a large immigrant English population in the country and that is a problem. I mean you 
don't identify with the culture in the same way as the national, the indigenous, population 
does. It's a problem. NN (Swansea staff) 
It's on size, isn't it. If you're looking at a group of half a million, a million people 
speaking Welsh as opposed to a group of people [who are] French-speaking ... that's a 
large section of people that can communicate together. English or French have got such 
a large number of people there, a large number of ideas are generated and can be moved 
around the community of that nationality of speakers. MT (Bangor University trainee) 
Leaving aside the constructed nature of all national languages (see Chapter 4), these attitudes 
reflect the long-held distinctions that have been consistently drawn between minority and majority 
language varieties. While the latter have been unproblematically accorded with the `benefits' of 
national status, including the unquestioned primacy of the language within education, the former 
are still largely excluded from such benefits -- or, when they are included, are still viewed 
pejoratively. The arguments over `statistical significance' and `size' employed by these 
interviewees implicitly suggest this wider distinction. However, the distinction is even more 
baldly stated by another English-speaking respondent: `I think there's a sense in which Welsh 
could so easily be artificially elevated in 
front of other languages just because it happens to be the 
language of this country' (my emphasis). The inherent contradiction here is obvious since such 
a statement would be almost unconscionable with regard, say, to the role of English in England. 
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However one views the constructedness of national languages, drawing a distinction between 
minority and majority languages on this basis can only be construed as part of the wider historical 
prejudice exhibited towards minority groups. As I discussed in Chapter 1, the claims of 'non. 
historic' nations or 'historyless peoples' (Geschichtslosen Völker) have long been ignored on just 
this basis. This recognition of historical prejudice towards Welsh is directly addressed in the 
following interview comment by a Welsh-speaking trainee: 
I think lots of people forget that they are in Wales. I think it extends from the fact that 
it's a minority of people who speak it. I suggest they go back to the last century with the 
Welsh Not and the history of the English in Wales repressing the language. That's where 
it stems from. I think that the fact that it's always been knocked back in a way which has 
set it as a minority language, but the national identity hasn't been dented whatsoever, I 
think if people try and make comparisons to Welsh and any other language, then they say 
not many people speak it, it's not used day to day, people are obviously going to think of 
it as a minority language because it is. Until the day when everybody in Wales [speaks it], 
until it grows in importance, then it won't ... 
be more than a minority language. It's a bit 
like the Catalan in Spain... HE (Bangor University trainee) 
Nonetheless, the normalisation of Welsh as a national language remains problematic for many 
exactly because it requires some element of compulsion. As with the open-ended responses, many 
Welsh speakers argue in interviews that some element of language compulsion is necessary in 
order to provide real choice and opportunity: `I think it's essential that we have a bilingual policy 
because someone like me is being penalised. Even though Welsh is my first language, because 
I also speak English, I'm being penalised [by being required to speak in English]. I should be 
given the choice of what language I want to speak, whatever it may be' (ER: Bangor Normal 
trainee). This is a clear assertion of the `personality language principle' as applied to minority 
language use (see Chapter 5). That said, there is also a recognition among Welsh-speaking 
interviewees of the potential backlash that any notion of compulsion will inevitably elicit from 
non-Welsh speakers: 
I think if the element of compulsion is overdone then people will react. There's a lot of 
goodwill towards the Welsh language, but the moment they talk of compulsion then 
suddenly people feel threatened by it ... so 
I don't think we should push that at all.... 
Compulsion is wrong in that it drives people, scares non-Welsh-speaking people and even 
for Welsh-speaking people it stresses the negative reasons for speaking Welsh. I think 
that I feel strongly that there should be positive reasons for speaking Welsh, it shouldn't 
be negative. SB (Swansea trainee) 
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And so it seems, since monolingual English-speaking interviewees sec few redeeming features in 
a compulsory Welsh language requirement. As with the open-ended responses, opposition to 
such a requirement is most apparent with regard to employment, where it is viewed as at best 
discriminatory and at worst racist: 
In most adverts you see at the bottom `this is a job where a knowledge of Welsh is 
essential' which is why the advert's in Welsh. It's like in schools where you have to speak 
Welsh, the curriculum and everything, you have to. I think it is racist isn't it.... You have 
to speak Welsh to get this job, and then it brings on nationalism and then you start having 
problems. 
Interviewer 
Why is it a problem in Wales when it's not a problem in France, for example? 
Because people don't believe that they should learnt Welsh. If you were going for a job 
in Europe, then you'd make an effort wouldn't you, I hope you would make an effort. 
But then people think `Oh why should I learn Welsh, you can only use it in Wales'. EW 
(Bangor University trainee; my emphasis) 
Again, the issue of minority language status appears to be the principal stumbling block for 
majority language speakers in this particular context. Accordingly, racism and racial exclusion 
are invoked on the specious grounds that a Welsh requirement inhibits the `rights' of English 
language speakers to continue to speak English wherever and to whomever they wish. This is 
more about the continued assertion of the untrammelled hegemony of English than about anything 
else, as the following interview exchange makes clear: 
I would have thought it does turn out to be a racial issue if you can prove that a job where 
you're forced to speak both Welsh and English say doesn't really require that skill. 
Interviewer 
What about jobs that do require it 
I would have thought that it's a very subjective issue, being able to prove that.... You're 
always going to have people that want to speak English. I would have thought that it's 
going to be very difficult to prove that lot satisfactorily in law... KC (Bangor University 
trainee; my emphasis) 
Suffice it to say, many Welsh speakers argue that this is exactly why a compulsory language 
element is required in the first place. The association with racism is also categorically denied: 
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I think that's nonsense really because if it's a criterion for a job, I'm not going to be 
employed as a Spanish teacher when I've studied Welsh and they're going to say you have 
to speak Spanish. If it's the job criteria, then it's needed. AW (Bangor University trainee) 
If Welsh is an essential part of the job, well then they should make an effort to satisfy that 
need. If they were trying for a post as a lorry driver, well they wouldn't try for it if they 
didn't have a driving licence so, yes they should make an effort to speak the language. it's 
a requirement of a job, it's something they wouldn't use unless it was necessary to speak 
Welsh for that post. I wouldn't say it was racist. NG (Bangor Normal trainee) 
Others suggest a more conciliatory position, where an empathy for Welsh, and a willingness to 
learn it, may be regarded as sufficient: 
jobs and positions and opportunities should not be closed to those people who have not 
had sufficient opportunity for a variety of reasons to equip themselves with the skill and 
ability to speak Welsh.... the people appointing should be able to assess the receptiveness 
of somebody, sympathy, empathy, of somebody to the Welsh language and culture. I think 
the onus should be -- if they want to make that condition -- the onus should be on the 
employers to make that opportunity available and to make sure that the person they're 
appointing is going to avail themselves in a wholehearted way of taking that opportunity... 
DH (Swansea staff) 
The latter position -- which places a dual responsibility on employer and employee with regard 
to learning an additional (minority) language -- might avoid the difficulties that were encountered 
in relation to the deeply unpopular compulsory Irish language requirement for the Irish civil 
service (see Chapter 4). The widespread provision of language learning courses for public sector 
employees has also been successfully pursued 
in Canada, with regard to French (Coulombe, 1995) 
and, to a lesser extent, in New Zealand with regard to Mäori (Waite, 1992). 
Be that as it may, these ongoing debates over choice and compulsion highlight that the movement 
towards a greater recognition of Welsh in the public sector will remain a contested one for some 
time to come. As I argued in Chapters 4&5, this is principally because minority language 
policies necessitate changes within a given nation-state to the balance of wider power relations 
between linguistic groups and the languages they speak (Churchill, 1986; Tollefson, 1991). This 
is so even when, as is the case in Wales, there is general support for such developments. As such, 
the policy of quiet coercion which seems apparent from the Welsh Language Act guidelines may 
be the best way to proceed. Certainly, a gradual and graduated approach is more likely to attain 
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the degree of `tolerability' (Grin, 1995) needed from majority language speakers to ensure the 
long term success of any formal bilingual policy in Wales. 
Language and education 
That such an approach is likely to prove successful in the long term is reinforced, however, by a 
more ready acceptance from non-Welsh speakers of the compulsory language element now 
present within Welsh education. This is not to say that the discourses of 'individual choice' and 
`opting out' are absent here. In fact, they continues to remain clearly evident. As one respondent 
observes, `it should be up to the individual whether they want to learn Welsh', with such choice 
being assigned in various other open-ended responses either to the parents or the individual pupils 
themselves. Nonetheless, with regard to education there seems more widespread acceptance of 
the discourse of opportunity. Part of the explanation for this may lie in the ability of education 
to bridge the compulsion/choice divide. Thus, many English language respondents are happy to 
see Welsh as a compulsory element of the primary curriculum, with the proviso that Welsh at 
secondary level should be optional, or at least treated with greater flexibility. " There is also a 
recognition that the formal inclusion of Welsh within schooling provides children with an 
informed choice later on in life as to its further use and/or usefulness: `I think it is right that 
children are required to learn Welsh. This gives them a basic foundation and they can decide for 
themselves at a later stage whether they want to continue with the language'. However, there is 
also some evidence of an alternative discourse in relation to multiculturalism. As one respondent 
observes, `Throughout Britain children come from a variety of cultures, although I think it is fair 
for Welsh children to learn through their mother tongue I think that it is unfair that children from 
Pakistan, India, West Indies etc can't. Why should exceptions be made for Welsh speakers? ' I 
will return to this point, and its implications, in the following chapter. 
The idea of compulsion, as one might expect, is more strongly endorsed by Welsh language 
respondents, with a concomitant diminution of the notion of the secondary school opt out. There 
is also a wider cognisance of the pivotal role of a compulsory language component in the 
curriculum as a basis for ensuring the long-term future of the language: `The demands of the 
National Curriculum concerning the Welsh language are securing the future of the Welsh 
language. They are also ensuring that English children have the chance to learn Welsh'. 
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Additionally, there is stronger advocacy of the primacy of Welsh-medium education over other 
forms of language learning. Some respondents suggested that this should be the only option 
available: `It should be compulsory for every child in Wales to be educated through the medium 
of Welsh in order to secure the future of the language. It happens in other countries, so why not 
Wales? ' Others were less sure: `I agree that Welsh should be taught in every school in Wales but 
I think that the pupils should choose the language through the medium of which they receive most 
of their education'. Only one Welsh language response questioned the apparent contradiction at 
the heart of the National Curriculum between choice and compulsion: `I have mixed feelings about 
this matter. The present situation secures the continuation of the use of the Welsh language in 
the classroom. However, the freedom of choice which is (supposed to be) the cornerstone of the 
National Curriculum is taken away'. 
In short, while differences remain within the two language cohorts over the role of the Welsh 
language within education, there is a greater congruence between the two concerning its overall 
centrality and importance. Likewise, the discourse of individual choice with regard to the use of 
Welsh, while still present among non-Welsh speakers (and some Welsh speakers), is mediated by 
a wider acknowledgement of the need to provide a genuine language choice in the first place. 
Given the minority status of Welsh, only an element of compulsion can achieve this; a position 
that is clearly articulated in the following interview comments, both from second language learners 
of Welsh: 
I think the individual often cannot see the picture in a big enough form to be able to make 
a properly informed decision about what they are doing and the implications of what they 
are doing, the decision they're making.... Either they don't have the maturity, or they 
don't have access to the sort of information and expertise that's necessary ... and as result 
they may make an individual choice that may not actually be in their own interests. That's 
why the national curriculum is important -- so that they cannot choose exactly what they 
wish to learn. The national curriculum is there in that broader interest. DII (Swansea 
staff) 
I think it should be compulsory from a young age because children are like sponges, they 
don't really realise what they're learning anyway. If they introduce [Welsh] now they can 
choose then as they get older, say sixteen or when they leave school, whether they want 
to go on with Welsh. They don't choose whether they're taught English, they don't 
choose whether they're taught maths in school, so why should they choose Welsh. It 
should be introduced just like another subject. SE (Swansea trainee) 
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Civricwlwm Cymreig 
This more sympathetic stance is also reflected in interview comments on the development of 
Cwricwlwm Cymreig. In line with the wider discussions on Cwricwlwm Cymrcig outlined in the 
previous chapter, some interviewees were wary of its potential for insularity: 
I think [Cwricwlwm Cymreig] needs to be carefully thought out otherwise it can become, 
be seen as being rather insular, nostalgic possibly, but certainly insular and inward-looking 
rather than something which is about understanding Welsh within a much bigger 
context..... I think the Cwricwlwm Cymreig needs to be seen in that [wider] context. 
What's the role, distinctiveness of Wales and Welshness within the UK, within Europe and 
within the world. DH (Swansea stall) 
However, as this observation acknowledges, there is also considerable scope for the fostering of 
an outward-looking, dynamic conception of Welshness -- one that, while recognising the 
significance of its linguistic and cultural antecedents, is neither limited to, nor uncritical of them: 
Cwricwlwm Cymreig starts with the individual, works then to family units, then to the 
community, then to the council, the country, Europe and then the world. In fact it's an 
outward spiral. In the past it tended to be a spiral that worked inwards and perhaps didn't 
reach the centre at all but now at least there is a realisation that they've got to start at their 
roots and then sort of work outwards, but not just to stay put if you like. N(J (Bangor 
University trainee) 
An advocacy of Cwricwlwm Cymreig along these lines returns us to the discussion in Chapter 2 
on the need to recognise the `cultural-historical' as well as the `legal-political' dimensions of 
nationhood (Smith, 1995a) -- to recognise, 
in effect, one's cultural membership, or ethnic habitus, 
as well as one's citizenship. In so 
doing, this position rejects the tenets of political nationalism 
and the `cosmopolitan alternative' 
(Waldron, 1995; see Chapter 3), both of which equate 
modernity and progress only with the 
latter. These themes, and the implicit critique underlying 
them, are highlighted well in the following interview observation: 
If I suffered from amnesia and if someone helped me to restore my memory rather than 
acquiring a new personality, would that be a retrograde step? No, I don't think it would 
be.... I think that restoring the Welsh tradition will bring back self-esteem to the Welsh 
people. It is only then that they can begin to look outwards and be able to appreciate the 
cultures of other people. Usually people who argue along the lines that it would be 
pandering to nationalism are unaware of the fact that they usually are the biggest 
nationalists going. What people like that usually will tell you in private is that they look 
forward to a time when everybody in the whole world can speak English. My God, that 
will be a terrible day. I think that having one language in the world would be the worst 
possible scenario. This is what people who argue on those lines are for. 77rey drink 
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internationalism is the same as un(formity, but it's not, People forget about the `iinter' 
bit in the nationalism which to me is a two way process, giving and taking. GWJ (Bangor 
University staff, my emphasis) 
Cultural nationalism reframed 
Mention of Europe and the wider nation-state system brings me to the final theme that emerges 
from the qualitative data -- the question of devolution and/or independent statehood for Wales. 
A few who answered the Welsh language questionnaires on this topic asserted the need for an 
independent Wales. However, the vast majority of the remaining Welsh language responses reject 
this option. Instead, it is the idea of a Welsh assembly which is strongly endorsed -- both for its 
potential to provide a greater degree of local autonomy (cf. Chapter 3) within the wider British 
state and, concomitantly, for the positive implications that this is likely to have with regard to 
Welsh language policy: `A Welsh Assembly would mean that laws would be passed in Wales -- 
this would give the Welsh language more status. Welsh people would be able to pass laws which 
were relevant to the needs of the people of Wales'. The potential role of a devolved Wales within 
the European Union (EU) is also raised: `It is important that we as a nation can make decisions 
about our future and the part which Wales will play in the EU'. The role of Wales in Europe is 
further reiterated in interviews, with a concomitant argument for the diminution of British 
influence: 
... at present 
London, I don't think they really understand what's happening in Wales, so 
if you have got a Welsh assembly, at least the problems are obvious to all. As part of 
Europe, I think that must have its advantages not only economically but also from a 
cultural point of view. The problem we've got [in Britain] I think is that we don't 
consider ourselves as Europeans, but that is going to change isn't it, the European 
dimension in the national curriculum for instance is bound to make people more aware. 
Given that England has been such a dominant feature of the British Isles, if London 
becomes less important perhaps it is going to improve the situation in Wales. MJ (Bangor 
University trainee) 
From the middle ages on, [Wales has] always looked towards Europe whereas the Anglo 
Saxon line has always looked to the shores of this island.... We've always looked towards 
Europe. I suppose if you're small you've got to look for allies elsewhere. I think it's more 
than that. It's the tradition.... We've always been far more European in outlook. People 
like Saunders Lewis and so on were always regarded as European. I think that the day 
of the nation state is over. As we become part of the united states of Europe, and I'm 
sure we will, I think that all the regions in Europe will be on an equal footing.... I sec 
nothing wrong in, say the Scots or the Welsh, having the same representation as the 
Catalans have now within the EC. GWJ (Bangor University stafl) 
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In contrast, the English language responses are far more ambivalent. There is no support for an 
independent Wales at all. Independence is equated directly with isolationism and nationalism, and 
is seen as being economically unsustainable. This position is summarised, in its most trenchant 
form, by the following: 
A waste of money. Too much chance of the welsh `fundamentalist' minority enforcing 
their will on the rest of us. 
Unnecessary. If a United kingdom is in practice, then why separate areas off? A waste 
of public finance to set up a dying nation. 
A vast and potentially useless idea which will achieve little except yet another level of 
bureaucratic interference. Welsh independence has no realistic future if one considers the 
financial and economic consequences. 
While there is greater support for a Welsh assembly within the cohort, some of the same caveats 
are raised in relation to it. Also highlighted is the ongoing importance of the British union, and 
the potential implication that regional and language differences within Wales might be ignored 
under devolution to the detriment of English speakers. This more cautious approach is 
encapsulated by the following, final interview observation: 
I don't think we could survive [economically]. I don't think that we should cut ourselves 
off either. I do think that we could have greater freedom to make rules which are more 
suitable in Wales, for instance with the Welsh curriculum where you speak Welsh and 
have a Welsh element to all the subjects as well. I think we should have a greater say in 
that. Maybe something like Scotland. No, I wouldn't like to see a Welsh government 
controlling Wales at all. I'd hate to think what would happen to the English-speaking 
Welsh people then.... It's this age-old thing about the English. I don't know if they'd be 
fairly treated. LP (Bangor University trainee) 
In short, independent statehood continues to be a peripheral concern for many within Vales. 
Cultural rather than political nationalism remains the dominant discourse. These comments on 
independence and devolution also help to illustrate why the 1997 devolution campaign proved to 
be such a close fought contest (cf. Chapter 6). 
The fault lines and tensions evident within Vales 
-- particularly with regard 
to regional and linguistic variations -- continue to exert considerable 
influence on the debate. Many English-speaking respondents, in particular, have yet to be 
convinced that a move to greater 
local autonomy will result in their interests and concerns being 
fairly represented. 
336 
More broadly, such ongoing tensions have important implications for the long terns success of a 
formal bilingual policy in Wales. In this respect, much has already been accomplished -- as the 
quantitative analysis makes clear. However, when counter-trends in the quantitative analysis are 
combined with the qualitative data, a far more mixed and contentious picture emerges. The fears 
and antagonisms of non-Welsh speakers, and the associated discourses of individual choice and 
rights, continue to hold considerable purchase, even within a cohort that is broadly committed to 
bilingual policy. Moreover, many of these reservations and concerns are valid. Pertinent issues 
raised here include the ongoing articulation of an essentialist, language-based identity by some 
Welsh speakers. While language often acts as a key boundary marker, or symbolic border guard, 
for minority groups surrounded by a majority language and culture, it may lead in its extreme 
forms, as here, to the objectification of ethnicity (see Chapter 1). This, in turn, understates the 
many internal variations in Wales and has the potential to exclude and discriminate against non- 
Welsh speakers and/or those who value or demonstrate other forms of `Welshness'. Indeed, anti- 
English sentiment (both in the national and language sense) continues to be clearly apparent 
among the Welsh language cohort and clearly felt by non-Welsh speakers. Likewise, the wider 
invisibility of other ethnic minority groups in Wales remains a cause for concern (no Welsh 
language response mentioned ethnic minorities or multiculturalism), as does an ongoing tendency 
to view Welsh language and culture in static, reified terms. While the framework now exists 
within Cwricwlwm Cymreig for fostering a more dynamic and self consciously multicultural 
Wales, the full implications for bilingual policy development have yet to be adequately addressed. 
Indeed, a debate that is ongoing in Wales at present is the potential impact of Welsh language 
requirement on ethnic minorities 
(The Western Mail, 13 November, 1997: p. 1; see also Charlotte 
Williams, 1995). 
That said, much of this discourse of exclusion, discrimination and racism articulated by non-Welsh 
speakers needs to be treated with considerable caution. 
In many instances -- with a bilingual 
language requirement for employment being one key example -- it relates more to the threat to 
English language hegemony than to anything else. Concomitantly, the valorisation of English as 
the language of modernity and `wider communication' needs to be seen for what it is -- a linguistic 
proxy for the legitimation of the greater socio-political status of the majority language group (cf. 
Chapter 4). The latter also suggests that attempts by monolingual English speakers to present 
themselves as a disadvantaged 
linguistic `minority' are largely specious. Indeed, given my 
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discussion in Chapter 5 of Article 27 of the (1966) International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights, English speakers in Wales are clearly not a minority in this sense. " Rather, 
these arguments simply highlight the inevitable opposition that attends minority language policy 
development, particularly when the process of linguistic accommodation has been perceived 
historically by the majority (linguistic) group as the sole responsibility of minorities. 
And this brings me to my final point. The empirical analysis conducted here highlights, above all, 
that the legitimation and institutionalisation of minority languages within modern nations will be, 
and will remain a contested process. In effect, the discourses of choice and opportunity outlined 
here reflect two distinct views of the world. The former is framed within a wider discourse of 
orthodox liberalism which has gained a pre-eminent position in western political discourse over 
the course of this century (see Chapter 3). However, the term `western' also indicates the implicit 
ethnocentrism of this position. As I have argued, in elevating the political dimensions of 
nationhood over the cultural-historical, such a position considerably understates, even ignores, 
the hegemonic imperatives which underlie the historical development of modern nation-states. 
In so doing, it also reflects the long-standing derogation of minority languages (and, in many 
cases, the minority groups who speak them) within both political and academic discourse. 
In contrast, the discourse of opportunity argues for the recognition and validation of national 
minority languages which have 
been historically marginalised by the hegemonic construction of 
the nation-state and the associated valorisation of majority language varieties. By this, it is 
argued, such groups are accorded the cultural and 
linguistic capital necessary for (re)legitimating 
and institutionalising their 
language(s) within the civic realm. However, as we have seen, this 
process has its own problems -- most notably, the potential 
for simply replacing one totalising and 
exclusionary discourse with another. 
In short, the possibilities of essentialism, reification and 
social and political closure still 
haunt the advocacy and implementation of group-differentiated 
rights for national minorities. Other languages varieties, and alternative forms of identity, must 
still be recognised as valid within 
the nation-state, even if they are not accorded the official 
recognition consonant with national minority status. 
It is to this ongoing problematic that I want 
to turn in the final chapter. 
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Notes -- Chapter 8 
1. I outline below my reasons for pursuing this methodological approach -- many of which, I 
argue, extend considerably previous research in this area. However, I am also aware that there 
is nothing entirely new under the sun. This was brought home to me upon reading W. Gareth 
Evans' (1997) account of the first language attitude survey on the Welsh language in 1885, which 
was conducted among elementary school head teachers. Certainly, many of the issues raised in 
that survey still have resonance today and a comparison makes for fascinating reading. 
2. A breakdown along these dimensions reveals that of the five per cent who actually disagreed 
that `Welsh is a language to be proud of' (six per cent were neutral) -- most identified as English 
or British in ethnic identification and lived in the south of Wales. In respect of the question on 
co-equal status, while 75 per cent agreed overall, only 14 per cent were in strong agreement. The 
level of agreement was predictably strongest among Welsh speakers (87 per cent), although 
support among non-Welsh speakers was also substantial (68 per cent). Of those who disagreed, 
there were relatively large concentrations among those who did not consider themselves to be 
Welsh (23 per cent), non-Welsh speakers (21 per cent), and those living in the south (21 per cent) 
(NOP, 1995: 16-17). 
3. As Baker argues, adopting this approach also assumes an additive view of bilingualism. In 
contrast, single language studies have tended to adopt a subtractive view of bilingualism (cf. 
Chapter 5). In comparing languages in a given context, the latter have assumed that positive 
consequences for one language (e. g., English) necessarily involved negative consequences for 
another (e. g., Welsh). While such language competition clearly exists -- indeed, much of my own 
analysis is predicated on this notion -- the potential for language complementarity is underplayed, 
as is bilinguals' use of languages in different domains and contexts. 
4. The scales are modified in a number of ways. Particular questions used by Baker, which were 
found in the course of his analysis to have low internal reliability, were excluded. Salient 
questions were also included from previous language attitude scales used in Wales, notably from 
Sharp et al. (1973). Since much of the previous research on language attitudes in Wales has 
concentrated on children and adolescents, including Baker's study, I have also reframed certain 
questions for an adult context. Finally, a number of additional questions were constructed to 
reflect my particular interests in attitudes to Welsh bilingual policy and the issues surrounding 
individual and group differentiated rights. 
5.35 interviews, ranging from a'/2 hour to an hour in length, were conducted with individual 
trainees and staff at Bangor University, Bangor Normal and Swansea at the time that the 
questionnaire was being distributed (January, 1996). These interviews were non-standardised 
(Fielding, 1993) but did comprise a number of probes to facilitate discussion around the key issues 
in which I was interested. All these interviews were taped and subsequently transcribed. The 
remaining interview material was gathered more informally over the course of 1994-1996 from 
discussions with educationalists, administrators, teachers, and policy makers in Wales -- 
predominantly in Gwynedd and Cardiff. Material used from these interviews is drawn from my 
written notes at the time. 
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6. Of this broad grouping, 42 per cent were between 18-21 years, and 42 per cent were between 
22-25 years. In addition, seven per cent were between 26-29 years, seven per cent were between 
30-39 years, and only two per cent were between 40-49 years. This results in a mean age of 23 
years, although the range extends from a minimum of 18 years to a maximum of 47 years. 
7. Questionnaires were provided in both English and Welsh. The latter was professionally 
translated for me from the English original by Berwyn Prys Jones (sec Appendix c). 
8. The varied response rates per institution may be attributable, at least to some extent, to the 
different approaches adopted by each institution with regard to administering the questionnaire. 
Bangor Normal and Swansea provided the opportunity to answer (and return) the questionnaire 
during specified class times -- thus ensuring a good response rate. Aberystwyth and Bangor 
University handed out questionnaires to trainees to fill in during their own time. Inevitably, the 
response rate was lower in these cases. 
9. All the quantitative analysis discussed here has been generated via SPSS (Statistical Package 
for the Social Sciences; see Bryman & Cramer, 1997). 
10. Of course, there is no means of determining how many in this group will actually proceed to 
teach or, more significantly for our purposes, proceed to teach irr Males. However, an indirect 
indicator of the latter -- albeit, admittedly, a tenuous one -- can be gauged by the clear majority 
of the cohort (70.1 per cent) who indicated that they intended to stay in Wales after completion 
of their training. 
11. In addition to those born in England, 2.4 per cent (13) were born in Northern Ireland, the 
Irish Republic or Scotland, and 2.8 per cent (14) were born outside the British Isles. 
12. The regional breakdown for those born in Wales, based on the old county system established 
in 1974, is as follows: Gwynedd, 17.8 per cent; Clwyd, 13.9 per cent; Dyfed, 7.3 per cent; 
Glamorgan (including south, west and mid Glamorgan), 14.7 per cent; Gwent, 2.1 per cent; 
Powys, 1.3 per cent. 
13. The general subset comprises the following: 7 a), c), d), e), f), g), h), j), k), 1), m), n), r), s), 
t), v), x), y) z), aa) (see Appendix b). 
14. This caveat also applies to the ensuing analyses of the other language attitude scales. 
15. I do not generally distinguish in what follows between the categories of `strongly agree' and 
`agree', and `strongly disagree' and disagree', preferring to talk instead about either broadly 
positive or negative responses. There are two reasons for this. One is practical -- it simply makes 
the following analysis more accessible. The second is statistical. Since a Likert scale is not a true 
interval scale, no conclusions can be drawn about the meaning of distances between scale 
positions (see Moser, 1968). 
16. The subset of specific attitudes to Welsh comprises: 7 b), i), o), p), q), u), w), bb) (see 
Appendix b). 
17. The integrative subset comprises 8 a), b), c), e), g), i), j), 1), m), n), o), p), s). The 
instrumental subset comprises 8 d), f), h), k), q), r), t). 
340 
18. The trend to a more secular Wales is reinforced by an analysis of religious affiliation. Only 
19 per cent of the cohort identified as Nonconformist (including Methodist, Presbyterian, 
Independent and Baptist), although 32.2 per cent identified as Anglican, 22.1 per cent as Christian 
(unspecified) and 11 per cent as Catholic. 41.7 per cent either failed to answer the question, or 
identified as none, suggesting a significant minority with no religious affiliation. 1.7 per cent 
identified as Muslim, Jewish or other. 
19. While there was strong overall support for this item at 78.6 per cent, 31.3 per cent of the 
non-Welsh-speaking sample saw Welsh as unimportant or relatively unimportant compared to 
only 6.7 per cent for the Welsh-speaking sample. 
20. The growing association and use of Welsh in the domain of popular culture may be influenced 
to some extent by the current status of a number of Welsh-speaking rock/pop bands -- in 
particular, the Manic Street Preachers, Super Furry Animals, and Catatonia. While all these bands 
began life on the `indie' circuit, they have gained increasing recognition and a considerable 
following in recent years -- both in Britain and, with the Manic Street Preachers at least, beyond 
it as well. Given their prominent use of Welsh, including songs written and performed in Welsh, 
such bands have provided the language with a social and cachet far removed from the more 
traditional cultural forms with which it has long been associated (see, for example, The Guardians 
G2, November 11,1997: 9) 
21. This subset comprises 9 a), b), c), d), e), h), j), 1), m), q), r), s), t), u). 
22. This subset comprises 9 f), g), i), k), n), o), p). 
23. Open-ended responses in the Welsh language questionnaires were translated and transcribed 
for me by a fluent Welsh speaker, Ruth Kelso. 
24. This position is consonant with the current stance of Plaid Cymru (see Chapter 6). 
25. This pattern maybe explained to some extent by the fact that 65.5 per cent (110 out of 168) 
of those training to be secondary teachers are non-Welsh speakers. 
26. As I indicated in Chapter 5, debates about linguistic minority status in relation to Article 27 
are ongoing. However, precedent has been set in international law by the 1993 judgement of 
Ballarityne, Davidson and McIntyre v. Canada. Here, an argument that English speakers in 
Quebec constituted a linguistic minority under Article 27 was rejected by the United Nations 
Human Rights Commission. The commission ruled in effect that `English-speaking citizens of 
Canada cannot be considered a linguistic minority' since this is determined by their position within 
the state rather than within particular regions of it (de Varennes, 1996a). 
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REIMAGINING THE NATION-STATE: ACCOMMODATING 
MINORITY RIGHTS 
We need a little less pietistic articulation of political principle ... a little more of the 
principle of political negotiation (Bhabha, 1994: 28) 
All collective forms of identity are permeable, fluid and subject to change. They vary in salience 
depending on the individual, the immediate context, their complex articulation with other 
identities, and the wider vicissitudes of history. There is certainly nothing inherent about them. 
Ethnic and national identities are no exception here -- they are as constructed and as contingent 
as any other. Nonetheless, it is also clear that such identities continue to exert considerable 
influence, both individually and corporately; ethnic and national identities more than most. This 
can be explained, I have argued, by the fact that ethnic and national identities are also at the same 
time an embodied set of dispositions, or habitus (Bourdieu, 1990a). In this sense, they are not 
simply representations of some inner psychological state, nor even particular ideologies about the 
world (Billig, 1995). Rather, they are social, cultural and political forms of life -- material ways 
of being in the modern world. 
On this basis, I have also brought into question the central tenets of political nationalism -- most 
notably, nation-state congruence -- which have resulted in the valorisation of the `legal-political' 
dimensions of nationhood (and the inherent individualism underlying these) over the `cultural- 
historical'. It has been my argument that this understates the considerable and continuing 
influence of the latter. Modern nations are not just political communities represented in and by 
the nation-state and expressed via individual citizenship. They are also ethnocuhural 
communities, which may or may not be so represented, and yet which are still shaped by shared 
myths of origins, and a sense of common history and ways of life. Moreover, it is principally this 
latter dimension which endows their members with identity and purpose. 
When this is recognised, it becomes clearer why ethnic and national affiliations which are not 
represented in and by the nation-state continue to be a source of identity and mobilisation for 
many minority groups, confounding the `liberal expectancy' (Fenton, 1998) that they would 
atrophy in the face of modernity. In this respect, my argument is the reverse of much academic 
and popular commentary (cf. Chapter 1). It is not the cultural and political expression or 
mobilisation of (minority) ethnicities and nationalisms which are the cause of so much 
contemporary mayhem in the modern world, but their disavowal. We ignore their ongoing 
influence and purchase at our peril. 
In adopting this position, I stress again that we do not need to abandon the social constructionist 
consensus on ethnicity and nationalism. Far from it. What we do need to do though is consider 
critically why the constructedness and contingency of majoritarimi forms of ethnic and/or national 
identity should somehow be immune from its purview. In short, what we should be asking 
ourselves is both why some ethnic and/or national identities are legitimated and normalised while 
other are not, and how this process of differentiation is accomplished. This in turn highlights the 
central importance of power relations, and the means by which these come to be articulated within 
modern nation-states, particularly between majority and minority groups. 
When these questions are asked we begin to realise that ethnicity and nationalism do not simply 
lurk out there -- the sole preserve of `extremist' nationalists or malcontented ethnic minorities. 
They inhabit the very structures of the civic societies in which we live. In effect, both the political 
and administrative structure of the state, and its civil society, are ethnicised, although they are not 
always recognised or acknowledged as such. This lack of recognition -- particularly among, but 
not limited to majority (ethnic) group members -- attests to the hegemony of the `philosophical 
matrix of the nation-state' (Churchill, 1996). As I discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this matrix is 
predicated upon the principle of nation-state congruence and the establishment to this end (and 
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often retrospectively) of a common civic language and culture. The latter is often sustained in 
turn by the tenets of political liberalism -- notably, individual autonomy, citizenship and 
universalism. Consequently, the civic realm often comes to be represented as devoid of ethnicity, 
neutral and common to all -- at least, that is, in modern democratic states. ' However, as I have 
consistently argued, it is none of these. Rather, the public sphere of the nation-state represents 
and is reflective of the particular cultural and linguistic habitus of the dominant ethnic, or 
staatsvolk. These habitus, in turn, are accorded with cultural and linguistic capital while other 
(minority) habitus specifically are not. 
The principal consequence for many minorities -- at both the individual and collective level -- has 
been the enforced loss of their own ethnic, cultural and linguistic habitus as the necessary price 
of entry to the civic realm. As we saw Peter McLaren observe in Chapter 3, a prerequisite of 
`joining the [national] club' is to become denuded, de-ethnicised (or, rather, re-ethnicised) and 
culturally stripped. There are numerous examples where this act of defenestration has been 
achieved by state coercion. With regard to language the (1536) Act of Union, proscribing Welsh, 
is an obvious historical example -- as is, more recently, Franco's Spain. However, contemporary 
examples remain prevalent, with Albanians in Serbia, Tibetans in China, and Kurds in Turkey all 
currently facing the proscription of their languages by the state. If the US English Only movement 
has its way, such will also be the case for Hispanic communities in the USA. 
However, it is via civil society that this process has been most widely and effectively achieved 
(although, it must be said, often in conjunction with more coercive measures). Language and 
education play central roles here. Indeed, the construction of national languages, and their 
reinforcement via mass education, have become a sine qua non of modern nation-states. These 
linguistic and educational processes have also linked dominant language varieties inexorably to 
modernity and progress, while consigning their minority counterparts to the realms of primitivism 
and stasis. The cultural and linguistic capital ascribed to dominant language varieties also 
inevitably leads to the view that they are of more value and use in the modem world. Such 
associations operate on the international stage as well -- with the status of lingua franca currently 
ascribed to the English language being a reflection of the socio-political dominance of those 
nation-states (notably the USA) with which it is most closely associated. 
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It is perhaps not surprising then that many minority group members have come to accept and 
internalise the view that their own cultural and linguistic habitus have little or no value. This, in 
turn, leads many to become active participants in the jettisoning of their traditional languages and 
cultures. Bourdieu (1991) describes this process as one of meconnaissance (misrecognition) -- 
assuming the greater value accorded the dominant language and culture to be a `natural' rather 
than a socially and politically constructed phenomenon. As Bourdieu argues, the resulting 
`symbolic violence' which is visited upon particular minority languages and cultures is often 
sustained by an active complicity, or implicit consent, on the part of those subjected to it. 
So how can we change this state of affairs? Not easily is the simple answer. But the example of 
Wales demonstrates that real progress can be made. The nation-state can be reconfigured -- 
reimagined, in effect -- to accommodate greater cultural and linguistic diversity. Or rather, as 
Homi Bhabha argues, it can be reimagined in order to accommodate greater cultural and linguistic 
difference. The distinction Bhabha makes is crucial here. The former, most evident in the 
rhetoric of multiculturalism, treats culture as an object of empirical knowledge -- as static, 
totalised and historically bounded, as something to be valued but not necessarily lived (see also 
May, 1994,1998b). The latter is the process of the enunciation of culture as `knowledgable', 
as adequate to the construction of systems of cultural identification. This involves a dynamic 
conception of culture -- one that recognises and incorporates the ongoing fluidity and constant 
change that attends its articulation in the modern world. 
A formal recognition of cultural and linguistic difference along these lines is what is presently 
occurring in Wales. The development of a Welsh bilingual state has involved the legitimation and 
institutionalisation of Welsh in the public domain -- after centuries of proscription, derogation and 
neglect -- alongside English. It aims to build on, and where necessary transform Welsh language 
and culture in order more adequately to meet the demands of modernity. However, this process 
remains a highly contested one, and it is perhaps most virulent at the intersection of group- 
differentiated and individual rights. As Chapter 8 makes clear, both English and Welsh speakers 
mobilise such rights, but often to quite different ends. Likewise, claims and counter-claims of 
disadvantage and discrimination feature prominently. 
345 
In light of this, how might we proceed? For a start, by recognising that these issues are never 
likely to be entirely resolved. More significantly, it is not necessary that they should be. As 
Bhabha (1994) again observes, an alternative minority discourse amounts to a strategy of 
intervention which is similar to what the British parliamentary procedure recognises as a 
supplementary question. A supplementary strategy suggests that adding 'to' geed not be the 
same as adding 'up'. In other words, what we may have here in the end are incommensurable 
discourses -- 'abseits designating a form of social contradiction or antagonism that has to be 
negotiated rather than sublated' (1994: 162). We cannot, and perhaps should not, evacuate 
tension and conflict from these negotiations since real and substantive differences continue to 
underlie the various positions involved (Coulombe, 1995). 
Indeed, the continuing debates around individual and group-differentiated rights may help to 
guard against the possibility of, and potential for social and political closure -- of simply 
substituting one kind of totalising and exclusionary (national) discourse for another. After all, the 
world is replete with examples of minority groups who, on attaining greater socio-political status 
for themselves, promptly deny it to others. The tenets of international law with regard to minority 
groups (see Chapter 3) become crucially important here. With regard to language, for example, 
three key tenets can be highlighted. The first principle, which is widely accepted, is that it is not 
unreasonable to expect from national members some knowledge of the common public 
language(s) of the state. On this basis, it is possible to argue with regard to Wales that Welsh, 
along with English, constitutes such a language and should be accorded all its benefits. 
A second principle is that in order to avoid language discrimination, it is important that where 
there are a sufficient number of other language speakers, these speakers should be allowed to use 
that language as part of the exercise of their individual rights as citizens. That is, they should 
have the opportunity to use their first language if they so choose (cf. Chapter 8). As de Varennes 
argues, `the respect of the language principles of individuals, where appropriate and reasonable, 
flows from a fundamental right and is not some special concession or privileged treatment. 
Simply put, it is the right to the be treated equally without discrimination, to which everyone is 
entitled' (1996a: 117; my emphasis). 
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This principle can be applied to the ongoing promotion of Welsh on the basis of the still significant 
number of Welsh speakers in Wales. Ostensibly, this can also be applied to English speakers on 
the same grounds. However, a crucial caveat needs to be added here -- particularly in light of the 
attitudes expressed by some monolingual English speakers in the previous chapter. The formal 
promotion of Welsh, as a minority language, does not preclude the ongoing use of English, given 
its majority status. What is being promoted in Wales is not monolingualism in Welsh -- indeed, 
this is neither politically or practically sustainable -- but Welsh/English bilingualism. As such, the 
claims of language discrimination by English speakers are both misplaced and inapplicable. The 
English language is not being precluded form the public realm, nor proscribed at the individual 
level. 2 Far from it, since English continues presently to dominate in Wales. Rather, monolingual 
speakers of English are being asked to accommodate to the ongoing presence of Welsh in Wales 
and to recognise its status as a national language -- a process which I described in Chapter 5 as 
`mutual accommodation'. The assertion of many English speakers to continue to speak only 
English is thus contrary to this principle, not an example of it, since this would inevitably lead to 
the further erosion of a minority language like Welsh. 
The third principle arises directly from the previous one -- how to determine exactly what is 
`appropriate and reasonable' with regard to individual language preferences. Here, the distinction 
between national minority and polyethnic rights (see Chapter 3) becomes crucial. I have argued 
that only national minorities -- as historical ethnies -- can demand as of right formal inclusion of 
their languages and cultures in the civic realm. However, this need not and should not preclude 
other ethnic minorities from being allowed at the very least to cultivate and pursue unhindered 
their own historic cultural and linguistic practices in the private domain. In relation to language, 
this has been articulated by Kloss (1977) as the distinction between promotion-oriented and 
tolerance-oriented rights. In relation to Churchill's (1986) typology of minority language policy 
approaches, it is illustrated by the distinction between the maintenance of languages for private 
use (Stage 5) versus the institutional recognition of languages (Stage 6). 
Thus, while continuing to recognise the rights attributable to other minorities, this distinction 
allows us to avoid the problem of cultural relativism. In short, greater ethnolinguistic democracy 
is not necessarily the same as ethnolinguistic equality. It also addresses the question, to which 
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I have alluded on a number of occasions, of the role of multiculturalism. In this respect, a 
common argument has been that bicultural/bilingual policies privilege one particular minority 
group over others and are therefore both disadvantageous and discriminatory towards the latter. 
In this view, differential treatment of minorities is illiberal -- either all minority groups should be 
so recognised, or none should be. The current debate on the potential racism of Welsh language 
policy (see Chapter 8) is an example of this position. 
However, this argument can be challenged on a number of grounds. First, as with much 
discussion of minority rights, no distinction is made here between the differing rights attributable 
to national and ethnic minorities. National minority rights are thus treated as merely equivalent 
to the rights of all other competing groups. What is being advocated, in effect, is the applicability 
of polyetluzic rights (and only these) to all minorities. In the process, and this is my second point, 
the demands of multiculturalism come to be articulated as an alternative to national minority 
rights -- i. e., as a means of avoiding biculturalism/bilingualism. This suggests, in turn, the distinct 
possibility that the articulation of multiculturalism along these lines is not seriously countenanced 
by at least some of its proponents. Remembering Bhabha's distinction above, the rhetoric of 
cultural and linguistic diversity is used as a spoiling device against the articulation of cultural and 
linguistic difference. Support for multiculturalism may thus arise less out of a valuing of diversity, 
and/or a concern for the interests of minority groups, than from a fear of the possible fulfilment 
of bicultural and bilingual aspirations (May, 1997). Pierre Coulombe makes this point, albeit 
somewhat more forcefully, in relation to Canada's official French/English bilingualism: 
Those who object to bilingualism often do so because they fear differences and are unable 
to reconcile themselves with the loss of their hegemony over society. Needless to say, it 
is an attitude that is not receptive to multiculturalism and the maintaining of differences. 
There is no way that the cultural imperialists who wrap themselves in the language of 
moral outrage in denouncing bilingualism will open their arms to multiculturalism.... They 
will, in other words, profess their tolerance towards a diversity of languages and cultures, 
so long as that diversity is consigned to the private sphere. Ethnic minorities ought to be 
cautious when they too oppose official bilingualism, for they may be unwillingly 
supporting an attitude that will turn against them. (1995: 104) 
As such, we should treat the competing claims of multiculturalism with considerable scepticism. 
But having said that, it is unwise to dismiss multicultural claims out of hand, as Coulombe comes 
close to doing. Multiculturalism may still have and important, perhaps essential part to play as 
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an addition or complement to bicultural/bilingual policy. There is in Wales, for example, some 
danger that the Welsh/English dialectic is being emphasised to the exclusion of other ethnic and 
linguistic minority groups in Wales. This is a cause for concern and needs to be addressed in an 
ongoing manner with regard to Welsh language and education initiatives. The development of 
formal bilingualism in Wales must remain sensitive to, and accommodating of other ethnic 
minority groups and the languages they speak. 
Likewise, there is a continuing necessity to guard against essentialism and reification in the 
articulation of Welsh cultural and language rights -- features which are still clearly apparent from 
the empirical data examined in the preceding chapter. Multiculturalism may thus usefully ensure 
against the objectification of ethnicity and the hardening of ethnic and national boundaries, while 
contributing at the same time to ongoing debates about a more open, evolving conception of what 
it means to be Welsh. As Fiona Bowie asserts, `new definitions of Welshness which can embrace 
all those who consider themselves to be Welsh [are essential] if any sense of a wider national 
identity is to be sustained' (1993: 193). Bourdieu argues, more broadly, that one needs here `to 
keep together what go together in reality: on the one hand the objective classifications ... and, on 
the other hand, the practical relation to those classifications, whether acted out or represented, 
and in particular the individual and collective strategies ... 
by which agents seek to put these 
classifications at the service of their material or symbolic interests, or to conserve or transform 
them' (1991: 227). 
And this brings me to my final point. It has been my argument throughout that in order to 
reimagine the nation-state along more plural and inclusive lines we must first (and somewhat 
counter-intuitively) acknowledge the cultural-historical dimensions of the ethnic and national 
identities which comprise it. As Stuart Hall argues, a positive conception of ethnicity must begin 
with `a recognition that all speak from a particular place, out of a particular history, out of a 
particular experience, a particular culture, without being contained by that position' (1992b: 258; 
my emphasis). Moreover, if a particular language has played an important part in that historical 
positioning (and it may well not have), there is no reason why it cannot continue to do so. 
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However, Hall's qualification points to the second key aspect of my argument -- that the 
recognition of our cultural and historical situatedness should not set the limits of ethnicity and 
nationality, nor act to undermine the legitimacy of other, equally valid forms of identity. This 
requires a reflective, critical approach to ethnic and national identity -- one that engages with the 
present and the future as well as the past, and one that remains open to competing 
conceptualisations, diverse identities, and a rich public discourse about controversial issues 
(Calhoun, 1993b). As Peter McLaren observes, echoing Renan's conception of the `will to 
nationhood' (see Chapter 2): `rather than searching for the origins of our identities as historical 
agents of struggle, we need to focus more on what we can achieve together. What we might 
become takes precedence over who we are' (1995: 109). Likewise, Terry Eagleton asserts: `Any 
emancipatory politics must begin with the specific ... 
but must in the same gesture leave it behind. 
For the freedom to question is not the freedom to be "Irish" or "to be a woman", whatever this 
might mean, but simply the freedom now enjoyed by certain other groups to determine their 
identity as they wish' (1990: 30; my emphasis). 
Such a position recognises the ongoing interspersion of groups, the complex interconnections 
between ethnic and national identities and other forms of identity, and the ambiguities, tensions, 
and competing demands that inevitably arise as a result. But even more importantly, it recognises 
that these can be outworked from within rather than determined from without. Or, to put it 
another way, they can be negotiated on one's own terms, rather than the terms set by others as 
has so often been the case historically for minority groups. The Welsh, along with many other 
national and ethnic minorities in the modern world, are increasingly settling for nothing less. 
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Notes -- Chapter 9 
1. As I discussed in Chapter 1, there are examples of nation-states where ethnicity is overtly and 
formally employed as a basis of differentiation -- Nazi Germany, Apartheid South Africa, the 
former Yugoslavia, Malaysia and Fiji, to name but a few. However, these cannot be regarded as 
democratic states. 
2. This stands in contrast to some examples of minority language policy where discrimination 
against other language speakers can be said to occur. In Latvia and Estonia, for example, the long 
proscription of their indigenous languages and cultures under Soviet Rule has been replaced by 
a similar discriminatory policy in their favour. The significant Russian speaking population in 
these areas are now denied citizenship rights unless they can demonstrate a conversational ability 
in Latvian or Estonian (see de Varennes, 1996a). This policy clearly runs counter to the principle 
in international law which sanctions the recognition and use of a minority language where 
numbers warrant (cf. Chapter 5). 
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APPENDIX B 
Dear teacher trainee 
This questionnaire aims to find out your views on Welsh language and culture, bilingualism, 
and bilingual education. 
As a teacher trainee, currently training in Wales, your views on these issues are of particular 
interest and importance for future language planning in Wales. 
You do not necessarily have to be Welsh, or a Welsh speaker, to answer this questionnaire. 
All views are welcome. 
The questionnaire should take about 10 minutes to complete. Please try to answer all 
questions as fully as possible and return it to your tutor when finished. 
All responses to this questionnaire will be treated entirely confidentially. 
Many thanks for your time and help. 
Stephen May 
PLEASE NOTE: THERE IS A WELSH LANGUAGE VERSION OF THIS 
QUESTIONNAIRE AVAILABLE FOR ALL THOSE WHO 




I). What is the name of your teacher training institution? 
2). What level of teaching are you training for? (Please tick appropriate box) 
infants Q 
primary (B. Ed) Q 
primary (PGCE) F 
secondary* a* main subject 
other** F-I ** please describe 
3). What year of teacher training are you currently in? 
Ist Q 2nd Q 3rd ii 4th Q Other 
4). Which of the following descriptions best describes the language(s) used on 
your particular teacher training programme in college? 
Welsh Q Welsh & English F-I English 
Mainly Welsh II Mainly English iI 
5). Which of the following descriptions best describes the language(s) used by 
you to teach on your current (or most recent) teaching practice in school? 
Welsh Q Welsh & English Q English Q 
Mainly Welsh Q Mainly English Q 
6). Which of the following best describes your current (or most recent) teaching 
practice school? 
Welsh-speaking primary school F-I 
Bilingual (Welsh-English) primary school F-I 
English-speaking primary school F1 
Welsh-speaking secondary school in Welsh-speaking area 
welsh-speaking secondary school in English-speaking area 
Bilingual (Welsh-English) secondary school 
English-speaking secondary school 
Here are some statements about the Walsh language. Please say whether you 
agree or disagree with these statements. There are no right or wrong 
answers. Answer with ONB of the following. 
SA " Strongly agree (circle SA) 
A. Agree (circle A) 
NAN D. Neither Agree Nor Disagree (circle NAND) 
D" Disagree (circle D) 
SD " Strongly Disagree (circle SD) 
7). 
a. I like hearing Welsh spoken 
b. Welsh should be taught to all pupils in 
Wales 
c. It is a waste of time to keep the Welsh 
language alive 
d. I like speaking Welsh 
e. Welsh is essential to take part fully in 
Welsh life 
f. There are more useful languages to learn 
than Welsh 
g. Welsh is a language worth learning 
h. Welsh is not relevant to the modern world 
J. Pupils should not be made to learn Welsh 
J. It is only traditionalists who want to 
keep the Welsh language alive 
k. We need to preserve the Welsh language 
1. I am likely to use Welsh in my everyday 
life 
M. Learning Welsh is unnecessary because 
Britain is mainly English-speaking 
n. I prefer to be taught in college in Welsh 
o.. All schools in Wales should provide the 
opportunity for pupils to learn in Welsh 
p. All pupils in Wales should be taught 
in Welsh 
q. The learning of Welsh should be left to 
individual choice 
r. I prefer to teach in Welsh 
s. There should be more Welsh in public life 
t. The rights of people to use Welsh in 
public life must be protected 
U. Welsh should be limited to the private 
domain (family, friends etc. ) 
v. It is right that some jobs are reserved 
for Welsh speaking people 
w. In-migrants to Wales should learn Welsh 
x. The Welsh language should be maintained 
because it is a sign of Welsh nationhood 
Y. I would prefer to marry a Welsh speaker 
Z. I would prefer my children to be 
Welsh speaking 
(5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
SA A NAND D SD 
con tinued overleaf 
aa. The government spends too much money on SA A RAND D SD 
promoting the welsh language. 
bb. Legislation protecting the Welsh language SA A NAND D SD 
is necessary, even if it limits the choices 
of some English speakers in wales 
(e. g. their choice of education). 
How important or unimportant do you think the Welsh language is for the 
following activities. There are no right or wrong answers. Please tick 
appropriate box. 
Important A Little A Little Unimportant 
A. Important Unimportant 




d) having an 
intellectual 
discussion 
6) watching TV 
f) getting a job in 
wales 




h) doing tertiary 
study 
i) going to 
church/chapel 
j) talking to peers in 
college 
k) getting a job in 
industry/commerce/ 
management 
1) living in Wales 
m) bringing up 
children 
n) talking to tutors 
in college 
o) being involved in 
contemporary 
popular culture - 
music/media etc. 
p) talking to other 
teachers in schools 
q) getting a job in 
the public sector - 
civil service, 
media, teaching etc 
r) succeeding at 
college 
2) being accepted in 
the community 
0 teaching in schools 
Here are some statements about the English and Welsh language. Please say 
whether you agree or disagree with these statements. There are no right or 
wrong answers. Answer with ONE of the following. 
3A " Strongly Agree (circle BA) 
A" Agree (circle A) 
NAND . Neither Agree Nor Disagree (circle HAND) 
LD" Disagree (circle D) SD - Strongly Disagree (circle SD) 
9). (5) (4) (3) (2) (1) 
a. It is important to be able to speak SA A NAND D SD 
both English and Welsh 
b. Knowing Welsh and English is an SA A NAND D SD 
intellectual advantage 
c. Children get confused when learning SA A NAND D SD 
English and Welsh 
d. Speaking both Welsh and English is SA A NAND D SD 
an advantage in seeking employment 
e. Being able to write in English and SA A NAND D SD 
Welsh is important 
f. All schools in Wales should teach SA A NAND D SD 
pupils to speak in both English and Welsh 
g. Road signs in Wales should be in SA A NAND D 8D 
English and Welsh 
h. Speaking two languages is not difficult SA A NAND D SD 
J. Children in Wales should learn to read SA A NAND D SD 
in both Welsh and English 
J. People who speak Welsh and English can SA A NAND D SD 
have a wider social circle than those 
who speak one language 
k. All jobs in Wales should be advertised SA A NAND D SD 
in both Welsh and English 
1. Young children learn to speak Welsh and SA A NAND D SD 
English at the same time with ease 
Ea. Both English and Welsh should be SA A NAND D SD 
important in Wales 
n. All printed forms in Wales should be SA A NAND D SD 
in both English and Welsh 
o. The ability to speak and read in SA A NAND D SD 
both English and Welsh should be a 
requirement for public sector jobs 
in Wales 
p. All public services in Wales should be SA A NAND D SD 
available in both Welsh and English 
(e. g government, media, courts etc. ) 
q. I would like to be considered as a SA A NAND D SD 
speaker of English and Welsh 
r. All people in Wales should speak SA A NAND D SD 
English and Welsh 
s. I would want my children to speak SA A NAND D SD 
both English and Welsh 
t. Both English and Welsh should be SA A NAND D SD 
treated equally as the two national 
languages of Wales 
U. People only need to know one language SA A NAND D SD 
Questions 10-22 are necessary for statistical purposes, could you please 
answer all those that apply to you. (see relevant directions) 
10). What is your plac* of birth? (Please specify country and, if possible, 
county/region) 
Country County/Region 
11). How long have you lived in wales? (Please tick appropriate box) 
0-1 year Q 1-3 years Q 4-6 years [J 7-10 years Q 10+ Years Q 
12). What is you religious affiliation - if any? (Please specify) 
13). Which of the following best describes your ethnic affiliation? 
(Please tick appropriate box) 
Welsh 17 English Q British Q European Q 
Irish L] Scottish Other* F-1 *If other, please state 
14). which of the following descriptions best describes your ability to speak 
Welsh. 
No Welsh F 7 
Little Welsh - Q 
Much Welsh 7 
Fluent Welsh F-I 
(Go directly to question 18) 
(Go to question 15) 
(Go to question 15) 
(Go to question 15) 
15). If you speak welsh, which of the following descriptions best describes your 
current use of welsh. 
Rarely speak Welsh II Half & Half a 
Occasionally most of the time Q 
16). Is Welsh your lot or 2nd language? 
1st language F7 2nd language D 
(Go directly to question 19) (Go to question 17) 
17). if you are a 2nd language learner of welsh, where did you learn Welsh? - e. g 
primary school, college, ulpan etc. (Please specify) 
(Go directly to question 19) 
18). If you are not currently able to speak Welsh, would you be prepared to learn 
it as a second language? 
No Q Yes Q 
19). Do you understand Welsh? 
No Welsh Little Welsh Q Much Welsh Fluent Welsh Q 
20). Are there any members of your family who speak Welsh? (This may include 
members of your wider family - grandparents, uncle/aunt, cousins etc. ) 
No II Yes* F-1 *If Yes, please specify 
21). Apart from welsh and/or English, do you speak any other languages fluently? 
No Q Yes* ii *If Yes, please specify 
22). Do you wish to continue to live in Wales after completing your course? 
No F-I 
Yes 
Finally, could you answer Questions 23-28 as fully as you can. 
23). In your view, what are the most important /distinctive elements of Welsh 
culture and society? 




Nod yr holiadur hwn yw darganfod eich barn am y Gymraeg a'i diwylliant, dwyieithrwydd, 
ac addysg ddwyieithog. 
Gan eich bod yn ddarpar-athro/athrawes sy'n cael ei hyfforddi yng Nghymru ar hyn o bryd, 
mae eich barn am y materion hyn o ddiddordeb a phwysigrwydd arbennig o ran cynllunio 
ieithyddol at y dyfodol yng Nghymru. 
Dylai hi gymryd rhyw 10 munud i chi lenwi'r holiadur. Ceisiwch roi ateb mor Ilawn ä 
phosibi i bob cwestiwn, a dychwelwch yr holiadur i'r tiwtor ar 61 i chi orffen. 
Caiff pob ymateb i'r holiadur hwn ei drin fel ymateb cwbl gyfrinachol. 
Diolch o galon i chi am eich amser a'ch cymorth. 
Stephen May 
Cyn i chi ddechrau ateb yr holiadur, a wnewch 
chi nodi'r wybodaeth isod 
Oed 
Rhyw 
1). Beth yw enw eich ssfydliad hyfforddi athrawon? 
2). Pa lefel o addyagu yr ydych yn hyfforddi ar ei chyfer? (Ticiwch y blwch 
priodol) 
babanod Q 
cynradd (B. Add) F1 
cynradd (TAR) Q 
uwchradd* 
arall** 
* prif bwnc 
** disgrifiwch ef/hwy 
3). Ar ba flwyddyn yn eich hyfforddiant fel athro neu athrawes yr ydych chi ar 
hyn o bryd? 
laf El Ail 3edd Q 4edd a Arall 7 
4), p'un o'r disgrifiadau isod sy'n disgrifio orau yr iaith/ieithoedd a 
ddefnyddir ar eich rhaglen hyfforddi athrawon yn y coleg? 
cymraeg Q Cymraeg a Saesneg a Saesneg F-I 
Cymraeg yn bennaf F-I Saesneg yn bennaf Q 
5), Pun o'r disgrifiadau isod sy'n disgrifio orau yr iaith/ieithoedd a 
ddefnyddir gennych i addysgu ar eich ymarfer addyagu cyfredol (neu fwyaf 
diweddar) yn yr ysgol? 
cymraeg Q Cymraeg a Saesneg II Saesneg 
Cymraeg yn bennaf F] Saesneg yn bennaf Q 
6). P'un o'r isod sy'n disgrifio orau eich ysgol ymarfer addysgu gyfredol (neu 
fwyaf diweddar) ? 
Ysgol gynradd Gymraeg ei hiaith Q 
Ysgol gynradd ddwyieithog (Cymraeg-Saesneg) Q 
ysgol gynradd Saesneg ei hiaith a 
ysgol uwchradd Gymraeg ei hiaith mewn ardal Gymraeg ei hiaith F] 
ysgol uwchradd Gymraeg ei hiaith mewn ardal Saesneg ei hiaith 17 
ysgol uwchradd ddwyieithog (Cymraeg-Saesneg) 
ysgol uwchradd Saesneg ei hiaith D 
Dyma rai datganiadau yngl n ä'r Gymraeg. Dywedwch a ydych yn cytuno neun 
anghytuno ä'r datganiadau hyn. Nid oea atebion cywir nac anghywir. Atebwch 
drwy roi cylch am UN o'r canlynol. 
CG . Cytuno'n Gryf (rhowch gylch am CG) 
C" Cytuno (rhowch gylch am c) 
HGNA = Heb Gytuno Nac Anghytuno (rhowch gylch am RGNA) 
A- Anghytuno (rhowch gylch am A) 
AG = Anghytuno'n Gryf (rhowch gylch am AG) 
7). 5) 4) 3) 2) 1) 
a. Hoffaf glywed y Gymraeg yn cael ei siarad Co C HGNA A AG 
b. Dylid addysgu'r Gymraeg i bob disgybl yng Nghymru CG C HGNA A AG 
c. Gwastraff amser yw cadw'r Gyrnraeg yn fyw CG c HGNA A AG 
d. Byddaf yn hoffi siarad Cymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
e. Mae'r Gymraeg yn hanfodol er mwyn cymryd rhan yn CO C HGNA A AG 
llawn yn y bywyd Cymreig 
f. Mae ieithoedd mwy defnyddiol na'r Gymraeg i'w CO C HGNA A AG 
dysgu 
g. Mae'r Gymraeg yn iaith sy'n werth ei dysgu CG C HGNA A AG 
h. Nid yw'r Gymraeg yn berthnasol i'r byd modern CG C HGNA A AG 
i. Ni ddylid gorfodi disgyblion i ddysgu Cymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
j. Dim and y rhai sy'n glynu wrth draddodiad sydd CG C HGNA A AG 
am gadw'r Gymraeg yn fyw 
k. Mae angen i ni ddiogelu'r Gymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
1. Yr wyf yn debygol o ddefnyddio'r Gymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
yn fy mywyd bob-dydd 
M. Nid oes angen dysgu Cymraeg gan mai gwlad CG c HGNA A AG 
Saesneg ei hiaith yn bennaf yw Prydain 
n. Mae'n well gennyf gael fy nysgu drwy'r Gymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
yn y coleg 
o. Dylai pob ysgol yng Nghymru roi cyfle i'w CG C HGNA A AG 
disgyblion ddysgu drwy'r Gymraeg 
p. Dylid addysgu pob disgybl yng Nghymru drwy'r CG C HGNA A AG 
Gymraeg 
q. Dylid gadael i'r unigolyn benderfynu a ydyw am CG C HGNA A AG 
ddysgu Cymraeg 
r. Mae'n well gennyf addysgu drwy'r Gymraeg CG C HCNA A AG 
Dylid cael rhagor o Gymraeg mewn bywyd cyhoeddus CG C HGNA A AG 
t. Rhaid diogelu hawl pool i ddefnyddio'r Gymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
mewn bywyd cyhoeddus 
U. Dylid cyfyngu'r Gymraeg i feysydd preifat CG C HGNA A AG 
(y teulu, cyfeillion etc. ) 
v. Mae'n iawn i rai swyddi gael eu neilltuo ar CG C HGNA A AG 
gyfer pobl sy'n siarad Cymraeg 
w. Dylai mewnfudwyr i Gymru ddysgu Cymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
%. Dylid cadw'r Gymraeg oherwydd ei bod yn arwydd o CG C HGNA A AG 
genedligrwydd y Cymry 
y. Byddai'n well gennyf briodi rhywun sy'n siarad CG C HCNA A AG 
Cymraeg 
Z. Byddai'n well gennyf I'm plant fedru'r Gymraeg CG c HGNA A AG 
parhad tro . odd 
as. Mae'r llywodraeth yn gwario gormod o arian ar 
hyrwyddo'r Gymraeg 
bb. Mae angen deddfwriaeth i ddiogelu'r Gymraeg, 
hyd yn oed os yw'n cyfyngu ar ddewisiadau 
rhai siaradwyr Saesneg yng Nghymru 
(e. e. eu dewis 6 addysg). 
ca c 
CG c 
HGNA A AG 
HGNA A AG 
Pa mor bwysig neu ddibwys yn eich barn chi yw'r Gymraeg ar gyfer y 
gweithgareddau canlynol. Nid oes atebion cywir nac anghywir. Ticiwch y 
blwch priodol. 
Pwysig Gweddol Gweddol Dibwys 
8). Bwysig Ddibwys 




d) cael trafodaeth 
ddeallusol 
e) gwylio'r teledu 
f) cael swydd yng Nghymru 
g) ymwneud a 
gweithgareddau 
diwyllianncl Cymraeg - 
eisteddfodau etc. 
h) gwneud astudiaethau 
trydyddol 
i) mynd i'r egiwys/capel 
j) siarad a'ch cyfoedion 
yn y coleg 
k) cael swydd ym myd 
diwydiant/masnach/ 
rheoli 
1) byw yng Nghymru 
in) magu plant 
n) siarad ä thiwtoriaid 
yn y coleg 
o) ymwneud ä'r diwylliant 
poblogaidd cyfoes - 
cerddoriaeth/cyfryngau 
etc. 
p) siarad ag athrawon 
eraill yn yr ysgol 
q) cael gwaith yn y 
sector cyhoeddus - 
y gwasanaeth sifil, y 
cyfryngau, addysgu 
etc. 
r) llwyddo yn y coleg 
8) cael eich derbyn yn y 
gymuned 
t) addysgu mewn ysgolion 
Dyma rai datganiadau ynglgn ä'r Gymraeg a'r Saaanag. Dywedwch a ydych yn 
cytuno neun anghytuno ä'r datganiadau hyn. Nid oes at. bion cywir nac 
anghywir. Atebwch drwy roi cylch am UN o'r canlynol. 
CG - Cytuno'n Gryf (rhowch gylch am CG) 
C- Cytuno (rhowch gylch am C) 
HGNA . Heb Gytuno Nac Anghytuno (rhowch gylch am HGNA) 
A: Anghytuno (rhowch gylch am A) 
AG = Anghytuno'n Gryf (rhowch gylch am AG) 
9)" 5) 4) 3) 2) 1) 
a. Mae'n bwysig medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg Co C HGNA A AG 
b. Mae medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg yn fantais CG C HGNA A AG 
ddeallusol 
c. Bydd plant yn drysu wrth ddysgu Cymraeg CG c HGNA A AG 
a Saesneg 
d. Mae medru'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg yn fantais CG C HGNA A AG 
wrth chwilio am swydd 
e. Mae'n bwysig gallu ysgrifennu yn Gymraeg CG c HGNA A AG 
a Saesneg 
f. Dylai pob ysgol yng Nghymru addysgu ei CG C HGNA A AG 
disgyblion i siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg 
g. Dylai arwyddion ffyrdd yng Nghymru fod yn CG C HGNA A AG 
Gymraeg a Saesneg 
h. Nid yw'n anodd siarad dwy faith CG C HGNA A AG 
i. Dylai plant yng Nghymru ddysgu darllen CG C HGNA A AG 
Cymraeg a Saesneg 
j. Gall pobl sy'n siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg CG c HGNA A AG 
fod a chylch cymdeithasol ehangach na'r 
rhai sy'n siarad un iaith 
}c. Dylid hysbysebu pob swydd yng Nghymru yn CG C HGNA A AG 
Gyrnraeg a Saesneg 
1, Bydd plant ifanc yn dysgu siarad Cymraeg CG c HGNA A AG 
a Saesneg yr un pryd yn rhwydd 
Dylai'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg ill dwy fod yn CG C HGNA A AG 
bwysig yng Nghymru 
n, Dylai pob ffurflen brintiedig yng Nghymru CG c HGNA A AG 
tod yn Gymraeg a Saesneg 
o, Dylai'r gallu i siarad a darllen Cymraeg a CG c HGNA A AG 
Saesneg fod yn ofynnol ar gyfer swyddi yn y 
sector cyhoeddus yng Nghymru 
p. Dylai pob gwasanaeth cyhoeddus yng Nghymru CG C HGNA A AG 
fod ar gael yn Gymraeg a Saesneg (e. e. y 
llywodraeth, y cyfryngau, y llysoedd etc. ) 
q. Hoffwn i mi gael fy ystyried yn un sy'n siarad CG C HGNA A AG 
Cymraeg a Saesneg 
r, Dylai pawb yng Nghymru siarad Cymraeg a Saesneg CG c HGNA A AG 
Byddwn yn hoffi I'm plant siarad Cymraeg CG C HGNA A AG 
a Saesneg 
t. Dylai'r Gymraeg a'r Saesneg gael eu trin yn CG C HGNA A AG 
gyfartal fel dwy iaith genedlaethol Cymru 
U. Nid oes angen i bobl wybod and un iaith CG c HGNA A AG 
Mae cwestiynau 10-22 yn angenrheidiol at ddibenion ystadegol. A fyddech 
cystal ag ateb pob un o'r Thai sy'n gymwys i chi. (gweler y cyfarwyddiadau 
perthnasol) 
10). Ble cawsoch chi eich gani? (Enwch y wlad ac, os oes modd, y air/rhanbarth) 
Gwlad Sir/Rhanbarth 
11). Am faint o amser yr ydych wedi byw yng Nghymru? (Ticiwch y blwch priodol) 
0-1 1-3 






flynyddoedd y y 
12). Beth yw eich crefydd - os oes un gennych? (Enwch hi) 
13). P'un o'r canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich tarddiad ethnig? 
(Ticiwch y blwch priodol) 
Cymr Q Sais/ Q Prydein- Q Ewropead 
Cymrae aes Saesnes iwr(aig) g) 
7 
Gwyddel F-I 
Alban- 7 Arall* *os arall, enwch of 
wr(aig) FQ 
14). P'un or disgrifiadau canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich gallu i aiarad 
Cymraeg. 
Dim cymraeg F-I 
Ychydig o Gymraeg 7 
Eithaf tipyn o Gymraeg Q 
Rhugl yn y Gymraeg 17 
(Ewch yn syth i gwestiwn 18) 
(Ewch i gwestiwn 15) 
(Ewch i gwestiwn 15) 
(Ewch i gwestiwn 15) 
15). P'un o'r disgrifiadau canlynol sy'n disgrifio orau eich defnydd cyfredol o'r 
GyTnraeg? 
Anaml y byddaf yn 77 Hanner a 
hanner 
siarad cymraeg 
Ambell waith F-I Y rhan 
fwyaf o'r amser F-I 
16). Ai'r Gymraeg yw'ch iaith laf neu'ch ail iaith? 
Iaith laf F-I Ail 
faith Q 
(gwch yn syth i gwestiwn 19) (Swch i gwestiwn 17) 
17). Os ydych wedi dysgu Cymraeg fel all faith, ble y gwnaethoch chi ddysgu 
Cymraeg? e. e. ysgol gynradd, coleg, wlpan etc. (Enwch of/hi) 
(Ewch yn syth i gw. stiwn 19) 
- 18). Os nad ydych yn medru'r Gymraeg ar hyn o bryd, a fyddech chin fodlon ei dysgu fel ail iaith? 
Na fyddwn Q Byddwn F] Ddim yn 
gymwys F-I 
19)" A ydych yn deall Cymraeg? 
Dim Cymraeg Ychydig Qo 
Gymraeg 





20). A oes unrhyw aelod o'ch teulu yn siarad Cymraeg? (Gall hyn gynnwys aelodau 
o'ch teulu ehangach - tad-cu/taid, mam-gu/nain, ewythr/modryb, cefndryd etc) 
Nac oes Q Oes* F-I *Os oes, enwch hwy 
21). Ar wahän i'r Gymraeg a/neu'r Saesneg, a ydych yn siarad unrhyw ieithoedd 
eraill yn rhugl? 
Nac ydwyf F-I Ydwyf* F-I *Os ydych, enwch hi neu hwy 
22). A ydych yn dymuno parhau i fyw yng Nghymru ar 81 cwblhau eich cwrs? 
Nac ydwyf a Ydwyf F--] 
Yn olaf, byddwch cystal ä rhoi atebion mor llawn ag y gallwch i gwaatiynau 
23-28. 
23). Yn eich barn chi, beth yw elfennau pwysicaf/mwyaf arbennig diwylliant a 
chymdeithas yng Nghymru? 
24). Beth yw eich barn am gynulliad Cymreig a/neu Gymru annibynnol? 
25). A oes angen i chi fedru'r Gymraeg i fod yn Gymro neuen Gymraes? 
26). Beth yw eich barn am fanteision a/neu anfanteision Cymru ddwyieithog? 
(Cymraeg a Saesneg ei hiaith)? 
27). Beth yw eich barn am ofynion y Cwricwlwm Cenedlaethol i addysgu'r Gymraeg ym 
mhob ysgol yng Nghymru? 
28). Beth yw eich barn am ymagwedd eich sefydliad hyfforddi athrawon eich hun at 
y Gymraeg? 
